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A B S T R A C T
Pay occupies a central place in the theoretical, as well as 
applied, aspects of income distribution. Vet the accumulated know­
ledge of how pay is determined in reality in developing countries 
is too sparse and too fragmented to enable the identification of 
the underlying determining forces. It is only when the operation 
of labour markets in specific situations has been empirically inves­
tigated, documented and analysed that it will be possible to cons­
truct sensible theories or formulate apposite policy. This study 
is an attempt to tackle both these goals. It examines the nature 
of public sector pay determination in the Sudan. The choice of the 
public sector is appropriate because of the significance of the 
sector in the national economy, the government being responsible 
for more than 80 per cent of formal sector employment.
Adopting the empirical approach, evidence has been adduced 
to indicate the prevalence of a multitude of forces and pressures 
which influence the relative and absolute levels of public sector 
pay. These forces include, the historical legacy originating from 
the colonial era, the disproportionate weight of government and 
general bureaucratic decision making, over-valuation of educational 
qualification, the political influence of trade unions and the in­
tractability of the economy's macro-economic problems. The outcome
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of such a combination of socio/economic/political variables is the 
creation of pay structures characterised by distortions and anoma­
lies which persistently inhibit the achievment of either equity or 
efficiency in the payment of labour in the Sudan.
The study concludes with a consideration of likely implicata- 
tions of the research findings for theoretical formulations and 
suggestions about how the Sudan's experience can contribute to 
bridging, at least partially, the gap in the existing body of know­
ledge concerning the processes of pay determination in LDCs. Fin­
ally, proposals are made regarding policy initiatives directed to 
reforming the existing system of public sector pay determination 
in the Sudan.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Public sector pay determination is of particular interest because 
of the role of the sector as the principal agent of economic activity 
and source of employment in the Sudanese economy. Despite its importance, 
the issue has been curiously neglected. While problems of pay in the 
public sector have always been controversial, predating independence in 
1956, they have assumed major significance in the last decade or so.
This period has witnessed a substantial deterioration in the relation­
ship between the government and its employees, with an increasing resort 
to the use of the strike weapon and an apparent failure on the part of 
the government to cope with pay-related problems. Ad hoc pay review 
bodies have been less than successful in restoring stability and indus­
trial peace, and procedures for reconciling disputes have been increas­
ingly abandoned in favour of the threat or use of industrial action.
It is widely believed that most of the industrial unrest in the recent 
past has been directly associated with the dramatic fall in the value of 
real incomes; a fall which could not be rectified in the current crisis 
situation of the Sudanese economy and which has almost completely wiped 
out the motivational effectiveness of pay. Thus, far more serious than 
the employees' dissatisfaction with their relative and absolute pay lev­
els, is the adverse impact on morale and commitment, and in effect the 
operational efficiency of the public sector.
How accurate is the picture painted above? If it is accurate how
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did it occur? Why has pay in the public sector become one of the
most intractable issues facing government? How should the problem
be resolved? These are the main questions that have been taken into 
consideration in drawing up the objectives of this research which sets 
out:
1) to examine in depth the nature of public sector 
pay determination;
2) to identify the factors affecting the process and 
influencing the pay rates available to government 
employees in both relative and absolute terms;
3) to identify the areas and sources of problems im­
peding the attainment of an effective and stable 
pay determination system;
4) to consider the major developments and salary trends
in the public sector, particularly since the early
1970s;
3) to consider what can be done to reform the present
system to make it more satisfactory to employees,
and generally more compatible with the economy's
overall goals; and
6 ) to assess the extent to which the processes of pay
determination in the Sudanese public sector fit 
the hypotheses contained in the existing body of 
relevant wage theories.
By fulfilling such objectives this study should a) enhance our 
understanding of the pay-related problems of the public sector in the 
Sudan; b) enable policy makers to draw upon reliable labour market
- 3 -
analyses in formulating pay as well as economic development policies; 
and c) establish a base for future empirical research by Sudanese 
scholars in the whole area of pay and employment situation.
On the basis of our prima facie knowledge we may hypothesize that 
pay levels in the public sector in absolute and relative terms are 
largely determined by non-economic forces. We would expect a priori 
that:
1) government policy and decisions are crucial in det­
ermining the pay rates available to different occu­
pational groups in different parts of the public 
sector;
2) the general economic environment affects the level of 
wages through its influence on government financial 
capabilities and movements in the cost of living;
3) trade unions and professional associations can pro­
tect and advance their members' interests;
4) the pricing of labour processes is distorted by the 
institutionalising of the value of educational quali­
fications; and
3) pay determination processes and pay structures con­
tinue to reflect strongly the 'historical legacy' 
effect.
To test these hypotheses and to achieve the objectives outlined 
above, an empirical methodology has been adopted. Primary and second­
ary empirical material was collected during six months of field in­
vestigations undertaken in the Sudan from February to August 1986.
Primary data and information were obtained either through the 
conduct of structured interviews, or by direct case study investiga­
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tions at organisation levels. To provide contextual understanding 
of the general nature of pay determination in the public sector, dis­
cussions were held with the Under-Secretaries of the Ministries of 
Finance and Economic Planning, Labour and Social Security, and the 
Civil Service Department. These interviews sought to explore broad 
employment and pay policies, the factors affecting government decisions 
in rewarding public sector employees, the problems currently facing the 
government in the sphere of pay and the measures necessary to restore 
industrial peace. The views of unions were ascertained by interviewing 
members of executive committees of the two national federations, the 
Sudan Workers' Trade Unions' Federation (SWTUF) and the Employees'& Profes­
sional Trade Unions' Federation (EPTUF). Discussions were also held 
with a number of senior officials in the relevant government departments 
and public sector organisations.
The case study research involved investigation of pay and employ­
ment practices in six public sector organisations in the Sudan, selec­
ted to represent public authorities, public corporations and public 
companies. They were chosen because they are relatively large employers, 
expected to maintain systematic records and to appreciate that the study 
objectives could not be attained without their co-operation, given the 
virtual absence of reliable and regular statistical information pertain­
ing to the public sector.
In addition to direct examination by the resarcher of the pay 
and employment data of these organisations, another major source of 
primary data was the flow of circulars and manuals issued by the Civil. 
Service Department for the determination of pay scales, allowances and 
other terms of service for different occupational groups; an equally 
valuable source was the Council of Ministers' resolutions regarding 
pay awards.
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Secondary material comprised official and non-official published 
papers, reports and documents relating to public sector employment and 
pay. This information was found in the reports of the ad hoc commissions 
set up periodically to review pay and conditions of service since the 
1940s, as well as those of international organisations (ILO, World Bank, 
United Nations). Of the latter, the reports of the 1986 ILO Mission 
on Employment and Economic Reform were of particular value. Secondary 
data were also obtained from the Department of Statistics’ publications, 
Bank of Sudan annual reports, and the Ministry of Finance annual economic 
surveys.
The format of the study is designed to shed as much light as pos­
sible on pay determiantion and the general operation of public sector 
labour markets in the Sudan. In Chapter One the relevant theories are 
reviewed, gaps in the literature identified, and a broad conceptual 
framework for the study is established. Chapter Two details the struc­
ture and functioning of labour markets in the Sudan. In Chapter Three, 
pay in the public sector is placed in the context of the increasing 
importance of the sector's employment in the national economy. Chapter 
Four traces the historical development up to 1969 of pay structures and 
pay determination processes since the early years of the establishment, 
under the colonial rule, of formal administrative structures. Chapter 
Five presents a comprehensive analysis of the civil service pay struc­
ture over the period 1970 - 1986, focusing attention on salary trends 
during the period, and the current provisions of grading classifica­
tions, pay scales, allowances and promotion in the service. A similar 
analysis in respect of the parastatal sector forms the substance of 
Chapter Six. The expected distinct pattern in the emoluments available 
in different parts of the public sector naturally lead to the discussion 
of pay differentials in Chapter Seven. In this Chapter movements in
- 6 -
inter- and intra-sectoral differentials are examined. Chapter Eight 
highlights some of the problems currently obstructing the attainment 
of an effective pay determination system in the Sudan. The concluding 
chapter summarises the major findings of the study and attempts to draw 
out the implications for both theory and policy.
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C H A P T E R  O N E  
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Paul Samuelson once lamented that although there exists a multipli­
city of wage theories, economists are yet uncertain as to how wages are 
determined in the market. Thus, he asserted:
"I fear that when the economic theorist turns to the 
general problem of wage determination and labour econo­
mics, his voice becomes muted and his speech halting.
If he is honest with himself, he must confess to a 
tremendous amount of uncertainty and self-doubt con­
cerning even the most basic and elementary parts of 
the subject".
Two decades later, other writers appeared to be still in agreement with 
Samuelson's contention. For example, R McConnel (1970) argued that:
"... in fact, there simply does not exist a theory of wage 
determination which has gained general acceptance". '
If this is supposed to be the state of wage theory in respect of 
the advanced industrialised countries, to which Samuelson and McConnel 
were apparently referring, then how much more complex and indeterminate 
must it be when it comes to the case of less developed economies where 
there is hardly a general organised market for labour and where the wage 
employment still represents only a fraction of total employment in the 
country. So, what would development economists say about the determina-
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tion of pay in the complex milieu which developing countries provide?
And, to what extent the processes of pay determination in public sec­
tor in the Sudan fit the hypotheses contained in existing theoretical 
approaches? This chapter seeks to find an answer for the first part 
of this question whilst the second part will be dealt with in Chapter 
9 when the theoretical implications of the study findings are identified.
This chapter begins with the consideration of some distinctive 
features of pay determination problems and pay structures in LDCs. It 
then examines some of the well-known models in the development litera­
ture which attempted to conceptualise some factors involved in pay 
determination in LDCs. The chapter also highlights attempts which have 
been made recently to apply certain emerging labour market concepts with­
in the context of developing economies. The chapter concludes with an 
attempt to establish a braod conceptual framework for subsequent chap­
ters' analyses.
1.2. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF PAY STRUCTURES AND PAY DETERMINATION IN
LDCs
While LDCs vary considerably amongst themselves and have been 
subject to many of the same sorts of economic pressures as the more 
developed countries, their wage determination problems have been 
characterised by some common distinctive features of their own.^^ For 
many years, the crucial distinguishing feature of a less developed 
country was taken to be its dualism. A dual economy consists of two 
sectors: a small industrialised (modern, urban) sector which is typically 
located in the few urban pockets and operates, more or less, like any 
modern industrial economy, and a much larger agricultural (rural, trad­
itional, subsistence) sector where the modes of production are primitive
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and a vast majority of the population are very poor living at sub­
sistence consumption. Consequently, the labour market is stratified 
into two parts, with the workers in the industrial sector earning higher 
wages than their counterparts in the rural sector. In fact, much of the 
literature on this subject has evolved around this particular feature 
of the larger idea of dualism. In effect, it has been widely argued 
that wage structures of most LDCs are 'unsatisfactory' and that wage
differentials are generally wider in developing than in developed
. • (4)
countries.
Concern with the 'dual structure' of developing economies has 
focused attention on the nature and implication of rural-urban pay 
disparities. E Iwuji (1980) claims that:
"In the developing countries there are no wage and salary 
differentials more striking than those between the urban 
and rural sectors".
Such disparities have been explained in terms of the attributes of the 
two sectors. Relatively low wages in the rual sectors are likely to 
stem from slow technological progress and capital accumulation, low 
productivity and high labour/capital ratios; while high wages in the 
urban sector are likely to be found in the large-scale production, manu­
facturing and service organisations characterised by high capital/labour 
ratio, rapid capital accumulation and technological progress and rela­
tively high productivity per man-hour.
Furthermore, it has been long conceptualised that these regional 
disparities can be attributed to the imperfections of the labour market 
which are generally greater in developing than in industrially advanced 
economies. It has been argued that in particular the labour markets of 
LDCs suffer from the limited knowledge of workers concerning alternative 
job opportunities as well as persistent obstacles to the mobility of 
labour in terms of cost of transportation, family ties, etc.^^
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Concern with the dualistic nature of labour markets in LDCs has, 
also, generated other hypotheses such as: wage differentials reflect 
variations in firm size. This type of differential has been singled 
out to be important in analysing wage issues in LDCs as many other 
issues revolve around the size of the establishment. Company acts, 
minimum wage legislation, social security provision and even develop­
ment strategies all are usually based on the size of the firm which is 
measured largely by number of employees and/or degree of capitalisation. 
Applying the former measurement K Taira (1966) found that not only large 
firms pay higher wages than small firms, but these differentials are 
wider in developing than in developed countries. This differential on 
the basis of firm size has been attributed to the fact that in most of 
LDCs the large (private) firms were - and many of them still are - 
foreign-owned and/or multinationals. The high pay policy of such firms 
was reported to be related to a number of factors: a) multinationals 
may see the payment of high wages as a form of insurance in a 'strange 
and probably hostile environment'; b) it could be a way of recruiting 
the best local labour, securing its loyalty and reducing the possibility 
of trade antagonism; c) since such firms are usually capital-intensive 
and in many cases in monopolistic positions, their high wage policy can,
therefore, partly be explained by their ability to pay; and d) the high
pay could also be politically orientated and it might reflect the fear
of these firms of being accused of exploitation as well as fears of
nationalisation and/or desire for a good public image.
One of the most important features of a national pay structure is 
its occupational composition. In the competitive model where occupational 
differentials derive from intrinsic skill differences, and are not affected 
by market imperfections or social prejudices, they are the only differ­
entials that should be expected to persist in the long term. As Professor
- 11 -
M Reder (1962) pointed out:
"In the long-run, under competitive conditions, any industry 
will pay the same price for a given grade of labour as any 
industry hiring labour in the same location ... therefore, 
real wage differentials among industries will reflect dif­
ferences in the skill-mix".
Occupational differentials in LDCs embrace those distinguishing 
skilled and unskilled, manual labour/non-manual labour, and literate/ 
illiterate. It is generally believed that all these types of differ­
entials are much wider in developing countries than in the developed
industrialised world. Despite some methodological problems that make
(8)
comparability and measurement hazardous, available empirical evid­
ence tends to support such a hypothesis. For example, Berg (1969) 
argued that:
"... only one general statement can be put forward with any 
fairness and it is hardly novel and daring: differentials 
for skill are much bigger in most LDCs than in the advanced 
industrial countries".
Similar statements are also quoted in H A Turner (1965), R Sabot (1977) 
and Iwuji (1980) who specifically pointed to the fact amongst the develo­
ping countries occupational differentials seem to be the highest in 
Africa.(9)
The most popular thesis put forward to explain the relatively 
larger occupational differentials found in LDCs is the 'natural history 
of wage structure' based on the premise that skill differentials follow 
a 'natural' evolution based on changing market conditions. This means 
that differences in earnings among various occupational groups tend to 
reflect relative scarcities of supply. In effect, the earnings differ­
ential between literate and illiterate manpower, for instance, is large 
in countries where the supply of educated labour is small relative to 
the size of the total labour force. Implicit in such a thesis is the 
fact that in the long-run as the supply of the educated labour increases.
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these differentials must disappear. A counter-thesis which recent 
years experience tends to support has been the strong influence of 
custom and tradition. The role of tradition in wage determination is 
documented in a number of investigations undertaken in different regions 
of developing countires. Reynold's work on Pakistan and Puerto Rico and 
Turner's studies on Zaire, Egypt and a number of South American countries 
conlcude that the observed differentials between manual and non-manual 
manpower's pay could be largely accounted for by the influence of 
custom. Turner underlining the heavy influence of such an institu­
tional factor argues that when there are changes in the course of time 
in the relative magnitude of different types of skill differentials 
changes are sometimes in a perverse direction. He contended that in 
Africa the increase in the supply of educated manpower appeared to 
have had little effect on the relatively high premium it used to enjoy 
in the past. S Palekar (1962) reflecting on the Indian experience 
observed that:
"It is the man who is paid, not the job. A man sitting 
behind the desk is paid more than a man working behind 
the machine, not because the latter's contribution to 
national output is less than that of the former, nor 
because the desk worker in India is in short supply, 
none of which is true, but mainly because the man 
doing the paper work belongs to a social group which 
has traditionally enjoyed a higher standard of life
than the group to which the manual worker belongs".
These tendencies are not unique to developing countries, of course, but
they are particualrly pronounced there.
In many LDCs wages and income policies have been concerned with 
rectifying major structural imbalances in the economy. These imbalances 
are often associated with apparently large differences in incomes obser­
ved above, that have few parallels in more developed economies. In con­
sequence, in many LDCs, the government has been obliged by circumstances 
to play a much more important role in wage determination than has gener­
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ally been the case in developed countries. Thus, in addition to the 
well-known goal of allocative efficiency, Rempel and House (1978) con­
tended that through the pay determination processes governments in the
developing countries try to achieve other fiscal, employment, political 
(13)
and social goals. It has been reported that even where governments
have not sought to pursue a centralised wage policy patterned after the 
centrally planned economy countries of Eastern Europe or where the pub­
lic sector has not been the main provider of regular wage employment, 
their influence in wage decisions has still generally been comparatively 
strong. Both employers and workers are usually not well organised and
workers in particular have needed government support in labour markets
(14)
characterised by chronic labour surplus conditions. Thus, inter­
ventions in the labour market (for example through minimum wage legis­
lation) reported to be much wider in LDCs than in the industrialised 
countries.
Against this brief background of apparent differences in pay 
structures and pay determination processes between LDCs and developed 
countries, the next section provides a critical examination of some 
wage theories developed within the development economics discipline in 
the last four decades or so.
1.3. WAGE DETERMINATION IN DEVELOPMENT THEORIES
In the beginning, it must be noted that there are no independent
theories for wage determination in LDCs. Available theories have always
been part of the mainstream of development theories and even in these
theories, as Fry (1979)noted:
"The treatment of wage determination is one of the weaker 
points in the application.of.the economic theory to the 
problems of development".
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Therefore, the theoretical base of pay determination in LDCs remains 
largely deficient and the lack of reliable data has always been regarded 
as a major constraint and a discouraging factor for scholars from paying 
more attention to the subject. Nevertheless, this section outlines some 
of thse theories based on the premise of labour market duality in LDCs, 
and of which the 'Lewis model' is the most prominent.
The reader should be warned at the outset that what is convention­
ally known as the Lewis model of wage determination occupies only a very
(16)
small portion of Lewis' celebrated paper (1954) which still occupies 
a seminal place in the development literature. His work is a comprehen­
sive long-run analysis of the development of a dual economy. It traces 
the path over time of a poor economy getting gradually industrialised. 
For our purposes, it will suffice to consider that part of his work 
which deals with wage determination in a LDC.
According to this model the economy consists of two sectors: the 
rural sector ('capitalist' and 'subsistence' sectors were expressions 
used by Lewis). Lewis describes his model as a 'classical'one meaning 
thereby that in the rural sector there is, for all practical purposes, 
an unlimited labour supply at the subsistence wage. More precisely this 
means that at the subsistence wage there is an excess supply of labour 
and the excess supply is sifficiently large so that no employer has to
worrry, when considering employment expansion, about having to bid up
(17)
wages or about getting rationed in the labour market. Thus, the
cornerstone of Lewis' model is the assumption that the supply of labour 
to the modern sector is unlimited at constant real wages.
Several assumptions were put forward by Lewis to verify the above 
thesis. It is assumed that labour supply price, which is determined by
the average product of labour in income-sharing households in rural 
areas exceeds its marginal product which in turn viewed as equal to
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zero in the early stages of development. Moreover, because labour
supplies are excessive in relation to other complementary factors wages
are usually held down to a subsistence level.
If the capitalist sector wishes to draw on this unlimited supply,
it cannot however do so at the subsistence wage because:
"Men will not leave the family farm to seek employment if
the wage is worth less than/they would be able to consume
if they had remained home".
The urban sector typically has to pay a higher wage which is a mark-up
on the rural subsistence wage. Lewis argued that:
"Earnings in the subsistence sector set a floor to wages 
in the capitalist sector, but in practice wages have to 
be higher than this and there is usually a gap of 30 per 
cent or more between capitalist wages and subsistence 
earnings".
He adduces reasons for the existence of this wage gap: a) higher cost
of living in urban areas; b) to compensate for psychological costs from
easy going way of life to the more regimented and urbanised environment;
and c) the recognition of the fact that even the unskilled labour is of
more use to the capitalist sector after he has been there for some time
than is the raw recruit from rural areas.
This problem of the gap, and the link, between the industrial wage
and subsistence incomes has always been a major difficulty for the Lewis
model, and it has been subjected to criticism from various perspectives.
For many LDCs, experience of recent decades showed that neither formal
sector wages nor the process of economic development have followed the
course anticipated by Lewis' or other labour surplus models. Several
(19)
inconsistencies have been identified by ILO (1987a). To begin with,
the expansion of industrial employment has often lagged behind the growth 
in industrial output, that of the urban propulation, and even more ser­
iously that of the rate of national population growth. Secondly, evidi- 
dence of growing urban unemployment and under-employment suggest that
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the rapidly expanding urban centres of the LDCs have been attracting 
more workers than they can effectively absorb. Thirdly, in many LDCs 
wages from regular urban employment have tended to rise faster than in­
comes in agriculture. They have also often exceeded wages earned by 
workers with comparable qualifications in other sectors, by margins 
that appear well in excess of what might be justified by cost of liv­
ing or other economic differences. The reasons for these trends have 
been commonly, and rather casually, attributed to misguided government 
wage policies (statutory minimum wages and public sector pay) or the 
exercise of trade union power through collective bargaining and poli­
tical action.
All these considerations have led, in the ILO (1987a) words:
"To the widely held and stereotyped view that urban earnings 
are fixed at artificially high levels that reduce employment 
growth by hampering capital accumulation while encouraging 
capital intensive production techniques".
At the same time high urban earnings induce excessive rural-urban migra­
tion which is only kept in check by the rise of open urban unemployment 
or low earnings in the informal sector. This view underlies the well- 
known 'Harris-Todaro model' of internal migration.
This model, like the Lewis' model, is one of a dual economy in 
which rural urban migration and the level of 'equilibrium' urban unem­
ployment were jointly determined by exogenously given gap between a 
fixed wage in the formal sector and the substantially lower alternative 
value marginal product and/or supply price of rural-urban migrants. The 
latter would^in this modelrseek to equate income foregone in agriculture 
with higher expected income in the formal urban sector. This expected 
income in turn being a function of the ratio of the number of unemployed 
seeking formal sector jobs to the number of vacancies opened up, in each 
time period. The relevance of this aspect of the model is argued by
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Todaro (1976) in the following terms:
"One of the most striking features of urban labour market 
and wage determination in almost all developing countries 
has been the tendency for these wages to rise substantially 
over time, both in absolute terms and relative to average 
rural incomes, even in the presence of rising levels of 
unemployment".(21)
Thus, with regard to urban sector pay, the hallmark of the Harris-
Todaro thesis was the assumption of permanent institutionally determined
wage rigidity. Apparently no explanation for such rigidity was made in
the model. A counter-thesis proposed by Stiglitz suggested that the
rural-urban gap was the outcome of rational wage setting by employers.
He sought to explain this contention in terms of two models, the 'labour
(22)
turnover model1 (1974) and the 'wage efficiency model' (1976).
In the 'labour turnover model' the explanation provided for the 
rigidity of urban sector wage relied upon differential costs of labour 
turnover in the two sectors (rural and urban). Stiglitz showed that if 
there were no such costs attached to the use of labour in agriculture, 
but they were positive for urban formal sector labour, then it could 
be in the interests of profit maximizing urban producers to influence 
these costs by providing higher wages to their employees. These, to­
gether with the accompanying open urban unemployment would lower quits 
by their workers. Thus, there would be an optimum rural-urban wage 
differential and an accompanying open unemployment rate, at which the 
costs of turnover would be minimised.
This model has been subjected to a number of criticisms particu­
larly in relation to its unrealistic assumptions such as homogeneous 
labour and constant training costs. Basu (1984), for example, expressed 
his objection to one of Stiglitz's assumptions and argued that:
"In Stiglitz's model a firm may face a higher or a lower turnover 
but never a shortage of labour. The quit rate is assumed to be 
exactly matched by the 'replacement' rate and moreover between 
a quit and a replacement rate there is no time-lag. It is this
assumption that allows Stiglitz to speak of the 'quit rate' and
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the 'labour turnover' as synonyms. If we adopt this 
dual perspective, the diffiuclty becomes quite trans­
parent. We had assumed that as the firm lowers its 
wage, the quit rate rises. But by the above argu­
ment this means that the replacement rate rises as 
well. This may be realistic up to a point, but 
when the wage drops sufficiently, the assumption 
that each quit can be immediately replaced becomes 
grossly unrealistic".(23)
Moreover, it is very difficult to test the validity of the theory 
because data are not readily available in forms that permit direct 
tesing. As is well known, in many LDCs it is rare for firms to 
keep details of turnover and training costs for individual em­
ployees. Also, it appears that the model does not take into 
account situations where increasing wage may not be sufficient to 
reduce turnover. For example, Sudanese firms will never be able 
to bridge the gap in pay with Arab states and thus reduce the 
numbers of thosequitting to emigrate.
Another widely discussed explanation for wage rigidity in
the dualistic less developed economies is the efficiency-wage 
(24)
hypothesis. The basic axiom of this model is that a worker's
productivity is positively related to his level of consumption.
The model assumes that output depends not on the hours of labour 
but on the number of efficiency units of labour used; and the 
number of efficiency units that a worker can produce per hour is 
a function of the wage he/she receives. The model, thus proposes 
that the 'efficiency wage' is the wage which minimises the cost of 
efficiency units.
J Stiglitz (1976) claimed that the efficiency wage consid­
erations are important in both the rural and urban sectors; but 
he added:
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"There is no reason to assume that the efficiency 
wage function should be the same in the two sectors 
since the nature of the work performed is so dif­
ferent as are the environmental factors which 
affect the effect of wages on productivity".(25)
J Fry (1979), while admitting that the efficiency wage model 
has had some success in explaining wage levels in small-scale agri­
culture in India, argues that it does not offer much assistance 
when one tries to account for the steady growth in real urban 
wages that has occurred in many developing economies over the 
past 20 years, or for the very considerable sectoral differentials 
that persist despite few apparent differences in the physical de­
mands placed upon a worker.
The model has been subjected to further criticisms. One 
major problem is that the relationship between calorie intake and 
the ability to work cannot be practically determined. Employers 
may find it difficult to determine the nutrition requirements even 
for a single individual, let alone the entire workforce.
Moreover, Bliss and Stern (1978) argued that many doubts arise
around the theory particularly in respect of the employment of casual
short-term labour. Thus, they described the problems as follows:
"The model must be considered more plausible in 
the longer term than in the short term. The
effects on strength and energy would be expected
to show after weeks and months rather than a
day or two. With day-to-day hiring of different 
labourers a given employer would not reap the 
productivity benefits of extra wages".
From what has been said above it is clear that all too frequently 
it is assumed either that wages in the modern sector are equal to the
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price of labour, or, where this is obviously untrue, that wages are 
determined exogenously. In the former case, equilibrium in the labour 
market is typically analysed in terms of equating marginal products 
(or average products) of labour in the modern and traditional sectors.
In the latter case, rural-urban labour migration, leading to the appear­
ance of urban under-employment, is the mechanism that equilibrates the 
labour market by bringing expected incomes in the rural and urban areas 
into equality with one another. As mentioned earlier, these theories 
leave many questions about pay determination unanswered. For example, 
Lewis (1954) assumed that with zero marginal productivity of labour in 
agriculture, the supply of labour in industrial sector would be infin­
itely elastic at some constant level of real wages - but what level?
Theories that attempted to answer this question, such as labour 
turnover model and efficiency wage model apparently could offer little 
help largely because of their 'unrealistic' assumptions and eventually 
lack of empirical support.
Mounting uncertainty about the correct modelling of wage deter­
mination has led to a quest for more realistic paradigms in LDC labour 
market analysis. Recently, it has been increasingly argued that a 
promising line of investigation is the application of some modern labour 
market theories, originally formulated for highly developed capitalist 
economies to LDCs and it is some of these theories which are considered 
in the next section.
1.4. WAGE DETERMINATION IN LDCs: APPLICATIONS OF MODERN LABOUR MARKET
THEORIES
In the beginning, it is reasonable to ask whether these theories, 
initially intended for application in developed economies, could be
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successfully applied to LDCs. Indeed, it has been argued that, grow­
ing primarily out of the need for finding ananswer to the problem of 
wage 'stickiness' or 'rigidity', ie, the failure of wages to adjust so
as to prevent open unemployment, these theories may be more relevant
(27)
to LDCs than to highly industrialised ones. Despite this acknow­
ledgement the practical application of the theories and their empirical 
verification within the less developed economy context, remains generally 
limited.
1.4.1. The Internal Labour Market Theory
The Internal Labour Market (ILM) theory has generally emerged
(28)
from Doeringer and Piore's(1971) work in the USA. Accordingly the
ILM was defined as:
"An administrative unit within which the market functions 
of pricing, allocation, and training of labour are governed, 
not only by market forces, but by a set of institutional 
rules and procedure which delineate the boundaries of in­
ternal labour market and determine its internal structure".
These institutional or administrative rules which regulate the hiring 
and employment practices define the 'ports of entry' into the internal 
labour market, the relationship between jobs for purposes of internal 
mobility, and the privileges which accrue to workers.
In the model, the job structure of a firm consists of two categories 
of occupations. Firstly, are jobs that are filled from sources external 
to the firm. Recruitment to these jobs occurs only at certain limited 
and clearly defined 'entry ports'. This clearly contrasts with the all­
level recruitment from the market assumed in the classical labour market 
models, such as Lewis's model. In the second category of occupations 
are jobs that are filled from internal sources through advancement up 
well-defined promotion ladders and upgrading. The process by which 
workers advance from entry level positions to higher level jobs is con­
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ceptualised as one in which they acquire, either formally or informally, 
added knowledge or skills that for the most part are specific to the firm.
Within this conceptual framework the market forces delineated by 
classical and neo-classical economic analysis are perceived as operating 
directly on occupations at the entry level. Firms are unable by bidding 
in the labour market to attract supplies of labour which embody the firm 
specific and job specific skills they require. Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
argue that this difficulty leads firms to undertake their own training, 
their process being accompanied by measures which ensure the efficiency 
of training provided and the retention of workers who have been trained. 
This training and skill nurturing process contrasts with the assumptions 
of the neo-classical model that skill and knowledge can be acquired in 
the required quantities in the labour market at a price.
In the ILM model, a major consequence of the reliance on internal 
sources of labour is the formation of a relatively permanent attachment 
between the worker and the firm. For the employer, the incentive to 
form a stable employment relationship is a desire both to protect a 
firm's investment in training and to minimise recruitment costs. For 
the employee, three major factors contribute to the maintenance of this 
relationship. Firstly, once employees have advanced beyond entry-level 
positions they may well be discouraged from changing employers on pain 
of starting once again at the bottom of a promotion ladder elsewhere. 
Secondly, the fact that their training is firm or industry-specific 
restricts their employment opportunities in other firms or industries. 
Thirdly, is the network of non-transferable fringe benefits, including 
pension rights and other incentives which form part of the total remun­
eration package designed to retain and motivate workers in the firm.
The ILM theory postulates that since the occupational distribution 
of the firm intersects directly with external labour market only at entry-
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level position, the internal wage determination process will reflect
factors not traditionally considered in analyses which focus solely on
market forces. These factors include job evaluation schemes and other
formal administrative arrangements which are frequently used to specify
wage relationships among occupations. Within occupational categories,
pay differentials among workers are generally based on seniority and
(29)
merit considerations. The existence of such formal arrangements
makes changes in wage relationships difficult unless they are accompanied 
by specific alterations in job content. Moreover, Doeringer and Piore 
maintain that any wage rate, set of wage relationships, or wage setting 
procedure which prevails over a period of time tends to become customary; 
changes are then viewed as unjust or inequitable and the work group will 
exert economic pressure in opposition to them.
Among those who attempted to apply the ILM model in the analysis 
of labour market problems in LDCs are Siwale (1981) and B Hansen (19 8 2 ) . ^ ^  
The former adopting the model as a framework for his study of the copper 
industry in Zambia concluded that:
"The concept of the internal labour market model is an important 
analytical construct, offering a viable alternative to the neo­
classical competitive labour market model. It enables the 
analysis of labour markets to be brought within the ambit of 
social and political and other non-economic forces which are 
central to problems of wage determination in most developing 
countries".
B Hansen (1982) discussed the application of the ILM theory on the basis
of labour market data from Egypt. He argued that:
"This theory, adapted to the circumstances, goes a long 
way toward explaining wages and employment in agriculture 
and the informal small-scale sector".
Apparently, Hansen claimed that this theory has nothing to offer by way
of explaining public sector wage behaviour; a view certainly not shared
by the researcher. As will become clear (Chapter 9), the ILM theory can 
contribute to the explanation of some aspects of pay determination pro-
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cess in the public sector in the Sudan.
1.4.2. Labour Market Segmentation Theory
Labour Market Segmentation (LMS) has been identified as a major 
factor accounting for the persistence of pay differentials between various 
sectors of the economy, and the focus of much research in recent decades. 
While many writers have appealed to the notion of LMS, no single univer­
sally agreed definition has evolved. Nevertheless, W House (1984) argued 
that:
"At the core of the hypothesis, however, is the idea that 
workers with such identical human capital characteristics 
as education and work experience are rewarded differently 
depending on the segment of the labour market in which they 
happen to be located".
The concept originated from USA-based literature (Doeringer and
(32)
Piore, 1971; Reich, Gordon and Edwards, 1973) which has distinguished
between a primary and a secondary labour market. In the former, there 
are more formal employment contracts and a promotional ladder within 
internal labour markets. In the latter productivity and earnings are 
low with supply and demand factors determining wages.
The concept has been widely used in recent years to identify seg­
ments in the labour markets in LDCs, particularly in the guise of the 
formal/informal dichotomy. Mazumdar (1981) argues:
"The high- and low-wage sectors of the labour market turns 
on the idea that employment in the formal sector is in 
some sense or senses 'protected' so that wage levels and 
working conditions in the sector are not available, in 
general, to job seekers unless they manage somehow to 
cross that barrier. This kind of protection may arise 
from the action of trade unions, of governments, or of 
both acting together".(33)
Within the formal sector public/private sector dichotomy constitutes 
another segmentation mechanism in the labour market. It has been argued 
that this type of segmentation arises largely because the government in 
LDCs acts as a 'model employer'. Moreover, Gunderson (1979) claimed
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that the political factor could also be an explanatory factor for such 
segmentation. Thus, he asserts:
"The operation of the public sector in most countries is 
distinguished from the private sector by the nature of 
its operating environment which is largely marked by 
the absence of strict market forces. In the public 
sector the profit constraint of the private sector is 
replaced by an ultimate political constraint. The wages 
of public sector workers ultimately depend on their 
ability to compete with other interest groups over the 
allocation of the budget and with taxpayers over the 
size of the budget. The services provided by the pub­
lic sector invariably face a demand curve which is 
relatively inelastic so that acquiescence to wage 
demands can be passed on to consumers in the form of 
price increases with little consequence for output and 
employment".
Another factor behind labour market segmentation on a public/private 
basis is the extent of unionisation and professionalisation which is bel­
ieved to be relatively wider in the public sector.
Thus, it is clear tht the LMS theory, at least in the manner it 
is applied in LDCs, could partially explain differences in pay between 
sectors. In a sharp contrast to what it was originally intended for,
LMS has little to offer as a way of explaining the micro aspect in fixing 
the wage paid to individuals.
1.4.3. Other Theories
In the recent past literature on labour markets in industrialised 
countries, a number of new models emerged. These models have not, to 
the best of my knowledge, been applied on a wide scale in LDCs. However, 
they appear to be quite relevant particularly to the case of rigidities 
in the markets for educated labour; and can provide a viable potential 
framework for future research.
One theory which appears to be gaining momentum is the 'Rent-Seeking' 
model. The theory is of very recent origin and emerged, within the domain 
of institutional economics, only in the 1970s. However, its application
- 26 -
has been seen as relevant to different issues of which one is wage
"In an equilibrium where wages are rigid and there is unem­
ployment of educated labour, part of the earnings of employed 
educated workers is a rent: the wage is higher than the 
private opportunity cost of being educated. Thus, one can 
think of it as a rent-seeking equilibrium, where the unem-
d as engaged in competing for the rent-
In such a model with a rigid wage combined with unemployment the rent 
is seen to be equally shared by all graduates who are considered as 
taking turns being unemployed or holding the rent-bearing jobs, res­
pectively, a sharing pattern which may not in my view always exist.
There is, however, another version of the rigid-wage model in 
which rent-seekers are not unemployed, but instead work in jobs for
which they are over-qualified. This is the 'Job Ladder' or 'Pumping'
. . (40) 
model.
Looked at from the view-point of the rent-seeking literature, the 
essential feature of this model is that even though there is rent- 
seeking because the wage rates are above the private opportunity cost 
of acquiring the necessary educational qualifications there is no un­
employment. Those who are unsuccessful in obtaining a job for which 
they are qualified, instead, end up working in the job that could be 
filled by somebody less qualified. In equilibrium, the educational 
activity expands until the average earnings of all educated people (inc­
luding those working in jobs for which they are over-qualified) are just 
high enough to offset the private opportunity cost of becoming educated.
The extention of this model to incorporate the phenomenon of 
'credentialism' can be accomplished by adding to it what Bhagwali and 
Srinivasan (1977) refer to as the 'fairness of hiring' principle. 
Credentialsim refers to a situation in which there are several levels 
of jobs with regid wages, and several levels of education, and in which
rigidity.
(38)
For example, it has been argued that:
bearing jobs"
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preference for hiring in a particular job is always given to the 
applicant with the higher educational qualification. As the educational 
system expands, and provided the wages remain rigid, this leads to a 
gradual process in which workers with increasingly sophisticated educa- 
tioanl qualifications crowd out those with less advanced credentials in 
successively less complex and less well-paid jobs. This process, however, 
primarily depends upon the speed with which job seekers lower their 
expectations.
The basic idea of rent-bearing jobs and credentialism is indicative 
of the fact that wages are determined on the basis of non-market forces, 
resulting in waste of resources (through unemployment or under-employment). 
However, an unsatisfactory aspect of these models is that they offer little 
evidence or analysis of the role of institutional factors and how in prac­
tice they influence wage stickiness.
1.5. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The analysis in this chapter so far does not point to any single 
dominant labour market theory that could successfully explain the pay 
determination problem in a less developed economy, let alone the public 
sector of such an economy. However, it does reveal that these theories 
largely lie within the ambit of two broad approaches: the market forces 
and the institutionalist schools of thought. These are considered below 
as the basis for a conceptual framework for analysis of public sector 
pay determination in the Sudan.
With reference to wage theory, essential aspects of the competitive 
model include: a) ready mobility of labour; b) opportunities to substit­
ute other factor inputs for labour are readily available; c) the market 
provides adequate information to induce re-allocation of labour in res-
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ponse to relative sectoral or regional wage differences, to encourage 
up-grading of skills in response to occupational wage differences and 
to facilitate continuous re-selection of a profit-maximising technology 
in response to relative factor price changes; and d) no single economic 
unit is large enough to exert control over either prices in the commod­
ity market or wages in the labour market. The first three conditions 
are necessary to ensure that resources can be allocated optimally via 
the market mechanism. The fourth condition ensures that people will 
re-allocate or engage in training to maximise income and firms will 
readily change technology to maximise profits.
Assuming these essential competitive conditions in the labour 
market, several expected results can be derived, especially under the 
conditions of rapid increase in the supply of labour. These results 
include: a) within each skill category inter-and intra-sectoral wages 
will tend to equalise over time; b) within each skill category wages 
among regions will tend to equalise over time; c) an increase in the 
proportion of the growing labour force that has obtained formal educa­
tion will tend to reduce the differentials among skill categories; and
d) the differential between unskilled wages in the formal sector and the 
average income of the labour force outside the sector will tend to dec­
line.
Although many of the competitive model assumptions are irrelevant 
in the case of the public sector pay determination processes in the 
Sudan or elsewhere, the main hypothesis to be tested, that excess supply 
of labour tends to lower wages and excess demand to raise them, remains. 
However, the major problem which one faces in such analysis is that of 
the quantitative assessment of the demand for and supply of labour in 
the public sector labour market. The information regarding the public 
sector's demand for manpower, and the worker's willingness to work at
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a given wage rate is lacking so that the numerical calculation of 
excess demand and supply becomes impossible. Alternatively, the 
aggregate trends in the labour supply and demand will be compared with 
the wage rates fixed for certain occupational categories since the 1950s.
It is acknowledged that such an exercise leaves many questions unanswered, 
but it may nonetheless serve as a rough indication of the influence (or 
lack of influence) of market forces in the Sudanese public sector.
The second school of thought contends that extensive institutional
interventions in the labour market in LDCs (and the Sudan is no exception)
(41)serve to prevent the realisation of expected competitive market results. 
Central to this institutional thesis in the public sector labour markets 
is the role of the government itself. This role can take various forms.
One form is the government as the wage leader. In this role the govern­
ment may set wage levels for its employees above their opportunity cost 
because it wants these wages to serve as a pattern to be followed by the 
private sector. Also, the motivation for relatively high public sector 
wages may reflect self-interest by a certain class in the society which 
has disproportionate political and economic control.
Trade union power has long been established as a form of institu­
tional intervention in the labour market. However, there is great un­
certainty regarding its exact role in raising wages above the market- 
clearing levels in LDCs. In the absence of adequate collective bargain­
ing machinery, as is the case in the public sector in the Sudan, even 
yardsticks such as the degree of unionisation become irrelevant since 
it is not possible to compare relative pay gains arising from negotiated 
settlements.
In line with the objectives of this thesis outlined in the intro­
duction, analysis in subsequent chapters will allow us to examine the 
relative impact of market forces and institutional factors on public
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sector pay determination processes in the Sudan. The implications of 
the findings for the existing theoretical base, which clearly suffers 
from wide gaps (particularly regarding public sector pay), will be 
considered in Chapter 9 where a refined framework for future research 
will be proposed. In the meantime it is essential as a first step to 
examine the state of labour supply and demand in the Stidan which is the 
subject matter of Chapter 2.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF 
LABOUR MARKETS IN THE SUDAN
2.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
2.1.1 Geography
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the ninth largest in 
the World covering an area of one million square miles. Thus, it is 
over ten times the size of the UK and is as large as the whole of the 
EEC plus Austria, East Germany and Switzerland - approximately equal 
to the area of the USA east of the Mississippi River. The country is 
flanked by Egypt to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya, Uganda 
and Zaire to the south and by the Central African Republic, Chad and 
Libya to the west. Moreover, it is separated by the Red Sea from 
Saudi Arabia. Stretching more than 1200 miles from north to south 
and nearly 1000 miles east-west, the Sudan is physically and cultur­
ally very heterogeneous with an environment ranging from deserts, 
savannah grasslands, mountains and swamps to equatorial forests, and 
with Muslim/Arabs in the north to Christians and non-religious Afric­
ans in the south. Although much of the northern and central territ- 
orities are desert or semi-desert abundant water supplies for irriga­
tion are provided by the River Nile and its two tributaries the White 
and the Blue Nile. Adminstratively, the country is divided into nine 
regions and each region is subsequently sub-divided into provinces as 
follows:
1. Northern (Northern and Nile provinces)
2. Eastern (Kassala and Red Sea provinces)
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3. Central (Gezira, Blue Nile and White Nile provinces)
4. Kordofan (Northern and Southern Kordofan provinces)
3. Darfur (Northern and Southern Darfur provinces)
6. Equatoria (Eastern and Western Equatoria provinces)
7. Bahr-El-Ghazal (Eastern, Western and the Lakes provinces)
8. Upper Nile (Upper Nile, Jongeli and Unity provinces)
9. Khartoum (Khartoum province)
2.1.2. Economy
The Sudan is among the world's most economically underdeveloped 
and poorest countries with a GDP per capita in 1985/86 of US $370.
The economy is based heavily upon agriculture both in terms of its 
direct contribution to GDP and as a source of intermediate Twputs into 
industrial production. Virtually all of the Sudan's visible exports 
are agricultural with cotton as by far the most important single item.
As Table 2.1 shows; in 1985/86 agriculture accounted for 36 per cent 
of GDP with 'trade and finance' as the second biggest sector at approx­
imately 26 per cent. Manufacturing accounted for 7 per cent, construc­
tion for 5 per cent and services (transport, public and personal services) 
for 23 per cent. Three types of agriculture are practiced in the Sudan; 
irrigated (basically producing cotton), mechanised rain-fed and trad­
itional rain-fed in which sorghum and groundnuts are produced. Live­
stock husbandry is another important activity in the Sudan particularly 
in the Western and Southern regions. In 1984/85 the value of livestock 
exports as percentage of total exports accounted for 35 per cent. The 
industrial sector in the country is small and dominated by manufactur­
ing. Manufacturing production consists of food processing industries
such as sugar, flour and vegetable oils as well as other industries 
such as textiles, cement, refining of imported crude oil, and prod-
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uction of other consumer goods such as cigarettes, shoes, mineral waters, 
tyres and tubes. Although some of the industrial activities, notably 
food processing, are based on domestic inputs, most others are largely 
dependent on imported inputs. Production is, therefore, highly depend­
ent on a healthy balance of payments position. Another feature of the 
Sudan's industry is that its output is essentially directed towards 
domestic consumption.
Two decades ago, the Sudan was hailed to be the potential 'bread­
basket' of the Middle East through an anticipated 'happy marriage' of 
Arab capital and domestic resources of untapped arable land and cheap 
labour. By the early 1980s, the dreams of the early 1970s had proved 
to be grossly unfounded. The 1983/84 famine represented the culmina­
tion of a number of emerging problems which, together with inherent 
structural factors, account for the present-day economic crisis.
The economy has declined steadily over the past decade or so.
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the major performance indicators. 
Although GDP showed little or no growth between 1973/76 and 1985/86, 
population grew at about 2.8 per cent a year with the result that real 
per capita GDP declined by about 2.3 per cent a year. The current 
account deficit of the balance of payments worsened going from 8 per 
cent of GDP in 1975/76 to over 17 per cent in 1981/82. Although the 
1985/86 current account deficit was reduced to 11 per cent of GDP, it 
was still very high and unsustainable. The budget deficit continued 
to rise from 4 per cent of GDP in 1975/76 to 13 per cent in 1985/86, 
and was increasingly met through money creation, which pushed inflation 
to an average of 25 per cent a year over the period.
No one factor can account for the failure of the economy to 
develop since 1975. The Sudan's problems started with the oil crisis 
of 1973/74. As one of the poorest oil importing countries, the rise
- 37 -
in the prices of oil as well as capital goods had a devastating effect 
on the country's terms of trade, increasing substantially the import 
bill while the exports which are primarily raw materials suffered from 
the impact of world economic recession and prices fell sharply. Thus, 
severe foreign exchange shortages began to develop since the mid-1970s 
affecting seriously the overall performance of the economy.
The performance of different sectors has deteriorated continuously 
over time. As already indicated agriculture is the Sudan's major econ­
omic activity. This sector experienced substantial difficulties in the 
1970s and 1980s. The irrigated sub-sector suffered from the problems 
of declining yields and rising costs for most of 1970s, as well as from 
unfavourable export prices and an institutional setting which weakened 
production incentives. However, during 1981/82 - 1983/84, as a result 
of higher prices paid to farmers, following devaluation of the Sudanese 
pound, and a change in institutional arrangements and following rehabil­
itation of the irrigation canals, output of the irrigated sub-sector 
slightly improved but it started to decline again since then and the 
increase in output in 1985/86 was 12 per cent relative to 1981/82 
levels (see Table 2.3).
During 1981/82 - 1984/85 crop production in the rain-fed sector 
declined by 71 per cent as a result of consecutive years of drought. In 
1985/86 the situation was slightly improved but it was still 24 per 
cent less than 1981/82 production levels. Livestock production declined 
by 22 per cent since 1981/82. The poor performance of the Sudanese can, 
therefore, be largely attributed to the poor performance of the agricul­
tural sector in the 1970s and 1980s since this sector accounts for more 
than a third of total output and 80 per cent of total exports.
With the emergence of foreign exchange problems and the success­
ive devaluations of the Sudanese currency since 1977/78, the manufac-
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turing sector has run into severe difficulties. In physical terms
the output has declinded and its percentage share in GDP dropped from
(1 )
7.9 in 1981/82 to 6.9 in 1985/86. Many factorieshave been forced
to close down, and those still in operation are operating at only 40-50
(2)
per cent of their rated capacity. The major factors responsible for 
declining manufacturing output and low capacity utilisation can be iden­
tified as: (a) shortage of raw materials conisting of imported inputs 
due to foreign exchange constraints and declining agricultural inputs 
as a result of the drought; (b) shortage of fuel, electricity and spare 
parts; (c) shortage of skilled labour and managerial staff owing to 
emigration; (d) financial and liquidity problems arising from lower 
rates of return and high interest rates; and (e) marketing problems.
The investment boom in physical infrastructure, especially in 
roads such as the Khartoum-Port Sudan Link and the construction of the 
pipeline, were justified and may have served to reduce the running costs 
of transport. But they were not called upon to meet the need for which 
they were essentially designed, that of moving increasing amounts of 
domestically produced goods. Such an increase in output never mater­
ialised. Moreover, the vast sums spent on the construction of the 
Jongeli Canal and oil exploration have had no benefits as the work is 
incomplete and currently suspended because of the civil war. In other 
areas investments have failed to generate commensurate increases in 
production. Sugar and textile development projects did not meet the 
targets in terms of completion and production and the difficulties 
were compounded by the need to raise extra capital and to service debt 
before the returns from these investments were available. Also, a 
succession of schemes for rehabilitation in Gezira Board, railways, 
water transport and electricity generation did not seem to bring about 
the improvement required and deterioration continued. Recently, govern­
ment investment in new ventures has been largely restricted and efforts
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have been directed towards the rehabilitation of existing projects. 
Generally, investment fell from 23 per cent of the GDP in 1973/76 
to 12 per cent in 1985/86, of which an increasing share (up to 50 per 
cent in 1985/86) is for residential housing. Both private and public 
investments in the productive sectors declined. Circumstantial evid­
ence shows speculative investments in real estate and hoarding have 
increased. The relative increase in residential housing may be part 
of this pattern.
There is little doubt that the country's problems have been
significantly exacerbated by past policies which have been dictated
by the World Bank and the IMF or pursued by the government at its own
discretion. The Sudanese Pound has been devalued against the US Dollar
by approximately 1200 per cent (£s1 = $2.87 to £s1 = $0.22) since 1978
to provide incentive for the production of tradeable/exportable goods
(4)
and to reduce the imports. However, experience of the recent years 
demonstrates that devaluations by themselves are ineffective for bring­
ing about the required changes in the real economy. They did not lead 
to any increase in exports and evidently they have contributed substan­
tially to the apparent bottlenecks and skyrocketing inflation.
Fiscal policies have never been adequate either to reduce expen­
ditures or to increase government revenue; thus by the end of 1985/86 
overall deficit was 12.7 per cent of GDP. Frequent changes in proced­
ures, laws and regulations in recent years have created difficulties 
and exerted pressure on the Sudan's public finances. For example, in 
1984/85 the fiscal year was changed to correspond to the Islamic 
calender year, but then the July-June fiscal year was reinstated, with 
the result that normal budget procedures were upset contributing to
the erosion of expenditure controls. Also in 1984, the structure of 
the taxation system was drastically altered with the abolition of in­
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come tax and the introduction of ' Z a k a t ' . A s  a general income tax, 
the revenue potential of the Zakat was limited because the flat rate 
on income and profits was only 2.5 per cent, although agricultural crops 
were taxed between 5 and 10 per cent. In addition, the Zakat was levied 
by local Zakat committees for social welfare purposes and little money 
was returned to the central government. Despite the establishment of 
a Social Justice Tax in November 1984 and the reinstatement of some of 
the taxes in 1986, such changes had adverse implications and weakened 
the tax base and its administration. Another factor that has seriously 
eroded the tax base is the tight foreign exchange situation. The gov­
ernment has relied on import taxes for approximately 45 per cent of 
its total revenue. With the shortage of foreign exchange, however, 
the level of imports has dropped, and likewise the level of import 
taxes. Moreover, with the persistence of price and exchange rate 
controls in recent years, a significant proportion of economic trans­
actions has shifted to the unofficial economy where they can escape 
taxation. To the extent that goods are smuggled into the country, the 
government loses revenues from import duties and other forms of taxa­
tion. As a result revenues from tax fell from 11.9?o of GDP in 1980/81 
to 7.4?o in 1985/86. Non-tax revenues of the central government, also, 
have declined from 2.8 per cent of GDP to 1.0 per cent during the per­
iod primarily because of the deteriorating financial situation among 
the parastatals. Compoundly, these declines made the ratio of total 
revenues to GDP to fall from 14.7 per cent in 1980/81 to 8.4 per cent 
in 1985/86 (see Table 2.4). Table 2.4 also reveals that the total 
expenditures have fallen slightly owing much to the relatively large 
fall in development expenditure. In 1984/85 and 1985/86, the average 
growth in total expenditure was, however, still 34 per cent which in­
dicates a highly inflationary growth. Thus, the weak performance of
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the government in the field of taxation from 1980/81 to 1985/86 
caused the fiscal accounts to deteriorate by an amount equal to 6.3 
per cent of GDP which was financed mainly by a fall in current expen­
ditures of 2.0 per cent of GDP, development expenditures equivalent to 
3.3 per cent of GDP, and by a 1.5 per cent increase in foreign aid or 
debt rescheduling.
The Sudan's balance of payments and debt services situation 
which was relatively healthy in the early 1970s began to run into 
trouble by the mid-1970s.^  The deterioration was caused by decline 
in exports, resulting mainly from declines in cotton exports, and sharp 
increases in imports associated with the economic expansion of the mid- 
1970s, as well as to increases in the prices of imports, particularly 
of petroleum. The rise in the debt service burden followed the increased 
dependence on the inflow of foreign loans and credits for the finance of 
development expenditures especially in the face of falling export earn­
ings. The current account deficit has fluctuated around US $900 million 
except in 1981/82 when it reached a record level of US $1.3 billion (see 
Table 2.5). Imports were 17.1 per cent of GDP in 1985/86 and export 
revenues have been decreasing since 1983/84 and two years later were 
9.0 per cent of GDP, creating a resource gap of 8.1 per cent of GDP.
The balance of payments problems have been aggravated by the need to 
divert more funds to debt servicing. The latest figures available 
indicate that by the end of 1986 the Sudan's external debt had increased 
to US $13 billion. Scheduled debt service obligations in 1985/86 were 
US $1241 ie twice as much as the total export revenues for the same 
year. However, during the last four years, Sudan has been devoting no 
more than 21 per cent of its combined revenues from exports and workers 
remittances for debt service obligations. This unmanageable debt burden 
has generated great uncertainty about the foreign exchange resources
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leading to inadequate industrial and agricultural production because 
of shorages of imported inputs, which combined with exchange rates 
speculation made inflation inevitable.
Failure to manage the country's external financial position has 
been matched by inability to contain the need for advances from the 
banking system to the government, the parastatals and private sector. 
The result has been a large increase in the money supply, expanded 
from £s246 million in 1973/74 to about £s6914 million in June 1986.
This expansion had major inflationary consequences and led to multiple 
devaluations which further fuelled inflationary pressures.
An almost endless list of reasons could be drawn up to explain 
the current economic crisis in the Sudan. The 1983/84 famine and 
drought had dramatic effects not solely in terms of the loss of output 
or the human misery but also in the extra financial and administrative 
burden to deal with its effects. The civil war in the south has been 
another major source of economic problems. In addition to its human, 
social and political costs, without it some oil might have been pro­
duced, and irrigation water increased; national production and trade 
would have been enhanced, government expenditure would have been easier 
to contain and revenues increased.
The exodus of Sudanese skilled labour and professionals to neigh­
bouring Arab oil-rich countries, and, at the same time, the influx of 
more than a million refugees from neighbouring famine and war hit 
African countries has also contributed significantly to the current 
deterioration in economic performance (to be discussed in more detail 
below). Thus, as the ILO (1967) stated:
"No single cause is in itself sufficient to explain the 
decline. And no single cause operates in isolation from 
the rest; in total they are mutually re-inforcing and the 
overall impact of their effects is greater than the sum 
of their direct effects".
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It goes without saying that the discussion above is essential 
to understand the background to the labour market and eventually the 
pay determination problems experienced in the Sudan.
2.1.3. Population
Table 2.6 gives the estimates of the population of the Sudan at 
various census dates, the urban-rural distribution and the intercensal 
growth rates. According to the results of the 1983 census the total 
population amounts to 21593 million; of which 80 per cent is in the 
rural sector and 20 per cent in the urban sector. The average inter­
censal growth rate increased from 2.2 per cent per annum during the 
period 1956-73 to 3.8 per cent between 1973 and 1983, essentially 
because of the influx of refugees in recent years. Available data
suggest that very little change in fertility is taking place while
(9)mortality is declining slowly. If an annual growth rate of 2.8 
per cent is assumed it means that the p opulation is doubling every 
25 years.
The figures in Table 2.6 may suggest that the pace of urbanisation 
is slowing down, but the picture is blurred because of emigration of 
urban dwellers since 1973. In the Sudan, as elsewhere in Africa, rural- 
urban migration is gaining momentum. Assuming that about half a million 
uraban dwellers have emigrated - which obviously is an under-estimation - 
it can be said that the urban population has increased by 6 percent per 
annum. With a natural rate of demographic growth of 2.8 per cent it 
appears that an average of about 1.2 per cent, or 200,000, at the 
present time, of the rural population migrates each year to urban centres.
The geographical distribution of the population has undergone sub­
stantial changes in the past few decades, as is shown in Table 2.7. Al­
though the data are of dubious quality they, nonetheless, give a rough
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indication of population mobility. Over the period, there has been an 
outflow from the Northern Region and to a lesser extent from Kordofan 
and Equatoria Regions basically because of international migration in 
the first, drought in the second, and the civil war in the third 
instance. At the same time, the Eastern and Darfur Regions absorbed 
substantial inflows mainly from Eritrea and Chad respectively. The 
Southern Regions first experienced a decrease in the relative share of 
its population during the 1960s but the temporary halt in the civil war 
in 1972 and the inflow of refugees from Uganda and Zaire brought them 
back to about one quarter of the country's total population. Table 2.7 
shows that the share of Khartoum increased from 5 per cent in the Sudan's 
population in 1956 to 8 per cent in 1973, and to 9 per cent by 1983, in­
dicating the magnitude of rural-urban migration in the country.
Other characteristics of the population reveal that 13 per cent
of rural population in 1983 were nomads concentrated in Kordofan, Darfur
and the Eastern Regions. The age structure of the population in 1983
was for the age group 0-14 45.4 per cent, for 15-64 years 51.8 per cent,
and for 65 and above 2.8 per c e n t . ^ ^  Prolonged high demographic rates
of growth obviously affect the age structure of the population: the child
(11)dependency ratio increased from 0.77 in 1956 to 0.82 in 1983.
2.1.4. Labour Force
A number of problems arise with regard to labour force participa­
tion measurement in the Sudan. Labour force information available is 
fragmentary and inadequate,. The 1983 census was expected to provide a 
comprehensive set of data, but after nearly five years the final results 
of the census have yet to be published owing to technical problems.
Other sample surveys are unreliable because of restricted coverage and 
differences in definitions and concepts used. Furthermore, it is dif­
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ficult to establish precise definitions or measures of labour force 
participation. In an economy in which market conditions allow for 
the majority of workers to be in paid-employment, in stable jobs with 
standardised hours of work, and in which there are accepted norms of 
working days, working conditions and rates of pay, it may not be diffi­
cult to set boundaries to what constitutes 'economic activity1. Such 
conditions are not widespread in the Sudan and wage-employment is a 
a minority activity in the Sudan. Many people in rural areas work in 
the subsistence agricultural sector in which work, leisure and con­
sumption intermingle. Social activities essential in some societies 
may be regarded as casual leisure pursuits in others. For instance, 
men sitting under a tree in Kordofan deciding what to do about a local 
dispute would probably not be called working; yet in Khartoum their 
informal deliberations would be replaced by salried employment of 
judges.
Measures of female economic activity in the Sudan are, also, 
confusing. Activities women undertake, ostensibly outside the labour 
force, such as collecting firewood, fetching water, milking and feed­
ing livestock, weaving mats, etc, are of as much use-value as being
(12)
economically active in the more conventional sense. Hence,
official statistics seriously underestimate female labour force par­
ticipation. A recent study tried to measure the extent of the under­
estimation of urban female labour in the 1983 census and found that 
in urban Khartoum as much as 38 per cent of it was unrecorded. Most 
of this consisted of activities in the informal sector such as selling 
food and clothes, traditional hairdressing, dyeing hands and feet, etc.
A further problem arises from the fact that in rural areas chil­
dren engage in economic activities from a very early age, while the age 
of retirement is open-ended, since few people have access to a formal
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social security system. For practical reasons, the official stat­
istics in the Sudan define the potentially active population as those 
of 15 years and above. The discussion which follows is based on stat­
istics from the national censuses, ILO missions' estimates and various 
other reports. They should be read, however, with the above-mentioned 
reservations in mind.
Table 2.8 shows that in 1983, the total labour force amounted to 
6.5 million resulting in a crude participation rate of 30 per cent. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the total labour force is male and nearly 
the same percentage is in rural areas. Regional distribution reveals 
that 50 per cent of the Sudan's labour force dwell in only three regions, 
(Central, Kordofan and Darfur).
Table 2.9 indicates that the overall participation rate has 
changed very little between 1956 and 1983. The participation rate 
among males has declined but this can be explained by the growth of 
secondary and higher education over the period. The educational factor 
along with the gradual relaxation of cultural obstacles, and the fin­
ancial pressures of recent years may be responsible for the apparent 
increase in female participation rates. Figures in Table 2.9, show 
that male participation rates are not significantly different between 
urban and rural centres. Female participation rates, by contrast, are 
substantially lower in urban centres since women's major activity is 
agricultural work (Islamic tradition presents obstacles to women's 
work outside the household). In rural areas there are more opportunit­
ies for households (including women) to engage in conventionally def­
ined production activities within their own premises or family unit.
For example, the use of migrant household labour in commercial farms 
and the large irrigated schemes enables wives, daughters and sisters to 
work alongside men. This may imply that rural-urban migration would
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lower the overall female participation rate as intra-household 
production is less widespread in urban areas; but such an effect, 
however, may be offset by increased education opportunities and the 
prevalence of more liberal attitudes towards women's work, reflected 
in the nearly doubling of urban female participation rate between 1973 
and 1983.
It is not possible, given the existing data base, to provide an
accurate breakdown of labour force in sectoral and occupational terms.
Nevertheless, Tables 2.10 and 2.11, based on 1973 statistics, provide 
(13)some indicators. As seen, the agricultural sector is the largest
source of employment. Its share is 65 per cent, while the share of 
services, the second largest sector, is only 10 per cent. The contrib­
ution of the manufacturing sector in the overall employment in the 
Sudan is still relatively insignificant at 5 per cent. Family and own 
account workers together with employers represent a group which is 
twice the size of the salaried and wage earners group, not surprising 
since workers in rural areas and small farmers in particular work on 
their own plots. The occupational structure of the labour force 
(Table 2.11) exactly mirrors the economic structure of the Sudan. The 
bulk of the active population work as agricultural labourers while 
the managerial class is restricted to the few large-scale production 
or service units in existence. The relatively sizeable category 
labelled 'others' comprises workers who are not classifiable by occu­
pation; most of these are in the informal sector and available for any 
kind of work.
ILO (1987) estimated that, assuming no change in the refugee sit­
uation in the country, the labour force will increase by 2.5 per cent
per year over the next 10-15 years. In absolute figures, this requires 
the creation of some 150,000 additional jobs per year to provide adequate
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employment. By the end of the century, some 250,000 additional jobs 
will be required annually. The urban labour market will be under 
severe pressure, since the supply of labour there is expected to grow 
by 150,000 units per annum by the end of the century, compared to approx­
imately 70,000 today.
2.1.5. Education
At independence the literacy rate was 10 per cent and only one
(15)in eight to ten children of school age was enrolled in primary school.
In the post-independence era and particularly since the 1970s, the Sudan
has made substantial progress in its education and manpower development 
as evidenced by increase in enrolments. For example, enrolment in prim­
ary schools increased by more than twice from 74^049 in 1970/71 to 
1,653,491 in 1984/85. However, the enrolment rate in primary schools 
was still only 48.7 per cent (Table 2.12), well below the 76 per cent 
achieved on average by low-income African countries among which the 
Sudan is classified. Primary enrolment in the Sudan is substantially 
below the country's own target set in early 1970s of 60 per cent by 
1977. Although in the late 1970s universal primary education had been
expected by 1990, a new target for achieving this has been set for the
(16) 
year2. © o o  •
The national average masks wide differentials in primary school 
enrolment in different regions. While enrolment rates in 1984/85 were 
94 per cent in the Northern region, 87 per cent in Khartoum and 67 per 
cent in the Central Region, the rates were notably low in other regions: 
Eastern Region 43 per cent, Kordofan 45 per cent, Darfur 36 per cent,
Upper Nile 16 per cent, Bahr-El-Ghazal 6 per cent and Equatoria 45 per 
cent (Table 2.12).
As might be expected the overall enrolment rate for girls is lower
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than for boys. In 1983/84 enrolment rate for boys was 31 per cent, 
and that for girls was 39 per cent. There was little difference in 
the enrolment rates between boys and girls in the Northern, Khartoum 
and Central regions where male rates were 83 per cent, 81 per cent and 
71 per cent respectively, compared to female rates of 83 per cent, 75 
per cent and 61 per cent. However, in the regions where overall perfor­
mance was well below average, the differences in enrolment rates were much 
larger. Enrolment rates for girls range from 3 per cent in Bahr-El-Ghazal
to 35 per cent in the Eastern Region. The largest boy/girl differentials
(17)are in Bahr-El-Ghazal, Upper Nile, Kordofan, Equatoria and Darfur.
The expansion in school enrolment at the secondary level (which
consists of a three-year intermediate level and a three-year secondary
(18)
school split into general and technical secondary school) has been 
more rapid than that in the primary level. Whereas primary school en­
rolment doubled between 1970/71 and 1983/85, enrolment at the secondary
(19)level increased nearly sevenfold in the same period (from 75,483
to 512,555). According to World Bank data, the enrolment rate of the
combined secondary level in the Sudan is about 20 per cent, higher
than the 13 per cent average for low-income sub-Saharan Africa.
However, like the primary school enrolment rates, there is considerable
variation across the regions and sexes with the Southern and Western
regions being the most deprived (Table 2.12).
The progress in higher education in the Sudan is relatively greater
than at both the secondary and primary school levels. The enrolment
rate in higher education, estimated at 2 per cent in 1983, was double
(2 1)
the average for low income sub-Saharan African countries, whereas, 
as we have seen, the primary school enrolment rate was well below the 
African average and the secondary enrolment rate was higher by 7 per­
centage points. This has raised some concern that the Sudan's higher
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education may be relatively overdeveloped in relation to other levels, 
as shown by unfavourable middle to high level manpower ratios.
At present the higher education system consists of four national 
Universities, Khartoum, Omdurman Islamic, Gezira and Juba, as well as 
the University of Cairo, Khartoum branch and a number of technological 
institutes and specialised colleges, of which the most notable is the 
Khartoum Polytechnic. Total enrolment in higher education in the Sudan 
in 1984/85 was 36,226 (see Table 2.13 for the details). This means an 
increase of 64 per cent since 1974/75. About 25 per cent of the stu­
dents of Khartoum are enrolled in arts and social sciences, with another 
15 per cent in law and education, and 60 per cent in scientific and 
technological studies. In Gezira only 25 per cent are in social sciences 
and in Juba about 50 per cent of the students are enrolled in scientific 
and technological subjects. However, in the University of Cairo,
Khartoum branch - which provides about 60 per cent of higher education 
opportunities within the country - nearly all students are enrolled in 
commerce, law and arts, with less than 0.5 per cent of its students in 
mathematics.
Male/female differentials in higher education have declined over 
the last decade. The overall female enrolment increased from 17 per 
cent in 1974/75 to 35 per cent in 1984/85. At the University of Cairo, 
Khartoum branch, female students now account for 40 per cent of total 
enrolment, 30 per cent in the University of Khartoum, 28 per cent in 
the national institues, 27 per cent in Gezira, and 15 per cent in Juba.
Outside the formal school system training is provided basically 
by the Vocational Training Centres (VTCs) which are designed to provide 
apprenticeship and crafts training essentially for graduates of the in­
termediate level of education. There are currently eight such centres, 
in which training is provided in a wide range of skills, such as auto-
- 51 -
(23)
mobiles, building, furniture, leather work and secretarial skills.
The capacity of these centres is estimated to be 2,500 trainees, with
(24)
about 1,000 skilled and semi-skilled trainees passing out annually.
Other forms of training include youth training and adult literacy 
and training. There are currently 24 Youth Training Centres (YTCs), 
mainly in urban areas, designed to provide pre-vocational training for 
primary school leavers who have been unable to proceed to the inter­
mediate stage of formal education. It is estimated that the maximum
capacity of these centres under the apparent financial resources con-
(25)
straint, is about 5,000 students annually.
Overall literacy rates in the Sudan are poor. It is estimated
that 70 per cent of the economically active population is illiterate
and the ratio is 93 per cent amongst agricultural workers. The National
Council for Adult Education organised literacy classes for 101,693 adults
(26)
in 1983/84 but only 17 per cent of those were farmers and farm workers.
2.2. AGRICULTURAL LABOUR MARKETS
As stated earlier in this chapter, the agricultural sector in the 
Sudan is the sector which provides the bulk of employment. With the 
exception of about 20 per cent pastoralists, the total rural labour 
force is engaged in agricultural activities. Agricultural labour 
markets are divided into three sectors: traditional, mechanised rain- 
fed, and irrigated farming.
2.2.1 The Traditional Farming Sector
This sector accounts for about 50 per cent of total agricultural
acreage - in 1982/83 it was estimated that 7.82 million feddans were
(27)
cultivated in the traditional sector. The typical size of the in­
dividual holding is small, varying between 2 and 20 feddans. The prin-
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cipal crop is dura (sorghum) which takes about a third of the land 
utilised. Other crops include millet, sesame and groundnuts. While 
most of the production is destined for household consumption, small 
quantities are marketed. This sector, however, is distinguished from 
the other sectors discussed below by the absence of both mechanisation 
and irrigation.
Farm incomes are generally low and have to be supplemented by
wage employment, trading or crafts and trades such as blacksmithing,
carpentry, tailoring or hut building. The Rural Labour Markets Survey -
conducted by an ILO team in 1982/83 - found that 30 per cent of all
resident rural workers had other supporting jobs besides their principal
occupation, while a further 6 per cent were seeking additional work.
Nevertheless, it is the case that even smallholders may hire in outside
labour during the peak season for weeding, harvesting and threshing.
Even amongst households with holdings of less than 10 feddans, 11
per cent hire harvest labour. The proportions of households with hired
(28)
labour rise rapidly with farm size as does hired labour per feddan.
El-Bagir et al (1984) suggested three possible explanations for this
reliance on hired labour: firstly, the household may have insufficient
labour available, secondly, the farmers may calculate that they get
higher net returns if they take on hired labour, and the third stems
from the 'noticeable1 phenomenon of young men's disdain for hard manual
(29)
work in the farms. Whatever the case, P Fallan (1987) argued that
such evidence on the traditional farming sector is
"... consistent with the existence of a rationally 
functioning labour market unlike the contrary evidence 
for some other African countries". '
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2.2.2. The Mechanised Rain-fed Sector
Mechanised farming in the Sudan was introduced in 1945 by the 
colonial government to increase sorghum production. Since then the 
sector expanded substantially particularly when it was opened to 
private entrepreneurs. The existing mechanised farm sector is con­
centrated in the Eastern Region with some farms in the Central and 
Kordofan regions. Each scheme accounts for between 1,000 and 1,500 
feddans per year and average farmers cultivate about 3 schemes al­
though some holdings are as large as 35,000 feddans. Mechanised 
farms currently represent 37 per cent of the total cultivated area 
in the Sudan, with sorghum as the principal crop, although sesame 
and groundnuts cultivation has begun to expand recently. About 
40-50 per cent of the production is targeted towards export.
The main labour input to mechanised farms takes the form of 
unskilled labour required in the two peak periods of weeding (August- 
September) and harvesting (November-December). Other activities are 
basically mechanised. It is difficult to estimate accurately the 
man-days required in this sub-sector as much depends on the crop, 
weather conditions and degree of mechanisation. Thus, available 
estimates seem to vary widely. The IL0, Employment, Grow and Equity 
mission to the Sudan estimated that 11 man-days were required annually 
per mechanised feddan of sorghum in 1973/74 and projected a figure of 
8 man-days for 1980. More recent estimates available suggest rela­
tively higher figures. The IL0 Rural Labour Survey - cited above - 
estimated that in 1982 13 man-days were needed for a feddan. The 
Rural Labour Study by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(1983) estimated the same figure (13 man-days)for sorghum, 10 for
(31)
sesame and 20 man-days per feddan of cotton annually in this sector.
In 1982/83 mechanised farms accounted for a cultivated area of 5.5
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million which would therefore require, using the Ministry of Finance
estimate for sorghum, some 72 million unskilled man-days or 720,000
(32)
temporary workers at 100 days each. Moreover, it has been estim­
ated that a further 11,000 drivers and service workers are required 
each year.^"^ Lately it has been reported that over 8.5 million 
feddans were planted in 1986/87.^^ If true, then there must be a 
substantial increase in demand for labour in the mechanised sector 
during the last couple of years.
The labour supply comes from two major sources! temporary 
seasonal workers and local villages. The former include seasonal 
migrant workers and refugees from Eritrea and other parts of Ethiopia. 
The great bulk of the migrants come from other rural areas of the 
country (the Western regions of Kordofan and Darfur). Seasonality 
of their work and the very small yields of the small traditional farms 
lead many small farmers to seek wage employment in large-scale mechan­
ised farms. The IL0 survey in 1982 found that just over one-half of 
their respondents came from the West while 19 per cent were refugees. 
Virtually all of the migrants are male and the Rural Labour Survey has 
shown that their average educational level is below that of the local 
resident population. Workers are recruited either by contractors at 
their place of origin or through the recruitment offices of large 
commercial farmers and the Mechanised Agricultural Corporation (the 
state mechanised farming body). E El-Bagir et al (1984) reported 
that wages for each kind of work (harvesting, weeding, etc) and for 
different crops (dura, sesame, etc) were negotiated separately.
This study indicated that, in view of the growing numbers of refugees 
as well as migrants from other drought-hit areas, workers are accept­
ing employers' pay offers well below normal e x p e c t a t i o n s . (-^ 5)
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2.2.3. The Irrigated Agricultural Sector
The irrigated agricultural schemes play a strategic role in 
determining the level of output and employment in the economy as 
a whole. Not only do they produce the country’s principal export 
crop-cotton, but they are also of great relevance to the rural labour 
market providing employment for a large sector of the seasonal migrant 
labour. These large-scale publicly owned schemes cover more than 3.3 
million feddans, and are located mainly in the Central and Eastern 
regions around the banks of the Nile and its tributaries.
The most important and model scheme is the Gezira scheme (2.1 
million feddans, established in 1 9 2 5 ) . ^ ^  The scheme is split into 
a large number of individual tenancies (102,000 in 1980) of which 80 
per cent lie in the 13 to 20 feddan range while the remainder vary 
between 30 and 40 feddans. The Gezira Board provides a range of 
services some of which are paid for by the tenants including land 
preparation for cotton and the irrigations themselves. Since 1981, 
the scheme has introduced an individual account system which means 
in principle a loss making tenant may be evicted, although in practice 
such evictions are rare.
The contract between the individual tenant and the Board is 
central to the operation of the labour market. The tenant is expected 
to manage and farm his holding employing his family and with additional 
hired labour at the two peak periods of weeding (September-December) 
and cotton-picking (January-May). Prior to each season, the Allocation 
Committee meets to determine key policies such as crop rotation and 
the size of cash advances to tenants. The latter represent an impor­
tant means by which tenants finance wage costs and it has been argued 
that as tenants normally take up the maximum available advance, the 
possible inadequacy of such advances may act as a brake on labour
demand. Against this may be set the fact that tenants are allowed
to roll over accumulated losses. Thus, the demand for labour from 
tenants depends upon factors such as availability of labour in their 
own households, the height and the width of the seasonal peaks, and 
the capital profile of the tenants. There are four sources of labour 
available to the tenants: (i) tenants and their families; (ii) workers 
from local villages; (iii) the labour camps or settlements which include 
workers who have migrated permanently from Northern Nigeria, Chad and 
Western Sudan (locally known as Fellata); and (iv) seasonal migrant 
workers from outside the area. The importance of migrant labour is 
clearly illustrated by the Gezira statistics on cotton pickers. In 
1983/84, 470,420 cotton pickers were used of which tenants and their 
families supplied 141,940 (30 per cent). Local non-family labour 
supplied 90,830 (19 per cent) while the rest were imported into the 
scheme. In adddition the Gezira Board itself directly employs around 
113,000 employees of whom about 84,000 are labourers. Migrants are 
recruited by both a central committee and by representatives of groups 
of individual tenants. In 1983/84 these two recruitment modes attrac­
ted 52,000 and 179,000 workers respectively while 'floaters', ie, mi­
grants who simply show up, numbered nearly 6,000. Transport to the 
Gezira is paid by the recruiter, while the work itself is paid on 
piece rate basis. Hence, central to the operation of the rural labour 
market is the seasonal migration.
2.3. MIGRATION
2.3.1. Internal Migration
The most striking feature of the Sudanese labour markets is the 
unusually high rate of geographical mobility of labour. The IL0 Mission
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(1976) estimated that one million workers (or about 15 per cent of
the labour force) move inside the country each year in response to
geographic disparities in employment opportunities and expected in- 
(38)
come. This includes rural-rural as well as rural-urban migration.
In addition, there is the traditional migration of nomadic cattle- 
herding tribes who move according to the rhythm of the seasons.
(i) Rural-rural migration
The majority of internal migrants (about 80 per cent) are rural- 
rural migrants moving along the two West-East and South-North axes in 
search of seasonal employment in irrigated and mechanised rain-fed agri­
culture. The study on rural labour in Northern Sudan (1983) estimated
(39)the total number of internal migrants at approximately half a million. 
However, the survey was carried out before the major peak season for 
cotton-picking in the Eastern and Central Sudan; therefore, the total 
number in a year should be much higher.
The principal ’push' factor is that the incomes from traditional 
agriculture do not cover the subsistence needs of most of the migrants 
who seek to supplement them as wacp labour in the modern agricultural 
sector. The landlessness or small size of landholdings, lack of irrig­
ation, desertification and drought, low productivity of the traditional 
sector and the encroachment of mechanised farming in these areas, all 
generate a natural pressure to seek work elsewhere. The 1982 ILO 
survey found that the migrants' own reported reasons for engaging in 
wage labour were the overriding need for c a s h . ^ ^  Thus, the main 
'puli' factor is the differentials in daily wage rates (in cash and/or 
kind) to seasonal labourers in areas of employment compared to the local 
labour market.
The demand for hired labour stems mainly from the large commercial 
mechanised rainfed agricultural sector as well as the irrigated schemes.
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As mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, in the former, 
weeding, harvesting and threshing are carried out by seasonal workers, 
while in the latter weeding and cotton-picking constitute the major 
activities of hired labour in the peak periods of the agricultural 
cycle.
The study on rural labour (Ministry of Finance, 1983) found that 
more than half of the seasonal labour came from the Western regions 
(Kordofan and Darfur) and 10 per cent from the Southern regions. The 
disparities in the investment patterns in the agricultural sector, ie, 
the neglect of the traditional agriculture in the West and the South, 
and the concentration of modern irrigated and mechanised schemes in 
Kassala and Blue Nile provinces, are reflected in the geographical 
distribution of migrants.
Both the Ministry of Finance Study (1983) and the ILO Rural 
Labour Markets Survey (El-Bagir, 1984) found that the overwhelming 
majority of the migrants were under 30 and unmarried. More than half 
had no formal education and, for nearly half, the length of absence from 
their villages was less than a year. Migrants are not necessarily 
restricted to a single target area. A common pattern would be to work 
on the mechanised farms during Nov.e mber/December and then to move on 
to the irrigated areas in, for example, the Gezira during the first 
three months of the following year, and to pick up work in theCentral 
provinces in the middle of the year. Such semi-permanent migrants may 
continue in this manner for several years before finally returning 
home and settling elsewhere. Other migrants are of the annual West to 
East and back again variety.
It is reported that seasonal migration has fallen since the mid-
1970s. Berar-Awad (1984) argued that,
"... internal migration might have decreased slightly since
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the 1970s due to the influx of refugees, representing 
a local pool, declining real wages and the decrease in 
the area under cotton cultivation". ( ^)
This trend is not, however, reflected the the Gezira data on imported
cotton pickers which show that 230,000 pickers were imported in the
1984/83 season which is similar to the numbers imported during the 
(43)
1970s. In any case migration must have risen recently due to the
displacement effects of drought. It has been estimated that the 1983- 
85 drought and famine crisis led to the migration of over 4.5 million 
people of whom more than one million sought refuge in the urban centres.
(ii) Rural-urban migration
The rapid growth of rural-urban and urban-urban migration in the 
last decade or so is one of the manifestations of labour mobility in 
the Sudan. The data and information on characteristics of these move­
ments are scanty and out-dated and pertain mainly to the Khartoum area.
In 1974 the annual rate of the migration flow to Khartoum was
(45)
estimated at 2.2 per cent for the period 1956 to 1968. It is
strongly arguable that the rate has increased substantially in recent 
years due to drought, famine, and civil war in the South. Nevertheless, 
the CESM statistical survey of urban households in 1974, indicated that 
most of the migrants came from four provinces: Northern (25?o); Kordofan 
(23?o); Blue-Nile (17?o); and Darfur (17?o). The proportion of migrants 
from rural areas was equal to that from other centres. However, the 
majority moved from a rural area to the nearest urban centre before 
migrating finally to Khartoum. Almost 80 per cent of migrant males 
coming from the rural areas were working in agriculture either as self- 
employed or as unpaid family workers before migrating; and about 90 per 
cent of these reported to have come to seek employment. This means
either they did not have adequate work on family farms or else their 
earnings were too low compared with what they expected to earn in
(44)
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Khartoum. Thus, it can be said that the main 'push' factors were the 
low agricultural productivity, lack of alternative opportunities of 
employment and climatic conditions. The 'puli' factors were predomin­
antly the income differentials between the towns and rural areas and 
the reasonable probability of finding jobs. The mere attraction of 
the 'bright city lights', further education, joining relatives and, 
for Southern regions' migrants, the search for physical security from 
war, provide further reasons for rural-urban migration. It also should 
be noted that since the mid-1970s, migration to Khartoum and Port-Sudan 
(the two main exit ports of the country) constitutes a preliminary step 
to work abroad in the Gulf states.
Due to the paucity of data, the pattern of employment among
migrants is now known. However, the ILO study (1976) found a very low
rate of open unemployment in the urban centres, almost 5 per cent of
the urban labour force. The available information suggests that
in 1960s and 1970s, the migrants got jobs relatively easily, within a
(47)
short period of time. More recent studies suggest that most of the
migrants are either employed as casual and temporary workers in the 
organised private and public sectors or involved in the wide range of 
activities covered by the 'informal sector'. It is also accepted that 
disguised unemployment and underemployment have reached crisis propor­
tions in recent years.
Notably, earlier reports and studies of migration in the Sudan 
concentrated on internal migration with little attention paid to inter­
national migration. Perhaps this was because the phenomenon itself is 
of fairly recent origin; inflow migration from neighbouring African 
countries and outflow migration to neighbouring Arab countries now 




(i) Sudanese Workers Abroad (SWA)
Before the 1970s emigration for employment was limited. Few
Sudanese - mainly unskilled - emigrated to Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon and other neighbouring countries. It has been estimated
that from 1965 to 1970 about 6,000 permits to work abroad were issued
(49)
by the Department of Labour. In terms of emigration for work the
1973/74 was a watershed because of the oil price increase and the res­
ulting boom in the neighbouring oil-exporting countries of North Africa 
and the Middle East. Later, and since 1978/79 the push factors have 
become more pre-eminent as early promise turned into economic crisis 
and decline in the Sudan, with low wages and spiralling inflation 
encouraging emigration.
The exact scale of out-migration from the Sudan is not known.
The lack of a monitoring system, coupled with the wide range of channels 
through which people leave make the collection of accurate statistics 
difficult. Thus, available estimates vary substantially: Ghourci (1985) 
estimated that there were 334,000 Sudanese working abroad in 1983 while 
the official sources estimated the number to be about half a million. 
Recently, the IL0 Mission (1987) indicated that some estimates refer to
totals as high as 1.6 million migrants when unrecorded emigration is 
(51)included. It is widely accepted that emigration through official
channels (the Ministry of Labour) forms only a minor portion of the 
total flow. M A Galal-el-Din (1978) suggested that unrecorded migration 
could account for as much as 70 per cent of actual numbers of SWA. Thus, 
even if the more conservative 50 per cent estimate of unofficial migra­
tion is accepted the actual numbers involved could be around one million 
(52)
SWA, or more than 15 per cent of the total labour force, and exceed­
ing even the urban labour force. However, the essential point is that
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SWA are drawn very disproportionately from the skilled sections of the
urban population. Ghourci's results indicated that only 12 per cent
of SWA were employed in agriculture prior to emigration which contrasts
sharply with our earlier observation that the majority of the domestic
labour force work in agriculture, and illustrates the urban bias in the
origins of SWA. Even more striking is the relatively high proportion
of Sudanese skilled workers who work abroad. It was estimated in the
Six-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan that there would be 47,800
skilled workers in the Sudan in 1983 while Choucri (1985) estimated
that there were at least 68,000 skilled SWA in the same year. This
suggests then that about 60 per cent of the total national stock of
skilled workers are abroad. Another study on labour migration in the
Middle East and North Africa estimated that by 1985, the Sudan would
have exported 67 per cent of its labour force in the professional and
technical occupations compared to 0.6 per cent of unskilled workers.
A third report (A1 Rahman 1984) claimed that 39 per cent of medical
doctors, 38 per cent of engineers, and 59 per cent of the country's
(54)teachers were reported to be working aborad. Moreover, it has
been suggested that, on average, SWA have had 12 years work experience 
before leaving. Thus, the alarming fact about emigration is not
so much the absolute numbers of migrants as the human capital outflow, 
the scarcity of their skills, and their importance for the vital sectors 
of the economy from which the manpower is drawn. This continuous 'skill 
drain' has created serious shortages and imbalances in the country's 
labour markets, reflected in increased wages and costs of production, 
as discussed below in section 2.5.
By far the largest recipient of SWA is Saudi Arabia which accounts 
for 80 per cent of the total. This reflects the geographical proximity 
and relative ease of entry. The annual (Hajj) pilrimage and (Omra)
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journeys provide easy methods of entering the country. Moreover, the 
very influx of Sudanese workers has a cumulative causative impact in 
that it creates in the host country a nexus of family and friends that 
potential migrants can utilize to facilitate their own entry. Other 
important recipients include Libya, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates,
Yemen and Qatar.
Although the surveys reported by Choucri (1985) found little 
evidence of occupational shifts associated with migration, it did seem 
that migrants were more likely to enter private sector employment 
abroad as compared with Sudan, while they were also more likely to be 
employed in the service sector abroad. This implies that migrants 
from rural areas in the Sudan would be engaged in non-agricultural 
activities particularly as agricultural activities are limited in the 
Gulf States. Therefore, if we assume that on their return, the majority 
of these migrants from rural origin will stay in urban centres, there 
will be a continuous and permanent loss to the rural sector of its 
better-educated members.
The critical issue in relation to emigration is whether or not 
the Sudanese economy gains from this substantial overseas migration.
In the general theory of international migration and from the experience 
of other labour-exporting countries the two major benefits that could 
be gained from workers abroad are the possible reducation in unemploy­
ment and the remittances which could be a valuable source of foreign 
exchange.
While the estimates of the scale of foreign earnings of Sudanese 
working abroad actually remitted to the Sudan vary widely - between 
US $1.6 and US $3.0 billion for 1983/84 - there is no question that 
they represent a major source of foreign exchange resources. How­
ever, only about 10 per cent of the total overseas remittances arrive
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(58)
through official channels. The most important reason for this
is the sizeable gap between the official exchange rate and the black 
market rate. Although remittances provide direct support for more than 
one million dependants in the Sudan, the fact that only a tiny proportion 
is transferred through the banking system reduces the chances of its be­
ing channelled to investment. It is estimated that remittances for the 
most part are directed to the purchase of land, housing, consumer dura­
bles with high imported components (TV sets, cars, furniture) and to 
the satisfaction of social needs (marriage). Choucri's study (1985) 
revealed that SWA have indicated some interest (when surveyed) in
investment in medium or small-scale (but not large) companies or joint
(59)
ventures, but to do so they seem to require some kind of guarantee.
Past government policies towards SWA appear to have created some psycho­
logical barrier which makes migrants reluctant to remit through official 
channels and/or undertake productive investment. This suggests that 
there is a need for some mechanism to protect their interests, if they 
are to be induced to make longer-term financial commitments in the devel­
opment of the Sudanese economy. In the meantime, benefits from remit­
tances could be overweighed by their detrimental effects on the pattern 
of effective demand implying further inflationary pressures.
Regarding benefits which might be expected in terms of employment, 
or more accurately, unemployment, available evidence suggests that only 
a minor proportion of the labour outflow could be considered as export 
of open or disguised unemployment. As already noted this is primarily 
due to the selective ;nature of the Sudanese out-migration. The 1982 
ILO survey recorded that 16 per cent of the sample could represent 
export of unemployment; the 1983 World Bank Study judged that only
10 per cent of the unskilled Sudanese workers (a category with high
(61)
unemployment rates) would be working abroad by 1985. In fact, it
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has been argued that the export of skilled labour might even increase 
unemployment by enlarging the relative incidence of unskilled labour
(62)
leading to lower growth rates and in consequence to more unemployment.
The average stay of SWA abroad has been estimted at five to six 
years, and there has been return migration. Very little is known with 
certainty about returning migrants as a whole, but preliminary findings 
are alarming. ILO (1987) estimated that three out of four returners 
are unskilled and semi-skilled and as much as 80 per cent appear to be 
unemployed. Some may be contributing to production and trade in
the informal sector, but the gain to the economy and to the domestic 
labour market in terms of utilising experience acquired overseas, seems 
to be limited. Thus, the ILO Study (1987) argued that,
"... if the government were to identify more precise skill 
shortages, it could of course provide financial and other 
incentives for the return of SWA having those particular (ch\ 
skills and thus raise the social value of the return flow."
It is clearly difficult to determine with precision the net bene­
fits of the out-migration to the Sudanese economy. If one considers 
the welfare of SWA themselves and their families then there has been 
obviously great benefits. If, on the other hand, one only includes 
the costs and benefits to the domestic economy, a different picture 
may emerge. If one assumes that workers are paid according to their 
marginal social products in the Sudan, then the costs of migration 
are the loss in domestic output accruing to the remaining domestic 
factors of production. For a marginal change such as the migration 
of a single worker, this is negligible; but for non-marginal changes 
such as the displacement abroad of over one-half of the domestic stock 
of skilled workers this effect may bequite substantial, particularly 
if the elasticity of substitution of skilled workers is low with res­
pect to other factors of production. However, against this must be 
set the benefit of remittances. On the whole, it seems improbable
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that a rigorous cost-benefit analysis would not suggest that overseas 
migration be curbed. It is in any case extremely doubtful whether the 
authorities would be able to enforce such a policy as the majority of 
emigrants are unofficial. Indeed, available forcasts point to a con­
tinued upward trent in emigration. The 'puli' factors in terms of 
large pay differentials are not expected to disappear, while the 'push' 
factors in terms of the stagnant Sudanese economy, reduced employment 
opportunities and declining real wages are now stronger than a decade 
ago. The recent slump in oil prices and the cut-backs in investment 
plans by major labour-importing countries could reduce demand for 
unskilled labour, but not for professionals and skilled workers; the 
imbalances in the domestic labour market depicted above are if any­
thing, likely to be aggravated.
(ii) Refugees
The discussion on international migration is not complete without 
consideration of the influx of refugees into the Sudan which constitutes 
a reverse flow of labour. This influx from neighbouring countries is 
not new as the Sudan has attracted successive waves of refugees from 
Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda and Zaire since the mid-1960s. But, in recent 
years their numbers have grown rapidly because of escalating political 
conflicts and civil war, and/or because of the widespread droughts in 
neighbouring regions. The exact number of the refugees in the Sudan 
is not known. Many of them have settled spontaneously in towns and 
villages without being registered. Nevertheless, the latest estimates 
vary between 1.16 million and 1.5 million, while an estimate for 1983 
put their number at 690, 0 0 0 . ^ ^  This means that currently the number 
of refugees in the country represents 5 per cent of the total popula­
tion. In the Eastern Region, where the majority of the refugees have 
settled, the proportion is as high as one-quarter to one-third.
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Most of the refugees are Eritreans who, according to UNHCR fig­
ures, constitute the majority of the 786,000, or about 70 per cent of 
the total refugees from Ethiopia, while the other three donor countries,
Chad, Uganda and Zaire account for 123,000, 250,000, and 5,000 respect-
■ , (67)
ively.
Although government policy has been to accommodate as many refu­
gees as possible in organised settlements, less than half have settled 
in either wage-earning settlements in which the inhabitants are located 
near to urban labour markets or irrigated schemes, or in land settle­
ments where refugees of rural origin are given 5 to 10 feddans per 
family in the semi-arid rain-fed areas. In spite of these efforts 
the majority have settled directly in the urban areas where some have 
taken up casual employment, mostly in services and the informal sector. 
The evidence as presented by the joint IL0/UNHCR mission to the Sudan 
in 1982/83 indicates that wage-earning settlements have so far been 
u nsuccessful because of the seasonality of employment in agricultural 
schemes and the inadequacy of income, while output is too low to permit 
self-sufficiency. Urban migrants have on average a higher income per
capita than those in rural areas, but their integration into the dom-
(68)
estic labour market is understandably limited.
The influx of refugees may be expected to have an impact on dom­
estic labour supply. There are signs that the availability of large 
numbers of refugees in the vicinity of the agricultural schemes in 
Eastern and Central regions has provided these schemes - to some 
extent - with the needed extra labour input, particularly in the peak 
seasons of cotton picking and sorghum harvesting. Nevertheless, refu­
gee participation in urban labour markets is relatively restricted 
particularly in the government sector. According to the Nationality 
Act 1948, access to public service employment is reserved for holders
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of a valid Sudanese nationality certificate. Even in the private 
sector refugees have to possess work permits which due to bureaucratic 
complexities are not easily obtainable. Consequently, refugees find 
that conditions prevalent in the informal sector suit them most. More­
over, language difficulties are a barrier to domestic participation.
The age distribution as revealed by the ILO/UNHCR Survey (1984) 
showed that only 8 per cent of all refugees were aged 45 years or more, 
while 51 per cent were in the prime working age group of 15 to 44 years. 
As 54 per cent of the total sample were males it follows that one could 
expect an overall participation rate of 30 per cent or higher. The 
skill survey carried out within the ILO/UNHCR mission indicated the 
presence of many skilled workers in the refugee settlements. These 
include men with skills apparently in shortage in urban areas such as 
mechanics, electricians, carpenters, drivers and typists. A large 
proportion were unemployed or working as farm labourers making no con­
tribution to the relief of skill shortages, while running the risk of 
losing their skills.
2.4. URBAN LABOUR MARKETS
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the population 
of the Sudan is predominantly rural, with urban population accounting 
for only ^0 per cent of the total. In the early 1980s, the urban labour 
market accounted for approximately 1.3 million people, ie, 20 per cent 
of the total labour force in the country. However, the share of national 
income accruing to the urban population is disproportionately higher as 
the urban centres contain almost all industrial investment, modern 
trade and the bulk of government and private sector employment.
A variety of urban labour market classificatory schemes has been
(69)
reported in the literature. The fact that urban labour markets in
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LDCs are very heterogeneous allows for the possibility of extensive 
segmentation, but for our purposes, the sectoral schema popularised 
by the ILO missions to Africa, and in which the urban labour market 
has been divided into 'formal'and 'informal' sectors, will be u s e d . ^ ^
2.4.1. The Formal Sector
The formal sector could generally be equated to regular wage
employment, which covers basically the public sector and the organised
private sector. The most striking feature of formal sector employment
in the Sudan is that it is very heavily dominated by the public sector.
The latest estimates available (ILO, 1987) give a total employed labour
force in the formal sector of 600,000 of which 500,000 are in the
public sector. These figures are probably on the low side because the
employment data base is extremely shaky even for the public sector. In
addition, both the public and the private sector provide employment
for casual or daily labourers. While this is not regular employment,
a considerable number of work-days is provided in this way each year.
Data limitations make it difficult to determine the volume of such
(71)
work, its incidence or the total wage bill.
As public sector employment will be the subject of the next 
chapter discussion here will focus on the private formal sector. 
Available statistics provide widely varying, and sometimes contra­
dicting, figures about employee numbers in the private sector. Never­
theless, a 1982 survey limited to Khartoum province showed the number 
to be about 50,000 (Table 2.14) while a recent ILO report (1987) sug­
gested 90,000 to be a 'reasonable' figure for private sector employ­
ment for all of the Sudan; a clear indication of the concentration of
(72)this type of employment in urban centres.
The ILO (1987) study also indicated that there is considerable 
underutilisation of labour in many private companies which means that
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a considerable increase in output might be achieved with relatively 
little growth in employment. This underutilisation could be the res­
ult of the failure of the manufacturing sector to operate at full 
capacity owing to the problems discussed in 2.1.2. above. Despite 
the deficiencies in the structure and opertion of private sector 
enterprises, the UNIDO survey indicated that average value added per 
worker may be four times higher in private than in public sector 
establishments thus supporting the generally held view of low produc­
tivity in the public sector. A more thorough comparison between 
activities, output, pay and working conditions would, however, be 
required, before such an assessment could be accepted.
As Table 2.14 shows the obvious difference between the public 
and private sectors in terms of the distribution of employment by 
production activity is that public sector employment is heavily con­
centrated in services and transport, while private sector employment is 
largely concentrated in manufacturing. Public sector employment in the 
modern sector is absolutely greater than that of the private sector in 
all major activities except manufacturing and possibly trade.
However, the importance of the public sector does not reside only 
in employment generation but in setting the labour relations standards 
for other sectors. Notwithstanding the fact that wages in the private 
sector are more responsive to market conditions, they follow the gen­
eral framework set by the pay structure in the public sector. The 
government also sets the minimum wage levels for the private sector 
through the minimum wage legislation machinery. Further government 
influence over private sector labour markets is exercised through the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1976, which lays down the procedures for the
settlement of industrial disputes and the Individual Labour Relations 
Act, 1981, which deals, inter alia, with the termination of employment.
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Prior to the early 1970s the trade union movement in the Sudan 
consisted mainly of small and weak unions with the one exception of 
the Railway Workers Union. By 1970 600 registered unions were in 
existence, both in the public and the private sectors. The turning 
point was the introduction of a deliberate restructuring of the 
entire union movement under two national federations: the (blue-collar) 
Sudan Workers' Trade Unions Federation with 441,398 members in 1982, 
and the (white-collar) Employees and Professionals Trade Union Federa­
tion with 167,534 members. Information made available by the Registrar 
of Trade Unions, shows that in 1982 there were 36 white-collar (excluding 
professionals) unions and 28 blue-collar unions in the public sector, 
against 3 white-collar and 15 blue-collar unions in the private sectors. 
In addition, there were 14 unions organising professionals both in the 
public and the private sectors; the restructuring had, thus, reduced 
the number of the unions in the country from 600 in 1970 to 96 in 1982.
Available estimates suggest that total union membership in the 
private sector was 133,442 in 1982. If this is so, serious doubts must 
be raised about estimated private sector employment figures. Unless, 
as is not improbable, some unions which in terms of sectoral distribu­
tion of employment are organising informal sector workers (eg taxi 
drivers) are counted as private sector unions.
In the private sector, union strength is highly concentrated in 
larger establishments; the unions themselves claim that membership is 
virtually 100 per cent. Although there is no provision for the closed 
shop under the Sudanese industrial relations laws, this claim may be 
justified as deviation from group consensus is socially and culturally 
unacceptable, and the 1971 Trade Union Act (amended in 1977) prohibits 
an employer from negotiating with any group of employees whenever a 
lawful trade union already exists. While membership is, therefore,
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large in large-scale private sector companies little is known about 
smaller enterprises. The Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) 
has claimed recent successes in unionising small-scale handicrafts, and 
is currently trying to organise seasonal workers in large agricultural 
schemes. ^ '5)
Unlike the public sector where collective bargaining is restricted 
by the pay determination system, private sector unions enjoy some lat­
itude in influencing the remuneration of their members. However, such 
collective bargaining success could depend not only on the presence 
of a strong union in terms of size and ability to conduct meaningful 
negotiations but on the encouragement of managements anxious to promote 
strong and stable unions and on company profitability.
2.4.2. The Informal Sector
Available estimates indicate that the informal sector is an 
important and growing urban employer. Currently about 50 per cent of 
the urban labour force ie, some 0.6 million workers, are engaged in 
informal activities. Comparison of this figure with early 1970s figures, 
which showed about 25 per cent of urban labour force in the informal 
sector, clearly indicates an upward trend.
The first attempt to assess the informal sector in the Sudan was 
made by the ILO, Employment, Growth and Equity Study (1976). Based on 
the 1974 Household Survey, the 1970 National Handicraft Survey, and 
unpublished data from municipal authorities, the study covered the 
activities in Khartoum area. Given the known difficulties in defining 
and classifying, the study proposed four categories of activities 
according to a number of criteria, such as permanence of place of 
operation, need for business licences, size of capital requirements, 
productivity and profitability standards. It is estimated that a total 
of 27,000 establishments operated in the Khartoum area, including the
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establishments in manufacturing and repair (20%), services and commerce 
(60%), and transport (20%). The study also showed that the informal 
sector in Khartoum was a heterogeneous and multi-layered phenomenon 
comprising,
"... at its most advanced levels, the well-established 
enterprises involved in retail trade, at its middle 
level, the multitude of small manufacturing, service 
and commercial establishments, employing a large 
number of people and finally the traditional petty 
vendors".(75)
Informal enterprises are small, on average consisting of two 
persons, but many are one-person ventures. Opportunities for wage 
employment are thus severely limited and enterprises that hire one or 
more non-family labourers are usually concentrated in construction, 
auto-repair and the manufacture of household goods. Female participa­
tion is insignificant and largely confined to either home-based activi­
ties (such as traditional hairdressing and tailoring) or petty trade.
Most of the hired labour is unskilled and recruitment normally takes 
place informally through relatives or at the 'factory gate'. Working 
hours are generally long (ten hours a day, six days per week). Appren­
ticeship seems to be widespread but is trade specific and most important 
in auto-repair, construction, manufacturing and tailoring. The results 
of a recent survey of informal sector enterprises in Juba - the largest 
city in Southern Sudan - tend to confirm the observations of the ILO 
missions to the Sudan (see ILO, 1976 and ILO, 1 9 8 7 ) . ^ ^  In the Juba 
survey (W House, 1987) it was found that 56 per cent of the urban work 
force in Juba are engaged in informal activities in about 2,500 enterpri­
ses; in 80 per cent of the enterprises sampled, the head of the enter­
prise was the sole owner. The family orientation of the sector is 
strong - in 20 per cent of the sample at least one relative was employed. 
However, only 2 per cent of respondents employ a female, which confirms 
the general dearth of females outside petty trade; 70 per cent of women
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in the sector were in petty trade. Of those employers who hire labour, 
just over half choose from job-seekers who approach them for work and 
another quarter ask current employees to recruit their friends or rela­
tives. Some employers admitted to hiring unskilled casual labour off 
the street on a daily basis. Not one respondent had ever used the 
public sector exchange or recruited labour through direct contacts in 
rural areas. One-man operators are widespread particularly in petty 
trade, transport, and repairs as 75 per cent of the enterprise sampled 
were found to employ, at best, the operator and one other worker. The 
informality of the sector is underlined by the evidence that one-third 
of businesses admitted to working irregular hours per day. The majority 
operate six or seven days per week for an average of 9.5 hours per day. 
Only one in five are housed in a permanent building while the remainder 
operate from temporary structures made of cardboard, tinsheets, mud, 
etc, or in the open air.
Despite the family orientation of the enterprises and the competi­
tive markets in which they operate, the entry into the sector is not 
necessarily easy. The Juba Survey reported that for new arrivals to 
Juba, without the necessary skills or capital to become self-employed, 
successful job search requires ethnic and kinship ties and contacts, 
and the time and resources to go knocking at the doors of potential 
employers. That workers confront a buyer's market for labour is con­
firmed by the negligible number of employers who claimed to encounter 
difficulty in hiring unskilled workers.
The demographic profile of the labour force in the informal 
sector shows the majority of entrepreneurs in the sector as between 
30 and 35 years of age suggesting relatively late entry into business, 
with high entry requirements including considerable skills, experience, 
savings and the maturity to take risks. However, where the capital and
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skill requirements to entry are thought to be low, as in petty trade, 
the average age of entry is 20 to 25 years. The Juba Survey also found 
that the mean age of proprietors exceeded that of employees by almost 
10 years. Moreover, there is a sizeable amount of child labour (15 
years and under): 10 per cent of petty traders fall into this group 
as do nearly a quarter of all employees. Many of these young workers 
still attend school.
Human capital status (as measured by years of formal schooling) 
shows that the educational attainments of the labour force in the in­
formal sector are pitifully low which could contribute to the low 
productivity levels in the sector. In Juba, almost a quarter of the 
proprietors and a third of employees never attended school while 70 
per cent of workers have not progressed beyond the primary school.
Formal education coupled with age, duration of stay in urban 
centre and household size positively affect informal sector earnings. 
The survey revealed that the net monthly business income of the highest 
educated proprietors was ten times that of those who never went to 
school, and every additional year of formal education was associated 
with an extra 13 per cent of income.
The ILO (1987) study reported that, generally, incomes from self- 
employment in the informal sector are higher than for agricultural 
labour or even middle-level government employees. in the past
the civil service was considered to offer an attractive career and 
an escape from less prestigious informal sector occupations. This 
still holds true in terms of respectability, although it has becQme 
unattractive economically. It is widely recognised that a car-washer 
or a laundry man - occupations that enjoy very little social esteem - 
could earn in one day the equivalent of a teacher's salary for two or 
perhaps three weeks. Thus, given the relative rigidity of wages in
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the formal (public and private) sector and the high inflation rates, 
employees in this sector - and in an increasing number in recent years - 
seek to supplement their income through activities in the informal sector. 
The notable high rates of labour turnover and absenteeism in the formal 
sector - which has been referred to frequently in a number of recent 
studies and reports - could be attributed to the fact that many people 
work in both sectors. Moreover, in view of present foreign exchange 
shortages, and import restrictions, large quantities of goods, financed 
by SWA remittances are channelled into the country via the hidden 
economy and distributed through the informal sector. As a result, 
many activities and services formally held by the formal sector have 
been transferred to the informal sector.
Thus, in addition to its traditional role as residual recipient 
of labour and a training ground for future entrepreneurs as well as 
potential formal sector workers, the informal sector has become a 
provider of supplementary income and source of a wide range of goods 
and services. In this capacity it plays a major dynamic role in link­
ing the different sectors of the economy.
2.5. LABOUR SHORTAGES AND SURPLUSES
2.5.1. Skilled Labour
The Six Year Socio-Economic Development Plan provided projec­
tions of the supply of and demand for various categories of labour 
for the period of 1977/78 to 1982/83 (Table 2.15). These estimates 
showed that from 1980 onwards the Sudan would be experiencing serious 
shortages of skilled and semi-skilled labour. By 1982/83, the total 
labour shortfall in these categories could have amounted to 25 per 
cent of the total demand. Other studies (Ali, 1984, ILO, 1987), 
confirmed the existence of acute shortages of all professional and
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skill categories, on a scale much larger than the Six Year Plan 
estimates indicated, largely because the Plan did not take fully into 
account the rapid pace of out-migration of Sudanese from the late 1970s^®^ 
Although the emigration of Sudanese to Arab countries has aggra­
vated seriously the shortages of a range of vital and scarce skills, the 
inadequacy of the educational and training system to compensate for 
migrants has been always regarded as an equally important factor. In 
fact, as pointed out by various studies (ILO, 1987 for example) and 
acknowledged by government, the educational system has not responded 
to the needs of the economy. Higher education continues to produce 
too many graduates in humanities and arts and few in the technical 
areas. It has been reported that in 1984/85 nearly two-thirds of 
grad dates of various universities had studied arts and social sciences.
The government's past policy of guaranteeing employment in the public 
sector for all graduates of universities, coupled with high social 
demand for university education in general are some of the factors 
behind the apparent bias towards these fields. However, in the last 
few years, the public sector because of budgetary constraints, has 
placed a moratorium on new graduate recruitment. As a result serious 
demand constraints have emerged and graduates from all faculties can 
no longer readily obtain employment. Between 1982/83 and 1985/86 the 
number of university graduates offered employment in the public service 
fell from 2,328 to 823, while for higher technical institutes recruit­
ment fell from 520 to 141. In 1985/86 only 14.5 per cnet of graduates 
of technological and scientific faculties registered for employment 
found employment in the public service which accounts for 85* per cent 
of total modern formal sector employment. Probably about 82 per cent
of these graduates would have become unemployed unless they went into 
self-employment, emigrated or worked in the informal sector. Not un-
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expectedly, the prospects facing graduates of humanities and arts 
are worse. In 1985/86 out of 5,000 liberal arts graduates registered 
for employment, only 200 were recruited into the public service (see 
Table 2.16).
What has been just said, however, does not invalidate the thesis 
that there is a shortage of qualified professional people but applies 
to experienced personnel who are required mostly by overseas employers. 
For example, the shortage of qualified teachers in secondary schools 
is not solely the consequence of an educational system unable to pro­
duce enough teachers, but results also from the loss of teachers 
through international migration (almost a third of teacher stock).
The other type of manpower imbalance frequently referred to in 
the Sudan is the shortage of skilled manual workers and technical per­
sonnel. It must be stated here again, that this only applies to 
experienced, workers. Fresh technical school leavers are, in general, 
not in a position to obtain jobs overseas and may, in fact, experience 
initial difficulty in finding employment. The ILO (1987) suggested 
that even with the current 16:84 ratio of technical to academic enrol­
ment the economy cannot productively absorb all technical secondary 
school leavers.
The basic pattern is then that workers accumulate experience 
within the Sudan and then migrate to much higher paid jobs in the 
Arab labour markets. This labour force loss is reflected in the high 
turnover rates experienced in both public and private sectors. The 
ILO survey of urban labour markets in 1982 revealed that the rates of 
turnover of skilled labour could reach 50 per cent a n n u a l l y . T h e  
main implication of this process is that as skilled wages abroad are 
roughly between 10-15 times those in the Sudan, the supply price of 
a typical skilled experienced labourer is going to be several times
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that of a corresponding inexperienced worker. The market equilibrium 
that is then observed is one in which employers will have to substitute 
inexperienced for experienced worker, a policy almost bound to affect 
productivity adversely.
It is unlikely that domestic wages could be raised to levels 
which make competition possible and thus 'true' shortages in the sense 
of excess demand at existing wages do tend to prevail.
2.5.2. Unskilled Labour
Although most projections suggest a substantial surplus of un­
skilled labour, there have been growing complaints by employers in the
(81)
rural and urban areas about difficulties in hiring unskilled workers.
As described below, however, it seems that this is the result of factors 
other than an absolute physical shortage of unskilled labour.
In the rural sector with the expansion of mechanised rain-fed 
agriculture and irrigated schemes there have been an increasing number 
of complaints by employers and agricultural boards about the availabi­
lity of the required number of hired labourers during peak seasons. It 
has also been said that the declining productivity of agricultural ac­
tivities could be explained by labour shortages. A decade ago, the 
Gezira Board was the main voice of complaint. Since then the Mechanised 
Farming Corporation (MFC), the Kenana Sugar Plantation, and several 
other parastatal and private employers have raised the issue. The ILO 
surveys on rural labour markets examined the question of the availabi­
lity of seasonal labour in Eastern and Central Sudan. In the rain-fed 
agricultural sub-sector, labour demand flucuated from year to year due 
to environmental conditions especially the starting date of rains. In 
1982, there was actually a surplus of seasonal labour even in the peak 
periods of sorghum harvesting. This situation might have been due also
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to the massive influxes of refugees from Ethiopia. It has further
been suggested that this influx may have caused a general decline -
or at least stagnation - in the wage levels of hired labour, making
jobs less attractive to traditional migrants from the South and the
(82)
West. Therefore, if there are difficulties in finding hired
labour, they may stem as much from low remuneration of labour and
recruitment processes rather than from physical shortages.
The study of the pattern of labour demand in the Gezira Scheme
and labour availability showed no absolute physical shortage of labour
but the low wage rates were not 'market clearing'. The Ministry of
Finance survey of rural labour in all Northern provinces in 1982/83
reached the same conclusion that there was no overall shortage of
labour but only seasonal shortfalls in some provinces, while surplus
(83)
labour existed in others. However, despite this 'theoretical'
surplus, shortages do occur. For example, calculations made by the 
Economic and Social Research Unit in the Gezira Board have consistently
shown shortage of cotton pickers in recent years in the order of 4 to 5
. (84) 
per cent.
Of course, transportation difficulties, sociological setting, 
bad living conditions, etc, are other factors serving to discourage 
labour supply but by far the most important limiting factor is the 
wage rate.
In the urban centres, official projections as well as informal 
estimates suggest that a net surplus of unskilled labour does exist. 
Historically, rural-urban migration has been regarded as the principal 
cause behind the phenomenon. In recent years, however, drop-outs of 
the schooling system have constituted a major source of unskilled
pool. The general orientation of the schooling system in the Sudan 
is that the lower level should prepare students for the next higher
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level, and not for the world of work. In 1983/84 124,014 candidates 
sat for the intermediate school entrance examination but only 64,976 
(about 32 per cent) passed. Those not proceeding to intermediate 
level education, although too young to enter the labour force legally, 
do attempt to seek employment or some form of skill training in the 
informal sector, but a significant proportion remains idle.
The problem is far more serious for drop-outs from the inter­
mediate and secondary schools. For example, the secondary school is 
still largely seen as a preparing ground for entry into higher education, 
although in 1984/85 only 6 per cent of total candidates were admitted 
to national universities and institutes. To equip secondary school 
leavers with adequate skills for the labour market, it had been hoped 
(in the Six Year Plan) that 60 per cent of enrolment in secondary schools 
would be in the technical streams. By 1984/85 the share was only 16 per 
cent. Technical education for girls is non-existent. Nevertheless, 
the rapid expansion of secondary education has resulted in an annual 
influx of about 120,000 new secondary school leavers into the labour 
force. These new labour force entrants prefer formal sector employment. 
However, it is unlikely that more than 5,000 formal sector jobs at the 
most are available for them in most years. This implies that 95 per 
cent of these secondary school leavers have to find employment in the 
informal sector, or through international migration, or to join the 
unemployed. Since these graduates have limited skills and experience 
for international migration and, because with the economic recession 
the informal sector has only a limited capacity to absorb these large
numbers productively, it can be inferred that the vast majority of
(85)
them would have had to join the unemployed.
Despite this apparent surplus of unskilled workers, a number of 
recent studies reported that some employers in the private sector have
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been complaining about the instability and high turnover rates among 
this category. The ILO study (1982) found that some firms in Khartoum 
were experiencing almost 100 per cent annual turnover rate. The study 
further indicated that the high turnover was directly related to pay. 
Establishments with higher wages, did not have high turnover rates 
and were able to secure a. stable workforce. The wages offered by most 
employers were indicated to be insufficient for securing a livelihood 
and so workers tend to move from one employer to another in the hope 
of better income.
In summary, available information about the structure and func­
tioning of labour markets in the Sudan reveals:
a) A high degree of inter-and intra-country labour mobility.
b) A shortage of experienced skilled and professional manpower
primarily due'to irternational migration.
c) A growing surplus among university graduates and secondary 
school leavers with general academic as opposed to vocationally 
based qualifications. Partly this reflects stagnating formal 
sector employment because of the mounting economic problems
in recent years.
d) A growing surplus of unskilled labour in rural as well as
urban areas fuelled by the influx of refugees from neigh­
bouring countries.
e) The inadequacy of wage rates in responding to the changing 
pattern of market conditions.
This chapter was intended to provide the backdrop for subsequent 
analysis of employment and pay. This analysis starts with the consider­
ation of public sector employment in Chapter 3.
Table 2.1
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GDP by Economic Sector (in current prices) and the Percentage 










Agriculture 622.6 38.4 1445.8 32.0 7257.2 36.0
Mining 5.4 0.3 4.8 0.1 20.5 0.1
Manufacturing 108.6 6.7 358.7 7.9 1398.8 6.9
Construction 87.0 5.4 207.2 4.6 1097.8 5.4
Public Utilities 28.0 1.7 88.5 2.0 434.3 2.2
Transport and Storage 186.4 11.5 467.8 10.3 2158.8 10.7
Commerce 259.5 16.0 1047.3 23.2 2992.5 14.8
Banking and Insurance 137.6 8.5 290.9 6.4 2219.6 11.0
Public Arinin. and Defence 173.5 10.7 493.3 10.9 1980.2 9.8
Personal Services 13.1 0.8 115.6 2.6 598.5 3.1
GDP 1622.3 100.0 4519.9 100.0 20157.5 100.0
Source: World Bank (1987) Sudan: Problems of Economic Adjustment j
World Bank Report No. 6491-SU - Statistical Annex, Table 2 .2.
Table 2.2








Real GDP (£sm)(a) 5965.1 6721.0 6247.6 0.5 -1.8
Population (m) 16.6 19.7 21.9 2.8 2.7
Real Per Capita GDP (£s) 359.3 341.2 285.3 -2.3 -4.4
Resource Gap (US$m) -528.1 -1347.0 -636.0
Current Account Deficit (US$m) -428.6 -1290.0 -842.0
Exchange Rate 2.87 1.12 0.37 18.5 -24.2
Budget Deficit (£sm) , * 
Consuner Price Index (1970=100)
- 73.3 - 800.0 -2721.1
221.4 643.5 2060.6 25.0 33.8
Item as % GDP
Resource Gap -10.0 -17.8 - 8.1
Current Account Deficit^ - 8.0 -17.0 -10.7
Overal Budget^ - 4.0 -11.9 -12.7
Source: World Bank (1987) Sudan, Problems of Economic Adjustment, Table 1.01 p. 2.
(a) Constant 1981/82 market prices.
(b) Lower income class (calendar year).
(c) Inlcudes intrest payments due, but not paid (accrual basis).
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Table 2.3
Performance of the Agricultural Sector, Production Index 1981/82 - 
1983/86
Subsector 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Irrigated 100 127 131 117 112
Rainfed 100 59 53 29 76
Livestock 100 101 97 81 78
Source: World Bank (1987) op. cit. Statistical Annex Table 7.
Table 2.4
Summary of Government Finances (As % of GDP) 1980/81 - 1985/86
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Total Revenues 14.7 13.3 13.6 12.9 10.0 8.4
11.9 11.1 11.6 10.9 8.6 7.4
(2.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.0) (1.6)
(9.6) (9.0) (9.4) (8.6) (6.6) (5.8)
Norvtax 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0
Total Expenditure 27.9 25.2 21.5 22.0 25.8 21.1
Current 21.2 20.1 16.8 17.3 22.3 19.1
Development 5.8 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.1 1.7
Equity 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3
Current Balance -6.3 -6.7 -3.1 -4.5 -12.4 -10.7
Overall Balance -13.2 -11.9 -7.9 -9.2 -15.8 -12.7
Ext. Finance 7.4 11.4 7.1 7.1 11.3 8.9
Int. Finance 5.8 0.5 0.8 2.0 4.5 3.8
GDP (£sm) 
(Market Prices)
4980 6721 9344 11472 14920 21357
Source: World Bank (1987) op. cit. Table 1.05.
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Table 2.5
Balance of Payments 1980/81 - 1985/86 (US$ millions)
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Exports 748 667 821 942 800 702
Imports -1799 -2014 -1804 -1640 -1394 -1338
Workers' Remittances 305 350 415 395 430 350
Interest - 214 - 288 - 297 - 488 - 478 - 559
Other Factor Services (net) - 1 - 5 - 20 - 20 - 3
Current Account - 961 -1290 - 885 - 771 - 642 - 842
GDP in nominal US$ 7903 7554 7597 7227 7430 7838
As % of GDP
Exports 9.5 8.8 10.8 13.0 10.8 9.0
Imports 22.8 26.7 23.7 22.7 18.8 17.1
Resource Gap -13.3 -17.8 -12.9 - 9.7 - 8.0 - 8.1
Current Account -12.2 -17.1 -11.6 -10.7 - 8.6 -10.7
Source: World Bank (1987) op. cit. Statistical Annex.
Table 2.6 








1956 9526 93 737 7 10263 100















Source: Department of Statistics, Population Census.
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Table 2.7







Northern 873 8 974 6 1137 5
Eastern 941 9 1572 11 2319 11
Central 2070 20 3804 26 4213 19
Kordofan 1762 17 2203 15 3248 15
Darfur 1329 13 2181 15 3248 15
Khartoum 505 5 1150 8 1892 9
Equatoria 903 9 758 5 1476 7
Bahr-El-Ghazal 991 10 1388 9 2373 11
Upper Nile 889 9 799 5 1687 8
Sudan 10263 100 14819 100 21593 100
Source: Statistical Department, Population Census.
Table 2.8
Labour Force by 
1983 ( ’000)









Northern 194.1 65.0 62.2 7.1 328.4
Eastern 411.3 103.5 187.3 18.2 720.3
Central 774.1 228.5 230.7 24.8 1258.0
Kordofan 643.7 197.8 102.9 12.4 956.8
Darfur 645.9 207.6 86.4 9.7 949.5
Khartoum 115.9 31.5 399.3 37.6 584.3
Equatoria 293.6 89.7 49.4 5.3 437.9
Bahr-El-Ghazal 522.6 144.5 52.8 5.1 725.0
Upper Nile 371.5 106.7 14.5 1.7 572.9
Sudan 3991.3 1174.8 1185.5 121.9 6473.1
Source: Department of Statistics, Census Office.
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Table 2.9
Labour Force Crude Participation Rates 1956, 1973, 1983
1956 1973 1983
Labour Force (Total) 31 29 30
Male 54 47 50
Female 10 12 15
Labour Force (Urban) 29 31
Male 50 48
Female 6 11
Labour Force (Rural) 29 33
Male 46 52
Female 13 25
Source: ILO, Employment, Grow and Equity, 1973. ILO, Employment 
and Economic Reform, 1987, and Department of Statistics, 
Khartoum.
Table 2.10


















Agriculture 2221 293 440 25 2979 64.7
Mining 6 3 - - 9 0.2
Manufacturing 96 99 8 6 209 4.5
Electricty & Water 6 54 - - 60 1.3
Construction 33 64 - - 97 2.1
Trade & Catering 197 52 9 1 259 5.6
Conmunication 43 121 9 1 174 3.8
Finance - 6 - - 6 0.1
Social Services 63 399 4 1 467 10.2
Others 43 65 2 235 345 7.5
Total 2708 1156 472 269 4605 100.0
Source: ILO, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1977.
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Table 2.11




















Technicians 12 113 1 126 2.7
Achinistrators & 
Managers 8 16 . . 14 0.3
Clerical Workers 1 62 - - 63 1.3
Sales Workers 174 30 7 1 212 4.6
Service Workers 46 264 3 2 315 6.8
Agricultural
Workers 2219 247 441 26 2933 63.7
Production & Tran­
sport Workers 183 292 5 5 487 10.7
Others 39 169 12 223 455 9.9
Total 2684 1193 468 470 4605 100.0
Source: ILO (1977) op. cit
Table 2.12
Enrolment Rates in General Education, 1984-85
Primary Intermediate Secondary
Region
Nunber Enrolment Number Enrolment Number Enrolment
Enrolled Rates Enrolled Rates Enrolled Rates
Northern 182002 93.6 49388 66.4 23195 40.0
Khartoum 260233 87.0 76706 61.7 47642 38.3
Central 501277 66.9 102496 36.1 51910 21.1
Eastern 160334 42.8 29646 22.5 16384 14.2
Kordofan 216852 44.6 33386 23.1 14783 12.8
Darfur 178649 35.6 24080 15.4 10573 7.4
Upper Nile 38060 15.9 6011 5.8 3144 3.3
Bahr-El-Ghazal 21618 6.3 5131 3.4 4301 3.1
Equatoria 94466 45.3 14439 16.0 8340 10.0
Sudan 1653491 48.7 341283 27.1 180272 16.1
Source: ILO (1987) op. cit. p. 143.
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Tabel 2.13











University of Khartoun 
Omdurman Islamic Uni­
715 6942 10.3 2390 8028 29.8




147 754 19.5 635 2166 29.3
- - - 124 856 14.5
— 273 965 26.8
Khartoum Branch 
Technological Insti­
2513 12671 19.8 8026 20383 39.4
tutes / \ 
Special Colleges C
178 1466 12.1 315 2192 14.4
112 208 53.8 730 1630 46.0
Total 3665 22041 16.6 12516 36226 34.5
Source: ILO (1987) op. cit.
(a) Figures for 1982/83 have been used here. Allowing for increases 
since then and enrolment of about 20,000 abroad, total higher 
higher education enrolment may be estimated at as much as 60,000 
students.
(b) Intake in Universities of Juba and Gezira started in 1978-1979.
(c) The relatively high share of female in this category reflects 
the inclusion of Ahfad College of Girls.
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Table 2.14
Employment Distribution according to Economic Activity in the 












Agriculture 45268 16.2 1781 4.0
Mining 3325 1.2 402 0.9
Manufacturing 11483 4.1 25510 56.8
Water, Gas & Electricity 21731 7.8 - -
Construction 20332 7.3 2959 6.6
Trade 5425 1.9 6762 15.1
Transport 63223 22.7 2373 5.3
Financial Services 10259 3.8 1780 3.9
Other Services 97615 35.0 3333 7.4
Total 278661 100.0 44900 100.0
Source: Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Labour:
i) Survey of Labour Force, Wages and Working Hours 
in the Public Sector, May 1983;
ii) Survey of Labour Force, Wages and Working Hours 
in the Private Sector, May 1984.
* Includes 819 establishments with 10 persons or more 
in Greater Khartoum area only.
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Tabel 2.13

















Stpply 3.2 1.1 1.7 4.9 7.0 105 122.9
1977 Demand 2.2 2.3 2.4 7.4 4.0 54 0.7 73.0
Difference +1.0 -1.2 -0.7 -2.5 +3.0 +51 -0.7 +49.9
Supply 3.8 1.3 1.9 5.4 7.5 108 127.9
1978 Demand 2.8 3.0 2.8 9.4 5.5 67.5 0.9 91.9
Difference +1.0 -1.7 -0.9 ^.0 +2.0 440.5 -0.9 +36.0
Supply 4.1 1.7 2.5 6.4 8.0 112 134.7
1979 Demand 3.6 3.6 3.3 11.3 6.5 94.5 1.3 124.1
Difference +0.5 -1.9 -1.8 -4.9 +1.5 +17.5 -1.3 +10.6
Stpply 4.6 2.3 3.2 8.1 7.7 115 — 140.9
1980 Demand 4.2 4.2 4.1 12.8 7.5 121.5 1.5 155.8
Difference -+0.4 -1.9 -0.9 -4.7 40.2 6.5 -1.5 -14.9
Supply 4.9 3.1 3.8 10.5 7.3 118.0 _ 147.6
1981 Demand 4.9 4.9 5.2 14.3 8.0 148.5 1.8 187.6
Difference 0 -1.8 -1.4 -3.8 -0.7 -30.5 -1.8 -40.0
Supply 5.4 4.2 4.4 13.5 7.5 121.0 — 156.0
1982 Demand 5.8 6.0 6.2 16.8 9.5 162.0 2.3 208.6
Difference -0.4 -1.8 -1.8 -3.3 -2.0 -41.0 -2.3 -52.6
T
0 Stpply 26.0 13.7 17.5 48.8 45.0 679 830.0
T Demand 23.5 24.0 24.0 72.0 41.0 648 8.5 841.0
A
L
Difference +2.5 -10.3 -6.5 -23.2 -4.0 +31.0 -8.5 -11.0
Source: Ministry of Finance & Planning: The Six Year Plan of Economic & 
Social Development.
* As regards this category, the table shows demand projections only 
because it includes various professional and educational levels.
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Table 2.16
Higher Education Graduates Registered and Recruited into the 
Public Service, 1982/83 - 1983/86
Years Registered Recruited Percentage
A. Graduates of Scientific and Technological Faculties:
1982/83 1816 1265 69.5
1983/84 2329 1155 49.5
1984/85 2261 823 36.4
1985/86 4162 623 14.5
B. Graduates of Liberal Art Faculties:
1982/83 2274 1063 46.7
1983/84 2034 492 24.1
1984/85 2026 696 34.4
1985/86 5000 200 4.0
C. Graduates of Higher Technical Institutes:
1982/83 860 520 60.4
1983/84 634 358 56.5
1984/85 808 208 25.3
1985/86 2132 141 6.6
Source: ILO (1987) op. cit.
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N O T E S
1. See Table 2.1
2. See ILO (1986), p 8.
3. See World Bank (1987), p 7.
4. The latest devaluation was in November 1987 and accordingly the
exchange rate was fixed at $1 =£s4.5.
5. Zakat is the Islamic tax system and is defined as: an obligation 
arising on the wealth and income of the Muslem to pay dues annually 
or upon realisation as the case may be.
6 . For example, during the period 1970/71 to 1972/73 the balance of 
payments was more or less in balance and debt service ratio ranged 
from 12 to 14 per cent.
7. The daily expenditure on war is currently estimated to be about one 
million Sudanese Pounds.
8 . See ILO (1987b), p 9.
9. Cru de birth rate (per thousand) was 47.0 in 1936 and according
to the latest estimates available it is 43.3. Crude death rate
declined from 23.9 to 17.2. Total fertility rate remained un­
changed, 6.7 in 1956 and 6.6 in 1979. Child death rate (per 
thousand) declined from 160.5 in 1956 to 113.2 in 1979.
10. See World Bank (1987), op cit, p 2.
11. Child dependency ratio = the ratio of the population aged 0-14
years to those aged 15 and above.
12. For further discussion of difficulties of measuring female labour 
force participation in LDCs see G Standing (1977).
13. Although these figures are rather outdated, they are the only stat­
istics which could be obtained as the final results of 1983 National 
Census are yet to be published.
14. See ILO (1987b), op cit, p 35.
15. See ILO (1976), p 123.
16. See ILO (1987b), op cit, p 141.
17. ibid.
18. The technical secondary stream is further subdivided into commercial, 
industrial, agricultural and home economics training.
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20. See ILO (1987b), p 146.
21. ibid.
22. ibid.
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27. See Peter Fallon (1987). A feddan is a measure of land area equal 
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28. ibid.
29. See El-Bagir et al (1984).
30. P Fallon (1987).
31. E El-Bagir (1984).
32. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1985).
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34. A Statement by the Minister of Agriculture to the Constituent Assembly 
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35. See E El-Bagir (1984).
36. Other large irrigated schemes include, Rahad, New Haifa, White Nile, 
Blue Nile, Al-Gash, etc.
37. P Fallon (1987).
38. ILO (1976).
39. See Government of Sudan: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(1983) for a full account of rural labour in Northern Sudan.
40. El-Bagir (1984), op cit.
41. Extreme regional imbalances are manifested by the fact that about 90 
per cent of modern irrigated and mechanised farming schemes are in 
only two provinces, Kassala and Blue Nile.
42. See Berar-Awad (1984).
43. See P Fallon (1987).
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50. See N Choucri (1985) for a comprehensive survey of Sudanese workers
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51. ILO (1987b).
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53. See World Bank (1983).
54. See H M Al-Rahman and M B Mohammed (1984).
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57. In view of the notable fall in cotton export earnings, remittances
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60. E El-Bagir (1984).




65. Skilled labour and professionals are now needed on an even larger 
scale to maintain and run the vast numerous projects that were 
established in Arab states with the oil boom in the 1970s.
66. See ILO (1986) and ILO/UNCHR (1984).
67. See P Fallon (1987).
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protected vs unprotected, organised vs unorganised, private vs 
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see S Kannappan (1976).
70. The ILO mission to Kenya made such distinction for the first time 
on the basis that these two sectors are found quite dissimilar in 
many ways. The formal sector is made up of large enterprises both 
public and private and is characterised by large and relatively 
stable wage employment, while the informal sector is basically com­
posed of unorganised enterprises with relatively large proportion 
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71. See Case Study No. 5 (EMIC), which reveals an example of the high 
incidence of casual employment in the public sector.
72. ILO (1987b).
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nearly one million workers.
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77. ILO (1987b).
78. M A Ali (1984).
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which is responsible for the large number of liberal arts students 
in the country. In 1984/85 20^383 out of a total higher education 
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all were in humanities and social sciences.
80. E El-Bagir (1984).
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82. ibid.
83. See the Ministry of Finance Rural Labour Survey, op cit. There were 
absolute surpluses of labour in the provinces of Gezira, White Nile, 
South Kordofan, North Darfur, Red Sea, Northern and Nile thoughout 
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84. P Fallon (1987).
85. Even if there were opportunities many may be reluctant to join the 
informal sector because of social factors and the low esteem attached 
to informal activities.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter a detailed analysis of the characteristics 
and functioning of the labour markets in the Sudan has been provided.
It emerged that urban labour markets are dominated by public sector 
practices. This issue will be thoroughly considered in this chapter.
By examining, inter alia, the size of employment at different levels, 
its growth over time and the share of the wage bill in public expenditure, 
our objective is to develop a broad context for subsequent analysis of pay 
in the public sector.
3.1. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LDCs
To put the Sudanese case into perspective, it seems useful to 
consider the factors which have made the role of the public sector so 
crucial in the socio-economic development in the majority of less devel­
oped countries.
3.1.1. Scope and Functions
The term 'public sector' cannot be easily defined as an entity with 
precise boundaries. It embraces a great variety of institutions which 
are loosely organised as a whole. Thus, the concept may differ substan­
tially between countries with different socio-economic systems and over 
time. In very broad terms, it has been defind as:
r mainly... the sector of an economy that consists wholl 
of the state-owned and controlled institutions."
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In LDCs the need for an active involvement of the state is 
pressing in view of the enormous task of improving the standards of 
living which in some countries literally means the difference bet­
ween life and death. The improvement of the quality of life for the 
majority of the population frequently requires not only an appropriate 
re-orientation in development goals and strategies, but also new insti­
tutional arrangements and instruments to implement them. Thus, it has 
been noted that:
"The role of the public sector is likely to be larger, the 
greater the possibility of divergence between social and 
private costs and benefits, the greater the institutional 
and organisational obstacles to development, the greater 
the attention paid to the question of more equitable dis­
tribution of the results of the development, and the 
greater the obstacles to economic independence from foreign 
pressures."(2)
A Eckstin (1958) brings the influence of a 'demonstration effect' into 
the picture and argues that the more backward the economy in relative 
terms, the greater will be the pressure and need for massive state 
intervention.
In a report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 
Economic and Social Council in 1977, the following criteria and practices 
employed by developing countries with regard to the role and place of the 
public, were mentioned: (a) providing facilities and services aimed at 
satisfying basic social and economic needs; (b) ensuring national con­
trol of national resources and the key areas of economic activities;
(c) creation of job opportunities with particular attention to the dis­
advantaged regions, sectors and groups; and (d) filling the gaps in the 
economy by promotion of development in promising economic activities 
where private initiative has proved insufficient. These roles are des­
igned to achieve wider goals in terms of equitable distribution of na­
tional wealth, reduction ofregional imbalances, the acceleration of
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economic growth and reduction of poverty.
3.1.2. The Growth of Public Sector in LDCs
Generally, two kinds of public sector institutions could be 
distinguished: those which are engaged in the traditional areas of 
public utilities and services, and those which are used as instruments 
for achieving specific development programmes or objectives. The growth 
of the public sector, therefore, involves growth of the traditional 
civil service as well as the increase in the number of public enterprises 
as policy tools available to the state to achieve its economic, social 
and political goals.
To achieve the wider goals mentioned above, many developing 
countries have increased their dependence on the public sector since 
independence from colonial powers. The heavy weight of the public sector 
in these economies both as an employer and as a component of national 
income and expenditures, is reflected in Table 3.1 which shows its share 
in GDP, employment, capital formation and total wage bill in some Afri­
can countries. As can be seen, in spite of the highly divergent develop­
ment strategies pursued by these countries, the public sector is extremely 
important in all of them. There are, of course, the usual data problems 
in making comparisions of this kind. For example, the range of institu­
tions included in the public sector may differ from one country to an­
other. The paucity of time-series data in many countries also makes it 
difficult to draw detailed conclusions on the relative rates of growth 
in their public sectors. What is clear, however, is that the growth has 
been extremely rapid since independence, for example, the Kenyan public 
sector accounted for 19 per cent of GDP in 1964 and 38 per cent in 1977. 
The share of the public sector employment rose from 32 per cent to 42 
per cent during the period. In Tanzania, the share of the public sector
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in total monetary fixed capital formation rose from 47 per cent in 
1966 to 74 per cent in 1974. And in Nigeria the public sector's share 
of GDP rose from 9 per cent in 1962 to 38 per cent in 1 9 7 6 . ^
The reasons for the rapid expansion of the public sector in LDCs 
are multi-dimensional ie historical, political and economical, (i) His­
torical factors: the existing economic structures of most LDCs were in­
fluenced, shaped and created by colonial regimes and their relationships 
to the metropolitans. Colonialism itself laid the foundation for the 
present expanding role of the public sector. For political and economic 
reasons, most of economic activities had been concentrated in the hands 
of the central government, with limited opportunities open for private 
initiative. Even those, were dominated by foreign companies. It was, 
thus, a simple step further for the newly independent countries to 
extend the realm of the state to manufacturing and agriculture both 
through the acquisition of previously foreign-owned concerns and through 
investment in newly-created state enterprises. In this respect L Jones 
and E Mason (1977) argued that:
"In the wake of colonial exodus new governments often
have little short-term alternative but to take over
substantial responsibilities in the industrial sphere."
In addition to the historical heritage, once an enterprise is in 
public hands, for any significant period of time, then there develops 
a strong inertia (defended by various interest groups) that tends to 
keep it in the public sector regardless of performance, (ii) Socio­
political factors: in the immediate post-independence era a strong
socialist orientation had understandably developed in many LDCs. The
most general motive for establishing public sector organisations is 
widely reported to be putting the major means of production in public 
ownership to attain more egalitarian social r e l a t i o n s . D i f f e r e n t  
countries, naturally, followed different paths to socialism, depending
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on the specific conditions of a given country, and the degree of 
socialisation it intended to achieve. Tanzania, for example, has paid 
considerable attention to complete social transformation, both in using 
public enterprises as the institutional basis of socialist development 
and in the importance given to ’ujamaa* villages in rural development.
A similar orientation has been observed in S o m a l i a . O n  the other 
hand, in India, the socialist orientation has put more emphasis on 
the role of public enterprises in the mixed economy framework. However, 
the policy orientation that the public enterprise sector should grow 
through state entrepreneurship and not through nationalisation means 
that the share of public enterprises has increased only gradually and 
that they have been complementing private enterprises rather than com­
peting with them.
Another important political motive - although it could have an 
economic dimension - for the establishment of public entities is prev­
ention of foreign domination of the economy. To obtain national con­
trol over natural resources and other key areas of economic activity, 
public enterprises replaced completely or partially nationalised for­
eign enterprises. Thus, the need for greater national control of the
economy in the struggle for political and economic independence has
(8)
led to a considerable expansion of the public sector in some LDCs.
A further motive of a political nature is that of prevention of 
private domination of the economy. In analogy to the argument about 
foreign interests, there has been widespread concern in developing 
countries to prevent the excessive concentration of economic power in 
private hands, in view of a possible divergence of private and public 
interests and its repercussions on the distribution of income, wealth
and power in the society, (in) Economic factors: economic factors
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like market structure, technology, finance, size of the firm and inter­
dependence in the economy have been very important distinguishing charac­
teristics and a major motive for the establishment of public sector 
organisations even in countries where the ideological orientation does 
not favour public enterprises in general. State intervention is pressing 
in LDCs where the micro-economic processes have not been sufficient and/or 
efficient enough to start a process of growth. Thus, the state should 
take the initiative and act as a model for the private investors. More­
over, because of lack of necessary finance, experience and technology 
private investors may be unable or unwilling to enter in certain sectors 
and industries. It is the government's responsibility to fill such gaps. 
Whatever the case, the overwhelming desire for rapid development and 
economic growth leaves governments in LDCs with no alternative but to 
assume increasingly the role of the entrepreneur. This means not just 
providing the infrastructure for investment, but also setting up its 
own organisations, managing industries and organising the distributive 
trade.
3.1.3. Public Sector as an Employer in LDCs
In most LDCs, the public sector is by far the largest employer 
of wage labour. As Table 3.2. shows almost half of the employed labour 
force is engaged in public sector activities, a much higher proportion 
than OECD countries. In contrasting the relative importance of govern­
ment employment in the industrial OECD countries and the LDCs, by level 
of government, certain patterns emerge clearly. Central government is 
far more significant in non-agricultural employment in the developing 
countries, averaging 23 per cent of such employment in contrast to only 
9 per cent in the OECD countries. There is, also, considerably large 
variance in the ratio of central government employment to non-agricultural
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sector employment in the developing countries than in the OECD countries. 
In the LDCs one standard deviation from the mean of this ratio implies 
a range from 7 per cent to 50 per cent. In the OECD countries the range 
would only be 3 per cent to 14 per cent. The clear message from these 
statistics is the significant impact that government policy on wages 
and salaries is likely to have on the overall remuneration of employees 
in the non-agricultural sector in developing countries. P Heller and 
A Tait (1984) estimated the magnitude of such influence and argued 
that:
"Without even taking into account state, local and non- 
financial public enterprise employment, central govern­
ment decisions on wages and salaries in developing 
countries are likely to affect from 15 to 40 per cent 
of the urban labour market, and therefore to have a 
pervasive effect on domestic unit wage costs."(9)
The inclusion of other public sector bodies, further enhances the sig­
nificance of the sector in LDCs. For example, the employees of public 
enterprises loom much larger in LDCs, averaging 14 per cent of non- 
agricultural sector employment in contrast to only 4 per cent in OECD 
countries. Thus, altogether, public sector employees average 44 per 
cent of non-agricultural employment in LDCs and 24 per cent in OECD 
countries. Among developing countries, the share of public sector 
employees in non-agricultural employment in Africa reaches 54.4 per 
cent which is significantly higher than the 44 per cent mean for the 
OECD countries. However, even this figure of 54.4 per cent could still 
be on the low side because it is clearly based on a limited sample of 
countries. Evidence available from other sources indicates that the 
ratio could reach as high as 80 per cent in many African countries.
Not unexpectedly, the literature on the determinants of public 
sector employment in lDCs is very thin. Obviously, however, the size 
of the public sector activity shaped - as we have seen above - by a
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multitude of historical, political and economic considerations, is 
the most important factor in explaining the share of government 
employment in modern sector employment. Thus, the growth in the pub­
lic sector activity in LDCs in the last three decades or so has had 
a commensurate effect on employment by escalating the number of people 
employed in the public sector not least due to the opportunities created 
by excessive government centralisation and bureaucratisation. It could 
be argued, however, that the need for creation of employment opportun­
ities might be itself a cause rather than a consequence of public sec­
tor activity expansion. In view of the special characteristics of the 
employment problem in LDCs - as exhibited by poverty level of incomes, 
underutilisation, and limited employment opportunities outside the 
public sector - the government may find itself morally, socially and 
politically obliged to establish entities purposely for job creation. 
This is particularly apposite in the case of highly educated manpower 
for whom there is relatively little demand from both private and in­
formal sectors. It has been estimated that almost three out of four
(11)university graduates in the majority of LDCs work for government.
Among the very few empirical works on the determinants of govern­
ment in LDCs, only Lindauer (1980) and Heller and Tait (1984) have 
attempted any econometric explanation. Lindauer's study of African 
countries explained per capita public employment over time, primarily
as a function of the size of a country (as proxied by its population
(12)
size) and per capita income. Heller and Tait found that govern­
ment employment tends to increase on a per capita basis as per capita 
income rises. However, they qualified their results by arguing that 
for countries with per capita income that is less than $800 there is 
no significant relationship. No relationship emerged between the size 
of population and the share of public sector employment in both non-
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agricultural sector employment and total population. For Heller and
Tait, the type of economic system proved to be an important factor:
the more centrally planned the economy, the higher the share of the
(13)public sector employees in total non-agricultural employment.
What is interesting is that such analyses fit within the framework of 
efforts to test tte. validity of Wagner's Law, which posited the growth 
of public sector over time. In his 'Law of Increased Government Activity' 
Wagner (1883) stated that rising government expenditure was a necessary 
accompaniment to rising incomes and social progress. Social progress 
would entail a growth in the state's administrative and protective 
functions and, therefore, social expenditure and responsibilities 
would grow. Wagner also argued that larger and more efficient public 
enterprise would inevitably replace small-scale private production.
The law is, therefore, one of the 'secular' growth of public expendi-
(14)
ture which inevitably causes growth in public sector employment.
In view of the current controversies that surround public sector 
employment in the Sudan, the examination of issues such as whether the 
growth in employment is a cause or effect of increase in public expendi­
ture, may prove valuable, provided that the available data would permit 
such analysis.
3.2. THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE SUDAN
3.2.1. Definition
In line with what has been said about the 'public sector' in 
LDCs under 3.1.1. above, the term will be used here and throughout this 
thesis in its widest possible sense to include all sectors of wage em­
ployment in the Sudan, in which the government is solely or predominantly 
the owner or employer. Thus, it covers essentially: (i) the civil service
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ie, central and regional governments; and (ii) the parastatal sector 
which comprises public authorities, public corporations (under the 1976 
Act or any other special act) and public companies.
3.2.2. Activity
The public sector economy varies from country to country, largely 
due to the historical, political and economic factors that have served 
to condition and determine the state's direct economic activities as 
reflected, inter alia, in public investments. In the Sudan, the state 
has been particularly active in the economy, accounting for over 70 per 
cent of total investments, just as it has always been the largest em­
ployer of wage labour.
The dominant role of the government in the Sudanese economy has 
been further enhanced by two major events in the last couple of decades.
The first was the nationalisation in 1970 and the other was the region- 
alisation in 1980/81. With the nationalisation and confiscation decisions, 
which were widely believed to be politically oriented, a vast spectrum of 
foreign-owned and indigenous companies came under government auspicies 
ranging from large commercial banks to small trading companies. Region- 
alisation was first introduced with the conclusion of the Addis Abbaba 
Peace Agreement which gave regional self-government to Southern Region.
The process was completed by a similar arrangement for Northern Sudan 
and five more regions have been created with independent and large ad­
ministrative and political bodies for each region.
Historically, the weakness of the private sector in LDCs has been 
considered to be one of the most important reasons for the involvement 
of the state in capital accumulation process, and the Sudan is no excep­
tion. The government's entry into the economic sphere was occasioned 
by the deficiencies of the private sector where investors were more 
ready to invest in the quick-yielding opportunities to be found in
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commercial activities than in the industrial sector, for which they 
also lacked the requisite financial and entrepreneurial resource).
Thus, the government established major agricultural schemes in 
Gezira, Rahad, Blue Nile and White Nile; has taken over such industries 
as sugar, textiles, leather, construction, etc, in which production 
requires capital and expertise on a scale which is beyond the capabil­
ities of the Sudanese businessmen. Moreover, the government owns 
commercial banks and trading companies in addition to its long standing 
monopoly of transportation, communications, generation and distribution 
of electricity and other services. The net effect has been the involve­
ment of the state in virtually every aspect of economic activity in the 
country. The growth of a large parastatals sector charged with carrying 
out, controlling and monitoring the economical functions of the govern­
ment was a logical development of such wide state intervention. It has 
been reported that there are about 137 state-owned enterprises in the 
Sudan, of which 44 are corporations and 93 are companies that are 
either wholly owned by the government or joint ventures with majority 
state ownership; 18 are in agriculture, 32 in industry, 21 in commerce,
9 in transportation and 4 in energy. Total government equity in these
enterprises was some £s944 million in 1983, and annual investment was
(15)
running at about £s200 million.
3.2.3. Public Expenditure Growth
Our definition of the government/public expenditure would cover 
only the expenditures incurred by the central government. Data on 
regional governments are not yet available and even the limited infor­
mation available on aggregate basis is of dubious quality. Data on 
expenditures at local authorities' levels are basically non-existent. 
Partial accounts of some public corporations appear from time to time
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in the Ministry of Finance's Annual Economic Survey, but they are of 
varying quality and no central consolidated source of such information 
is published. At the same time, frequent re-organisations make it dif­
ficult to present meaningful time-series data on parastatals and their 
operations. Such narrowly defined public expenditure is obviously in­
sufficient to provide the full extent of public sector activity in the 
Sudan. Nevertheless, it may provide an approximate picture of the 
relative importance of its different components and their growth over 
time which, in turn, could reveal the pattern of wage bill at least 
regarding central government employees.
The majority of the government expenditures are under either the 
current or the development expenditures. This division is roughly syn­
onymous with the normal concepts of current and capital expenditures. 
The current expenditures are composed of three 'chapters'. 'Chapter 
One' includes expenditures on salaries and wages; 'Chapter Two' covers 
expenditures on services, debt repayments and interest on loans, trans­
fers to higher education institutions, subsidies and defence expendi­
tures; 'Chapter Three' includes expenditures on minor items such as 
purchase of office equipment, cars, etc. The development budget is 
divided into the two sections of government and self-financed units. 
These cover all public sector investment expenditures except those 
associated with joint-venture investments with the private sector.
The self-financed units (such as Seaports Corporations) are placed in 
a class separate from the rest of the governmental and parastatal units 
because they provide (in theory at least) the local currency component 
of their development expenditures out of current savings. However, 
these divisions within the current expenditures budget and between the 
current and the development expend it ures are not clear-cut. To be 
technically precise, a few points need to be mentioned: firstly, in
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addition to personnel expenditure in 'Chapter One' a large proportion 
of expenditure on defence, transfers to the regional governments and 
higher education institutions on account of salaries and wages. 
Secondly, 'Chapter Three' of the current budget includes some items 
of capital expenditure while, on the other hand, the development budget 
includes expenditure on wages and salaries for employees in the develop­
ment projects in progress.
Table 3.3. shows the patterns and trends of government expenditure 
for the period 1970 to 1986. During this period the growth in expendi­
ture has clearly been substantial with an average rate of growth of 
more than 20 per cent per annum. Examining each category of the public 
expenditure, the figures reveal that while the currrent expenditure 
increased by 17 fold, the development expenditure rose by a multiple 
of 10 despite the substantial amounts of capital injected into the so- 
called 'breadbasket' development projects in 1970s. Moreover, the share 
of development expenditure in total government expenditure fell from 
almost 20 per cent in 1970/71 to about 8 per cnet in 1985/86 implying 
that more government money has recently been devoted to meeting its 
current obligations.
The share of the public expenditure in GDP assumed different 
patterns during the period. The downward movement of early 1970s was 
followed by a significant upward trend until it reached its peak of 
27 per cent in 1980/81. Since then it started to decline again - except 
in 1983-85 - and by 1985/86 the share was 21 per cent of GDP, indicating 
a reduction of 3 percentage points since 1970/71. Much of this reduc­
tion could be attributed to the fall in the share of development expen­
diture which fell from 4.8 per cent of GDP in 1970/71 to 1.7 per cent 
in 1985/86 while the current expenditures' share fell slightly from 
19.6 per cent to 19.1 per cent during the period. In 1984/85 and 1985/86,
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the average growth in total expenditure was, however, still 34 per cent. 
The growth was primarily related to the rise in current outlays which 
were 68 per cent higher in 1984/85 than in the previous year and again 
22 per cent higher in the next year. Table 3.4 shows that as expendi­
ture controls weakened, 'unidentified* and other expenditures have 
emerged in recent years as a substantial proportion of total current 
expenditure. For example, during 1980/81 - 1985/86 while expenditure 
on economic and social services, in which the wage bill is a major 
constituent, increased by 32 per cent, unidentified expenditure (pri­
marily related to national security, political organisations and the 
Presidential Palace expenses) increased by almost 300 per cent; 'other 
expenses' by about 800 per cent; armed forces expenditure by 278 per 
cent, and interest payments by 500 per cent.
Thus, it could arguably be said that in addition to the cuts in 
public investment in recent years, the government opted for some kind 
of informal wage restraint or a reduction in non-salary expenditures 
in economic and social services, to reduce budget deficit, which amounted 
in 1982/83 to 7.9 per cent of GDP. But since that year it began to in­
crease and amounted to 12.9 of GDP per cent by 1985/86. It appears that 
the decrease in development expenditure and perhaps the saving on unit 
salaries have been offset by apparent increase in other budgetary and 
extrabudgetary expenditure. Coupled with a simultaneous fall in rev­
enues which fell from 15 per cent of GDP in 1980/81 to 8 per cent in 
1985/86, the net effect has been the continuation of weak budgetary 
performance and excelerating inflationary pressures.
It emerges from what has just been said that current government 
expenditure as used in official documents in the Sudan is not of a 
great help in indicating the growth of public sector employment over 
time. Expenditure on economic and social services which presumably
- 111 -
include expenses on wages and salaries constituted only 5.6 per cent 
of total current expenditure in 1985/86. Moreover, wages and salaries 
are included also in other categories such as payments to institutions, 
transfer to regions and other expenditure. For example, in 1985/86, 
'other expenditure1 in Table 3.4 included £s136 million for pay awards 
in that year. More importantly, as has been said earlier, the defini­
tion of the public expenditure exployed in this analysis does not cover 
the whole of the expenditure of public bodies such as the parastatals. 
Nevertheless, in the following sections an attempt will be made to 
reveal the extent of public sector employment growth and the consequen­
tial increase in government wage bill.
3.3. THE SIZE OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
3.3.1. Problems of Data
The collection of data on public sector employment in the Sudan 
proved to be an extremely difficult task. It is surprising that neither 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (officially considered to 
be the actual employer of all government employees) nor the Ministry of 
Labour collect labour market statistics in any systematic or standard 
way. Moreover, the deficiency is exacerbated by the absence of any 
authoritative secondary data, and one is, thus, forced to depend on 
a variety of sources of which at least some are of doubtful reliability. 
The sources consulted include: budget documents of Ministry of Finance; 
reports of ILO missions to the Sudan; reports of government committees; 
and occasional reports by government officials. Available estimates 
vary widely according to the source and the definition used by any par­




Due to lack of co-ordination and discipline even the Civil
Service Department does not keep any records of total numbers of
government employees. The only information available about civil
service employment relates to budgeted posts, ie, posts for which
financial provisions are made in 'Chapter One' in the government
annual budget, rather than to numbers actually employed. Thus, there
is always a danger that the number of budgeted posts may overstate
the actual employment at any given time by a margin commensurate to
the number of vacant posts (estimated to be in the range of 2-4 per
(16)
cent in central government). In recognition of this, it has been
reported that the Budget deducts part of the total annual cost of the 
number of budgeted posts when providing estimates of the actual budget
(17)
provisions that need to be made. For example, in 1985/86, initial
budget provision for central government was cut by 12 per cent and 
for regional governments by 10 per cent in lieu of anticipated unfilled 
posts. Such reduction may indicate that the number of vacancies at any 
particular time could be significant. Furthermore, it has been sugges­
ted that it may take 3 to 5 months to fill a vacancy in the civil ser- 
(18)
vice. Certainly some posts will remain vacant for longer periods
especially in the regions and some may not be filled at all as a part 
of deliberate policy measures to reduce overmanning in certain parts 
of the public service. However, the number of vacant posts may be 
partly offset by extra-budgetary posts created for political reasons; 
a practice which has been widespread particularly during the Numeiri 
rule. Therefore, while budgeted posts provide a good indication of the 
number of jobs available in the civil service, they do not provide 
a completely accurate measurement of numbers actually employed in any 
particular month or year. Nevertheless, in the absence of any alter-
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native reliable source of information, it will be assumed that the 
numbers employed are the same as budgeted posts.
Table 3.5 shows the number of budgeted posts in central and 
regional governments, excluding uniformed non-military forces (police, 
prison, fire services and wild life guards) for fiscal year 1985/86.
The breakdown of the total budgeted posts of 305,423 reveals that al­
most 75 per cent of total employees are in regional governments and 
25 per cent in the central government. It also shows that the percent­
age shares of classified (white collar) and unclassified (blue collar) 
employees are 45 per cent and 55 per cent respectively. The balance 
between classified and unclassified in the central government and at 
regional levels is roughly the same as at the national level. Prob­
ably about 15 per cent of civil service posts are filled with univer­
sity graduates (grades 1-9) and more than 50 per cent by candidates 
at least with a secondary school certificate (grades 1-14) implying 
that civil service in the Sudan is a large employer of educated labour.
3.3.3. Parastatals
The employment data regarding the rest of the public sector is 
much more shaky as surveys about parastatals are very scarce if not 
non-existent. The Report of the Technical Committee for the Reform 
of the Public Service and the Promotion of its Performance (January 
1986) gives 168,872 as total employment in public corporations and 
higher education institutions. Comparable figures by the ILO Report 
(1987) showed employment in public corporations and institutions to 
be 170,624 in 1985/86. Scattered information collected by the writer, 
however, suggests a higher figure of 194,765 for total parastatal 
employment in 1985/86 (see Table 3.6).
Around 30 per cent of parastatal employees are classified. In
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comparison with corresponding figures for the civil service this 
share is relatively small reflecting the concentration of blue collar 
workers in agricultural and manufacturing public corporations. How­
ever, in the financial institutions, and not unexpectedly, the number 
of white collar employees outweigh s that of manual workers by almost 
three folds.
The public sector as a whole (civil service and parastatals) thus 
provides around 533,000 posts ( including 33,079 uniformed non-military 
forces in 1985/86), and the shares of central government, regional gov­
ernments and parastatals are 16 per cent, 47 per cent and 37 per cent 
respectively. The fact that parastatals provide more than twice the 
number of posts available in the central government is a clear indica­
tion of the significance of this sector in the Sudanese economy - at 
least as an employer.
3.4. GROWTH OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
3.4.1. Growth in Number of Employees
No appropriate time-series data are available to allow an adequate 
examination of the growth of public sector employment in the Sudan. 
Nevertheless, the writer ventures to offer some tentative conclusions 
on trends in government employment using the limited aggregate avail­
able at central and, recently, at regional levels.
As Table 3.7 indicates there has been a massive increase in the 
number of civil servants in the Sudan over the past 80 years. Since 
the turn of the century, the numbers of classified staff employed in 
central government have increased from less than 1000 to more than 
86,000 in 1975; the major growth has occurred in the post-independence 
era particularly over the decade 1965-1975. In 1966/67 the government, 
as a part of its 'human resource utilisation' programmes, had adopted
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a policy of guaranteeing employment to, at least, all graduates of
university and post-secondary institutes as an 'employer of the .
last resort'. According to one source, in the beginning and until
around 1970 even the intermediate and secondary school leavers, who
were not able to enter the next stage of the education system, were
(19)
also guaranteed employment in the government. Since 1970, however,
the scheme applied to graduates from universities and post-secondary 
institutes. For this purpose, the government earmarked in the annual 
budget a special amount which constituted the 'Unemployment Relief Fund'. 
Information with regard to the number of persons employed against the 
'Fund' is very scarce. According to one source 8,367 persons had been 
employed by 1968 at a cost of £s2.144 millionC^Moreover, it was rep­
orted that the government made a provision of £s1.0 million annually 
for this purpose and that this amount was always fully used. The total 
accumulative cost to the exchequer had been estimated to be of the order 
of about £s50.0 million between 1966/67 and 1973/74. All this amount 
cannot, however, be reckoned as having been spent on employing those 
for whom there was no real need in the government service. Some of 
this had certainly covered the need for normal development to meet 
the growing requirements of the country, but a substantial portion of 
the amount of £s50 million could be reckoned to have been spent on the 
support of the government's policy as 'an employer of last resort'. 
Because of its excessive direct financial costs and its deleterious 
effect on the education system and labour market operation generally, 
the policy was dropped with reference to arts graduates in 1974, science 
graduates in 1978, agriculture graduates in 1980, and then discontinued 
altogether in 1981. Nevertheless, the scheme had already caused a sub­
stantial expansion in government employment. From 1965 to 1975, for
example, the number of classified staff in central government almost
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tripled (Table 3.7). It is widely argued that the apparent over-
staffing in the public service has been the product of earlier govern-
(21)
ment policies such as the guaranteed employment system.
Table 3.7, also, shows that the number of classified staff in 
central government has been falling since 1975. But, this has been 
due to the shift of employment from central to regional governments 
as part of the regionalisation programme introduced in 1980/81. In­
fact, the first steps toward regionalisation started long before that 
time. Following the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 which temporarily 
ended the civil war, a Southern Region with a large degree of auton­
omy has been instituted. In 1974/75, the gradual devolution of the 
ministries of education, local government and agriculture was initiated. 
This was completed by the decentralisation of other ministries and the 
full establishment of political and adminsitrative bodies in five 
northern regions in 1980.
The rationale behind regionalisation has primarily been political 
and/or administrative. It is viewed as a way of making government work 
better and thus, ’regional and local government units are supposed to
be more responsive to people's wants and more efficient in satisfying 
(22)
them'. The process, nevertheless, has employment consequences.
By transferring as many functions as possible from the centre, before 
opting for creation of new posts in regional governments, it was expec­
ted to reduce the central government's burden in employment as well as 
budgetary terms. Moreover, it was viewed as a means of controlling the 
employment growth in the central and regional governments taken as a 
whole.
Table 3.8, which provides the number of budgeted posts in 
central and regional governments for the period 1975/76 - 1985/86, 
indicates that the balance between classified and unclassified remained
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roughly the same, but the balance between central and regional employ­
ment changed dramatically. In 1975/76 central government accounted 
for 53 per cent of all posts and 66 per cent of classified posts. By 
1985/86 its share had fallen to 25 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. 
Classified posts in central government had declined from 86,418 in 1975/76 
to 42,855 in 1985/86 and unclassified posts from 49,282 to 42,888 result­
ing in an overall fall in central government employment of 37 per cent.
In the absence of relevant information it is difficult to accurately 
claim that such a decline was entirely due to the shift from central to 
regional governments. It is possible that part of it might have been 
caused by the government's informal policy of restricting the number of 
new recruits in recent years.
Nevertheless, employment in regional governments expanded substan­
tially and increased by more than 100 per cent during the period 1975/76 - 
1985/86. The increase was marked in classified budgeted posts which 
rose by 180 per cent against 68 per cent for the unclassified. It 
appears, therefore, that creation of new posts in the regions was deemed 
necessary because either the required shift of staff from central gov­
ernment activity was too large to be manned by transferred staff alone. 
Whatever the case, total budgeted posts in central and regional govern­
ments increased by a third during the decade 1975/76 - 1985/86.
3.4.2. Growth of Wage Bill
Considering the difficulties in obtaining reliable information 
about employment in the public sector, the dearth of labour cost data 
should hardly be surprising. The only information available relates 
to the financial provision in 'Chapter One' of the Budget which roughly 
indicates the cost of central government posts each year. Even such 
information is not obtainable in a systematic fcrm and figures for
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earlier years are either lacking or vary considerably according to the 
source. Within these constraints, nevertheless, Table 3.9, which shows 
the growth in budget provision for 'Chapter One' (ie, wages and salaries), 
and the central governemnt employee unit wage cost during 1963/66 - 
1983/86, has been compiled. Figures indicate that provisions for 'Chapter 
One' had been icnreased by almost five times since 1965/66 against a 
37 per cent rise in the number of budgeted posts. As a result, the 
unit wage cost rose by more than 200 per cent from £s436 in 1965/66 to 
£s1452 in 1985/86. Apparently this dramatic rise in unit cost occurred 
after 1975/76 due to the combined effect of a sharp rise in 'Chapter 
One' provisions and a concurrent decline in the number of budgeted 
positions; implying that upward pay revisions during the period were 
quite substantial.
Unfortunately, data are literally non-existent to indicate the 
growth of labour cost in other parts of the public sector. Nevertheless, 
Table 3.10 provides an incomplete picture of the total labour cost and 
unit wage cost in the parastatals and regional governments in 1983/84 
and 1985/86. As evident, total labour cost in regional governments 
is almost three times that of the central government; obviously reflc- 
ting their relative share in employment. In terms of unit wage cost, 
however, the figure for regional governments is slightly lower probably 
because of the concentration of highly paid staff in central government 
or because of the difference between the kinds and rates of allowances 
payable. The unit wage cost in the parastatals in 1983/84 was about 
30 per cent higher than the corresponding figure in the civil service; 
not unexpectedly reflecting the disparities in individual emoluments 
as will become apparent later in this study.
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3.4.3. Leverage Implications of Public Sector Employment
A principal reason for analysing the size of public sector 
employment is the belief that government employment and pay policies 
have critical implications for the economy at large, not least the 
remuneration system. It has been stated that,
"... the larger the government share of employment, the 
more likely it is to dominate wage rates and awards not 
only for public sector employees but for the private 
sector as well, and thus to have a significant degree 
of leverage".(23;
The relationships of public sector employment numbers to popula­
tion, labour force and modern sector of employment might all be taken 
to be indicative of the impact of government wage policies on wage 
rates in the economy, the distribution of income, and the structure 
of output in the economy. But as the government in the Sudan has 
little direct influence on agricultural wage rates (for example, the 
1974 Minimum Wage legislation does not apply to agricultural workers), 
it is the size of government employment relative to the modern sector 
employment that is most likely to serve as a useful measure of potential 
leverage. Table 3.11 gives estimates of employment numbers in different 
parts of the modern sector in the Sudan. The public sector provides
about 83 per cent of total non-agricultural (modern) sector employment
and the share of the civil service alone reaches as high as 54 per
cent. However approximate the figures may be, the clear implication
is that government wage policy is likely to have a significant impact 
on the pay determination process in the country.
Another measure of the potential weight of government wage 
policy is the ratio of government wages to the national total wage bill 
or to GDP. As mentioned before, information in this regard is very 
scarce. Nevertheless, an authoritative source suggested that in 1983/84 
public sector wages constitued more than 80 per cent of the total wage
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bill and the equivalent of 15 per cent of G D P ; ^ ^  ratios considerably
higher than that of 52 per cent and 12 per cent respectively observed
(25)
for developing countries generally. This finding suggests that
not only the public sector has a pervasive effect on the overall remu­
neration system in the Sudan, but it has also a large claim on national 
income thus affecting its ultimate distribution.
3.5,. CONCLUSION
Although one is forced to rely on extremely deficient information 
regarding public sector employment in the Sudan, the scattered data 
assembled in this chapter suggest that: the public sector is the largest 
single employer in the country representing some 85 per cent of modern 
sector employment and over 80 per cent in the total wage bill. Employ­
ment in the public sector has been expanding with a marked shift to 
regional governments in recent years. Whilst part of this increase 
in public service employment was necessary to provide manpower to the 
increasing range of government activity and, thus, services needed by 
a fast growing population, it has been argued that other elements of
expansion over years have equally clearly not been justified by the
increase in services, but were a result of past government policies
and a response to a felt need to deal with a growing number of other-
(2 6 )
wise unemployed. It is widely recognised that some parts of the
public sector suffer from a gross underutilisation of manpower con­
currently with apparent shortages of certain skills in other parts. 
However, in the absence of proper assessments of staffing requirements 
it would be very difficult to determine the exact magnitude of over- 
staffing and/or shortages in public sector employment.
For the determination of adequate pay levels, this lack of infor-
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mation about existing staff levels coupled with the lack of a yard­
stick to indicate how much employment is required to provide a certain 
level and quality of public services, poses serious problems. Never­
theless, the public sector wage bill is growing rapidly, sometimes 
independently of the movement of public sector employment. This 
implies that, although the government employment policy in terms of 
numbers it retains at any time directly affects its ability to pay, 
the level of employment is only one determinant of the size of the 
pay bill. The level of pay of each employee is the other, and an 
alternative to cutting employment is constraining the rate of growth 
of public sector pay. The rest of this thesis is devoted to analysis 
of public sector pay developments in the last couple of decades or so. 
However, it was thought that the understanding of recent years' exper­
ience cannot be adequate without the consideration of the major devel­




Percentage Share of the Public Sector in GDP, Employment Capital 
Formation and Total Wage Bill*




Kenya 37.7 42.0 43.9 51.8
Nigeria 38.0 65.0 67.5 NA
Tanzania 61.4 70.1 73.7 70.7
Somalia 65.0 74.0 65.8 NA
Ghana 39.0 73.8 87.4 72.0
Source: Derived from different sources, including, R Abdin 
et al (1983), "A World of Differentials", and P 
Sicherl (1983) "The Role of Public Enterprises in 
National Development".
* These figures are for different years in different countries, 
but the majority are for the period 1974-1978.
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Table 3.2
Share of Government Employment in Total Non-agricultural Sector 










Central Government (x) 8.7 23.4 30.8 13.9 20.7
(s) (3.7) (16.2) (15.0) (3.9) (21.1)
(n) 16 27 13 5 9
Local Government (x) 11.6 4.0 2.1 8.0 4.2
(s) (6.0) (7.3) (2.6) (14.7) (4.4)
(n) 16 31 16 5 10
General Government (x) 19.2 26.0 33.0 22.2 20.7
(s) (5.9) (13.7) (15.1) (16.3) (4.6)
(n) 21 26 13 6 7
Nan-financial PUblic Enterprises (x) 4.1 13.9 18.7 15.7 5.5
(s) (2.7) (11.9) (14.2) (10.8) (4.2)
(n) 14 17 8 4 5
Public Sector Employment (x) 24.2 43.9 54.4 36.0 27.4
(s) (7.8) (22.1) (21.2) (23.1) (13.2)
(n) 14 22 12 5 5
x = mean
s = standard deviation
n = number of observations in the sample
Source: Figures derived from Table I in P Heller & A Tait, Government 
Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons, Occasional 
Paper No. 24, IMF Oct 1983.
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Table 3.3
Central Governments Revenues and Expenditures and GDP in current 
prices (in £s million) 1970/71 - 1985/86
Year








Revenues Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
1970/71 164 150 37 187 765 21.4 24.2
1971/72 170 171 30 201 832 20.4 24.2
1972/73 176 172 32 204 897 19.6 22.7
1973/74 206 190 42 232 1246 16.5 18.6
1974/75 288 264 102 366 1511 19.1 24.2
1975/76 323 284 113 397 1848 17.5 21.5
1976/77 385 332 155 487 2340 16.5 20.8
1977/78 459 423 186 609 2883 15.9 21.1
1978/79 505 647 165 612 3254 15.5 18.8
1979/80 587 724 221 975 3972 14.8 24.5
1980/81 734 1050 291 1341 4980 14.7 26.9
1981/82 895 1348 315 1663 6721 13.3 24.7
1982/83 1272 1563 414 1977 9344 13.6 21.2
1983/84 1474 1986 463 2449 11472 12.8 21.3
1984/85 1486 3333 472 3805 14920 10.0 25.5
1985/86 1790 4073 369 4442 21357 8.4 20.8
Source: figures for 1975/76 - 1985/86 period are derived from World
Bank (1987) op cit. Figures for earlier years are from
Ministry of Finance Economic Surveys for different years •
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Table 3.4



























1975/76 69 18 46 78 74 284
1976/77 84 18 67 76 88 - - 332
1977/78 92 53 81 91 105 - - 423
1978/79 82 32 76 252 131 - 75 647
1979/80 102 48 107 196 209 - 62 724
1980/81 174 193 125 69 264 112 115 1054
1981/82 184 281 114 89 297 255 128 1348
1982/83 214 324 164 106 301 266 190 1563
1983/84 222 374 300 124 322 436 208 1986
1984/85 188 939 462 143 361 762 479 3333
1985/86 229 1174 473 160 558 429 1051 4073
Source: World Bank (1987) op cit Table 5.3.
* Reflects security forces expenses, Presidential Palace expenses, 
custom duties uncollected from public corporations, etc.
** Includes £s92 million and £s91 million emergency food distribution 
in 1984/85 and 1985/86 respectively, £s106 and £s76 million devalua­
tion compensation in these years and £s136 million for pay award and 
£s280 million reserves in 1985/86.
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Table 3.5
Civil Service : Number of Budgeted Posts for Fiscal Year 1985/86*
Grade
Central Government 
Classi- Uhclassi- T , 
fied fled Total
Regional Government 








1 153 153 38 38 191 191
2 37 37 57 57 94 94
3 177 177 164 164 341 341
4 375 375 493 493 868 868
5 1289 1289 1149 1149 ' 2438 2438
6 1101 1101 3341 3341 4442 4442
7 2577 2577 7504 7504 10081 10081
8 3286 3286 10264 10264 13550 13550
8/9 3563 3563 3830 3830 7393 7393
9 2726 2726 3158 3158 5884 5884
10 1329 1329 886 886 2215 2215
10/1QA 314 314 5103 5103 5417 5417
10A 2449 2449 12643 12643 15092 15092
11 5 509 52 1789 1841 57 2293 2350
12 4454 1277 5731 10527 3833 14360 14981 5110 20091
13 - 3958 3958 - 8304 8304 - 12262 12262
12/14 680 - 680 27156 - 27156 27836 — 27836
14 9932 - 9932 11933 - 11933 21865 - 21865
15 286 5350 5636 2843 15965 18808 3129 21315 24444
16 - 9372 9372 - 28250 28250 - 37622 37622
17 - 5959 5959 - 19800 19800 - 25759 25759
18 - 16468 16468 - 48720 48720 - 65188 65188
Total 34733 42888 77621 101141 126661 227802 135874 169549 305423
Source: ILO (1987) Pay and Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector 
in the Sudan. A draft Report of an ILO mission to the Sudan.
* Excluding uniformed non-military forces.
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Table 3.6
Employment in Parastatals 1985/86.
Public Sector Category Classified Unclassified Total
Public Authorities 20913 58315 79228
Public Corporations 22924 59985 82909
Public Companies 4405 7369 11774
Higher Education Inst. 5049 7889 12938
National Banks 5982 1934 7916
Total 59273 135492 194765
Source: Civil Service Department, Bank of Sudan, Higher Education 
Council, Accounts Department of Ministry of Finance and 
Planning.
Table 3.7






1953 9218 986 100
1958 16803 1791 182
1965 31283 3346 339 100
1970 42405 4535 460 136
1975 86418 9242 937 276 100
1980 55329 5918 600 177 64
1985 42855 4583 465 137 50
Source: Data provided by Civil Service Department, 1986.
Table 3.8























1975/76 86418 49282 135700 45194 75000 120194 131612 124282 255894 53.0 51.4
1976/77 99643 47058 146701 58933 78000 136933 158576 125058 283634 51.7 55.9
1977/78 82373 54516 136889 70500 85000 155500 152873 139516 292389 46.8 52.3
1978/79 56358 49795 106153 77788 91000 168788 134146 140795 274941 38.6 48.8
1979/80 52591 51147 103738 83300 90000 173300 135891 141147 277038 37.4 49.1
1980/81 55329 47781 103110 109792 109000 218792 165121 156781 321902 32.0 51.3
1981/82 56679 53074 109753 105000 116000 221000 161679 169074 330753 33.2 48.9
1982/83 57632 54760 112392 109000 121000 230000 166632 175760 342392 32.8 48.7
1983/84 56523 52286 108809 109200 119000 228400 165723 171486 337209 32.3 49.1
1984/85 43000 38000 81000 126000 123000 250200 169600 162400 332000 24.6 51.1
1985/86 42855 42888 85743 125950 126000 252611 168805 169549 338354 25.3 49.9
Source: Data provided by Civil Service Department.




Growth in Central Government Budgeted Posts and Chapter I in the 
Budget 1963/66 - 1983/86
Year No. of posts^  ^
(2)
Chapter V  J 
(£s million)
Labour Unit Cost 
(£s)
1965/66 62566 27.3 436
1970/71 87090 42.0 482
1975/76 135700 55.6 410
1980/85 103110 107.5 1043
1085/86 85743 124.5 1452
Source: Civil Service Department
(1) Includes both classified and unclassified posts.
(2) Chapter I in the budget comprises annual provisions for wages 
and salaries for central government employees.
Table 3.10
Estimates of Labour Cost in Public Sector 1983/84 and 1985/86
1983/84 1985/86
1. Number of Employees
Central Government 108,809 85,743
Regional Government 228,400 252,611
Parastatals 168,226 194,765
2. Labourt Cost (£s)
Central Government 119,400,000 124,500,000
Regional Government NA 331,119,425
Parstatals 220,407,469 NA
3. Labour Unit Cost (£s)
Central Government 1,097 1,452
Regional Government NA 1 ,311
Parastatals 1,310 NA
Source: ILO (1987b) op cit p 6, and Civil Service Department.
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Table 3.11
Estimate of Employment in the Formal Sector* 1983/86
Sector Number Percentage
1 . Central Government 85734 13.8
2 . Regional Governments 252611 40.5
3. Civil Service (1 + 2) 338354 54.3
4. Parastatals 194765 31.3
5. Total Public Sector (3 + 4) 533119 85.6
6 . Private Sector 90000 14.4
7. Formal Sector (5 + 6) 623119 100.0
Source: Figures for the public sector are derived from Tables 3.6 
and 3.8. For private sector see ILO (1987b) op cit p 95.
* It must be noted that these figures provide very crude estimates 
and figures available from other sources may vary considerably.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF 
PAV DETERMINATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
1900 - 1969
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The obvious starting-point for an examination of pay determina­
tion processes is the historical legacy of the pay fixing machinery 
and pay structures originating from the colonial era. It is our 
belief that this historical legacy is more than a mere starting 
point since it appears to have powerfully influenced subsequent res­
ponses to the problems of pay determination in the public sector in 
the Sudan.
The prime source of information about the historical development 
of pay structures and policies is the reports of the ad hoc commissions 
set up periodically to determine pay and other conditions of employment 
for government employees. Thus, this chapter largely aims to provide 
a functional analysis of these commissions to reveal the processes 
involved, the factors that had been taken into consideration and the 
resultant remuneration system in the public sector. It needs to be 
noted, however, that the terms 'civil service' and 'public sector' 
will be used interchangeably in this chapter unless it is very essen­
tial to differentiate between them. This is due to the fact that the non- 
civil service government sector was very small during the period.
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4.2. THE PRE-1948 PERIOD
The Sudan's civil service dates back to the early years of this 
century, specifically to the Condominium Agreement (1899) between 
Britain and Egypt which established British rule over the country with 
a nominal recognition of the 'historical' claims of Egypt. The service 
was basically manned by the British, particularly the top posts, while 
a few Egyptians, Syrians and Lebanese were employed to do clerical and 
interpretation work. A local administrative system presided over by 
tribal chiefs was set up to deal with local affairs and collect taxes 
and rates.
In 1901, there were only 931 classified staff in the entire pub­
lic sector in the country; this increased by 1920 to 1459 of which 36 
per cent were Sudanese. At that time, the native employees had their 
wages and salaries fixed on an individual basis. When Egypt declared 
its independence from British rule in 1922, and in a show of good­
will towards its neighbour, Egyptians in the Sudan were evacuated crea­
ting many vacancies in the civil service particularly in the lower and 
middle-level posts. The Sudanese had to be recruited to fill the gap 
at relatively attractive salaries which would gain their support and 
induce them to accept the new political situation in which the British 
became the sole rulers of the country. As a result, pay scales had 
been revised and a general schedule covering Sudanese as well as ex­
patriates was created. The grading and pay scales which emerged are 
shown in Table 4.1. According to this schedule, new British recruits 
used to join the service at grade 4 or 5. The Sudanese with a secon­
dary school certificate would start at grade 7, while primary school 
leavers were recruited in at the lowest grade. As grade 4 and above 
were restricted to the British, the highest grade a Sudanese could
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reach was grade 5. Thus, no wonder the ratio of top-bottom differen­
tial was almost 47:1.
The great depression of 1929/30 imposed considerable hardship on 
the Sudanese economy. Among measures taken to deal with the effects 
of depression, the government reduced the salaries of Sudanese staff 
by 20 per cent without a corresponding cut in salaries of the British. 
These measures were resisted by the Sudanese and aggravated the suspi­
cion which had already been building up between the government and the 
(1)educated class. To avoid a possible confrontation, the government 
appointed a committee in February 1934 to enquire into the 'standard' 
of remuneration and conditions of employment in the civil service.
The committee recommended a new pay structure with three divisions and 
12 grades as shown in Table 4.2. The Sudanese were allocated to the 
second and third divisions while the first division was reserved for 
the British. Although there was some improvement in the pay rates 
for the Sudanese, still the highest salary which a Sudanese could 
achieve was much less than the lowest salary of a Britisher. Such 
practices at a time when there was a growing tide of nationalism, 
rising cost of living due to the war, and an expanding industrial em­
ployment, made the Sudanese workers more aware of the pressing need 
for an organised labour movement to protect their interests. As most 
industrial employment was concentrated in the Sudan Railways in Atbra, 
the first trade union in the country was set up by railway workers. 
After a 12-day strike, the first of its kind in the history of the 
country, the Workers Affairs Association (WAA) was recognised by the 
government as a bona fide trade union in July 1947. Having gained 
recognition, WAA consolidated its efforts to achieve economic gains 
for its members. In November 1947 WAA submitted to the government a 
list of demands including, inter alia, reducation of working hours,
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payment of overtime and a general increase in pay scales ranging from 
23 per cent to 40 per cent. A committee of enquiry, which was consid­
ered to be 'the first serious attempt to remould the wage structure
4.3. THE INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY, 1948
In its report - submitted to the government in March 1948 - the 
Independent Committee of Enquiry accepted in principle that wages of 
the lowest paid categories should provide a reasonable level of 'sub­
sistence'. Accordingly, it recommended that this group should receive, 
allowing for 100 per cent cost of living allowance, a basic minimum of 
£s2.10 a month, rising by biennial increments to £s2.55. On the other 
hand, it took the view that raising wages for the lowest-paid was not 
in itself a reason for raising those of more skilled workers. The 
Committee asserted that:
"The WAA's agruments in favour of a general increase of 
wages to enable a preconceived standard of living to be 
maintained at various levels, was based on a misconcep­
tion .... In the Sudan, as elsewhere, the standard of 
inue to derive from earnings and not
Evidence given to the Committee on wage ratios showed that skilled 
labour in Sudan Railways was earning up to six times as much as the 
unskilled and the earnings of clerks ranged from three to five times 
those of the skilled. Thus, the Committee noted that:
"While the scarcity of artisans inevitably raises the price 
of their labour a ratio of 6:1 may still be regarded as 
disproportionate, particularly up to 1948 when the labour­
ers did not get a living wage .... In Europe the pay 
ratio of the artisan to the labourer is approximately
1.25:1 or 1.33:1 .... this is not to suggest that Western 
European standards of wage structure can be applied in 
this country. But as far as this Committee is aware, it 
is unusual anywhere for an artisan to be paid up to six 
times as much as the labourer and still more unusual to 
find it possible for a clerk to attain a salary even five




times the wage of an artisan or up to twenty times
the basic wage of the labourer."(4)
The Committee while unanimously recommeding a 'subsistence' 
minimum wage, members disagreed on other matters, and two sets of 
recommendations regarding pay scales were produced. The majority 
recommended increasing both minimum and maximum rates and thus, 
establishing pay scales with a wide range of each grade. The min­
ority proposed a general increase in the minimum rates, a restricted
increase in the maxima and the introduction of new grades for leading 
artisans and other persons with special qualifications as a step to­
wards a system of 'the rate for the job' which the government hoped 
eventually to establish. Faced by a majority and a minority report, 
the government decided to adopt the unanimous recommendations for 
improved rates for labourers and the minority recommendations on the 
pay of skilled workers and others. The resultant scales are shown 
in Table 4.3. Accordingly the ratio of skilled/unskilled wage dif­
ferential had been reduced to 3:1 basically because of the adoption 
of those recommendations which did not raise the maxima for skilled 
and semi-skilled labourers.
Although the recommendations of the Independent Committee of 
Enquiry (1948) were meant to be applied to Sudan Railways Workers, 
it has been reported that other government units increasingly adopted 
these scales and adjusted their workers' wages accordingly.^^ Fawzi 
(1957) stated that:
"The attempts of government departments to introduce scales 
tailored for the standards of railway workers means they 
had chosen the easier way of ignoring internal standards 
and fitting their categories into a number of conveniently 
long scales, at the same time ignoring all efficiency b a r s " . (6)
Consequently, the system which emerged was described by Fawzi (1957) 
as grossly irrational. It was not tied to standards which were
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sufficiently known or co-ordinated and a confusion of category names 
reigned in the various government units, leading to a considerable 
amount of irregularities and anomalies. Overall, more than 100 pay 
schedules existed in different government departments, and each 
schedule had generally two classes of which the upper was usually 
reserved for expatriates, mainly British. The system, nevertheless, 
continued until 1951.
4.4. THE WAKEFIELD COMMISSION 1950/51
The Wakefield Commission was one of the two commissions set
up in December 1950 to revise pay structures in the civil service. It
was asked to review wages of labourers or 'unclassified' in the public
sector while the Mills Commission was responsible for designing new 
salary scales for officials or 'classified' staff.
These commissions had been brought forth largely to restore 
industrial peace. Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) which 
was formed by public sector unions in 1949, staged a number of strikes 
during 1949-51 to back its demands for better conditions and higher 
wages. Fawzi (1957) estimated the number of man-days lost through 
strikes related to pay issues to be nearly half a million days in 
1949/50.
Unlike its predecessor the Independent Committee of Enquiry, the 
Wakefield Commission, was entrusted with the difficult but then urgent 
task of revising the wage structure for all public sector labourers. 
After nearly a year of deliberations, the Commission reported to the 
government in September 1951. The proposed structure was based on the 
'grouping system' and established seven groups allegedly covering the 
variations in skill and responsibility in all jobs from the general
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(8)labourer (Group I) to those of the skilled worker (Group III).
The Commission then determined a minumum and a maximum wage rate for
each group, and a system of annual increments, supposedly commensurate 
with increased responsibility and experience, was adopted (Table 4.4).
In determining the rate for the lowest paid labourer, the 
Commission used as a yardstick the basic requirements of a man, his 
wife and two children at a conventional level of subsistence based on 
a Household Budget Survey conducted in Khartoum in 1951. Allowing for 
a differential ratio of about 1:2 between the average unskilled labourer 
and the average skilled artisan, the rest of pay scales were fixed. 
Relative to 1948 scales, the pay increases amounted to almost 100 per 
cent for all categories of skills. The Commission claimed that this 
was an attempt to equate the long term demand for labour with supply.
Moreover, the basic wage was supplemented by a Cost of Living 
Allowance (COLA) payable on a diminishing scale ranging from 100 per 
cent for Group I to 51 per cent for Group VII, and periodically adjus­
table to match fluctuations in market prices.
A major problem faced the Commission when it considered the pos­
sibility of applying the proposed pay structure to government workers 
throughout the country. The Commission argued that:
"It would be a positive disservice to the less-developed 
regions to ignore economic differences and pay the same 
real wage in all parts of the country .... if real wages 
were fixed too high in relation to productivity, commer­
cial concerns would be detered from starting new enter­
prises and investing capital in the region, thus delay­
ing its economic development. If they were already 
established there, they would economise in labour and 
unemployment would r e s u l t " . (9)
Another reason was given in terms of backward-bending labour supply 
curve theory. The Commission, thus, claimed that:
"If high wages were introduced in low productivity regions? 
workers would spend more of their wages on less essential 
goods or on supporting more dependants, or otherwise once
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their basic requirements had been satisfied, they 
would work less time".(10)
Therefore, it was considered appropriate to provide separate wage 
rates for the low productivity, low cost-of-living regions. However, 
the case for such regional differentials was not free from practical 
complications. In theory at least, government employees are transfer­
a b l e  to any part of the country, and could not reasonlably be expected 
to accept lower pay in some regions. Thus, applying low wage rates in 
certain areas would certainly hinder the mobility of labour particularly 
skilled manpower who were in short supply. The solution sought by the 
Commission established that skilled workers should receive the same 
wage rate wherever they were but for the unskilled, wage rates should 
be fixed to reflect differences in regional productivity and cost of 
living. Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF), was critical 
of this concept of regional differentials because it contradicted the 
’equal pay for equal work’ principle which it was actively trying to 
establish. The Federation also complained about other issues. It 
attacked the Household Budget Survey, according to which the minimum 
rate was fixed, on the grounds that it did not include many essential 
requirements. Moreover, it argued that the majority of workers were 
allocated in Group I and II and opportunities for promotion were lim­
ited. Nevertheless, in general, SWTUF regarded the recommendations 
of the Wakefield Commission as a victory in its struggle against the 
colonial rule for better conditions for Sudanese workers.
4.5. THE MILLS COMMISSION 1951
The Mills Commission was set up and reported at the same time as
the Wakefield Commission to revise the pay structure for government 
'classified' employees. The Commission was intended to make the neces-
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sary changes in the pattern of remuneration to prepare the Sudanese 
civil service for the transition and eventually independence era* The 
Commission claimed that there was an overriding need to dismantle rac­
ial segregation of jobs and reduce the degree of income inequality with­
in the civil service. Thus, its terms of reference were largely ref­
lecting such objectives. They included, inter alia, examination of the 
relationship between Sudanese and expatriates' term of employment, det­
ermination of general principles and criteria for pay and promotion, and 
introduction of a simplified grading system.
In its report, the Mills Commission (1951) stated that separate 
arrangement of pay for expatriates was dictated by the lack of quali­
fied native staff. But, as rapid Sudanisation was envisaged, it was 
essential to propose a unified structure. A special allowance was, 
however, recommended for expatriates presumably to facilitate the re­
placement of foreign staff without any fundamental changes in pay 
structure.
The recommended structure contained three main classes of 'clas­
sified' jobs in the civil service: (a) an adminsitrative/professional 
class; (b) a sub-professional/technical class; and (c) a clerical class. 
To each of these classes was attached a salary scale divided into a 
number of strata to be passed through on promotion as the incumbent 
gains experience and competence to hold high posts. Grades and pay 
scales laid down by the Mills Commission (1951) are shown in Table 4.5. 
Altogether, the proposed structure contained 19 groups, 10 in the admin­
istrative class, 4 in the technical and 5 in the clerical class. Pay 
for adminsitrative/professional groups was fixed on a flat-rate basis 
while for technical and clerical groups it was a scale extended by
up to 60 per cent between the minima and maxima. The resulting differ­
ential ratio between the highest and lowest classified group was about
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17:1 which represented a substantial reduction relative to the corres­
ponding ratio of 28:1 in 1935.
The movement in the cost of living index was a major criterion
in determining the proposed pay rates. The Commission found that there 
had been a reduction of 7 percentage points in the index during 1948- 
1951. Consequently, it recommeded that the cost of living allowance, 
which used to be paid separately since 1946, should be consolidated in 
the basic rate. However, it made a provision for its re-establishment 
if the cost of living had to increase by 10 per cent or more in a new
index with the base year 1950 = 100. In setting up the procedure for
the payment of the new COLA, the Commission argued that:
"The only practical course in determining the salaries of 
the classified staff involves as a fundamental principle 
that the individual must suffer the greater sacrifice as 
their means, measured by income, are larger".
Accordingly, it recommended a COLA system of a decreasing scale ranging 
from 100 per cent for thosepaid less than £s100 per annum to 20 per cent 
for those paid £s450 or more. This was regarded as an essential measure 
to reduce the wide inequalities in civil service pay structures.
While no explicit reference was made in the Commission's Report 
to indicate generally the principles it followed in determining the 
relative pay of different occupational groups, it was evident that the 
proposed system was closely linked to educational attainment. The three 
entry ports into the service (Scale K, J and Q) were conditioned by the 
possession of relevant qualifications from intermediate school, second­
ary school and university, respectively. Mohammed-Taha (1979) argued
that such emphasis on education was inevitable in view of the limited
(14)
supply of highly educated manpower within the country. However,
it could be argued as well, that in the absence of a salaries yard­
stick which could have effectively operationalised other principles,
- 143 -
such as comparability, adherence to educational attainment was to
resort to an easily applicable guideline. For example, due to lack
of any sort of competition from the private sector at that stage of
the development in the Sudan, it was often very hard to determine what
a candidate for the public service would have been paid for offering
his services elsewhere.
The Mills Commission, also, showed a great concern for the need
to maintain a high level of morale within the civil service. It stated
in its report that:
"Not only do new recruits have to be educationally acceptable, 
but once they are members of the service they cannot be expec­
ted to perform their duties to the best of their ability unless 
they remain contented with their lot which mainly depends on 
how well they are remunerated".^ '
Nevertheless, the report of the M ills Commission included about 
70 recommendations covering a wide range of civil service pay and emp­
loyment issues. The Commission believed that the implementation of 
these recommendations would bring stability and efficiency into the 
civil service. Probably, the Commission was right in it claim as the 
next major pay reform initiative was not taken until 1965, ie, after 
nine years of political independence. But, it could also be argued 
that this was a reflection of the unions' apparent inability to exert 
enough pressure on the government to make concessions. This failure 
was atributed to the fact that:
"The political developments in the country during this 
period seriously hampered the efforts of the labour 
movement in achieving demands for higher wages, a min­
imum wage law and equal pay for equal work".06)
Hostility and antagonism were salient features of union-government 
relationship at that time. Getting into the ideological struggle in 
the country, the SWTUF allied itself firmly, from the start, with the 
Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) against the traditional parties (Umma
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and Democratic Unionists) which drew their support from the two dom­
inant religious sects (Ansar and Khatmiyya, respectively), as well as 
against the Abboud Military Regime (1958-64). Thus, not unexpectedly, 
the national governments in the immediate post-independence era, fre­
quently attempted to weaken SWTUF by creating rival federations, or 
curtailing its power by means of legislation. In consequence, SWTUF 
devoted much of its effort in the struggle for its own survival.
This it did by getting more involved in the political struggle and
(17)working with other opposition elements to shake the existing regimes.
The implication of this hostility was that unions became in a relatively 
weak position to force the government to meet their demands for better 
pay and conditions.
It was not until 1964 that the unions became a powerful and a 
significant factor in the industrial and political scene. Following 
the October Revolution, trade unions grew in number and membership as 
favourable industrial relations legislation was enacted. Consequently, 
they were able to put enough pressure on the government to form two 
Commissions in 1965 to revise the 1951 wage and salary structure. The 
recommendations of these two Commissions and their implementation are 
considered below.
4.6. THE 'UNCLASSIFIED' WORKERS WAGES AND TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT COM­
MISSION, 1965/1968
The Commission (henceforth referred to as 'Unclassified' Workers 
Commission or UWC) was appointed to look into the wage structure and 
other terms of employment of the 'unclassified' workers in the public 
sector. A letter from the Minister of Finance (dated 31.8.1965) to 
the Commission specified its terms of reference which included: exam­
ination of existing salary scales, grades, posts, promotion procedures,
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post-service benefits and the recommendation of required modifica­
tions and adjustments.
UWC presented its report to the government in May 1968 ie after 
nearly three years from its formation. Apparently, no drastic change 
was made in the basic structure laid down by the Wakefield Commission
in 1951. UWC adopted the same grading classification but added an
extra grade (Group VIII). It stated that:
"The reason for increasing the number of 'groups' from
7 to 8 is that existing groups are not sufficient to
accommodate a wide range of new jobs introduced into 
the public service since the 1950s". ( ^3
The Commission, also, maintained the principle of formulating 
the entire pay structure on the basis of a minumum wage determined 
according to the basic needs of an 'average' family. However, it en­
larged the size of the family by increasing the number of children to 
be included from two to three. It argued that the size of the 'average' 
family determined by Wakefield Commission (five members) was 'unrealis­
tic' and incompatible with social and cultural considerations. The
UWC's report stated a number of other principles which had guided the
(21)
Commission in its work. These included: (a) the level of wages
in the public sector should be based on the ability of the treasury 
to pay which, in turn, is determined by the level of production and 
investment components of the national income. The national income 
should be distributed justly among the population so as to guarantee 
a suitable subsistence income for each individual. Thus if a family 
of five is taken for the purposes of fixing the subsistence require­
ments the minimum wage should not be much less than five times the 
share of one person in the national income; (b) the rate for different 
jobs should be fixed through an objective evaulation of jobs and that 
the 'point system' job evaluation should be used; and (c) equal pay
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rates must be paid for the same job or work with equal value irrespec­
tive of sex or region.
Presumably guided by these principles and on the basis of (i) en­
quiries in different government departments, (ii) a sample survey of 
household income and expenditure conducted in seven towns and cities; 
and (iii) the national income statistics, the Commission provided a 
number of recommendations. Regarding pay scales it proposed that the 
minimum wage should be fixed at £s12.5 per month and the rates for 
higher groups should be determined by maintaining a 20 per cent differ­
ential between adjacent groups. Moreover, it recommended that existing 
rates should be assimilated in the new structure after first granting 
a wage increase of 15 per cent for the lower four groups and 5 per cent 
for the remaining three. Each worker is then to be placed one step 
ahead of the range he is entitled to within the suitable group in the 
new wage structure. A scale had been assigned to each group in which 
wages were allowed to rise on an incremental by 50 per cent over 10 
years. Table 4.6 shows the proposed pay scales.
The Commission discontinued the regional wage differential system 
which had been operating since the Wakefield Commission (1951). It 
argued that the system contradicted the ‘equal pay for equal work' 
principle and had been encouraging rural-urban migration. It also rec­
ommended that equal rate should be paid to men and women and differ­
entiation should only be made on the basis of performance and efficiency. 
However, differentiation was allowed on the basis of age, and equal pay 
provision was not applicable to those under 18 years of age.
Other recommendations covered issues such as the rate for overtime 
payment, annual leave, retirement age, post-service benefits, and train­
ing. Eventually, the government accepted recommendations of the Commis­
sion in full and in the implementation stage it raised the minimum wage
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£s13.9 a month and adjusted the rates for higher grades accordingly 
as shown in Table 4.7.
4.7. THE 1 CLASSIFIED' STAFf TERMS OF SERVICE COMMISSION 1963/68
The 'Classified' Staff Terms of Service Commission (hereafter
referred to as Classified Staff Commission or CSC) was set up and
reported concurrently with UWC (1965-1968). It was asked, among other
related issues, to consider the principles that should govern pay and
terms of service in the public sector and to examine and revise the
(22)
pay rates and grading structure for 'classified' staff.
CSC began its report by referring to a number of principles and
guidelines that had been taken into account in formulating specific
recommendations. It mentioned the criterion of 'recruitment and
retention' but suggested that it must be considered along with other
principles. In this respect the Commission argued that:
"It has been understood in the past that the employer 
should pay only what is necessary to recruit and re­
tain an efficient staff without the need for search 
for other principles. The criterion of 'recruitment 
and retention' may be sound but not sufficient".(23)
For the Commission, 'fairness of pay' was egually important. It con­
tended that:
"The State should remunerate its employees fairly ... 
retainment of an efficient staff in the service does 
not stand as a proof of fairness of pay. The employ­
ees may remain in the service for considerations other 
than the financial - such as prestige or family reasons".(24)
In determining a 'fair pay', the Commission asserted that it would be
necessary to get a balance between the interests of the community, the
government and the individual civil servant:
"The community must feel that it is getting an efficient 
service without having to pay any excessive price, gov­
ernment departments must have sufficient suitably quali­
fied staff and the civil servants themselves must feel
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that they are fairly remunerated".(25)
The fairness of pay normally demands that the pay of a majority 
of public employees should becfetermined as a result of comparisons 
drawn between their pay and the pay of a group of employees in the 
private sector engaged on roughly comparable work. In the Sudan, the 
Commission maintained that:
"... 'fair comparison' is difficult to apply because it 
is not possible to find a large number of employees in- (nc\ 
side and outside the civil service doing comparable work".
Instead, it advocated the use of 'internal comparison', but emphasised 
that it should be based on a carefully conducted job analysis and class­
ification. In this connection, it maintained that 'egual rate should 
be paid for egual work' irrespective of sex or region:
"It is wrong, as a matter of principle, and undesirable 
in practice to ask two public service employees to per­
form identical work for different salaries".(27)
Moreover, the Com mission argued that in determining the pay rates
'living costs' must be taken into account:
"The government should pay rates that enable its employees 
a reasonlable level of subsistence. Any other consider­
ation that does not serve this purpose should be ignored".(28)
The Commission conducted a sample survey in Greater Khartoum to
(29)
determine the living costs of government officials. Deflating the
salaries on the basis of the findings, it had come to the conclusion 
that all government 'classified' employees suffered a substantial de­
cline in their real incomes as compared to 1951 levels. This was found 
to be acute in the case of senior grades due to the combined effect of 
piecemeal basic rate increases (in 1961 and 1965) and the prevailing 
COLA system which benefited the senior groups relatively less in per­
centage terms. For example, the gross pay of scale K (the lowest in 
the classified grading structure) had been increased by 83 per cent 
compared to a moderate 6 per cent increase for Group I (the top grade)
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during 1951-1968. In consequence, the Commission called for a rela­
tively high rate of increase in senior staff's pay, and as evident in 
Table 4.8 proposed increases amounting to 21-37 per cent for super- 
scale groups and 10 per cent for remaining classified groups. Dis­
continuing the concept of diminishing compensation (ie increasing pay 
by proportionately declining rate the higher the grade) which had been 
applied since 1951, the Commission argued that:
"The current differentials are so tight that it is not 
possible (or desirable) to recommend a pay increase 
on a diminishing scale".(31)
Furthermore, it recommended a new Cost of Living index to be established 
as early as possible on the basis of a more 'comprehensive' family bud­
get survey that should cover both 'classified' and 'unclassified' employ­
ees. However, this was not followed in the Commission's report, as 
might be expected, by any specific recommendation about the payment of 
COLA. Probably, the Commission endorsed the existing provisions and 
felt no need for modification until the introduction of the new Cost 
of Living index. It also maintained the grading structure set by the 
Mills Commission (1951). Coupled with what has been said about the 
recommendations of UWC in the previous section, this leaves one with 
the suspicion that the two 1968 Commissions opted primarily for pay 
increases rather than making significant changes in the basic principles 
and structures that govern public sector employment and pay.
4.8. THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'CADRE' SYSTEM
The aftermath of 1968 pay revision bodies confirms our contention 
that their recommendations fell short of bringing about the required 
structural changes. The structures apparently maintained by the 
Commissions largely reflected the British conception and objectives to
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guarantee the perpetuation of the system of bureaucratic control, which 
stemmed from their faith in the appropriateness of the colonial civil 
service as the ideal blue-print for the development of the independent 
Sudan. The inherited pay and grading structures appeared to have been 
working well while the numbers and variety of posts remained small.
But as the state started to assume a more active role in the development 
of the country, and development programmes were initiated (The Ten-Year 
Plan 1960/61 - 1970/71, for example), it was inevitable to introduce 
new kinds of jobs into public service. It was difficult to accommodate 
these new occupations into the existing job classification system. Con­
sequently, sub-groups, segments and new pay scales had been created res­
ulting in a complex of groupings and pay scales in which it was hard to 
discern a coherent pattern. As efforts to get more system into the 
situation were largely defeated, the government adhered to the creation 
of the so-called 'special cadres', basically in response to pressure 
from trade unions and professional organisations which were asking for 
improvements in their terms of employment. The 'cadre' was a frame­
work (and this probably occasioned the use of the word) for special terms 
of pay and service for a particular occupational category. The pay 
scales, grading system and promotion provisions in these 'cadres' were 
not constrained by the formal provisions in the existing civil service 
structure. Thus, for some occupational groups a latitude was created 
in which it was possible to have not only better pay but greater career 
prospects.
The process started with the teachers' 'cadre' in February 1969. 
Other employees were apparently attracted by this concept and began 
to press for their own 'cadres' usually as pretexts for pay and condi­
tions improvement. Eventually there were 'cadres' for engineers, 
accountants, medical doctors, clerks, etc. It is not possible to esta-
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blish precisely their numbers, but one source suggested that by 1974/75
there were more than twenty major 'cadres' created among public sector
, (32)
employees.
The impact of the 'cadre' system on the public sector pay structures 
was not difficult to reckon. Designing special terms for some influen­
tial groups meant that these structures had increasingly become complex 
and distorted. Its implication for the general system of pay determina­
tion was that relinquishment to political pressures undermined equity 
and efficiency objectives that might be achieved had pay of different 
groups been determined according to economic considerations.
4.9. CONCLUSION
Some important points could be inferred from this Chapter's 
analysis. The establishment of ad hoc commissions to review salary 
scales, gradings, and other terms of service was first introduced by 
the colonial government and continued to be the chief method of pay 
fixation in the post-independence era. This would seem to suggest 
either a continuing belief in their efficacy, or else this method has 
become 'inevitable' for reasons that largely related to non-economic 
factors. Whatever the case, its persistence over time may indicate 
the influence of historical legacy.
This historical legacy appears to extend beyond pay fixing 
machinery to the outcome of the commissions in terms of recommended 
salary scales. In broad terms, pay structures remained highly disper­
sed even after two decades of the Sudanisation. For example, in 1968 
the top-bottom differential was almost 1 8 : 1 . ^ ^  While it would be 
wrong to discount totally the possibility of economic factors playing 
some role, particularly in the immediate post-independence period
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when there was obviously a shortage of highly qualified indigenous 
manpower, the essential characteristics of the pay structures in opera­
tion were largely evolved in accordance with what had been inherited 
from the colonial period. Partly this was due to the influence of a 
bureaucratic elite. The development of a powerful bureaucratic class 
in the post-independence period has been widely recognised in Africa
(and the Sudan is no exception) to the extent of being described as
(34)
the 'new ruling class'. It has been argued that the power of this
class to influence its own reward, basically through its control over 
the mechanism of decision-making processes, was a major reason for pay 
principles and structures to remain largely intact after independence. 
The relatively large pay increase awarded to super-scale groups in 1968, 
and the continuing practice of forming separate commissions for classi­
fied and unclassified staff, possibly reflected the exercise of power 
by the elite group to preserve its inherited privileged position vis- 
a-vis other groups.
Thus, analysis in this chapter has shown the nature of the inheri­
ted pay structures and policies up to 1969. In the next chapter the 
major developments that occurred during 1970-1986, as well as the 
current pay levels and elements of remuneration, will be detailed.
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Table 4.1
Civil Service: Grading and Pay Scales (£s per annum), 1922
Pay Scale
Grade Minimum Maximum









Special Primary Grade 48 60
Source: Civil Service Department.
Table 4.2


















Source: Civil Service Department.
Civil Service: Labourers' Pay Scales (£s a month), 1948
Grade Flat-rate Wage
1. Leading Artisans 11.50
2. Skilled Labourer 9.60
3. Skilled Labourer 7.10
4. Semi-skilled Labourer 4.80
5. Semi-skilled Labourer 3.80
6. Unskilled Labourer 3.50
7. Unskilled Labourer 3.00
Source: Government of Sudan: The Report of Independent 
Committee of Enquiry.
Table 4.4
Groups, Job Description and Basic Wage Rates (£s per month) 






I General unskilled labourers 5.8 7.8
II Semi-skilled under constant super­
vision 6.6 9.3
III Semi-skilled with some specialised 
training or experience and super­
visors of workers in Groups I & II 8.3 12.3
IV Technical or skilled labourers who 
could perform tasks requiring 
specialised training without super­
vision 10.5 16.5
V Fully competent tradesmen normally 
trained in a recognised technical 
school served a recognised appren­
ticeship, received experience and 
can carry out any task allotted to 
them within their trade 14.5 23.5
VI As Group V but who can perform work 
of a precise and creative nature 23.5 29.5
VII As Group VI but in addition to skill 
of his trade, able to direct, control, 
supervise and organise 23.5 37.5
Source: Government of Sudan: The Unclassified Wages (Wake­
field) Commission Report, 1951.
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Table 4.5
Civil Service: Groups and Pay Scales (£s per month) for 'Classified' 
Staff, 1951
Class and Group Salary
Rate
Remarks
1. Adminsitrative/Professional Posts held by under­
a) Super-Scale Posts secretaries, heads and as­
Group I 150.0 sistant heads of department
Group II 141.7 in accordance with scope
Group III 133.3 and functions of departments




b) Scalar Posts University graduates and
B 87.5-98.7 employees from lower posts
DS 53.7-83.7 with long experience.
Q 29.0-50.0
2. Sub-Professional/Technical For example:
F 55.0-67.5 - Head Accountants
G 35.8-52.5 - Accountants
H 27.0-37.5 - Senior Book-Keepers
J 15.0-25.0 - Book-Keepers
3. Clerical
F 56.6-67.5 - Head Staff Clerks
G 40.0-56.0 - Staff Clerks
H 26.6-35.0 - Senior Clerks
J 15.0-25.0 - Secondary School Leavers
K 9.0-14.0 - Intermediate School Leav­
ers
Source: Government of Sudan: Report Classified Staff Terms of Employ­
ment (Mills) Commission, Khartoum, 1951, p 72.
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Table 4.6
Wage Scales for Government Unclassified Workers (£s per month), 1968
Wage Scale
Group Incremental Steps
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VIII 45.0 47.5 50.0 52.5 55.0 57.5 60.0 62.5 65.0 67.5
VII 37.5 39.6 41.7 43.8 45.9 48.0 50.1 52.2 54.3 56.4
VI 31.4 33.1 34.8 36.5 38.2 39.9 41.6 43.3 45.0 46.7
V 26.0 27.5 28.9 30.4 31.8 33.3 34.7 36.2 37.6 39.1
IV 12.6 22.8 24.0 25.2 26.4 27.6 28.8 30.0 31.2 32.4
III 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 25.0 26.0 27.0
II 15.0 15.6 16.7 17.6 18.4 19.3 20.1 20.9 21.8 22.7
I 12.5 13.2 13.9 14.6 15.3 16.0 16.7 17.4 18.1 18.8
Source: Government of Sudan: Report of UWC, op cit p 127.
Table 4.7













Source: Mohammed-Taha op cit




Classified Staff Pay Rates (£s per annum) in the Civil Service 









I 1900 2600 36.8
II 1800 2400 33.3
III 1700 2250 32.4
IV 1650 2100 27.3
V 1600 1950 21.9
VI 1500 1850 23.3
VII 1450 1750 20.7
Professional/Adminstrative
Top 1475 1622 10.0
Bottom 532 585 10.0
Technical
Top 1430 1573 10.0
Bottom 214 235 10.0
Clerical
Top 840 924 10.0
Bottom 198 218 10.0
Source: Report of Classified Staff Terms of Service Commission, 1968.
* Existing rates for groups other than the super-scale include basic 
rate plus the Cost of Living allowance.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
PAY LEVELS AND TRENDS 
IN THE CIVIL SERVICE 
1970 - 1986
5.1. INTRODUCTION
In May 1969, the second military take-over since the independence
(1)brought General Numeiri into office. At the beginning, the 'May 
Regime' attracted the support of the labour movement (which was domina­
ted by the Communists) because it raised revolutionary and socialist 
(2)
slogans. During the early period of the Regime it asked workers to:
"... freeze any immediate economic demands and increase 
productivity so as to enable the 'Revolution' to pull 
through the inherited economic problems".^'
However, this close alliance between the Regime and the SWTUF/SCP came
to a tragic end when the Communist elements in the army staged the
(4)
abortive coup d'dtat of July 1971. As a direct consequence of these 
events, a single party system had been constitued. The Sudanese Social­
ist Union (SSU) comprised five 'working forces': workers; peasants; in­
tellectuals; national capitalists; and the regular forces. This was, 
in fact, a deliberate attempt to integrate the labour movement into the 
mainstream of the ruling party to enable the government to exercise more 
control over trade unions and curb their growing political and industrial 
power. However, as events eventually proved, for a labour movement which 
had been accustomed to a great deal of political independence and milit­
ancy, it was difficult to accept this subordinate role to a political
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party and the limitation of their activities within the framework of 
the SSU.
This brief political background is important to understand the dev­
elopments in pay determination in the 1970s and 1980s. The first part 
of this chapter considers some of the changes made either through poli­
tical decisions or through pay review bodies. The latter part provides 
an analysis of existing grading and pay scales, elements of the pay 
package, and salary trends 1970-1986.
5.2. THE PAY INCREASE IN 1974
Due to emerging bottlenecks and shortages in commodity supply 
coupled with problems inflicted upon the Sudanese economy following the 
1973 international oil crisis, domestic inflation began to rise. It 
has been reported that the Cost of Living index for lower salaried em­
ployees rose by 67.4 per cent and that of the higher salaried by 57.3 
per cent between 1970 and 1974.
Following the Trade Unions' General Conference, held under the 
auspices of SSU in November 1973, the SWTUF sent a list of demands to 
the SSU Chairman who was the President of the Republic himself. The 
demands included a general increase in wages and salaries as well as 
proposals for methods to control prices and to curb black marketing 
which was blamed as the main cause for rising prices. Disputing the 
accuracy of official Cost of Living index statistics, SWTUF provided 
its own calculation of the cost of a subsistence living standard for 
a family of five in Khartoum. It estimated that £s52.4 a month would 
be the 'reasonable' minimum income for such a family to live a 'barely' 
decent life. Apparently, this figure was almost three-and-a-half times 
the minimum wage prevailing in the public sector at that time. Reali-
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sing the fact that it was 'unrealistic' to ask for an increase of such 
magnitude, SWTUF did not specify how much increase it wanted for the 
minimum wage.
In a clear departure from the established method of forming an
ad hoc pay review commission, addressing the Opening Session of the
National People's Council in May 1974, the President declared that:
"Having read the recommendations of the SWTUF and the 
studies carried out by the Ministry of Public Service 
and administrative Reform, and having followed the 
discussions and the responsible dialogue between the 
leadership of the SSU and the executive committee of 
SWTUF, it gives me pleasure to declare the following 
decisions ... ".
These decisions included:
(i) An increase in the Cost of Living Allowance for all employees 
of the Central, Local and the Regional (Southern) governments by
a) 17 per cent of basic pay for the lower-paid grades (workers in 
Group I to Group IV and officials paid less than £s560 annual basic 
salary); b) 12 per cent of basic salary for the higher-paid grades 
of both workers and officials exclusive of super-scale class.
(ii) As for other public sector establishments in which pay was
not divided into basic and COLA (for example University of Khartoum) 
the increase was a) 15 per cent for the lower grades; and b) 12 per 
cent for the upper grades.
The increase in the super-scale class, which was announced later, 
was apparently higher than the above rates, particularly at the top level. 
It ranged from 22 per cent for Group I (an Under-Secretary) to about 13 
per cent for Group III (an Inspector). This was justified on the grounds 
that the compression of salary differentials which occurred throughout
the 1950s and 1960s had eroded the income position of the highest paid 
class to an 'undersirable' l e v e l . I n  a draft report by the Ministry
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of Public Service and Administrative Reform on super-class salaries,
figures were given which showed that the ratio of the salary of the
under-secretary to the Junior clerk (basic salary plus COLA had declined
from 19.1 in 1931 to 10.1 in 1973.^^ Moreover, it was found that during
this period the percentage increase in nominal salaries for the junior
clerk ranged from approximately 44 per cent at the minimum to 62 per cent
at the maximum while for the under-secretary the increase was 21 per cent.
Thus, since the major objective was to retain efficient and qualified
civil servants, the government argued that financial incentives had to
be competitive with those paid to managerial staff in the public corpora-
(8)
tions, and to a lesser extent, the private sector.
The net effect of 1974 increases on civil service pay differentials 
varied among different groups. The increases in the super-scale salaries 
obviously widened inter- and intra-class differentials. However, this 
attitude of creating 'reasonable' vertical differentials for top posts 
was not extended to similar differentials within the lower classes as 
can be inferred from the percentage rates granted. Increasing pay for 
lower grades by 17 per cent and the remaining by 12 per cent had comp­
ressed pay structure below super-scales. The compression was more sig­
nificant in the middle-level grades. For example, a clerk whose salary 
was £s560 per annum was granted 17 per cent while another whose pay was 
£s600 per annum achieved 12 per cent incease. After the adjustment, the 
new salaries became £s655 and £s672 respectively leading to a fall in 
the differential ratio from 1.07:1 to 1.03:1. A similar shift of differ­
entials resulted between the wages of unclassified workers in Group IV 
and Group V. Moreover, a widening of differentials could be observed 
between the skilled workers' categories (Group V and above) and a large 
portion of sub-professional and clerical classes. A clerk in scale (H), 
for example, whose salary ranged from a minimum £s375 to a maximum £s500
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per annum was considered within the lowest paid grades (ie, entitled 
to 17 per cent incease). On the other hand, a skilled worker in group 
V with a wage range of £s399-555 per annum, was treated as those in 
the upper grades and, thus, granted 12 per cent increase.
An aggregate supply-demand explanation of the pattern of above 
differentials is clearly inadequate. While it is difficult to deter­
mine with any degree of precision the magnitude of the competition pre­
vailing in the labour market at that time, available rough estimates of 
the growth of high and middle level manpower in the country (see Chap­
ter 2) would lead one to expect that their premia would have fallen 
relative to the skilled groups and not vice versa. This may be partly
explained in terms of the influence of bureaucratic £lite referred to 
(9)
in Chapter 4.
3.3. THE JOB EVALUATION AND CLASSIFICATION SCHEME (JEC5) 1973-1978
Following the establishment of the Ministry of Public Service 
and Administrative Reform, the Sudanese government requested the United 
Nations in November 1972 to send a mission with terms of reference which 
included among other matters: a) helping the newly established Ministry 
to map out adminsitrative reform strategies and programmes; and b) help­
ing the Ministry develop its organisational capabilities for steering 
and implementing a major administrative programme. Eventually, the
most important recommendation of this mission (July 1973) was:
"The initiative, at the earliest possible date, of a compre­
hensive classification and pay study, is an overriding neces­
sity to serve as the basis for a sound restructuring of the 
personnel systems and adminsitrative practices in the entire 
public employment sector".(11)
The government endorsed the report of the Mission entitled "A 
Programme for Adminstrative Reform" as a basis for an integrated reform
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programme. In late 1974, four senior officials from the Ministry of 
Public Service were sent to the UK for the purpose of training in job 
evaluation methods and techniques. On their return, (with a British 
expert) they formed the Central Team for the Job Evaluation and Class­
ification Scheme in July 1975. It took the Team about 8 months to do 
its preparatory work.
In his monthly 'Face the Nation' speech, in March 1976, the 
President of the Republic inaugurated the JECS plan. He described the 
plan as a 'revolution' that intended to sweep away the remnants of
a system inherited from the colonial era and completely inappropriate
(12)
to meet the 'ambitions' of employees in the mid-1970s.
As its report asserts, the JECS was intended to be a complete 
programme for an effective system of personnel administration of pub­
lic sector organisations. It was seen as a way to 'rationalise' the 
entire pay structure by, for example, reducing the length and complexity 
of scales, rewarding the technical skills and transferring the fragmented
'pay-oriented' pay structure to a unified 'work-oriented' one. Speci-
(13)fically, the objectives were:
a) to determine the number of posts in each government unit 
on the basis of the job evaluation exercise;
b) to determine the number of levels and grades into which 
government work should be divided to achieve maximum efficiency;
c) to determine the standards of skills required in each govern­
ment unit at different levels;
d) to determine the responsibilities and volume of work for each 
grade;
e) to determine the relative importance of jobs on the basis 
of adequate job description and classification methods;
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f) to provide a system that would decide, on a scientific 
basis, how much pay employees should receive in absolute and 
relative terms.
It was reported that an exercise which involves the above- 
mentioned measures was quite essential to get rid of the proliferation 
of wage and salary structures which characterised the public service 
and gave an advantage to white collar employees over skilled workers 
and technicians; the same categories which were most needed for devel­
opment projects and many of whom had emigrated of late. The JECS was 
also expected to dismantle the 'cadre' system, remove anomalies between 
public sector employees and provide solutions to the chronic promotion 
problems. Moreover, it was believed that the scheme would provide speci­
fic measures to tackle the problem of overstaffing in the civil service 
as well as measures for enabling the productive use of the inceasingly 
growing numbers of graduates and secondary school leavers. Therefore, 
it can be inferred that the JECS was, by no means, intended as another 
plan for a general increase in government wages and salaries.
Using a 'factor comparison' method the scheme produced - and for 
the first time - a unified pay structure for all public sector employees. 
The procedure adopted was as follows: Firstly, the Central Team of JECS 
took a sample of 1648 jobs across the entire public service composing 
the weight of the whole. Secondly, data were collected through ques­
tionnaires and interviews and a draft job description was prepared 
depending mainly on the information provided by the occupant. Informa­
tion obtained was related to a) decision making; b) mental and physical 
efforts required by the job; c) representation; d) working conditions;
e) knowledge, experience and qualifications to perform the job; f) man­
ual skill; g) the degree of complexity of work; h) supervision; and i) 
personal contact. Needless to say that different employees had been
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asked to provide information about different sets of the above factors. 
Thirdly, the final job descriptions were prepared, the number of grades 
were decided upon, and the functions corresponding to these grades were 
determined. The grade descriptions were framed in such a manner as to 
cover discernible differences in the degree of skill, responsibility 
and other job characteristics with varying weights. The lowest grades 
would cover jobs which merely require the workers concerned to follow 
simple instructions under close supervision, with little or no latitude 
for the exercise of independent judgement. Each succeeding grade would 
reflect a higher level of skill and responsibility with less and less 
supervision up to the top of the structure which included, inter alia, 
jobs the duties of which were:
"To plan, direct, execute unprecedented programmes with 
immense difficulty and responsibility requiring extended 
training, experience and qualifications".(14)
Fourthly, based on its studies and findings the JECS Commission classi­
fied the public service jobs (both 'classified' and 'unclassified') into 
22 grades, which it believed to be comprehensive enough to contain all 
the activities of the public sector, comprising various occupational
groupings which were identified as a) Administrative; b) Executive (pro-
(15)fessional, non-professional and routine); and c) Miscellaneous. Fifthly, 
the pay structure was determined according to the different job levels 
and pay scales were fixed to the 22 grades. In determining these pay 
scales the first step was to fix a minimum rate for the lowest grade.
This was done, allegedly, by increasing the 1974 minimum wage by a rate 
corresponding to the change in the Cost of Living index during 1974-1977. 
The rest of the pay scales were fixed as follows: each scale's minimum 
rate was fixed at a level 10 per cent higher than that of the scale below 
it. Each scale was extended for 50 per cent of its starting pay rate 
and by increments of 5 per cent of that rate to bridge the gap in 10
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years. In this way, the new pay structure was constructed with a 
minimum wage of £s28 and a maximum of £s450 a month.
The criteria upon which the new structure was based could be gauged 
from fragmented statements in the JECS report. The first of these was 
internal relativity ie, the standing of the employee's job in relation 
to other jobs within the public service. In fact, this was the essence 
of the whole job evaluation exercise. The second was the cost of living. 
It has been reported that:
"No employer can expect to retain the services of his employees 
if he does not pay them a 'living wage'. The government, as 
a 'model' employer for all other employers in the labour mar­
kets in the Sudan, must pay at least a living wage as a matter 
of principle".(16)
Mention has also been made of the principle of 'equal remuneration for 
equal work'. The Commission argued that if this could be applied to all 
grades of employees, men and women in different parts of the public sec­
tor, then relative pay would be fair. It emphasised that there was an 
urgent need for a unified structure because the non-unified or 'cadre' 
system had led to a considerable leap-frogging between different occu­
pational groups and different public sector units.
It could be seen from the foregoing that the proposed scheme was - 
at least theoretically - appealing and appeared to have provided solu­
tions to many problems facing the pay determination issue in the pub­
lic sector at that time. Nevertheless, the implementation of the scheme 
turned out to be much more difficult than apprehended.
The government endorsed the proposals for the JECS in May 1978. 
Initially the implementation of the new pay scales was phased over two 
years starting from July the same year. But, eventually the government 
decided to discontinue with phase II because of the high costs involved 
in the implementation of phase I. Estimates provided by the JECS com­
mission put the cost at £s44 million; a revised estimate, however, indi-
- 169 -
cated that the actual cost could be three or four times higher. This
was probably one of the main factors that led observers to believe that:
"The scheme was rendering to be an 'unorganised' exercise 
that brought chaotic state of affairs into the public ser­
vice" . (  ^^  J
There seems to be little doubt that the scheme was designed and intro­
duced hastily. For example, the original plan had been to conduct the 
scheme over three years to be implemented in 1980. But in August 1977, 
the President of the Republic instructed the JECS commission to complete 
its work and report in just one year to be ready for implementation by 
July 1978, for patently political reasons. The attempted coup d'etat 
of 1976 showed that popular support for the government among unions and 
professional associations was virtually non-existent. So, the govern­
ment was anxious to provide some kind of material gain to its employees.
In addition to the insufficient preparatory work on the scheme, 
doubts had been raised about the quality of manpower that was charged 
with its design and implementation. The JECS team suffered losses of
qualified and trained staff and eventually comparatively untrained staff
(18)
were brought in to implement the scheme. Consequently, it had been
argued that the scheme was born with fundamental technical shortcomings 
and it was unable to practise many of its advocated principles. A 
Sudanese expert asserted that:
"... instead of evaluating jobs properly, the JECS commission
has simply matched the existing scales with one of the 22 grades 
on the scheme ... The JECS should have defined the posts and 
grades necessary within every government department according 
to its objectives and terms of reference, and not simply in­
corporated in the new system all the overstaffinq apparent in 
the old".(19)
Perhaps capitalising on such deficiencies trade unions instantan­
eously started to complain about their grades and scales in the new sys­
tem. Everyone claimed that their duties and responsibilities and some­
times their qualifications and market values justified higher pay. It
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was, also, claimed that the JECS had created further anomalies between, 
what they considered, broadly comparable work. In some cases, unfortun­
ately, this was true. For example, it has been reported that the JECS 
job classification had reversed the existing authority and responsibility 
structure in Sudan Railways. According to the proposed structure, station 
managers were placed in grade 12 while some of their subordinates from 
administration were assigned to higher grades (11 or 10).
Part of the employees' reaction, however, reflected their inexper- 
dience and lack of knowledge about the job evaluation technique which 
led them to develop unrealistic expectations about the outcome of the 
scheme. Many employees, as well as unions, viewed the JECS primarily 
as a means of increasing their emoluments. In fact, such expectations 
could be justified in view of apparently limited employee participation 
in the work of JECS. Unions were not represented in the Commission and 
only asked to provide their suggestions. If this was the case, obviously 
the policy makers were mistaken to assume that employees would accept 
the change without resentment. Thus, complaints escalated from differ­
ent parts and different groups and it appeared that very few employees 
were actually contented with their 'place' in the new system. For its 
part, the government instead of pressing on with the scheme's provisions 
and correcting obvious discrepancies, gave way to the demands of some 
groups considered politically significant, such as armed forces, medical 
doctors, judges and railway workers. The subsequent feeling among other 
groups was one of frustration and each group began to put forward its 
case for an adjustment.
It was reported that the years 1970 - 1980, not surprisingly, 
witnessed a massive exodus of professional and technical staff from the 
public sector to the neighbouring oil-rich countries. This was attribu­
ted to the 'unfair anomalies' created by the JECS, ironically, the same
- 171 -
problems as it was intended to solve by the introduction of the new 
system. Those who did not leave their job became militant labour.
Limited information available from the Ministry of Labour statistics 
showed that there were nearly forty strikes in the public sector during 
the six month period that followed the implementation of the JECS. The 
government responded to this industrial action by granting pay rises 
mainly by payment of special allowances, and the adjustment of pay scales 
and sometimes the grade structure itself. Such response inevitably gen­
erated further complaints about the perceived inequalities of the scheme.
5.A. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1986
In the face of these mounting complaints and industrial action, 
the President of the Republic appointed in April 1979 a ministerial 
committee (headed by the Minister of Finance) to revise and re-design 
the whole work of the JECS. For unknown reasons, three months later, 
the President set up another committee, under the chairmanship of the 
National Assembly Speaker with the same terms of reference. Apparently, 
the two committees came into conflict and it became quite clear that 
these two could not operate concurrently. A Presidential Decree (August 
1979) dissolved the Speaker's Committee; the Ministerial Committee con­
tinued its work and reported to the President in December 1979. In con­
sequence, major modifications took place in the JECS grading classifi­
cations and pay scales. Notably, the number of grades had been reduced 
from 22 to 18 (though two subsidiary grades - 10A and 5A - were created); 
and basic pay scales were modified and for the majority there was an in­
crease of 5 - 10 per cent, together with the increase of transport al­
lowance by almost 100 per cent. The Committee claimed that such adjust­
ments were designed to remove anomalies and bring harmony to the rela-
• i - K  k t  • (21)tive pay m  the public service. But t(-,e industrial peace sought
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did not last long. Within a few months period another round of demands 
started.
To end a one-month strike by judges in 1981, the Presidential 
Decree No. 131 granted them generous improvements in basic pay scales, 
allowances, benefits and promotion provisions. The pay rise for police 
force followed suit, but it was the adjustment for state bank employees 
in November 1981 that was significant for comparability and encouraged 
employees in other parts of the public sector particularly in the para- 
statals, to demand similar treatment. Eventually, employees in some 
of these parastatals gained substantial increases through government 
concessions to their demands. For example, it has been reported that 
the Gezira Scheme employees received increases ranging between 50 per 
cent and 100 per cent in their basic salary and allowances in February 
1982.
The years 1982 - 1984 witnessed a series of damaging strikes.
As usual, the number and duration of these strikes are not documented. 
However, it could be remembered that the judges' strike for one month 
in 1982 and again for nearly 4 months in 1983 set the pattern for other 
groups. Railway workers 40-day strike in June-July 1983, doctors one- 
week strike in September 1983 and the accountants two-week strike 
January-February 1984 were just a few examples. Coupled with the anoma­
lies created by political decisions in conceding to some factions' de­
mands, escalating inflationary pressures during the period provided 
further impetus for pay rise claims and eventually strikes.
In an attempt to curb the spread of strikes the government awarded 
all public sector employees in December 1983 an increase ranging between 
10 per cent and 25 per cent in basic salary as well as improvement in 
some allowances. It appeared that this was not sufficient and strikes 
continued.
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The High Commission for Revising Pay and Terms of Employment or
El-Turabi Commission (named after Dr Hassen El-Turabi, a well-known
politician who chaired the Commission) was set up in April 1984. It
(22)
was asked, inter alia: a) to propose new methods of improving pay
conditions without causing cost-push inflation; b) to suggest a unified 
policy for determining pay structures in different parts of the public 
sector that would lead to removal of any discrepancies; and c) to suggest 
possible alternatives for financing the expected increase in the govern­
ment's wage bill.
With the assistance of three sub-committees (economic, legal and
(23)
technical) El-Turabi Commission recommended the following: a) the
increase of the statutory minimum wage from £s42.5 to £s60 per month;
b) the designing of separate pay scales, grading system and other terms 
of service for judges and lawyers, academic staff in universities and 
research institutions and the uniformed forces; c) the establishment of 
a unified general schedule for 'classified' and 'unclassified' staff 
of central and regional governments; d) the distinction between three 
types of public sector organisation: employees in service-orientated 
parastatals must be remunerated according to the 'general schedule' of 
the civil service; those in economic-orientated parastatals should be 
paid two extra increments above their civil service colleagues' pay; 
finally, profit-orientated parastatals should have the right to set 
their own terms and conditions of employment; e) a general pay increase 
ranging from 20 per cent at the top grade to 40 per cent at the bottom;
f) those who had seen their pay increased since 1981 should be excluded 
from the new adjustment if a 'reasonable' degree of relativity had to 
be maintained; g) existing allowances of a general nature (for example
responsibility allowance) should be consolidated in the basic salary 
and under no circumstances should total amount of allowances exceed 73
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per cent of basic salary.
The foregoing recommendations were endorsed by the Presidential 
Decree No. 647, March 17th, 1985. A few weeks later, on April 6th a 
popular 'up-rising' spearheaded by trade unions brought the Numeiri 
government down and a transitional military government was set up to 
prepare for elections. In May 1985, the Council of Ministers discon­
tinued the implementation of El-Turabi Commission proposals and set up 
a technical committee to revise its proposals. It was believed that 
the work of the Commission contained considerable discrepancies. As 
soon as the new Committee started its work, a wave of pay claims emerged. 
These included demands by the SWTUF to increase the minumum wage by near­
ly 1800 per cent relative to the 1970 wage level, supposedly to be corres­
ponding to the rate of increase in the costs of living during the period, 
and demands by professional groups for equality in pay and allowances 
with doctors and engineers. The Committee, nevertheless, confined itself 
to its original terms of reference ie, the revision of the proposals of 
El-Turabi Commission. In this regard, it maintained most of El-Turabi's 
recommendations but re-classified the parastatals into public authorit­
ies, public corporations and public companies (their pay and grading 
structures will be discussed in Chapter 6). The recommendations of 
this Committee were implemented by the Council of Minister's Besolution 
No. 985, in August 1985. However, it was decided that the proposed pay
rise should take place in two phases; the first 50 per cent was to be
(24)
paid in September 1985; and the second in July 1986.
The adoption of these pay scales generated yet another series of
claims. Several unions had gone on strikes lasting between one day and
one month and virtually all were related to their dissatisfaction with
(25)
absolute and relative pay increases that took place. The government 
conceded to some unions' demands and those benefited from such con­
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cessions were engineers from technological institutes, agriculturalists 
and vets. University lecturers acquired the right to free accommodation 
and doctor's on-call allowance was increased by nearly 100 per cent.
Another committee was set up in December 1985 (chaired by Professor
El-Jack of the University of Khartoum) to conduct a more thorough study
(26)
into pay levels and to propose methods of removing existing anomalies.
In one month the Committee received nearly 60 claims for parity and in­
crease of pay. The Committee attributed this largely to the way the 
government had handled the issue in the recent past and argued that:
"Granting special terms and allowances to some groups and 
depriving others jeopardised the principles of equity and 
fairness in the public service and left the government 
vulnerable to further pressures".(^ 7)
But while the Committee was, nonetheless, convinced that the majority 
of claims were 'legitimate' and 'justifiable', it argued that meeting 
everyone's demand would be difficult under the prevailing economic con­
ditions. Moreover, it suggested that, to provide appropriate and perm­
anent solution to the problem of discrepancies, more than a technical 
committee was needed. It consequently proposed the formation of a national 
commission to investigate issues of employment, pay and pricing, Mean­
while, it asked the government to relieve it from continuing its work.
In March 1986, the Council of Ministers decided to allocate £s175 
million in another attempt to restore industrial peace by removing some 
of the conspicuous discrepancies and improving real pay. In effect, a 
standard nature of work allowance had been introduced to be awarded to 
all public sector employees except those who had earlier been granted 
special allowances. In the remaining sections of this chapter existing 
(July 1986) grading classification, pay scales, elements of remuneration 
and salary trends in the last 15 years or so will be discussed.
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5.5. THE GRADING STRUCTURE
Currently, civil servants (central and regional government employ­
ees) are covered under a general schedule containing 19 grades, extend­
ing from grade 18 at the bottom of the structure to grade 1 at the top, 
with an interposed grade 10A. Since 1985 three special categories have 
been introduced (outside this general schedule) with basic salary rates 
higher than grade 1. These special segments are designed basically to 
recruit some highly qualified personnel (managers and advisers for 
example) considered to be in short supply.
The senior grades (1 - 10) are exclusively for adminsitrative, 
professional and senior clerical staff, grades 10A - 12 for supervisors 
of skilled workers and grade 14 for clerical and skilled manual workers. 
Grades 15 - 17 cover semi-skilled and grade 18 unskilled workers. In the 
civil service classification, grades 1 - 10A, 12 and 14 relate to 'class­
ified' employees who are covered by the Pension Act; and grades 11, 13 
and 15 - 18 to 'unclassified' workers covered by the Social Insurance 
Scheme.
Various legislative and similar provisions provide details of the 
entry grade levels for holders of specified qualifications. The most 
recent provisions appear in the Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
No. 985 (August 14th, 1985); subsequent Civil Service Department (CSD) 
circulars provide the technical details. Three grades are used as the 
recruitment grades for various groups: grade 9 is the entry level for 
university graduates; grade 14 for secondary school leavers; and grade 18 
for unskilled workers. Thus, the internal labour market provisions con­
fine entry to the civil service employment to these grades, the rest be­
ing filled through promotion.
As mentioned above in this chapter, attempts by the JECS 1978 to
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build up a graded structure using objective and scientific methods 
based on job evaluation were unsuccessful. Many job holders did not 
find themsleves at the point which they believed their service, qualifi- 
cation and experience justify, many irregularities have been generated 
by the re-valuations and re-gradings of posts. In consequence, there 
is prima facie evidence that, currently, there are no job descriptions 
or specifications applied in the civil service. However, the JECS has 
created a system which allocates a complement of posts in particular 
grades approved by the CSD for each ministry. The basis of the comple­
ment theory is that, posts with a number of common facts group naturally 
and logically to form some sort of a ’job family'; these common factors 
have been reduced in practice to background educational and training 
requirements. Furthermore, for pay purposes experience has shown that 
individual exployees are not confined to grades specified in the com­
plement, implying that the graded structure is not always systematically 
applied. Nevertheless, as pay scales are determined by money values 
allocated to these grades, this structure has to be relied on as the 
best available guide to current pay levels.
5.6. ELEMENTS OF REMUNERATION
The two main elements in civil service remuneration are basic 
salary and allowances. However, as each salary scale, except for grades 
1 and 2, contains a series of incremental steps, an individual's pay is 
influenced not only by the grade in which he or she is allocated, but 
also by the step on which he enters a grade. Moreover, for 'unclassi­
fied' workers overtime (as we will discover below) provides an important 




5.6.1. Basic Salary Scales
Each grade (except grades 1 and 2) has a basic salary scale which 
specifies both the minimum and the maximum salary. The difference div­
ided by the number of the steps in each grade usually represents the 
amount of the annual increment. Variations exist in the number of steps 
in the grade ranging from 5 steps for grades 3 - 5 to a maximum of 12 
steps for grade 9 (Table 5.1).
According to the latest pay adjustments (1985/86), the minimum 
basic rates range from £s720 to £s8400 per annum. The minimum basic 
rate for grade 18 represents the statutory minimum wage in the Sudan, 
allegedly determined in accordance with the movements in the Cost Price 
Indices (CPI). As mentioned above, El-Turabi Commission (1985) had 
recommended an increase of the minimum wage from £s42.5 to £s60 a month, 
a wage rise much less than the CPI increase of approximately 100 per 
cent for the period November 1983 - July 1985; if the minimum wage had 
been increased proportionately to the CPI change, the monthly wage would 
have risen to almost £s85. The minimum wage, nevertheless, represents 
the floor upon which the entire pay structure is built. Basic salary 
rates above the minimum are seemingly fixed to compensate for qualifi­
cations, experience, responsibility, working conditions, etc. Since 
the pay structure has to provide for appropriate differentials between 
jobs and grades, in the absence of adequate job descriptions and specifi­
cations, as is the case in the Sudanese public sector, identifying the 
exact measures upon which differentials are based is a difficult task. 
Table 5.2 shows the percentage differentials in basic salary rates and 
the minima and maxima of adjacent grades. Examination of these figures 
hardly reveals any coherent pattern. Among some grades, the differentials 
are as small as 4.2 per cent whilst among other grades they may be as high 
as 55.6 per cent. Asked about the exact criteria which have been applied
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to determine the size of these differentials, senior officials in the
CSD failed to provide any satisfactory answer other than saying that
(28)they depend upon the jobs included in the structure. What is
certain, however, is that, as a result of the smallness of differentials 
among some grades, many jobs have become 'marginal' cases leading to 
endless arguments about the validity of the job grading processes. On 
the other hand, too large differentials would involve jumps from lower 
to higher grades generating salary increases not compatible with the 
assumed changes in responsibility. Examination of figures in Table 5.1, 
also, shows considerable overlapping - as measured by the proportion of 
a grade simultaneously covered by the next grade - particularly regard­
ing lower grades (9 - 18). This overlapping may, of course, merely rep­
resent management's recognition that an experienced person in a lower 
grade can be of more value than a new-comer to a job in the grade above. 
However, experience also shows that overlapping has caused serious prob­
lems in the operation of the civil service pay structure. In the case 
of promotions individuals move from the maximum step of the lower grade 
to such a high step in the promoted grade that the length of time required 
to reach the maximum of this grade is considerably shortened. Without 
prospects for further promotion this may lead to 'coasting' in the grade 
for relatively long periods, and this leads to pressure to provide extra 
increments to the scales capable of destroying the integrity of the en­
tire pay structure.
5.6.2. The Incremental System
Incremental payment systems provide an annual addition to the 
basic salary over and above any increase which may be obtained via gen­
eral pay adjustments. Table 5.3 shows that increments add 2.4 - 5.5 
per cent to the basic salary at the bottom, and 2.2 - 4.1 per cent at
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the top of the grades. The reduced percentages at the grade maxima 
result from the use, in most cases, of flat-rate increments. Gener­
ally, in percentage terms, increments appear to be more significant 
to employees in the lower grades of civil service pay structure.
Theoretically, the main justification for incremental scales is 
to reward people according to their performance over time. In the Sudan's 
civil service, however, payment of annual increments has little to do 
with performance as they are paid almost automatically and very rarely 
withheld even from those employees whose annual reports are extremely 
poor. Officially there is an 'efficiency bar' within the scale which 
employees may pass only if their work is judged to be entirely satis­
factory on the basis of appropriate efficiency tests. In practice, no
tests are carried out and normally every employee is given a satisfac-
(29)
tory annual report. Increments have, therefore, become a reward
for service rather than performance. In any case, individuals who 
reach the top of the scale expect automatic promotion to the next higher 
grade. Often, however, promotion opportunities are not readily available 
and there is considerable risk of no further progression for a lengthy 
period. The negative impact of such 'condemnation' as seen by employees: 
on the job satisfaction and performance may be serious.
5.6.3. Allowances
There is no centralised information source showing the incidence
of the allowances payable or their effect on gross salary. However, it 
can be inferred that for public service employees allowances form signi­
ficant components of pay. Prior to the 1985-86 salary adjustments allow­
ances were not of major importance for most civil service grades. The 
JECS, 1978, consolidated the then existing Cost of Living and Housing 
allowances into basic salary scales and reduced the total number of
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allowances. Most of these with the exception of COLA were either 
relatively small and/or applicable to a relatively small number of 
the higher grades. However, the mileage allowance could be signifi­
cant for higher grades. One exception to this generalisation was
the transport allowance which, in 1983, ranged from £s16 to £s25 a 
month.
The key development, however, was the introduction of a special 
allowance for medical professionals (engaged on full-time work) effec­
tive from January 1984 following industrial action by their professional 
association. It appears that this allowance has set the pattern subse­
quently followed by other factions in the public service. For example, 
in January 1983, engineers asked for equal treatment and gained a simi­
lar allowance.
El-Turabi Commission (1985) had opposed, in principle, any payment 
of allowances outside the basic salary scales on the grounds that they 
were adequate to meet the basic needs of employees. It recommended the 
consolidation of all allowances of a general nature into the basic sal­
ary scales, a charge the Committee considered would bring great advan­
tage to employees by raising the effective pay on which post-service 
benefits are calculated. It seems that this recommendation was not 
adopted. The 1985-86 adjustments not only re-introduced existing 
allowances but introduced additional allowances. Transport Allowance 
(TA) payable in Greater Khartoum area was increased to £s25 or £s35 a 
month, depending on distance travelled from home to office; a Housing 
Allowance (HA) was introduced in March 1986 ranging from £s150 a month 
for grade 1, to £s20 a month for grade 18, together with a Nature of 
Work Allowance (NW) extending from £s150 for grade 1 to £s10 for grade 
18. Grades 1 - 4  had previously received a Responsibility or Technical 
Allowance ranging respectively from £s40 to £s25 a month since 1974,
- 182 -
with the amounts remaining unchanged, but the NW allowance replaced 
these allowances and covered all grades. In addition, the Mileage 
Allowance (MA), applicaable to grades 1-8 was increased and the Repres­
entation Allowance (Rep) payable to grades 1-4 was increased consider­
ably and extended to grade 5. Some individuals in higher grades may 
have a government car and a driver in lieu of MA and TA; a provision 
likely to be worth more than the monetary value of the allowances.
Some other allowances are payable to individuals possessing 
specified qualifications or meeting certain conditions. It is diffi­
cult to list exhaustively all the allowances prevalent in the public 
service but some examples may be noted. Medical doctors and engineers 
receive monthly allowance of up to £s200 presumably to cover their lia­
bility for 'on-call' duty; veterinary doctors similarly receive £s40-75 
a month. University medical teachers receive 100 per cent of basic 
salary for being unable to participate in private practice. Lower 
allowances include a typist's speed allowance, computer proficiency 
allowance, X-ray allowance, secretarial allowance, post-graduate allow­
ance, etc, with amounts ranging from £s10 to £s40 a month.
From the foregoing account of the components or elements which 
combine to make up the gross earnings of civil servants, it is clear 
that the examination of civil service pay structure must include con­
sideration of the following:
a) changes in basic salary scales;
b) changes in the amount of allowances and overtime pay;
c) changes in grading or the rules governing the incremental




As we have seen above, salary scales are reviewed periodically 
every few years. It has never been the practice in the Sudan to fix a 
regular time span within which revisions must take place and the inter­
vals are consequently uneven, with the adjustments resulting from union 
pressures for increase to meet upward movements in the costs of living.
Pay reviews normally lead to a general increase in all scales and 
may also introduce new allowances or consolidate existing allowances.
As we have revealed above, in the last couple of decades, such increases 
occurred in July 1968, July 1974, July 1978, December 1983, and through 
the phased increases of September 1985 - July 1986. Table 5.4 shows 
the minimum and the maximum basic salary rates of employees in the 
central and regional governments in the adjustment years since 1974, 
and Table 5.5 details the magnitude of increase in each adjustment.
It is evident from these two tables that the pattern of basic salary 
increases varied significantly for different years and among different 
grades. The JECS (1978) increased the then existing rates by amounts 
varying between 33.9 per cent and 90.1 per cent. The 1983 adjustments 
added relatively small amounts of 9.9 - 28.0 per cent to 1978 scales.
The latest revisions, however, provided additions of 41.3 per cent to 
67.4 per cent in July 1986. It is difficult to specifically pinpoint 
what influences the size of pay icnreases in each review. Pay commis­
sions often refer to the changes in the cost of living as the principal 
criterion used. However, it is certain that pay increases have never 
been the product of direct collective agreementjas there is no formal 
provision for collective bargaining in the civil service^neither have 
they been catch-ups to outside settlements as private sector pay set­
tlements follow those of the public sector.
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Strict comparisons between the salary advances to specific occupational 
groups may not be possible due to the lack of detailed information, but 
comparisons of increases awarded to different grades would give an indi­
cation. During the period 1974 - 1986, the lowest two grades (17 and 
18) received the highest increase in basic salary rates and generally 
the advances of the last 15 years or so appear to have benefited those 
at the bottom of the pay structure. Personnel in grades 3 - 7, on the 
other hand, were the least rewarded during this period. In other words, 
pay for 'unclassified* staff has generally advanced more consistently 
and at relatively higher rates than in the pay for 'classified' employ­
ees, probably because of the government wish to protect the most hard 
hit during inflationary periods.
Nevertheless, the main concern of employees is usually the change 
in real pay and, for them, nominal pay changes are satisfactory only 
if they represent improvements in real income or purchasing power.
Table 5.6 shows the indices of real basic salary scales minima and max­
ima in the civil service since 1974. Nominal salaries are deflated by
the Cost of Price Index (CPI) for 'Higher Salaried Employees' with the
(31)average CPI for 1970 = 100. As the figures indicate, there has
been a drastic reduction in the real level of basic salary scales since 
1974. Even after full implementation of the 1986 increases, real basic 
salaries have decreased to 16 - 27 per cent of the 1974 levels or to 
approximately 21 - 29 per cent of the levels established by the JECS, 
1978. The reductions were a little less severe for lower grades indi­
cating that there has been a narrowing of top-bottom basic salary dif­
ferentials.
The principle of adjustment to the cost of living which broadly 
underlies the payment of increases in basic salary logically requires 
a 100 per cent 'neutralisation' of the rise in CPI. However, it is
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apparent that other factors have been taken into account. Table 5.6 
shows that upward revisions in nominal salaries have failed to raise 
basic real salaries to pre-adjustment levels. The 1983 revisions main­
tained only about one-third of 1978 real pay levels, while the 1986 ad­
justments relatively improved the situation by guaranteeing on average 
more than two-thirds the 1983 standard. Clearly then, basic salary 
increases from one adjustment to the next bore little relationship to 
changes in the cost of living, particularly since 1978. Policy makers 
interviewed in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning acknowledged 
that increases which occurred in the recent past were irregular, piece­
meal and insufficient to maintain real income, but argued that national 
economic conditions did not permit full 'neutralisation'; furthermore, 
it was government policy to avoid wage-price spiral (an objective inevi­
tably undermined by the allowance system).
5.7.2. Gross Salary
Generally, allowances are divided into two main categories: 
standard and non-standard. Standard allowances are either received by 
all employees in all grades (such as HA, NW and TA) ojr by all employees 
in certain grades (such as Rep. for grades 1 - 4 ) .  Non-standard allow­
ances, on the other hand, are payable to certain occupational groups or 
individuals possessing specified qualifications and/or fulfilling cer­
tain conditions (such as 'on-call' allowance for doctors and engineers, 
post-graduate allowance, field work allowance, secretarial allowance, 
etc). The allowances included in the gross salary analysis are assumed 
to be the standard allowances: mileage; transport; and representation
allowances in 1978 to 1983; together with nature of work and housing
(32)
allowances introduced in 1986. The monthly or yearly totals shown
in Table 5.7 indicate that the number of allowances and quantums has
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increased significantly in the present decade. The non-availability 
of information about allowances prior to 1978 has apparently shortened 
the period over which analysis of changes in gross salary may be made. 
Table 5.8 shows the basic salary scales, allowances, and thus the size 
of the gross salary in 1978, 1983, and 1986, with the indices of gross 
salary to basic salary shown in Table 5.9. In 1978, allowances were 
relatively insignificant particularly for the middle-level and lower 
grades (at best they added an equivalent of 50 per cent of the basic 
salary). By 1986, however, the picture had changed considerably: the 
basic salary of the majority of staff (excepting those in grades 10 - 
12) is practically doubled by allowance payments (Tables 5.8, 5.9). 
Examination of figures in Table 5.10 provides further evidence of the 
growing weight of allowances. Between 1978 and 1983, for the majority 
of grades, nominal gross salary had increased by an average of 30 per 
cent; from 1983 to 1986, however, the rate of proportionate increase 
was almost trebled to an average of 90 per cent. During the 8-year 
period 1978 - 1986 the gross salaries rose by percentages ranging from 
113 per cent to 267 per cent. Similar comparison of basic salary (Table 
5.5) showed increases of 56 to 114 per cent illustrating clearly, as 
shown in Table 5.11, how allowances were used to off-set the reduction 
in real pay reflected in basic salaries. In very broad terms, during 
this period (1978 - 1986) the movement in the real gross salary index 
was about 50 per cent greater than basic salary index (Table 5.6). How­
ever, by 1986, even with the inclusion of allowances, real pay was not 
more than 50 per cent, at best, of its 1978 level.
In Table 5.7 - 5.11 the so-called standard allowances have been 
taken into account. To illustrate the effect of all allowances, stan­
dard and non-standard, in increasing basic salary, a random selection 
of 12 individuals' salary records was made from the payrolls of the
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Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. In Table 5.12 each person's 
allowances and gross salary is expressed as a percentage of the basic 
salary. For the majority GS as a percentage of BS falls within the 
ranges shown in Table 5.9. However, two members of grade 4 received 
qualification, allowances and one in grade 14 is paid typing allowance. 
These non-standard allowances added sums amounting to 8.5, 6.3, and 25 
per cent of respective basic salaries of the individuals concerned.
The inclusion of another means of augmenting basic pay, viz, 
through overtime payments, for which there were not data obtainable ex­
cept in respect of the random information of individuals' earnings, is 
illustrated by examples of 4 grade 18 staff (unskilled labourers) in 
Table 5.12. In these cases, overtime payments ranged from about one- 
third to one-half of basic salary. Gross pay (basic salary, allowances 
and overtime) was some 225 to 250 per cent of basic salary. As will 
become apparent in Chapter 6 (and the case studies) overtime payments 
for these individuals appear to be moderate in relation to amounts 
practically payable in some other parts of the public sector.
Analysis so far, has concentrated upon changes in real pay without 
consideration of the pay implications of movements within grades through 
the incremental system and between grades through promotion. These move­
ments will now be examined. It needs to be noted, however, that the 
following analysis, in view of apparent dearth of information, largely 
depends upon examples provided by a recent ILO report (1987c).
5.8. REGRADING AND PROMOTION
According to current civil service provisions university graduates 
are recruited into grade 9. Graduates of a two-year course at a techni­
cal institute enter on step 1, university arts graduates (four-year course)
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enter on step 3, agriculturalists and vets on step 8, engineers on 
step 9 and medical doctors on step 10. After one year for medical 
graduates, two years for engineers, three years for agriculturalists, 
and four years for arts graduates, these staff can expect promotion to 
grade 8. In theory at least, this requirement is necessary but not 
sufficient for promotion. The Public Service Regulations, 1973, prov­
ide the rules for promotion and require that promotion shall be made
only to fill a vacant post. They also require that selection for prom-
(34)
otion shall depend primarily on merit. Moreover, no employee who
is required to pass a test before being promoted shall be promoted until 
he/she passed successfully such test. The commonplace practice and the 
prevalent attitude, however, is that spending the required period in a 
certain grade is quite sufficient to claim promotion. If there were no 
vacancies in grade 8, for example, individuals receive the basic salary 
of that grade while remaining formally in grade 9.
Consequently, regrading and promotion practices have become an 
important means of achieving larger increases in pay over and above those 
resulting from periodic adjustments. This may be illustrated by prov­
iding firstly, hypothetical and then actual examples.
Table 5.13 shows the salary and grade 'career progression' of two 
university graduates, a vet and an arts graduate, assumed to have been 
recruited in January 1979, July 1983 and July 1 9 8 4 . ^ ^  The figures 
broadly reveal that graduates recruited in 1979 would have suffered a 
reduction in real basic salary of about two-thirds and a fall in real 
gross salary of 32 - 44 per cent. Those recruited in July 1983 would 
have had a fall in real basic salary of 15 - 20 per cent but an increase 
of 40 - 50 per cent in real gross salary. The 1984 recruits would have 
lost 12 - 14 per cent of their real basic salary but increased real gross 
salary by more than a third.
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Further illustrations of the effects of regrading and promotion 
in respect of 40 randomly selected individuals are presented in Tables 
5.14 and 5.15. In Table 5.14 the date of recruitment and recruitment 
grade of each individual is shown. Both grades 7 and 8 contain some 
individuals who were recruited as secondary school leavers (grade 14 
or its equivalent) in the 1960s and others who were university graduates 
recruited into grade 9. Grade 12 consists of people recruited into grade 
14, and grade 13 of these initially entering grade 18 as unskilled work­
ers. Comparison of the dates of recruitment of those entering as mem­
bers of the same grades but currently in grades 7 and 8 may suggest that 
promotion is not automatically determine by years of service. Apparently, 
there are currently some members of grade 7 who were recruited later 
than others who are still in grade 8. Attainment of additional qualifi­
cations and training after recruitment, coupled with the relative avail­
ability of openings may explain such variation. There is little evid­
ence to suggest that such variation resulted from promotions on the 
basis of performance appraisal.
What Table 5.15 broadly establishes is that the drastic reductions 
in real pay observed earlier has been modified by increments and promo­
tion. Particularly coupled with allowances, promotions and regrading 
have enabled some public service members to maintain or increase their 
real gross salary relative to levels prevailing at recruitment date 
(columns 8 and 9). It appears that the more recent recruits who have 
been promoted have done best. But this has been attributed to the fact 
that their recruitment gross salary was low in real terms in relation 
to levels received in earlier years.
However, this is by no means to suggest that promotion automatic­
ally solves real pay problems for government employees. For example, 
individual 2 (Table 5.15) after being in the service for 18 years and
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being promoted from grade 14 to grade 7, has lost nearly a quarter of 
his gross salary in real terms by 1986. Moreover, at least half of the 
individuals in the sample have experienced a reduction in their gross 
salary even after being promoted several times.
These examples are too few and the details available too fragmen­
tary to facilitate comprehensive analysis of the movements in effective 
real pay of civil servants in the Sudan, but they are sufficient to dem­
onstrate the inadequacy of any analysis which takes account only of basic 
salary scales and allowances as the measures of the trends in real pay 
of serving civil servants.
5.9. THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS
There is no formal provision for collective bargaining in the 
civil service. However, existing arrangements allow for the representa­
tion of the two national federations - the Sudan Workers' Trade Unions 
Federation (SWTUF) and Employees'and Professionals' Trade Unions Federa­
tion (EPTUF) - in pay review committees. It appears that such arrange­
ment has been established recently because, as we revealed earlier, up 
to 1978 union participation was restricted to consultation as the fed­
erations were usually asked to present their suggestions through formal 
submissions. Unions' representatives serve as a link between the 
Committee and the two federations: thus, while the possibility of unions 
influencing the recommendations of the Committee should exist, it is 
difficult to determine the exact magnitude of this influence neither 
the extent of their negotiation power. But the fact that there is no 
foolproof method for quantitatively assessing the impact of unions on 
salaries, does not invalidate the contention that such impact can be 
quite significant. A number of occasions highlighted in this chapter
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and previous chapters have shown that the real power of the trade 
unions in the Sudan could be seen in their ability to achieve 'political 
settlements' to pay problems. Moreover, recent years' experience has 
indicated that there is an increasing resort to the use of strike weapon 
by public sector employees. Details of the number of strikes, the exact 
number of employees involved in each strike and the resulting 'working 
days lost' could not be obtained bee ause they were not, surprisingly, 
documented by any official body. This is despite the fact that strikes
in recent years have almost become a constant feature of the news head-
t  (37) 
lines.
Statutory provisions for the settlement of industrial disputes 
are contained in the 1976 Industrial Relations Act. The Act explicitly 
prohibits strikes at any stage of the settlement procedure which requires 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. However, unions rarely comply 
with the statutory provisions and apparently attach no faith to the 
effectiveness of the system. It appears that the reluctance of the 
government to apply sanctions on defiant unions coupled with its readi­
ness to provide concessions to factional demands has clearly undermined 
the effectiveness of the system, and enhanced the 'propensity to strike' 
among the unions. In an interview with a senior official in the 
Ministry of Finance it was revealed that almost 7 out of 10 industrial
disputes would be resolved only after the government conceding to part
(38)
or all of the unions' demands.
Thus, the above considerations, tentative though they are, lead 
one to the conclusion that unions have been effective in expediting the 
gains to employees and also in bringing about increases in salaries more 
than market forces would have otherwise permitted. One of the top SWTUF 
leaders expressed this view in a somewhat extreme form:
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"Only the struggles, strength and the vigilance of the 
trade union movement have enabled the worker to have 
the gains he h a s " . ^ ^
5.10. CONCLUSION
It emerges from what has been said in this chapter that the 
industrial relations climate in the civil service has deteriorated 
considerably with pay problems becoming more acute and controversial 
in the last 10 - 15 years. Ironically, the beginning of such deter­
ioration coincided with the first attempt in the history of the Sudan­
ese civil service to adopt a job evaluation scheme. Technical defici­
encies, lack of unions' support and the government's arbitrary decis­
ions were among the most important factors which led to the failure 
of the scheme to produce the anticipated reform of the system. In­
stead, the implementation of the scheme generated many disparities and 
distortions. In consequence, committees were more frequently set up 
to remove discrepancies, but they failed consistently to maintain 
industrial peace and/or reduce the incidences of sectoral claims for 
pay increases. One reason for the persistence of pay claims was govern­
ment's readiness to concede to the demands of certain groups. The second, 
and perhaps the major reason was the continuous fall in real pay levels. 
Although civil service pay scales have been adjusted in 1974, 1978, 1983, 
and 1985/86, and the increase in nominal basic salaries amounted for 
some groups to 264 per cent from 1974 to 1986, real basic pay scales in 
1986 were as low as 16 per cent of 1974 levels. The significant increase 
in the amount and quantum of allowances in recent years could be seen as
a way of modifying the magnitude of real pay decline. By 1986, the major­
ity of civil service grades were paid allowances which exceeded their
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basic salary rates. These allowances, along with the incremental system, 
regrading and promotion have partially offset the dramatic fall in the 
real value of basic salary scales. The introduction of the wide variety 
of allowances has provided a further impetus for coercive comparability. 
Largely through their political power trade unions have influenced the 
remuneration of employees significantly. Unions and professional associ­
ations typically sought special allowances because modifications in pay 
scales were not so easily won because they had to be universally applied 
across the service.
Thus, it can be argued that the labour markets in which the salaries 
of civil servants in the Sudan are established are from the simple perfec­
tly competitive models used in much of the economic theory. On the con­
trary, because of the internal labour market provisions, politically- 
orientated government decisions and the powerful influence of trade unions, 
competitive forces are totally displaced. Of course, this is by no means 
a peculiar feature of civil service pay determination; it is to be found 
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3 6204-6804 6204 6354 6504 6654 6804 150
4 5682-6282 5682 5832 5982 6132 6282 150
5 4980-5460 4980 5100 5220 5340 5460 120
6 4332-4932 4332 4452 4572 4692 4812 4932 120
7 3708-4428 3708 3828 3948 4078 4188 4308 4428 120
8 2838-3594 2838 2946 3054 3162 3270 3378 3486 3594 108
9 1824-2616 1824 1896 1968 2040 2112 2184 2256 2328 2400 2472 2544 2616 72
10 2664-3252 2664 2748 2832 2916 3000 3084 3168 3252 84
10A 2418-2943 2418 2493 2568 2643 2718 2793 2868 2943 75
11 2052-2577 2052 2127 2202 2277 2352 2427 2502 2577 75
12 1740-2265 1740 1815 1890 1965 2040 2115 2190 2265 75
13 1338-1779 1338 1401 1464 1527 1590 1653 1716 1779 63
14 1200-1632 1200 1254 1308 1362 1416 1470 1524 1578 1632 54
15 924-1281 924 975 1026 1077 1128 1179 1230 1281 51
16 801-1053 801 837 873 909 948 981 1017 1053 36
17 750- 960 750 780 810 840 870 900 930 960 30
18 720- 900 720 750 780 810 840 870 900 30
Source: Data provided by the Civil Service Department (CSP).
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Table 5.2 Table 5.3
CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SERVICE
Percentage Differentials bet­
ween Grades, 1986





Grade % at Bottom % at Penultimate
2-1 10.0 1 _
3-2 22.2 11.7 2 - -
4-3 9.2 8.3 3 2.4 2.3
5-4 14.0 15.1 4 2.6 2.4
6-5 14.9 10.7 5 2.4 2.2
7-6 16.8 11.4 6 2.8 2.5
8-7 30.7 23.3 7 3.2 2.8
9-8 55.6 37.4 8 3.8 3.1
10-9 (31.5) (20.0) 9 3.9 2.8
10A-10 10.2 10.5 10 3.2 2.7
11—10A 17.8 14.2 10A 3.1 2.6
12-11 17.9 13.8 11 3.7 3.0
13-12 30.0 27.3 12 4.3 3.4
14-13 11.5 9.0 13 4.7 3.7
15-14 30.0 27.4 14 4.5 3.4
16-15 15.4 21.6 15 5.5 4.1
17-16 6.8 9.7 16 4.5 3.5
18-17 4.2 6.7 17 4.0 3.2
18 4.2 3.4
Source : Calculated from Source: Calculated from Table 5.1.
Table 3.1.
Figures in brackets 
are negative numbers 
indicating that pay 
rates in Grade 9 are 


















1 2850 4900-5400 5400-5940 8400
2 2750 -2800 4420-4780 4860-5260 7600
3 2600 -2700 4020-4340 4420-4780 6204-6804
4 2600 3620-3940 3980-4340 5682-6282
5 2200 -2550 3220-3540 3550-3910 4980-5460
5A 2060 -2240 2980-3380 3280-3730
6 1900 -2050 2740-3140 3010-3460 4332-4932
7 1560 -1854 2180-2660 2440-2980 3708-4428
8 1043 -1503 1650-2180 1845-2446 2838-3594
9 659 - 986 1000-1500 1120-1675 1824-2616
10 1060 -1491 1596-1996 1820-2235 2664-3252
10A 861 -1022 1346-1696 1545-1930 2418-2943
11 643 - 889 1146-1496 1325-1710 2052-2577
12 635 - 878 966-1296 1115-1490 1740-2265
13 427 - 601 786-1046 905-1215 1338-1779
14 387 - 662 606- 846 695- 985 1200-1632
15 316 - 333 576- 786 660- 905 924-1281
16 264.6 - 399 496- 650 570- 745 801-1053
17 220.2 - 322.8 420- 546 510- 664 750- 966
18 198 - 288.8 336- 464 432- 590 720- 900
Source: Data provided by the Civil Service Department.
- Grades were revised in 1978 following JECS. So, the 1974 
grades were shown with their current equivalents.
- In 1974 there were different salary scales for classified 
and unclassified members of Grades 11, 12 and 15. The 
higher rates were included.





Percentage Changes in Nominal Basic Salary Scales during 
1974-1986
Grade 1974-1978 1978-1983 1983-1986 1974-1986 1978-1986
1 172.0-189.5 110.2-110.0 155.6-141.3 294.7- 171.4-155.6
2 160.7-170.7 110.0-110.0 156.3-144.5 276.4-271.4 171.9-159.0
3 154.6-160.7 110.0-110.1 140.4-142.3 238.6-252.0 154.3-156.8
4 139.2-151.1 109.9-110.2 142.8-144.7 218.5-241.6 157.0-159.4
5 146.4-138.8 110.2-110.5 140.3-139.6 226.4-214.1 154.7-154.2
5A 144.7-150.9 110.1-110.4 - - -
6 144.2-153.2 109.9-110.2 143.9-142.7 228.0-240.5 158.1-157.2
7 139.7-140.0 111.9-112.0 152.8-148.6 237.7-238.8 170.1-166.5
8 158.2-145.0 111.8-112.2 153.8-146.9 272.1-239.1 172.0-164.9
9 151.7-152.1 112.0-111.7 162.9-156.9 276.8-265.3 182.4-174.4
10 150.6-133.9 114.0-112.0 146.3-145.5 251.3-218.1 166.9-162.9
10A 156.3-165.9 114.8-113.8 156.5-152.5 280.8-188.0 179.6-173.5
11 178.2-168.3 115.6-114.3 154.9-150.7 319.1-290.0 179.1-172.3
12 152.1-147.6 115.4-115.0 156.1-152.0 274.0-258.0 180.1-174.8
13 184.1-174.0 115.1-116.2 147.8-146.4 313.3-296.0 170.2-170.1
14 156.6-127.8 114.7-116.4 172.7-165.7 310.0-246.5 198.0-192.9
15 182.3-173.3 114.6-115.1 140.0-141.6 292.4-282.2 160.4-163.0
16 187.5-162.9 114.9-114.6 140.5-141.3 302.7-263.9 161.5-162.0
17 190.9-169.6 121.4-121.6 147.1-145.5 340.6-299.2 178.6-176.9
18 169.7-160.7 128.0-127.2 167.4-152.2 363.6-311.6 214.3-194.0




Indices of Real Basic Salary Scales minima and maxima, 1974-1986
Grade
1974-1978 1978-1983 1983-1986 1974-1986 1978-1986
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 93 102 32 32 73 67 22 23 21
2 87 92 32 32 74 68 20 20 23 22
3 84 87 32 32 66 67 18 18 21 21
4 75 82 32 32 67 68 16 18 21 22
5 79 75 32 32 66 66 17 16 21 21
6 78 83 32 32 68 67 17 18 21 21
7 76 78 32 32 72 71 17 16 23 23
8 86 78 32 32 73 69 20 18 23 22
9 82 82 32 32 77 74 20 19 25 24
10 81 72 33 32 69 69 18 16 23 22
10A 85 90 33 33 74 72 21 21 24 24
11 96 91 33 33 73 71 23 21 24 24
12 82 80 33 33 74 72 20 19 25 24
13 99 94 33 34 70 69 23 22 23 23
14 85 69 33 34 81 78 23 18 27 26
15 99 94 33 33 66 67 21 21 22 22
16 101 88 33 33 66 67 22 19 24 22
17 103 91 35 35 69 67 25 22 24 24
18 92 87 37 37 79 72 27 23 29 26
July 1974=100 July 1978=100 December 1983= July 1974=100 July 1978=100
Ain CPI::185 A in CPI:=346.6 100Ain CPI=1363..4Ain CPI=735.1
A in CPI=212.1
Nominal salaries are deflated by the Cost of Living Index for 
Higher Salaried employees with the average CPI for the 1970=100 
and for
July 1974 = 172.4
July 1978 = 319.0
December 1983= 1105.3
April 1986 = 2345.0
(as figures for July were not available April CPI has been used 
for the July calculation).
The CPI for Lower Salaried has risen at a slightly higher rate, 
about 6% over the full period. The Real Salary Index for Grade 18 
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Transport Allowance (higher rate)
RA Tech = Responsibility or Technical Allowance
NW
HA
Nature of Work Allowance 
Housing Allowance
-  2 0 0  -
Table 5.8
CIVIL SERVICE
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Alice = Allowances (as shown in table)
GS = Gross Salary (BS + Alice)
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1 145.6 141.3 164.4 158.6 2011.4
2 150.5 146.7 171.6 166.2 196.3
3 146.6 143.1 170.6 165.3 212.2 202.3
4 146.7 142.9 173.9 167.7 217.2 206.0
3 135.8 132.5 159.2 153.7 209.6 200.0
6 133.2 129.0 159.8 152.0 202.5 189.9
7 141.8 134.3 151 .6 142.3 213.2 194.9
8 144.4 133.6 155.3 141.7 226.8 200.2
9 107.2 104.8 126.8 177.9 218.4 182.6
10 104.5 103.6 116.5 113.4 169.8 157.2
10A 105.3 164.2 119.4 115.5 159.6 148.9
11 106.3 104.8 122.6 117.5 167.3 153.6
12 107.5 105.6 126.9 120.1 169.0 153.0
13 109.2 106.9 133.1 124.7 180.7 160.7
14 111.9 108.5 143.2 130.5 180.0 158.8
15 112.5 109.2 145.5 133.1 197.4 170.3
16 114.5 110.1 152.6 140.3 197.3 174.1
17 117.1 113.2 158.8 146.2 204.0 180.7
18 121.4 115.5 169.4 150.8 208.3 186.7
Basic Salary each year = 100
Gross Salary = Basic Salary plus Allowances shown in Table 5,8.
-  2 0 2  -
Table 5.10 
CIVIL SERVICE














1 124.5 123.4 237.2 221.7 190.5 179.6
2 125.4 124.6 224.3 212.8 178.9 170.7
3 128.0 127.2 223.4 221.6 174.6 174.2
4 130.3 129.3 232.3 229.8 178.4 177.8
3 129.2 128.1 238.8 232.7 184.8 181.7
6 131.7 129.8 240.2 231.4 182.3 178.3
7 119.6 118.7 255.8 241.5 213.7 203.5
8 120.3 119.9 270.3 247.0 224.7 207.6
9 132.5 125.6 371.6 303.8 280.6 241.8
10 127.1 122.6 271.2 247.2 213.4 201.7
10A 130.1 126.1 272.0 247.9 209.1 196.5
11 133.4 128.2 281.8 252.4 211.2 196.9
12 136.3 130.8 283.2 253.3 207.8 193.6
13 140.0 135.5 281.8 255.7 200.7 188.7
14 146.8 140.0 318.6 282.4 217.1 201.7
13 148.1 140.0 281.5 254.2 190.0 181.9
16 153.2 144.7 275.3 253.9 181.7 175.4
17 164.6 156.0 311.0 287.5 188.9 181.1


















1 36 36 32 30 90 85
2 36 36 31 29 84 80
3 37 37 30 30 82 82
4 38 39 32 32 84 84
3 37 37 32 32 87 86
6 38 37 33 31 86 84
7 35 34 35 33 101 96
8 35 34 37 34 106 98
9 38 36 51 41 132 114
10 37 35 37 34 101 95
10A 38 36 37 34 99 93
11 38 37 38 34 100 93
12 39 38 39 34 95 91
13 41 39 38 35 95 89
14 42 40 43 38 102 95
15 43 41 38 35 90 85
16 44 42 42 35 86 83
17 47 45 42 38 89 85




Examples of Gross Salary and Gross Pay, July 1986
Grade 4 Grade 4 Grade 4 Grade 9 Grade 9
£s ?£S £s ?£S £s ?<£S £s ?£S £s ?£S
BS 473.5 100.0 473.5 100.0 473.5 100.0 176 100.0 164 100.0
TA 25 5.3 25 5.3 35 7.4 35 19.9 35 21.3
HA 135 28.5 135 28.5 135 28.5 70 39.8 70 42.7
NW 140 29.6 140 29.6 140 29.6 75 42.6 75 45.7
MA 145 30.6 145 30.6 145 30.6
Rep. 75 15.8 75 15.8 75 15.8
Qual. - - 40 8.5 30 6.3
GS 993.5 209.8 1033.5 218.3 1033.5 218.3 356 202.3 344 209.8
Grade 9 Grade 14 Grade 14
£s ?<BS £s ?£S £s 5BS
BS 218 100.0 100 100.0 122.5 100.0
TA 35 16.1 35 35.0 35 28.6
HA 70 32.1 25 25.0 25 20.4
NW 75 34.4 20 20.0 20 16.3
Other - - 25 25.0 - -
GS 398 182.6 205 205.0 202.5 165.3
Grade 18 Grade 18 Grade 18 Grade 18
£s ?£S £s ?«BS £s ?£S £s ?«BS
BS 67.5 100.0 72.5 100.0 67.5 100.0 60 100.0
TA 35 51.9 35 48.3 35 51.9 35 58.3
HA 20 29.6 20 27.6 20 29.6 20 33.3
NW 10 14.8 10 13.8 10 14.8 10 16.7
GS 132.5 196.3 137.5 189.7 132.5 196.3 125 208.3
0/T 25 37.0 27 37.2 34 50.4 22.5 37.5
GP 157.5 233.3 164.5 226.9 166.5 246.7 147.5 245.8
Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning Accounting Department.
BS = Basic Salary GS = Gross Salary
TA = Travel Allowance GP = Gross Pay (GS + 0/T)
HA = Housing Allowance
NW = Nature of Work Allowance
MA = Mileage Allowance
Rep. = Representation Allowance
Qual. = Qualification Allowance
0/T = Overtime




BS and GS - Entrants 1979, 1983, 1984













B. Recruited January 1979
Veterinary Arts
£s £s
BS 1/79 1300 1080
BS 7/86 3270 3162
Real BS (a) 7/86 (1/79 = 100) 35 40
(b) 33 39
GS 1/79 1372 1152
GS 7/86 5770 5682
Real GS (a) 7/86 (1/79 = 100) 58 68
(b) 56 65
Recruited July 1983
BS 7/83 1300 1080
BS 7/86 2838 2184
Real BS (a) 7/86 (7/83 = 100) 100 92
(b) 85 79
GS 7/83 1372 4152
GS 7/86 4998 4344
Real GS (a) 7/86 (7/83 = 100) 166 172
(b) 143 148
Recruited July 1984
BS 7/84 1455 1210
BS 7/86 2472 2112
Real BS (a) 7/86 (7/84 = 100) 99 102
(b) 86 88
GS 7/84 1755 1510
GS 7/86 4632 4272
Real GS (a) 7/86 (7/84 = 100) 154 165
(b) 133 143
Notes The only allowances included in GS are TA from 1979, plus HA and 
NW from 1986. The GS is, therefore, assured to be less than in 
Table 8.
(a) Real Salary Index using CPI from recruitment month base date 
to April 1986 eg 1/79-4/86 for January 1979 to July 1986.
(b) Real Salary Index using CPI for the month, three months prior 




Illustrations of Promotion and Regrading July 1986
Ministry of Labour Ministry of Finance and Planning
Current Recruitment Current Recruitment



























































Source: Ministry of Labour, 
Personnel Section, 
and Wage Section, 





Examples of Estimated Indices of Real Gross Salaries from Recruitment 
Gross Salary to July 1986 Gross Salary, and Basic Salaries
Recru- Recru- « , Rec.Grade Curr.Grade Curr.Grade Rec.Grade Curr.Grade Curr.Grade
Indi- itment itment ^rrT  1986 Real 1986 Real 1986 Real 1986 Real 1986 Real 1986 Real 
vidual Grade Grade ra Max BS Min BS Max BS Max GS Min GS Max GS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 14 12/62 7 22 50 60 31 96 104
2 14 7/68 7 16 39 46 24 74 81
3 9 12/71 7 19 27 32 33 54 59
4 9 1/74 7 30 43 51 51 85 93
5 9 8/77 7 45 63 76 76 126 138
6 9 1/79 7 55 78 93 62 102 112
7 14 8/67 8 21 36 46 29 73 81
8 14 10/68 8 16 30 38 24 60 67
9 14 2/73 8 27 48 60 39 96 108
10 9 5/76 8 34 37 46 58 78 87
11 9 8/79 8 47 51 64 80 107 120
12 9 11/80 8 58 63 80 99 134 150
13 9 1/81 8 59 64 81 101 136 152
14 9 5/82 8 82 89 112 140 188 210
15 14 10/71 12 22 23 30 30 35 41
16 14 1/73 12 27 29 38 39 44 52
17 14 5/77 12 42 45 59 60 68 80
18 14 4/78 12 47 50 65 66 75 88
19 14 11/79 12 51 54 71 72 82 97
20 18 7/69 13 24 36 47 37 53 63
21 18 4/75 13 40 59 78 61 88 104
22 18 1/79 13 37 55 73 57 82 97
23 18 8/80 13 58 87 115 90 129 153
Source: Compiled from Table 5.14
Notes Col (4): Index 1986 of the Maximun Real Basic Salary of the Recruitment Grade.
Col (5): Index of Real Current Grade Minimum Basic Salary to Recruitment Grade
Minimun BS.
Col (6): Index of Real Current Grade Maximum Basic Salary to Recruitment Grade 
Minimum BS.
Col (7): Index of the 1986 Maximum Real Gross Salary of the Recruitment Grade.
Col (8): Index of Current Grade Minimum Real Gross Salary to Recruitment Gross
Salary. Gross Salary = Basic Salary plus Allowances from Table 7.7.
Precise details of the Allowances are not available prior to July 1978. It has been 
assumed that the ratio of Gross Salary to Basic Salary for the minimum of each grade 
was the same prior to 1978 as in July 1978.
CPI = CPI April 1986 - CPI base year x 100 + 100 
CPI Base Year
- 208 -
N O T E S
1. The first was General Abboud's rule during 1958-1964 which was 
brought to and end by the October Revolution.
2. During this period a number of trade union leaders and leading SCP
members held ministerial and other important portfolios.
3. See Mohammed-Taha (1979), p 68.
4. As a result a number of trade union and SCP leaders including the 
General Secretary of SWTUF were executed.
5. Government of Sudan: The Speech of the President of the Republic 
to the opening session of the Second People's Council, (Khartoum, 
24 May, 1974), p 23.
6. See Mohammed-Taha (1979), op cit, p 164.
7. Government of Sudan, Ministry of Public Service and Administrative 
Reform: Report of an internal committee, Khartoum, December 1973,
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8. Mohammed-Taha, op cit, p 165.
9. See Abdin et al, op cit, for more analysis on this issue.
10. Government of Sudan: The Ministry of Public Service: The Report of 
an Experts Committee on Personnel & Administrative Reform in the 
Public Service, 1973.
11. ibid.
12. Government of Sudan: The Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme 
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13. ibid.
14. ibid.
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other job which is not easily dientifiable with one of the two 
categories.
16. The JECS Report, op cit, p 5.
17. H A El-Tayyeb, The JECS? quoted in Sudanow, April 1979.
18. Of the original 50 locally trained staff, 23 emigrated to Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf states, and of the 4 UK-trained only one 
remained to implement the scheme.
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19. El-Tayyeb, op cit.
20. An interview with the Secretary General of the Engineers' Union 
in National Electricity and Water Corporation quoted in Al-Sahafa 
newspaper, 27 August 1978.
21. Government of Sudan: The Report of High Commission for revising 
Pay and Terms of Employment (El-Turabi Commission), 1985.
22. ibid.
23. ibid.
24. Government of Sudan: Civil Service Department: The Report of the 
Technical Committee on Public Sector Pay, July 1985, p 12.
25. Unfortunately, the numbers and durations of these strikes are not 
documented.
26. Terms of reference of El-Jack Committee obtained from the CSD.
27. An interview with Professor El-Jack of University of Khartoum con­
ducted by the researcher.
28. Interviews with some officials (including the Under-Secretary) in 
CSD carried out by the researcher during the field work in March- 
September 1986.
29. Social and cultural factors play an important role in the superior- 
subordinate relationship in the Sudan. For example, knowing that 
the employee's performance has not been satisfactory, the boss may 
be reluctant to write an unfavourable report because of friendship 
or because he knows that the employee has a large family to feed.
In such a case, the boss may consider it unfair to write a report 
which would eventually deprive the employee of his/her annual in­
crement .
30. According to the public service regualtions mileage allowance is 
payable for the use of a private car for official duties, but in 
practice the mere possession of a car is sufficient to claim the 
allowance.
31. The CPI for lower salaries has risen during the period at a slightly 
higher rate, about 6 per cent. If the figures for lower salaried 
had been used, indices of real basic salaries would have been reduced 
a little. The latest available CPI is for April 1986 and this
has been used to calculate the July real basic salary index. The 
actual figures will be somewhat lower than those shown in Table 5.6
as a result of inflation between April and July 1986.
32. Although the mileage allowance may not be payable toall employees 
and thus not a standard allowance according to our own definition, 
it, nevertheless, included in the gross salary analysis because 
the numbers might be receiving the allowance are believed to be
larger than those not receiving it.
-  2 1 0  -
33. See ILO (1987c), pp 18-22.
34. Chapter 6 of the 1973 Public Service Regulations spells out the 
basis of promotion. Accordingly, evaluation for selection shall 
be made by giving, consecutively, the highest weight to perform­
ance then to educational qualifications relevant to the post of 
promotion concerned and lastly to seniority ranking in accordance 
with the following ratios:
a) 70?o for performance;
b) 20?o for educational qualifications relevant to the 
promotion post concerned in case of officials and 
in the case of workers consideration shall be given 
to technical, industrial and trade certificates;
c) 10?o for seniority.
35. The real change in GS and BS in Table 5.13 is measured in two 
ways. Method (a) deflates the increase in money terms by the 
CPI from the date of recruitment to April 1986 as the July 
1986 CPI figure is not available. Method (b) seeks to allow 
for the fact that only April 1986 figure is available by basing 
the price movements on a period three months prior to the date 
of recruitment thereby including the increase in prices for an 
equivalent full period.
36. ILO (1987c).
37. One newspaper recently reported that since the uprising of April 
1985 there has been at least one strike every week.
38. An interview with the Assistant Under-Secretary for Research, 
Ministry of Finacne, Khartoum, May 1986.
39. An interview with some members of the Executive Committee of SWTUF, 
Khartoum, June 1986.
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C H A P T E R  S I X




The parastatal sector is taken here to comprise all public sector 
organisations outside the civil service. As seen in Chapter 4, this 
sector is a large emplpyer of wage labour in the urban labour market and 
is engaged in activities in all sectors of the economy. The industrial 
organisation of the sector is complex, but for purposes of considering 
issues of pay, three categories can be identified:
1) Public Authorities (PAs);
2) Public Corporations (PCs);
3) Public Companies (PCOMs).
The government, through the Civil Service Department, determines 
the pay for public authorities and public corporations. Public compan­
ies, on the other hand, are organised under the 1923 Companies Act and 
essentially set their own terms and conditions of service, and thus are 
similar to private companies more than public authorities and corporaions 
where wages and salaries are concerned.
In the absence of regular statistical information on the public
sector and in order to appreciate the way in which the pay, allowances, 
and grading provisions were applied in practice, it was decided to collect
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examples of relevant data from a number of parastatals. Limitations of 
time and resources, meant that only a few organisations willing to allow 
access, could be consulted, thus, providing limited illustrations of pay 
and allowances rather than the more extensive (though in a LDC certainly 
less reliable) information to be expected from the use of sample survey 
techniques. Information was sought from six organisations of which one 
was a public authority (Sudan Railways Corporation, SRC), four public 
corporations (the National Electricity Corporation, NEC, the General 
Petroleum Corporation, GPC, the Sudan Airways Corporation, SAC, and the 
Earthmoving and Irrigation Corporation, EMIC) and one a major bank (the 
Bank of Khartoum) a government owned public company. These organisations 
were chosen because they are relatively large employers, thought to have 
proper pay records and were more willing to grant access to the required 
data through formal and informal channels.
It may be an exaggeration to claim that these organisations are 
representative samples of the parastatal sector. However, given the 
general absence of data about pay and allowances in the public sector, 
it is difficult to know how representative or otherwise any selection 
of public organisations would be. Nevertheless, these six organisations 
employ more than 55,000 people (ie, about the third of total parastatal 
employment) from different occupations, and it would be highly improbable 
that their pay structures are typical. As might be expected, it was not 
possible to collect information from each organisation in a standard 
form. Some organisations could not produce all the information requested 
while generally poor record-keeping meant that time-series data were 
virtually non-existent. In consequence although the analysis of pay 
is inevitably less than comprehensive it will at least be indicative 
of the public sector in the current decade, and of the pay policies 
which government is attempting to implement.
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6.2. A BRIEF BACKGROUND
In the analyses of previous chapters no distinction has been made 
in pay structure and determination between the civil service and the 
parastatals. In fact, there was no need for such a distinction prior 
to 1970. The pay structure and terms of employment of the civil service 
were more or less universally applied in the entire public sector. How­
ever, public corporations such as Sudan Railways, Sudan Airways, Industrial
Development Corporation, etc, were allowed to add two increments (commonly
(1)known as corporation allowance) to their employees basic pay rates.
With the nationalisation and confiscation measures of May 1970, a 
large number of commercial and industrial enterprises previously under 
private ownership came under the government control. As a result of 
this marked expansion in the non-civil-service government sector, a new 
situation emerged in respect of pay policy and determination in the pub­
lic sector as a whole. The newly state-controlled enterprises, not un­
expectedly varied considerably in activity, size, management and pay 
policies and practices.
The need to standardise and harmonise the different pay rates in 
the new extended public sector was immediately felt, but the main con­
cern was how to fix a practical unified pay structure which was gener­
ally consistent (though not equal) with that of the civil service. To 
serve this purpose, a central bureau for the personnel administration 
of the public corporations sector was established within the Ministry 
of the Public Service and Administrative Reform. Among its functions 
were: co-ordination of the terms of service for different public sector 
organisationsj laying down of general principles that should govern the 
pay and terms of service; and regular inspection to ensure proper appli­
cation of principles.
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Under the auspice of this bureau, a committee was formed in 1972 
to examine the pay structures of the corporations and to recommend a 
'unified' structure. It proposed a structure composed of seventeen 
grades and pay rates ranging from a minimum of £s14 to a maximum £s300 
a month. The implementation of these proposals faced considerable dif­
ficulty and eventually it was decided to adopt the new pay rates and to 
form two new committees entrusted with the task of conducting 'proper' 
job classification exercises in the corporations sector. Apparently, 
the two committees - one for the blue collar workers and the other for 
whiie collar - reflected the similar practice in the civil service.
The Workers Committee, using the same 'points system' method adop­
ted earlier by the UWC (1968), prescribed four main grades of manual 
workers and the lowest grade segmented further into four sub-grades, 
thus providing the same number of pay scales as was in the civil service. 
The government accepted the Committee's proposal in December 1974 and it 
was enforced back-dated to July. The instituted wage scales reported to
have exceeded corresponding pay rates in the civil service by amounts
(2)
ranging between 7 per cent and 10 per cent.
The other committee (for white collar staff) maintained the 17
grades recommended by the 1972 Committee on the grounds that they were
'reasonable' to contain all the jobs of this category of employees.
These grades were divided into four main classes: top management; middle 
management; executives and clerks. Moreover, apparently influenced by 
the professionals 'cadre' system prevailing in the civil service, the
Committee proposed creation of special cadres for: the engineers;
agriculturalists; typists; secretaries; and technicians. The salary 
rates of these cadres, however, stemmed from the scales of the basic 
structure and no extra premium had been granted for these categories.
But, a number of scales had been rolled into one long scale divided by
- 215 -
'efficiency bars'.
The resultant pay scales were considerably higher than the pay 
for corresponding groups in the civil service. It was reported that 
corporations' engineers, technicians, university graduates and secon­
dary school leavers were paid 28 per cent, 27 per cent, 21 per cent, 
and 25 per cent respectively higher than their central government col-
i (4)leagues.
Nevertheless, the corporation's sector's pay as established by 
these two committees was not the highest within the whole public sector. 
There were a number of autonomous bodies within the sector which evid­
ently had paid considerably higher wages and salaries as compared with 
both government and other public corporations. For example, The Sudan 
Development Corporation was found to be paying its employees salaries 
which exceeded in 1974 corresponding salaries in the civil service and 
the corporation sector by 78 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.
This was also true for University of Khartoum, commercial banks and 
the specialised b a n k s . T h e s e  'High-paying I s l a n d s ' w i t h i n  the 
public sector caused problems of considerable magnitude for the govern­
ment. They were (and still are) always a major source of complaints 
about the inequalities in pay on the part of comparable groups in the 
public service. The developments since 1974, and the current grading, 
pay scales and allowances' provisions will be discussed in the follow­
ing sections.
6.3. GRADING SYSTEMS
Formally there are two parastatals' standard grading systems and 
salary scales, one for the public authorities (PAs) and the other for 
public corporations (PCs). According to the CSD circular No. 23 (18
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August, 1985), the PAs' schedule is applicable to:
1) Sudan Railways Corporation;
2) River Transport Corporation;
3) staff of research corporations, units or centres other 
than research staff; and
4) staff of judiciary other than judges.
The public authorities have the same grading classification system as 
the civil service (CS) ie, 19 grades with the same number of incremental 
steps. The public corporations, however, operate a different grading 
system, and as will be seen below, have a higher basic salary structure. 
The PCs' grade structure extends to 23 grades, and comparing it to the 
CS and PAs' structure, grade 10A has been omitted, grade 16 has been 
extended to 16A and 16B, grade 17 to 17A and 17B and grade 18 has been 
divided into four grades, 18(4) - 18(1). The PCs' grades have been 
equated to the CS and PAs1 grades as appropriate. Thus, grade 9 which 
is the university graduate entrance grade for CS and PAs1 schedules, 
becomes grade 12; grade 14, the secondary school entrant grade, becomes 
grade 17A; and grade 18 for unskilled workers becomes grade 18(1); the 
lowest of the four categories of grade 18 in the PCs' classification 
system.
Examination of the case studies contained in the Appendix, clearly 
indicates that individual organisations do not strictly follow the gra­
ding systems specified for them by the CSD, and in practice there are 
widespread modifications and adaptations. For example, according to 
the formal provisions, Sudan Airways should have been applying the PCs' 
schedule yet it is operating an 18-graded schedule (the PAs' structure
minus grade 10A). Moreover, it has separate grading systems for its 
aircrew and ground engineers. This is also true for the NEC which uses 
the PAs' structure of grades though it is a public corporation. The
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EMIC, on the other hand, uses a combination of the two standard systems. 
For the classified employees it adopts the PAs* grades and for the un­
classified employees it adopts the PCs' grades after renumbering them 
from 15 - 18(1) to grades 1 - 7 .
The Bank of Khartoum uses a different grading system consisting 
of two separate schedules for classified and unclassified staff. The 
classified staff schedule has 12 grades ( 1 - 1 0  plus 1A and 10A) and 
six grades (8B, 9B, 10B and 11 - 13) are specified for the unclassified 
workers. As a public company, the Bank is not expected to follow either 
of the systems for the PCs or PAs. Under the provisions of the 1925 
Companies Act, the Board of Directors have full freedom to establish 
their own grading systems. Thus, it would be unsurprising to find pub­
lic companies with very different grading classification systems.
Interviews with responsible personnel in the Civil Service Dep­
artment revealed that the increased number of grades in the PCs rela­
tive to the CS and PAs' grades, was intended to provide the flexibility 
required to accommodate the diversity of jobs in the public corporations. 
However, it was not easy to discover why individual organisations opted 
to apply schedules incompatible with the formal provisions set by the 
CSD, though it is possible that their choice of schedules reflects 
attempts to enhance pay. The extent to which different grading systems 
permit differentiations in the pay scales, is the subject of the next 
section.
6.4. PAY SCALES
Two standard salary scales set by the civil Service Department 
are attached to the two standard grading systems discussed in the prev­
ious section. The PAs have increased their basic salary scales by add­
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ing two increments to the civil service scales. The public corporations 
also pay higher basic salaries. Details of the grading structure and 
basic salary scales in July 1986 for the two types of organisation and 
for the civil service are shown in Table 6.1. The PCs' grades have been 
equated to the equivalent grades in the CS and PAs. Figures in Table 6.1 
show that the PAs pay their staff basic salaries which exceed the CS sal­
aries by amounts varying between 4 and 11 per cent . It is particulaly 
evident that the skilled workers receive the highest premium. In view 
of the national shortages of skilled labour, ceteris paribus, this may 
suggest that the labour market is working efficiently. But, it would 
be premature to pass judgements on the functioning of the labour market 
on the basis of one differential. Full analysis of pay differentials 
and their behaviour over time will be provided in Chapter 7.
Table 6.1 also shows that the PCs pay premia over the civil ser­
vice pay scales amounting to 1.5 - 7 per cent. Although the majority 
of the PCs grades achieve premia that exceed the comparable PAs premia 
over the civil service, some grades receive less in terms of basic sal­
ary than equivalent grades in PAs. For example, a university graduate 
in the PCs (in grade 12) receives about 17 per cent higher minimum basic 
salary than his civil service counterpart; an equivalently graded grad­
uate in the PAs receives an 8 per cent premium. On the other hand an 
unskilled worker at the bottom of the pay structures in each organisa­
tion, receives an 8 per cent premium in the PAs and 5 per cent in the 
PCs. Wide variations exist among the premiums paid to the employees 
in the public corporations. For instance, university graduates who 
earn 16.8 per cent more on entry, achieve only 6 per cent more by the 
time they have reached the top of the senior executive officer scale
or its equivalent. Skilled and semi-skilled labour receive higher 
premia than the unskilled labour, but when they become senior skilled
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labour this advantage fades away; when they reach supervisory status 
(grades 15 and 16B), however, the initial advantage is more than res­
tored: at these levels they are paid almost treble the premia received 
by the unskilled workers. In very broad terms, the skilled labour cat­
egory receives relatively less amounts of premia than other occupational 
categories, particularly the fresh university graduates. This clearly 
refutes any belief that the wage system is operating to allocate labour 
efficiently in an economy characterised by apparent high levels of grad­
uate unemployment and general shortage of skilled labour.
The percentage excess of both PAs and PCs salary scales over the 
civil service scales is greatest at scale minima levels. This means 
that, for two employees recruited at the same time, one in the civil 
service and the other in public authority or a public corporation, the 
initial relatively high differential may contract by the time they have 
moved up to the top of their corresponding grades. This may be one of 
the policy measures of the government to remove pay disparities amongst 
public sector employees, although their intentions have not been made 
formally explicit.
Detailed analysis of pay scales in the six parastatals are con­
tained in the case studies (see the A p p e n d i x ) . E v i d e n t l y ,  all these 
organisations have adapted and modified the two formal standard basic 
salary scales prescribed for their type of organisation. The extent of 
these modifications are shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
In Table 6.2, the Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC), the public 
authorities case study example, applies the pay scales of the public 
corporations. Although application of the PC scales should cause some 
grades in SRC to receive less basic salary than comparable grades in 
other public authorities, for the majority it means a substantial rela­
tive incease. SRC employees in the predominantly classified grades 1 - 1 2
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receive premia varying from just under 1 per cent to 14 per cent over 
corresponding grades in similar PAs. On the other hand, SRC grades 
13 - 18 are paid basic salaries approximately 1 to 4 per cent lower than 
comparable grades in the PAs' standard classification system.
Table 6.3 shows the magnitude of the modifications in the basic 
salary scales of four public corporations. The National Electricity 
Corporation (NEC) has modified the PCs standard pay scales by adding a 
premium to each scale, except for grades 1 and 9 (the latter correspond­
ing to grade 12 in the PCs' system). As a result, NEC pays its staff 
basic salaries which exceed the officially set scales by up to nearly 
38 per cent. However, although grades 5 - 8  receive relatively substan­
tial amounts of premium, for the remaining grades the premium does not 
exceed 10 per cent. The General Petroleum Corporation (GPC), also, 
pays its employees a premium on every step of every grade scale, together 
with the operation of an additional step plus premium to grades 12, 13, 
17A and 18(1), and two extra steps with premium to grade 18(2). The net 
outcome of these modifications is relatively augmented basic salary 
scales in the GPC with standing differentials of 3 to 30 per cent above 
the formal scales laid down for public corporations in general (Table 
6.3, col. 7).
The effects of altering standard salary scales in Sudan Airways 
Corporation (SAC) are shown in column 8, Table 6.3. Basic salaries of 
SAC general staff (excluding aircrew and ground engineers who have sep­
arate pay schedules) are raised by amounts varying from 1 to 25 per cent. 
Grades 1 to 4 and the minima of grades 8 and 9, however, do not differ 
from the formal basic salary rates laid down the government for PCs.
The NRC, GPC, and SAC are among the corporations not covered by
the 1976 Public Corporations Act. They have been established under their 
own special acts. Prior to the 1985-86 pay revision, their salary scales
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were individually determined by the government in consultation (and 
not through negotiation) with the corporations. As a result, they 
were among the 'High-paying Islands' mentioned earlier which was accus­
tomed to paying basic salaries (as well as allowances and benefits) 
considerably higher than those paid by similar corporations under the 
1976 Act. For example, the GPC was paying up to 57 per cent differen­
tial to its employees in 1983, in comparison with other public corpora­
tions. As illustrated in the case studies, government attempts within 
the 1985-86 revisions to remove discrepancies and introduce uniformity 
by applying a single standard schedule have generally failed. Indivi­
dual organisations like GPC showed an extensive degree of resistence, 
and through strikes or threats of industrial action have been able to 
retain differentials through the payment of special premia over and 
above the standard pay scales set by the Civil Service Department. This 
may partly explain the prevalence of differentials between public cor­
porations which do not come under the umbrella of the 1976 Act. However, 
it is evident that those corporations which are covered by the Act have 
also managed to modify their salary scales. Column 9, Table 6.3 shows 
that although the Earthmoving and Irrigation Corporation (EMIC), for 
example, has retained the formal provisions for the PCs for its classi­
fied employees, it has adapted the basic salary scales for the unclassi- 
field. In modifying its pay scales, the EMIC has dropped the first two 
or three incremental steps, and added additional steps, thereby extend­
ing the scale. Grade 6 retains the starting level of grade 16B in the 
PCs, but has two additional steps. The EMIC scales (with the exception
of grade 6) are, therefore, higher than those of the PCs with differen­
tials of up to 15 per cent.
While it might appear then that the provision of three standard
grading and pay scale classification systems to cover the civil service, 
public authorities and public corporations would lead to some degree of
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uniformity and predetermined relationships between them, such is clearly 
not the case. The ability of individual organisations to modify both 
the grading systems and basic salary scales, as illustrated in the case 
studies, has led to considerable variation and diversity in pay from one 
organisation to another, and removed any possibility of achieving a uni­
form job evaluated pay structure for the public sector organisations in 
the Sudan. Furthermore, in addition to higher basic salaries, pay dis­
parities have been aggravated by the payment of better allowances to 
parastatal employees, discussed in the following section.
6.5. ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS
The allowances introduced following the 1985-86 adjustments for 
central and regional government employees also apply to the parastatals, 
and at least the standard allowances, (housing, nature of work, travel, 
and representation allowances) are meant to be identical with those of 
the civil service. However, what happens in practice, may suggest other­
wise. For example, Table 6.4 shows that SRC has modified the standard 
housing allowance set by the CSD for the civil service as well as PAs 
and PCs. Figures reveal that except for grades 5-9, which surprisingly 
receive relatively less HA, for the rest of the grades the allowance 
has been increased substantially and for many it has been doubled.
It has been reported that the EMIC pays standard allowances at 
the same rates as the civil service. However, examination of wage sheets 
and examples shown in the Appendix TableA6.4 (EMIC case study) indicate 
that transport allowance is paid at a higher rate than the civil service.
The Nature of Work Allowance, is not paid to the staff in GPC, who 
receive instead 25 per cent of their gross salary as a Petroleum Allow­
ance. The initial provision was that Petroleum Allowance should be a
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percentage of the basic salary. The GPC has succeeded in modifying the 
provision and, at present, the allowance is calculated on the basis of 
gross salary and not basic as was provided. For grade 1 in GPC this 
modification has increased the yearly allowance from £s2523.5 to £s5329; 
indicating that Petroleum Allowance which - in theory at least - ought 
to equate to the standard NW allowance, is double that allowance.
The extent of the possible variety of allowances and their total 
budgeted costs can further be seen in Appendix TableA2.2 (NEC case study), 
which shows the 1986-87 budget provisions for NEC. There are rather more 
allowances in this corporation than in others possibly because of the 
special work requirements. Petrol allowance for meter readers would not 
be paid in other organisations and on-call and field work allowances may 
be higher than in more typical organisations. Altogether 22 different 
types of allowances are payable to NEC employees. Moreover, allowances 
excluding shift and overtime payments, account for 82.3 per cent of the 
budgeted basic salary costs. Housing allowance is nearly 25 per cent 
of BS and Nature of Work plus similar special engineering allowance amounts 
to another 25 per cent of total basic salary. Transport allowance, which 
includes reimbursement of costs incurred in travel on official duties adds 
about a further 21 per cent to labour costs. Generally, all allowances 
and premia (such as overtime and shift work) together increase the BS 
total by 134.8 per cent and the inclusion of the pension contributions 
raises the BS costs by 144.3 per cent. The total labour costs budgeted 
for the financial year 1986-87 for the NEC are almost two-and-a-half 
times the total basic salaries.
Some organisations may have special allowance provisions which are 
not generally applicable. For example, it has been reported that, not­
withstanding the provisions of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
No. 985 dated 14.8.1985, which specifies how, when and to whom allowaces
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must be paid, some members of university staff may receive the correc­
tion allowance even though they are not involved in normal examination
. . (8) 
marking.
Thus, as the case studies illustrate, public organisations have 
used allowances to boost pay. There is now considerable diversity in 
allowances among these organisations and there are numerous instances 
where they are proportionately and absolutely more important in relation 
to basic salary than in the civil service.
Furthermore, the case studies clearly indicate that public organi­
sations have found ways to increase the compensation levels of their 
employees relative to civil servants through excessive overtime working, 
fringe benefits and bonus programmes. It would appear from the examples 
in the case studies that some manual workers work considerable amounts 
of overtime which increases their gross pay, in some instances by an 
amount equivalent to their basic salary. There may be good reasons why 
regular or large amounts of overtime are necessary in some organisations, 
but as some examples have shown, in practice, there is a considerable 
abuse of the system with many workers deliberately postponing work from 
normal hours to justify the more generously paid overtime hours. Given 
the general over-staffing in the public sector and the desire to expand 
employment opportunities, careful consideration should be given to the 
possibility of reducing consistent overtime working, and if there are 
insufficient labour resources when manpower requirements are determined 
by rational performance criterion, extra posts could be established.
Public organisations also have much greater latitude than the 
civil service to provide fringe benefits and to devise incentive schemes, 
which serve to enhance earnings substantially. For example, SRC provides
housing at nominal rents to a relatively large numbers of its employees; 
NEC rents houses for its senior staff and provides cars with petrol,
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maintenance and sometimes with drivers. Another example involves the 
provision by GPC of free medical care to its staff and their families; 
a benefit of immense value in a country without a national health in­
surance system.
Moreover, some parastatals provide generous staff loans for house
(9)or car purchase and other purposes repayable over relatively long periods.
A Bank of Khartoum employee is entitled to a house loan after seven year's 
service to the value of 60 month's basic salary with interest free repay­
ment by monthly instalments equal to 25 per cent of gross pay; a half per 
cent of the total amount of the loan is payable as an administrative 
charge.
Public corporations have more opportunities to increase their staff 
emolument through incentive schemes which are intended to reward produc­
tivity through cash bonuses. Ironically, in practice some organisations 
pay the bonus though they are running at a loss. For many parastatal
employees annual bonus of up to two months basic salary has become an
integral part of remuneration and any proposed withdrawal may lead to 
industrial action.
6.6. OTHER INFLUENCES ON PAY
Grade drift appears to be one of the factors influencing pay.
The absence of a job evaluation system enables individual organisations 
to restructure their grading system in a way that may considerably en­
hance the gross pay of some or all employees in the organisation. It 
can be seen from the case studies this is pronounced in a number of para­
statals. For example, the reduction of non-crew posts by 25 per cent 
between 1980 and 1986 led to practically the same increase in the aver­
age basic salary of the retained staff. Average gross salary was 20
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per cent higher than it would have been if the grade structure had 
remained the same as in 1980. The upgrading of 83 senior posts in 
Sudan Railways in April 1986 is another example. The practice of stop­
ping recruitment at lower grades while filling vacancies at higher grades 
by internal promotion in the EMIC will also lead to a grade drift; a 
phenomenon which is possibly more common in the parastatals than in the 
civil service.
The case studies reveal that parastatal unions have been effective 
in expediting the gains to their members and bringing about increases 
in effective pay particularly through improved allowances, benefits and 
bonus schemes. The fact that the demand for the services of some of these 
organisations - the electricity is an extreme example - is highly inelastic 
appears to be providing a further element of strength for parastatals' 
unions. In a situation where the degree of unionisation is largely irrel­
evant, as the case in the Sudanese public sector where there is virtually 
100 per cent membership, such 'demand for commodity or service' factor 
can be significant in determining the relative strength of unions.
6.7. BASIC SALARY TRENDS
The periodic pay adjustments in the civil service apply in the 
parastatal organisations as well. Table 6.5 shows the basic salary 
scales of public corporations in 1974, 1978, and 1986, the years in 
which these revisions took place. The magnitude of the changes between 
1974 and 1986 is illustrated in Table 6.6. In 1978, following the im­
plementation of the JECS, increases varying from 23 to 90 per cent were 
advanced to PC employees. However, the 1983 revisions provided more 
moderate increases and with the exception of the two bottom grades basic 
salaries were raised by 10 to 15 per cent; the 1986 increases were of 
the order 23 to 63 per cent. In comparison with changes in civil service
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basic salary scales these increases were slightly lower in 1978 and 
1986 but roughly equal in 1983. Taking the period 1974 - 1986 as a 
whole, nominal basic salaries in the civil service increased by 119 - 
264 per cent comparable to increases of 77 - 258 per cent for public 
corporations. Table 6.7 shows that real basic salaries of PC employees 
in 1986 were 13 - 26 per cent of the 1974 level or 18 - 29 per cent of 
1978 levels. It was evident in the previous chapter that the real BS 
of civil servants in 1986 were 16 - 27 per cent of 1974 levels or 19 - 
29 per cent of 1978 levels, indicating that they were slightly better 
than the comparable figures for the PC. This may suggest that the gov­
ernment has attempted, though not through drastic measures, to intro­
duce a more egalitarian pay policy throughout the public sector. If 
this was the policy, it has totally failed because of the almost total 
lack of control exercised over the payment of allowances which repres­
ent a major component of employees emoluments.
Little has been said in this chapter about the pay levels in the 
public companies, primarily because of the lack of reliable information. 
However, the Bank of Khartoum case study provides an indication of pay 
determination process and pay levels in this part of the public sector, 
and this is to be discussed in Chapter 8. In the meantime, it appears 
that pay in public companies is relatively higher in comparison with 
other parastatals and certainly the civil service. This could be attri­
buted to the fact public companies are unconstrained by government regu­
lations and have a wide margin of opportunity to adapt terms and cond­
itions of employment by unilateral management decisions or forms of 
collective bargaining. In recent years a number of public corporations 
have asked to be converted to public companies and some parts of the 
civil service to become public corporations. Such moves could only be 
ex pla ined in terms of the financial gains that would result from such
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convertion. It was understood that the transformation of the Cotton 
Corporation to a public company in 1985 resulted in an increase of at 
least 50 per cent in staff's gross pay. A pay increase of 30 - 60 per 
cent occurred to the Civil Aviation employees when it was converted from 
a department in the Ministry of Defence to an autonomous corporation in 
1986. Thus, the exact form of organisation is very significant because 
it determines the individual organisation's ability to adapt and modify 
its terms of service.
6.8. CONCLUSION
In principle, there are formal pay and grading classifications 
determined by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for public 
authorities and public corporations. The public companies, on the other 
hand, have full authority to set their own terms of employment at the 
discretion of the boards of directors. These formal provisions allow 
for moderate differentials in basic pay scales between the civil service 
and public corporations and authorities in line with the recognised dif­
ferences in the nature of work, working conditions and the role of dif­
ferent organisations. In practice, however, through the exertion of 
political and/or industrial power, these organisations have created for 
themselves a wide range of opportunities to increase the effective pay 
of their employees. They have been able to modify basic salary scales, 
to mushroom allowances and to restructure their grades, and thus consid­
erably to icnrease the gross pay of their staff well above the levels 
allowed by formal provision. Various factors have facilitated such 
modifications. The first is that historically some of these corporations 
were accustomed to setting their own terms, and traditionally enjoyed 
relatively higher remuneration. Attempts by government to bring these
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organisations under its direct control were largely defeated because 
employees were not willing to depart from historical practices. The 
second is that unions in some of these organisations are particularly 
strong, not least because of the inelastic demand for products and 
services provided (eg, transport, electricity, petroleum, etc). The 
third factor stems from the absence of common standards of job evalua­
tion, performance, appraisal and classification which makes it diffi­
cult to determine 'adequate' relative pay levels. The fourth is that 
employees in some corporations believe that their work and qualification 
entitle them to comparable pay levels with public company employees. 
These considerations leaves one with the suspicion that existing intra­
sectoral pay differentials can seldom be justified on equity or effici­
ency grounds. Chapter 7 sheds more light on the issue of pay differen­
tials in the public sector. It is intended to provide further evidence 
regarding the relative strength of market verus institutional forces in 
the pay determination process in the public sector in the Sudan.
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TABLE 6.1
Comparison of Public Sector Salary Scales, July 1986
Occupational
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Deputy Under Sec. 4 5682-6282 5982-6582 5.3 4.8 4 6540-7140 15.1 13.7







6 4332-4932 4572-5172 5.5 4.9 8 4452-5172 2.8 4.9
Sen. Exec. Officer 7 3708-4428 3948-4668 6.5 5.4 9 3972-4692 7.1 6.0






Uhiversity Grad. 9 1824-2616 1968-2768 7.9 5.8 12 2130-2922 16.8 11.7
Chief Clerk 10 2664-3252 2832-3420 6.3 5.2 13 2916-3420 9.5 5.2
Teachers & 
Technicians 10A 2418-2943 2568-3093 6.2 5.1 14 2754-3279 13.9 11.4
Supervisors of 11 2052-2577 2202-2727 7.3 5.8 15 2310-2835 12.6 10.0
Skilled Labour 12 1740-2265 1890-2415 8.6 6.6 16B 2031-2586 16.7 12.8
Senior Skilled
Labour 13 1338-1779 1464-1905 9.4 7.1 17B 1404-1845 4.9 3.7
Entry Grade Sec. 
School Grad. 14 1200-1632 1308-1740 9.0 6.6 17(A) 1278-1656 6.5 1.5
Skilled Labour 15 924-1281 1026-1383 11.0 8.0 18(4) 1008-1365 9.1 6.6
Semi-skilled
Labourer 16 801-1053 823-1125 2.7 6.8 18(3) 858-1110 7.1 5.4
17 750- 960 810-1020 8.0 6.3 18(2) 786- 996 4.8 3.8
Unskilled
Labourer 18 720- 900 780- 960 8.3 6.7 18(1) 756- 936 5.0 4.0
Source: Civil Service Department
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TABLE 6.2












1 8800 1 8900 101.1
2 8000 2 8100 101.3
3 6504-7104 3 6864-7464 105.5-104.5
4 5982-6582 4 6540-7140 109.3-108.5
5 5220-5700 5 5808-6288 111.2-110.3
6 4573-5172 6 5208-5688 113.9-110.0
7 3948-4668 7 3972-4692 100.6-100.5
8 3054-3810 8 3288-3936 107.6-103.3
9 1968-2760 9 2130-3922 108.2-105.9
10 2835-3420 10 2916-3420 102.7-100.0
10A 2568-3093 10A 2753-3279 102.2-106.0
11 2202-2727 11 2310-2835 104.9-104.0
12 1890-2415 12 2031-2556 107.5-105.8
13 1464-1905 13 1404-1845 95.5- 96.9
14 1308-1740 14 1278-1656 97.7- 95.2
15 1026-1383 15 1008-1365 98.2- 98.7
16 873-1125 16 858-1110 98.3- 98.7
17 810-1020 17 786- 996 97.0- 97.6
18 780- 960 18 756- 936 96.9- 97.5
Source: Compiled from Appendix Table A.1.6.
SRC = Sudan Railways Corporation 
PA = Public Authorities 
BS = Basic Salary 
Min = Minimum 
Max = Maximum
*PA BS = 100
PC NEC GPC SAC EMIC Index Index Index Index CD =J D
BS BS BS BS BS NEC/PC GPC/PC SAC/PC EMIC/PC
CO c  
O  03
Grade Min Max Gde Min Max Grade Min Max Gde Min Max Gde Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
03 t—> 
>—•








2 8100 8151 8448 8100 8100 1 0 0 . 6 104.3 1 0 0 . 0
CD CO 
ON 03
3 ’ 6864-7464 3 7116-7716 3 7571-7769 3 6864-7464 3 6864-7464 103.7-103.4 110.3-104.1 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0
H->
03
A 6340-7140 4 6792-7392 4 7072-7222 4 6540-7140 4 6540-7140 103.9-103.5 108.1-103.3 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 nN<
5 6168-6648 5 6774-6855 5 6168-6648 109.8-103.1 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 CO
6 5808-6288 6 6301-6361 6 5808-6288 108.5-103.1 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 o03
7 5208-5688 5 6510-6990 7 6004-6283 5 6168-6648 7 5208-5688 125.0-123.0 115.3-110.5 118.4-116.9 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0
t—• 
CD
8 4452-5172 6 6108-6588 8 523405555 6 5574-6054 8 4452-5172 137.7-127.4 117.6-107.4 125.2-117.1 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 CO
9 3972-4692 7 4902-5592 9 4804-5404 7 4902-5583 9 3972-4692 123.4-119.2 120.9-115.2 123.4-119.1 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 O
1 0 3624-4344 1 0 4193-4793 1 0 3624-4344 115.7-110.3 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 z
11 3288-3936 8 4230-4876 11 3799-4327 8 3288-4206 11 3288-3936 128.2-123.9 115.5-109.9 100.0-106.9 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 mo
1 2 2130-2922 9 2130-2922 1 2 2777-3683 9 2130-2922 1 2 2130-2922 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 130.4-126.0 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 —
13 2916-3420 10 3081-3585 13 3140-3707 1 0 2952-3765 13 2916-3420 105.7-104.8 107.7-108.4 1 0 1 . 2 - 1 1 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 CD“O
14 2754-3279 10A 2754-3423 14 2976-3534 14 2754-3279 100.0-104.4 108.1-107.8 1 0 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 0 CD
13 2310-2835 11 2310-2940 15 2589-3078 11 2646-3435 7 2535-3060 100.0-103.7 112.1-108.6 114.5-121.2 109.9-107,9 CO
16B 2031-2556 1 2 2046-2640 16B 2321-2813 1 2 2181-2811 6 2031-2706 100.7-103.3 114.1-110.1 107.4-110.0 100.0-105.9 CD
16A 2806-2481 16A 1018-2613 11.7-108.3 **
17B 1404-1845 13 1470-1995 17B 1648-2098 13 1560-2169 5 1530-2034 104.7-108.3 117.4-113.8 111.1-117.6 109.0-110.2 mX
17A 1278-1656 14 1347-1779 17A 1495-1909 14 1509-1980 105.4-107.4 117.0-115.3 117.2-119.6 i—iCD
18(4) 1008-1365 15 1044-1476 18(4) 1150-1543 15 1104-1575 4 1161-1518 103.6-108.1 114.5-113.0 109.5-115.4 115.2-111.2 03
18(3) 858-1110 16 915-1212 18(3) 1024-1246 16 894-1251 3 966-1218 106.6-109.2 119.3-112.3 104.2-112.7 112.6-109.7 DCL
18(2) 786- 996 17 828-1098 18(2) 918-1176 17 828-1095 2 846-1086 105.3-110.2 116.8-118.1 105.3-109.9 107.6-109.0 HH
18(1) 756- 936 18 795-1005 18(1) 824-1040 18 792-1011 1 816- 996 105.2-107.4 109.1-112.1 104.8-108.0 107.9-106.4 oCl
H*
O
Source: Compiled from various tables in the Case Studies.
PC = Public Corporations 
SAC = Sudan Airways Corporation 
BS = Basic Salary 
Max = Maximum
NEC = National Electricity Corporation 
EMIC = Earth Moving & Irrigation Corporation 
Gde = Grade




















1 1800 3300 183.3
2 1800 2760 153.3
3 1800 2340 130.0
4 1680 1980 117.0
5 1560 1440 92.7
6 1440 1200 83.3
7 1320 900 68.0
8 1080 720 66.6
9 900 720 80.0
10 600 720 120.0
10A 420 720 171.4
11 360 720 200.0
12 300 600 200.0
13 240 600 250.0
14 240 480 200.0
15 180 360 200.0
16 120 300 250.0
17 120 240 200.0
18 120 240 200.0
Source: Compiled from Appendix Table A.1.3.
Standard: the formal housing allowance provided by the CSD for 




Annual Basic Salary Scales in 1974 , 1978, 1983 and 1986
1974 1978 1983 1986
Grade BS BS BS BS
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 3400 5350-5850 5880-6440 8900
2 3200 4830-5230 5310-5750 8100
3 3100 4600-4960 5060-5460 6864-7464
4 3000 4380-4740 4815-5215 6540-7140
5 2900 4155-4515 4570-4970 6168-6648
6 2800 3936-4290 4320-4720 5808-6288
7 2700 3420-3780 3760-4160 5208-5688
8 2400-2550 2940-3390 3230-3730 4452-5172
9 2250-2400 2780-3320 3055-3655 3972-4692
10 1940-2230 2410-2890 2700-3245 3624-4344
11 1790-2050 2200-2680 2460-3000 3288-3936
12 990-1230 1250-1800 1400-2005 2130-2922
13 1415-1725 2075-2555 2320-2860 2916-3420
14 1304-1544 1850-2210 2080-2470 2754-3279
15 1148-1388 1635-1985 1880-2265 2310-2839
16 831-1072 1150-1465 1320-1684 2031-2556
16 700- 882 1025-1358 1175-1562 1806-2481
17B 554- 765 850-1109 975-1272 1404-1845
17A 475- 660 680- 911 780-1046 1278-1656
18(4) 343- 488 650- 860 745- 990 1008-1365
18(3) 304- 428 536- 711 610- 820 858-1110
18(2) 248- 349 450- 583 540- 708 786- 996
18(1) 211- 312 350- 486 450- 626 756- 936




Percentage change in Basic Salary Scales, 1974-1986
% Change % Change % Change % Change % Change
Grade 1974-78 1978-83 1983-86 1974-86 1978-86
BS BS BS BS BS
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 157.4-172.0 109.9-110.0 151.4-138.2 261.8 166.4-152.1
2 150.9-163.4 109.9-109.9 152.5-140.9 253.1 167.7-154.9
3 148.4-160.0 110.0-110.0 135.7-136.7 221.4-240.8 149.2-150.5
4 146.0-158.0 109.9-110.0 135.8-136.9 218.0-238.0 149.3-150.6
5 143.3-155.7 110.0-110.0 135.0-133.8 212.7-229.2 148.4-147.2
6 140.4-153.2 109.9-110.0 134.4-133.2 207.4-224.6 147.8-146.6
7 126.7-140.0 109.9-110.0 138.5-136.7 192.9-210.7 152.3-150.5
8 122.5-132.9 109.9-110.0 137.8-138.7 185.5-202.8 151.4-152.6
9 123.6-138.3 109.9-110.0 130.0-128.4 176.5-195.6 142.9-141.3
10 124.4-129.6 112.0-112.3 134.2-133.9 186.8-194.8 150.4-150.3
11 122.9-130.7 111.8-111.9 133.7-131.1 183.7-192.0 149.5-146.9
12 126.3-146.3 112.0-111.4 152.1-145.7 215.2-237.6 170.4-162.3
13 141.6-148.1 111.3-111.9 127.5-119.6 199.0-198.2 140.5-133.9
14 141.9-143.1 112.4-111.8 132.4-132.8 211.2-212.4 148.9-148.4
15 142.4-143.0 115.0-114.0 122.8-125.7 201.2-204.5 141.3-142.8
16B 138.4-136.7 114.8-114.9 153.9-151.8 244.4-238.4 176.6-174.5
16A 146.4-154.0 114.6-115.0 153.7-158.8 258.0-281.3 176.2-182.7
17B 153.4-145.0 114.7-115.1 144.0-144.6 253.4-241.2 165.2-166.4
17A 143.2-138.0 114.7-114.8 163.8-158.3 269.1-250.9 187.9-181.8
18(4) 189.5-176.2 114.6-115.1 135.3-137.9 293.9-279.7 155.1-158.7
18)3) 176.3-166.1 113.8-115.3 140.7-135.4 282.2-259.3 160.0-156.1
18(2) 181.5-167.0 120.0-121.4 145.6-140.7 316.9-285.5 174.7-170.8
18(1) 165.9-155.8 128.6-128.8 168.0-149.5 358.3-300.0 216.0-192.6




Indices of Real Basic Salary, 1986
Real BS Real BS
1986 1986
1974 = 100 1978 = 100
1 19 23 21
2 19 23 21
3 16 18 20 20
4 16 17 20 20
5 16 17 20 20
6 15 16 20 20
7 14 15 21 20
8 14 15 21 21
9 13 14 19 19
10 14 14 20 20
11 13 14 20 20
12 16 17 23 22
13 15 15 19 18
14 15 16 22 22
15 15 15 19 19
16B 18 17 24 24
16A 19 21 24 25
17B 19 18 22 23
17A 20 18 26 25
18(4) 20 21 21 22
18(3) 21 19 22 21
18(2) 23 21 24 23
18(1) 26 22 29 26
Source: figures in Table 6.5 deflated by CPI
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N O T E S
1. With the available information it is difficult to establish the 
exact size of parastatals sector at that time or the extent to 
which formal provisions were observed.
2. See Mohammed-Taha, op cit, pp 176-190.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
3. The basic salary differential ratios were provided by Mohammed-Taha, 
op cit, p 191, as follows:
Central Government 100
Gezira Board 108
Central Electricity Corp 116
Public Corporations 120
State Specialised Banks 133
State Commercial Banks 146
University of Khartoum 165
Sudan Development Corp 178
6. The term was used by E Berg (1969), op cit, to describe the position 
of high paying indistries in relation to the rest of the economy in 
developing countries.
7. Space limitations and the danger of duplication make it difficult to 
provide the full findingSof the case studies within the ambit of this 
chapter. The reader is advised to consult the case studies in the 
Appendix for the backdrop of the arguments in this Chapter.
8. See IL0 (1987c), op cit.
9. 'Other purposes' includes loans in emergency cases marriage, child­
birth, etc.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N  
PAY DIFFERENTIALS
7.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous two chapters we looked in depth at the levels
and movements of pay of, firstly, civil servants, and then parastatal
employees. We have seen how the basic salaries and allowances have 
grown over the last two decades and examined the interdependence and 
differences between the pay of similar grades within different parts 
of the public sector.
In this chapter the issue of different kinds of pay differentials
is considered, to see the extent to which the pattern or movements in
these differentials can be accounted for by changes in market and/or 
institutional forces and to consider the possible implications for 
labour market efficiency and equity. The complete realisation of these 
objectives depends on the availability of comprehensive pay data in 
greater quantity, detail and quality than currently exist in the Sudan. 
No information is available to indicate the actual earnings of public 
sector employees and analyses of intra- and inter-sectoral differentials 
will be made, as before, on the basis of basic pay rates payable to 
certain grades which are taken to represent broad occupational groups. 
The shortcomings of the analysis of this kind are acknowledged, none­
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theless, no better one could be sought with these data constraints.
7.2. OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS
Movements in the real pay of public sector employees discussed in 
chapters Five and Six showed that reductions which had taken place bet­
ween 1974 - 1986 were slightly less severe for the lowest salary grades 
indicating that there has been a narrowing of pay differentials between 
the higher and the lower grades. This is further illustrated in Table 
7.1 which shows the ratio of starting basic salary levels for four higher 
grades in relation to the lowest grade 18 for the dates of pay adjustment 
from 1968 to 1986. As seen, the major movement in basic pay over time 
is reflected in a secular compression of skill and seniority differen­
tials within the civil service. Figures show that the ratio of the 
basic salary of an under-secretary, a deputy under-secretary, a university 
graduate and a secondary school leaver to the basic salary of an unskilled
worker declined from 14.39:1, 13.01:1, 3.87:1 and 2.13:1 respectively in 
July 1968 to 11.67:1, 7.89:1, 2.53:1 and 1.67:1 respectively by July 1986. 
This compression seems to be a continuation of earlier trends as the cor­
responding ratios as calculated from the 1951 scales (ie, those adopted 
following the recommendations of the Wakefield and Mills Commissions) were 
25.71:1, 22.86:1, 4.71:1 and 2.57:1.(1)
The narrowing has been particularly marked for grades 4 and 9 which 
have seen their differentials over grade 18 contracted by 40 per cent and 
35 per cent respectively since 1968. Grade 1, on the other hand, exper­
ienced less narrowing (19 per cent), in part as a result of the abolition 
of the scale and the substitution of a single rate in 1986.
Earlier analysis has revealed that allowances may have a distorting 
effect on the relative positions of public sector employees in terms of 
gross pay. Thus, the impact of taking standard allowances (overtime and 
non-standard allowances will be discussed below) into account on the
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behaviour of differentials is considered in Table 7.2 which indicates 
that civil service gross salary differentials have moved in a way simi­
lar to basic salary differentials. The ratio of the grade minima for
grades 1 and 4 to that of grade 18 fell by approximately 36 per cent
(2)
between 1978 and 1986. The ratio of the grades maxima fell, also, 
but by a slightly lower percentage (30 per cent). Those for grade 9 
and 14 fell from 1978 to 1983, but the 1983 increases restored the 
earlier relationship for grade 9 and reduced the narrowing for grade 14.
Comparing Table 7.2 with Table 7.1 shows that the higher grades 
(1 and 4) had slightly larger ratios in terms of basic salary minima 
than in terms of gross salary maxima. It shows, also, that the magni­
tude of erosion in differentials since 1978 was more severe in respect 
of gross salaries than in basic salaries (the fall in the former was 
36 per cent and 20 per cent for the latter). This implies that stand­
ard allowances in the 1986 adjustment had been set to benefit the low­
est grade. Generally, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate that the extent of 
the narrowing of scales depends on which measure of pay is used, and 
the results may differ between basic and gross salaries and according 
to the grade minima or maxima used. However, all the measures exhibit 
the same tendency: there has been a marked narrowing of pay between the 
higher and the lowest grades.
Certainly there is more to the question of differentials than can 
be illustrated by summary ratios of this kind. Analysis wholly based 
on basic salary rates or even with the inclusion of the standard allow­
ances hardly tells the full story. For example, the effect of taking 
two opposing sets of factors into account may blur the picture neatly 
portrayed above. Depending on the strength or weakness of these factors, 
the differentials in take-home pay may be wider or narrower. These are, 
on the one hand, overtime payments and the progressive tax system which
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tend to compress differentials and, on the other hand, non-standard 
allowances and fringe benefits which tend to widen the gap.
Overtime payments are generally available to the public sector's 
unclassified (manual) workers. There is no general survey to show the 
incidence of overtime work or the proportion of overtime earnings to 
total earnings. However, examples of individual gross salaries shown 
in the case studies suggest that overtime can be a significant component 
of unclassified worker's gross pay and occasionally it may be equivalent 
or even greater than the basic salary.
With a similar effect on intra-civil service differentials is the 
progressive tax system or fiscal drag where tax-take rises as salaries 
increase. We do not have sufficient information to explore the full 
possibility of taking taxes into consideration, but a glimpse could be 
obtained from a recent report (World Bank, 1985) which has addressed the 
issue in a casual way. Comparison of the data which have been reprodu­
ced in Table 7.3 with corresponding figures in Table 7.1 shows that the 
impact of tax-take on top-bottom differentials could be considerable.
For example, in 1983 the income tax further reduced the ratio of grade 
4 to grade 18 differential from 9.26:1 to 7.88:1, ie, a reduction of 
15 per cent. Also, it is evident that post-tax differentials were 
reduced at a relatively faster rate than were pre-tax differentials from 
1974 to 1983. For grade 14 in 1974 and 1978 and grades 9 and 14 in 1983, 
however, the ratios were identical in pre- and post-tax calculations in­
dicating that these grades are in tax-exempted zones.
While the combined effect of overtime payments and taxation is to 
reduce differentials by increasing the earnings of lower and reducing 
those of the higher grades, there are other factors which may pull the 
pattern of differentials towards the opposite direction, thereby rein­
forcing rather than contracting the gap. A good deal of evidence is
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available to suggest that non-standard allowances usually benefit the 
higher grades more than the lower grades. For example the mileage 
allowance payable to some individuals in grades 1 - 8  would add up to 
the equivalent of 35 per cent of basic salary to the disposable pay of 
civil servants. Other allowances exclusively paid to senior staff (rep­
resentation, responsibility, qualification, etc) have the same effect.
Additionally, fringe benefits tend to be greater at the top than 
at the lower grades, favouring the 'better off' against the 'worst off'. 
Free housing or housing with nominal rent, government-owned cars, paid 
study leave, loans and pension schemes which are closely tied to the 
recipient's position in the administrative hierarchy are some of the 
benefits usually not available to those in the lower echelons of the 
public service. The fact that fringe benefits vary directly with level 
of salary has been addressed by Mohammed-Taha (1979) who reported:
"While the value of fringe benefits actually exceeds the 
basic salary of the most senior civil servants, they rep­
resent about 20 per cent and less than 10 per cent of the 
young graduate's and unskilled worker's total earnings 
respectively".^ '
Moreover, since fringe benefits' increases are less visible than salary 
increases, the distribution of such benefits may actually have become 
less equal over recent years. The introduction in 1985 of free tele­
phones for all top civil servants (grade 4 and above) is an example of 
a move in this direction.
It emerges from what has been said above that basic salary scales 
alone are inadequate measures of actual (disposable) income differentials. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of accurate quantitative evidence about 
overtime, taxation, allowances and fringe benefits, which makes their 
net effect uncertain, basic rates remain the only available yardstick 
for measuring compression of occupational differentials.
Almost without exception the literature on pay differentials and
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their movements has provided explanations which generally fall into 
two categories - economic and institutional.^^ An explanation based 
purely on economic principles would maintain that the pattern of differ­
entials could be narrowing over time either because there is an increase 
in supply (as might result from the expansion of educational and train­
ing systems) or because of changing patterns of demand for different 
skills (such as might result from technological change or sluggish econ­
omic growth). To put this into context we need to answer the following 
question: to what extent can the compression of nominal pay differentials 
observed earlier be directly or indirectly attributed to the market for­
ces of supply and demand? Any attempt to provide an adequate answer 
will be fraught with problems because of lack of reliable time-series 
data regarding the growth in the demand for and supply of labour. No 
analytical, non-intuitive technique has ever been employed by the Sudan­
ese government for determining manpower requirements or relating educa­
tional output to economic needs. The results of this neglect could be 
seen in the Six Years Socio-Economic Development Plan (1977/78 - 1983/84) 
where the 'Manpower and Personnel1 chapter consists of a series of loose 
and conflicting statements on probable levels and rates of growth of 
emp loyment without any attempt to disaggregate prospective requirements 
for different types of s k i l l s ^  On the supply side, there is almost 
total absence of co-ordinated information about the output of the educa­
tion system, numbers and skills of immigrants and emigrants and numbers 
unemployed. It might be expected, for example, that the number of grad­
uates registered with the Civil Service Recruitment Committee indicates 
the supply of this category of highly qualified labour, but not only does 
the Committee not have records predating its establishment in 1977, 
because of its unsatisfactory performance in recent years, many graduates 
do not use it as an employment register.
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Although lack of detailed data thus renders it particularly dif­
ficult to assess the precise pattern of movements in the supply of, and 
demand for, labour in the last three decades or so, from the fragmentary 
information that is available (originating from the meagre literature on 
the subject) it is nonetheless possible to provide a general account of 
the major imbalances in the Sudanese labour market.
Sudan entered independence with a clear shortage of intermediate 
and high-level manpower because of the neglect of secondary and higher 
education during the colonial period. The country did not have a formal 
university until independence in 1956, when Gordon Memorial Primary 
School became the University of Khartoum. Hence, in spite of the limited 
role of the government at that time (mainly concerned with maintenance of 
law and order) public sector demand for skilled manpower grossly exceeded 
the supply of qualified indigenous personnel. Top jobs were, therefore, 
filledby British expatriates while Egypt supplied the bulk of the man­
power needed for intermediate posts (clerical and junior technical). 
Relatively, however, there was abundance of unskilled labour as might be 
expected in any country at early stages of economic development and indus­
trialisation. This tightness of the labour market led some observers to 
conclude that market forces were primarily responsible for the pattern 
of public sector remuneration. Fawzi (1959), for example, asserted that:
"To a great extent, salaries are controlled by the dictates of 
supply and demand ... Sudan is still at a stage when extra 
bonus has to be paid for an education little higher than lit­
eracy" . ^  ^ )
The premium earned by the senior staff or the educated manpower in general 
was regarded as a 'scarcity-rent' to be gradually reduced (and differen­
tials compressed) as supply increased. Lewis (1964) argued:
"In the long-run the premium for education diminishes as the 
number of educated increases. Either the educated have to 
accept less, or else they are unable to resist the pressure 
which causes the wages of the less educated to rise faster 
than their own."^®)
- 245 -
Major changes have, however, taken place since the 1950s and recent
(9)
reports (ILO 1984, Fallan 1987, World Bank 1987) refer to three types 
of imbalances in the Sudanese labour market. Firstly, there is a growing 
surplus of university and secondary school graduates. Fallan (1987) 
argued that the high rates of unemployment among graduates is not a recent 
phenomenon but an ongoing problem disguised by government guaranteed em­
ployment policy in operation until 1980:
"Just as this policy led in the past to a growing over- 
staffing in the civil service, its dismantling has been /,n x 
reflected in growth of open unemployment among graduates".
No official figures could be obtained about the numbers of unemployed 
graduates but the Association of Unemployed Graduates (an informal pres­
sure group) suggested that the number of graduates looking for work could
(11)be between 25,000 and 30,000. The volume of graduate unemployment is
then dependent on the size and composition of output from the universities, 
the number of public sector jobs available, and the length of time it takes 
graduates to reduce their reservation wages to levels associated with jobs 
requiring lower educational qualifications. Clearly, universities are 
continuing to produce mostly non-vocational graduates for whom there are 
few job opportunities outside the public sector while public sector em­
ployment provision has stagnated. An increasing proportion of graduates 
go through the public sector recruitment process without gaining employ­
ment, yet it is estimated that less than 25 per cent of university grad­
uates eventually end up in secondary qualification public sector jobs,
(12)
the remainder choosing to be unemployed.
The second type of manpower imbalance lies in the apparent shortage
of skilled manual workers and technical personnel, particularly skilled
workers with substantial demonstrable experience. Freshly trained workers
are usually unable to obtain jobs overseas and may even experience initial
(13)difficulty in finding local jobs. The typical labour market behaviour
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pattern is for such workers to acquire experience within Sudan and then
(14)
migrate to much higher paid jobs elsewhere. As skilled wages abroad
(15)are between ten and fifteen times Sudanese levels, the supply price
of a skilled and experienced worker is going to be well above that of a
corresponding inexperienced and/or unskilled worker.
The third type of imbalance is found in unskilled labour markets.
Available evidence suggests that there is a rapidly growing excess of
unskilled workers in urban centres. The unimpressive performance of the
Sudanese economy over recent years (for example, GDP at constant prices
(1 6)
fell by 12 per cent from 1981 to 1985) has resulted in a significant 
reduction in its labour absorptive capacity, while there is increasing 
supply arising from influx of refugees from neighbouring countries and 
from the exodus of population from rural areas due to drought, famine 
and war conditions; it is currently estimated (October 1987) that nearly 
one million persons have sought refuge in and around Khartoum, Medeni 
and Kassala.
In general then it may be said that urban labour markets in the 
Sudan in the 1980s are characterised by a surplus of graduates and secon­
dary school leavers, shortage of skilled manpower, and abundance of un­
skilled workers. In comparison with the 1950s a shortage of educated 
manpower has turned into excess, while the problems associated with 
skilled and unskilled categories are recurring ones though the underlying 
reasons may be different. For example, although the scarcity of skills 
in the past was due to the shortage of education and training facilities, 
the output of training institutes would now be more than sufficient if it 
were not being drained away by the massive exodus to Arab labour markets.
Having noted the nature of the structural changes occurring in the 
labour market, we now turn to the question raised earlier about the extent 
to which observed compression can be related to these changes. In view
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of the increased surplus of graduates, for example, a neo-classical 
economist would tend to assume that narrowing of differentials between 
the top and the bottom of the civil service pay structure is a direct 
result of the working of market forces. Although part of this narrowing 
may reflect changes in underlying supply and demand conditions, it would 
be wrong to rely on this approach. More than one reason may be put for­
ward to demonstrate the implausibility of a simple 'scarcity-rent' expla­
nation of pay differentials. Firstly, narrowing between grades 1, 4, and 
9, in relation to grade 18 had occurred too rapidly (particularly in 
earlier years - 1951-1968) to be due solely to market forces which norm­
ally compress differentials slowly and gradually as the supply of educa­
ted personnel expands in relation to the employment opportunities with 
educational prerequisites. Secondly, during 1968 - 74 for grade 1 and 4 
and up to 1978 for grade 1 the differentials increased with no indication 
in the market of any apparent shortage of high level manpower. The argu­
ment used by the government when it substantially increased top salaries 
in 1974 was that:
"The increase was justified on the grounds that the compression 
of salary differentials which had occurred throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s had eroded the income position of the highest paid 
class to 'undesirable' levels".(18)
Even if changes in underlying supply and demand conditions might have 
partially influenced the tendency towards compression for high level man­
power, they certainly offer no explanation of the pattern of differentials 
between skilled and unskilled workers. For example, the differential 
ratio between an experienced manual skilled worker (grade 15) and an un­
skilled worker (grade 18) declined from 1.72:1 in 1968 to 1.28:1 in 1986
and the comparable ratio for an experienced technician (grade 10A) from 
(19)
4.62:1 to 3.36:1. Thus, if an explanation cannot be found entirely
from changes in aggregate supply and demand influences other reasons have 
to be elicited. It cannot be disputed that the principal factor behind
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this narrowing is related to nominal pay adjustemnts of public sector
employees. Pay increases for the lowest grades rose faster than in
higher grades; by 1986 the basic salary of grade 4 had risen by a factor
of 3.55 in 35 years while for grade 18 it rose by a multiple of 10.27.
While it is a matter of simple arithmetic that such a policy would lead
to a narrowing of the percentage differential, it is not evident why such
a pay policy was adopted. Several propositions, however, may be hazarded.
Such a policy might reflect government concern about the widely dispersed
pay structure inherited from the colonial era, widely expressed in the
1950s and '60s when egalitarianism was a 'fashionable' slogan for every
government. However, it is not clear whether the slogan indicated
a genuine interest in achieving a more equal distribution of pay, or was
merely a casual response to pressure from a powerful labour movement dom-
(21)
inated by Marxist activists.
From the mid-1970s onwards, Sudan has experienced high inflationary 
pressures. The alloa-ation of comparatively large premiums to those at 
the bottom of pay structures could be interpreted as an inspired govern­
ment attempt to protect its most vulnerable employees. Perhaps the adher­
ence of pay revision bodies to the movements in CPI as the main criterion 
for adjusting minimum wage is a manifestation of such an attempt. Infla­
tion also provides a good reason for the SWTUF to ask for relatively hi­
gher pay increases for workers.
In summary, occupational differentials (at least with regard to 
basic salaries) have been markedly eroded since the political independence 
of the country with little evidence that this compression reflects the 
effects of underlying structural changes occurring in the economy's labour 
market.
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7.3. CIVIL SERVICE/PARASTATALS PAY DIFFERENTIALS
Analysis in the previous chapter revealed that although public au­
thorities and corporations are, (in theory at least) bound by common 
salary scales set by government, in practice, they have extensively 
modified these scales and augmented allowances and other benefits. 
Particularly, attempts to extend these standardised scales to some 
corporations which traditionally had enjoyed relative autonomy in es­
tablishing their own salaries, proved to be unsuccessful. Moreover, 
we have seen that public companies have full freedom in setting their 
own terms and conditions of employment and can be presumably regarded 
as private sector for this purpose.
Hence, given the relative importance of parastatals as employers 
vis-a-vis the civil service (see Chapter 3), it is within the public 
sector itself that much of the comparison and dissatisfaction over pay 
differentials and the correspondingly upward pressures on remuneration, 
have occurred. Therefore, it is clearly incorrect to assume, as is of­
ten done with respect to industrialised countries, that the private sec­
tor is necessarily the most important reference point for the pay deter­
mination process for the public sector as a whole.
Large income differentials between the civil service and public 
corporations have been the focus of attention of recent pay commissions 
and committees (El-Turabi 1983, for example) because disgruntled civil 
servants have mainly compared their 'plight' with that of counterparts 
in other branches of state apparatus rather than the private sector.
It is precisely because these comparisons have been made from within 
the public sector that large pay differentials have been so politically 
explosive. A classical example of the government pay policy dilemma is 
demonstrated by the case of Ministry of Irrigation engineers when its
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Earthmoving Department became an autonomous public corporation (case 
study no. 5) in 1976. The corporation engineers were immediately up­
graded and awarded generous pay and benefits leaving behind their coun­
terparts in the Ministry. Understandably, the neglected engineers did 
not accept the disparity and asked for equal treatment. What worsened 
the situation, however, was not simply that they possessed equal quali­
fications and did similar work, but many shared with corporation employ­
ees the same premises and worked on common sites, removing any ground 
for discriminatory treatment in relation to working conditions. Conse­
quently, 37 out of 40 of the Ministry's engineers resigned during 1976/77, 
while the Corporation recruited 51. The work in the Ministry was serious­
ly disrupted and the government had no choice but to grant a large number 
of allowances. Not unexpectedly claims spread throughout the civil ser­
vice as professionals and other occupational groups who happened to be 
in similar situations, demanded prompt government action to remove anom­
alies. It was reported that, in 1977, about 50 unions engaged in strike
action (for varying durations of one week to one month) to support their
(22)
claims. Apparently, the government's decision to speed up the imple­
mentation of the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme (the original 
plan for implementing the scheme over four years was shortened to two 
years by a Presidential Decree) was seen as an effort to contain this 
upsurge of militancy among public sector employees.
However, neither the JECS nor the subsequent commissions were able 
to resolve the ever-present problems of pay disparities in the public 
sector. They have been already mentioned in this thesis, and will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Meanwhile, our focus in 
this section is primarily on the movement of pay differentials which res­
ult from the formal government pay policy, ie, differentials between civ­
il service scales and the public corporations' standard basic salary scales.
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Table 7.4 shows the basic rates of certain grades (representing top 
management, university graduate, secondary school leaver and an unskilled 
worker) in the public corporations as ratios of corresponding civil ser­
vice scales during 1974 - 86. As evident, even at the least skilled level 
(grade 18(4) in the public corporations compared to grade 18 in the civil 
service) where significant competition for positions might be expected 
given the available pool of unskilled labour, differentials of about 5 
per cent have always existed. Moving up the salary grade ladder, public 
corporations pay premiums which are generally greater than those prevail­
ing at grade 18, although the increase is not always in parallel with
the grade level. It certainly is not necessarily the case that top man­
agers receive the largest proportionate differential over civil serants.
Regarding the movements in differentials, Table 7.4 shows that a 
considerable amount of erosion has taken place since 1974. However, a 
closer look reveals wide variations in the magnitude of this narrowing 
for different occupational groups. While differentials among university 
graduates and - to a lesser extent - among secondary school leavers had 
contracted sharply, they held up among unskilled workers. In fact, dif­
ferentials among the latter had slightly been increased in 1983 adjust­
ment (from 4 per cent to 5 per cent) and were unchanged in 1986.
The justification for these differentials and the impetus behind 
the pattern of their movements needs a more complete and rigorous analy­
sis than was feasible from rather limited evidence at hand. Nonetheless, 
it is almost certain that the observed narrowing has resulted from gov­
ernment concern over the existence of wide 'unjustified' disparities, a 
concern made explicit in a number of recent reports. The 1985 Report of 
El-Turabi Commission on public sector pay stated that:
"There is an urgent need to remove pay anomalies in the public 
sector and remunerate staff on a more equitable basis. This 
is essential to avoid the development of more internal pressure
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on the part of dissatisfied civil servants ... under the 
present economic conditions the country cannot afford a 
discontented civil service".(23)
Judging the policy on the basis of movements in relative formal 
basic pay scales, would suggest that it has been a complete success.
But, we have already noted that there is much more to say about the 
actual pay differentials than just the comparison of basic salaries. 
Undoubtedly, the policy is seriously undermined by the government's 
contradictory decisions. The case studies revealed how frequently the 
government has conceded to factional demands and allowed modifications 
and increases in basic salary scales, allowances and benefits for indi­
vidual corporations. Evidently, these concessions have worked in a man­
ner to defeat the government's own policy towards tackling the issue of
,. ... (24)
disparities.
The foregoing account makes the task of explaining the behaviour 
of differentials in relation to changes in supply and demand parameters, 
perplexing. It is possible that the narrowing (in basic salaries) would 
not have continued had it not been working in the same direction as mar­
ket forces. This is particularly true for graduates and secondary school 
leavers. However, for unskilled workers, and beyond basic salaries in 
the case of all workers, there is no way in which these forces can be 
brought to bear on the question of differentials.
A further complicating factor in the analysis of civil service/ 
parastatals pay differentials is the sheer absence of any kind of organ­
ised information about pay levels in the public companies' sector. In
Chapter 3 we have seen that there are about 137 state-owned enterprises
in the Sudan, of which 93 (ie, 68 per cent) are companies either wholly
owned by government or joint ventures with majority state ownership.
There is no readily available information to indicate the exact size of 
public companies' employment apart from an unofficial source suggesting
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that they command a sizeable share of well above 30 per cent in the
(25)
almost 200,000 parastatals' posts .
Under the present institutional set-up the government has virtually 
no control - apart from the statutory minimum wage regulation - on the 
pay determination process in these companies. An interview with the 
Under-sectretary of the Ministry of Finance and Planning revealed that:
"Public companies under the 1925 Act have complete authority 
to set wages and salaries as they see fit and may adjust 
them whenever necessary to attract and retain staff, as well 
as to link pay to performance to the degree that they feel 
desirable".
Accordingly, little is known about how much is paid to each skill in 
these companies, and it would be unsurprising to find a complicating 
complexity of pay scales across this part of the public sector. None-
the less, in case study no. 6 the Bank of Khartoum was taken as an
example of public companies and a representative of state-owned commer­
cial banks in the country. It is known that all public banks have a
single pay schedule basically determined through negotiations between 
the central bank (Bank of Sudan) and the General Union of Bank Employees 
(GUBE). Although the one case of the banks will do insufficient justice 
to the analysis of intra-public-sector differentials, it may, nevertheless, 
be used as a rough guide. Table 7.5 shows that not only are pay differ­
entials between bank employees and civil servants excessively wide but 
they have been increasing over time for the majority of occupational 
groups. In general, it appears that the working of collective bargaining 
in this area of the public sector, has played the major role in determin­
ing the prevailing pattern of differentials and their behaviour over the 
years. In addition to the relatively large pay increases which result 
from negotiated settlements, bank employees generally enjoy a greater 
frequency of pay adjustments than do those in civil service or public 
corporations. Over and above their periodic revisions every four years,
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whenever there is an adjustment in civil service pay, bank employees 
manage to have an increase either in basic pay, allowances, or in both. 
For example in July 1986, public banks threatened industrial action in 
support of a claim for the introduction of a Nature of Work allowance 
similar to that which was introduced in the public sector. Notwith­
standing that the agreements provided for revision only in January 1987, 
a nature of work allowance averaging 25 per cent of the basic salary 
was intoduced for bank employees retrospectively to 1st of April 1986.
It has been reported that movements in the cost of living and 
remuneration levels for comparable groups elsewhere in the public sec­
tor are frequently used by the unions to further their claims for pay 
increases. Comparisons with the best paying public corporations and 
companies, however, provide only the floor above which a premia commen­
surate with their 'special' working conditions are demanded. Despite 
a growing presence of private sector banks (Islamic and/or foreign) in 
recent years, there is no evidence to suggest that these banks have been 
used as reference points in pay negotiations between the state banks and 
the unions. This leads into the discussion of public/private sector 
differentials, the third category considered in this chapter.
7.4. PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTOR PAY DIFFERENTIALS
What must be stressed form the outset is that the actual size of 
inter-sectoral differentials does not in itself constitute an important 
factor affecting salary levels in the public sector. The limited size 
of the private sector (cited earlier) has not posed any serious challenge 
to the dominant position of the public sector in the pay determination 
process since the element of inter-sectoral competition and thereby com­
parison with outside rates has been largely absent. In other words, the 
emergence of sizeable differentials may be a necessary but not sufficient
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condition for any subsequent upward pressures in public sector pay.
Even if pressures do arise - as might be expected in cases of severe
shortages of certain skills - the public sector wages and salaries still
may not be increased due to a combination of political and/or economic 
(27)
contraints. In the Sudan the public/private sector pay differentials
are difficult to measure owing to data inconsistencies for private sec­
tor earnings. Considering the shaky data base in the public sector, their 
dearth in the private sector is hardly surprising. Therefore, it is not 
possible to provide definite answers to questions about the comparative 
rates of pay, neither is it possible to provide an adequate account of 
the pattern or movements of differentials over time. Nonetheless, by 
using available evidence - which is fragmentary, anecdotal and undoubt­
edly biased - it may be possible to make some assessment of the situation.
Existing evidence suggests that, since the early 1970s, the public/ 
private sector pay differentials have undergone changing patterns partic­
ularly for unskilled workers. An impressive array of quotations suppor­
ting this view can be assembled. A survey by the Ministry of Labour in 
1973 covering 1731 establishments of which 1594 were in the private sec­
tor and 137 in the public sector, found that the average weekly earnings 
for the manual workers (wage-earners) in the public sector was 25 per
cent higher and for 'salaried' employees 13 per cent higher than in the
(28)
private sector. These figures, however, must be interpreted with
great caution for several reasons. Firstly, the survey excluded the 
civil service, agricultural establishments and firms employing less than 
5 persons and secondly, it is uncertain whether the definition attached 
to 'weekly earnings' refered solely to basic salary or was inclusive of 
allowances and benefits. Mohammed-Taha (1979) raised doubts about the 
validity of these figures with regard to non-manual workers and argued 
that the pay-leadership role exercised by the public sector:
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"... may be attributed to the fact that when public corporations 
were nationalised in 1970 they already had the characteristics 
of large enterprises vis-a-vis pay and other conditions of 
employment".
He continued to claim that:
"Since the government is the largest employer of high-level 
manpower, the private sector will always pay a higher salary 
in order to bid the needed personnel away from the govern­
ment ... graduates generally prefer to secure an easy life 
of the civil servant than to search for jobs in the private 
sector".(29)
This, in fact, seems to be a reflection of similar views expressed by 
the ILO (Growth, Employment and Equity) mission (1976) which asserted 
that:
"The government appears to exercise a wage-leadership role for un­
skilled and semi-skilled workers, in as much as average weekly 
earnings for manual workers are slightly higher in the public 
sector than in the private sector ... As for highly qualified 
manpower, the pace-setting effects of the public sector hiring 
are attenuated by private sector patterns. Virtually all 
university graduates in the Sudan are employed in the public 
sector, but technically trained professional manpower returning 
from foreign universities tend to reach salary levels in the 
private sector that are never attained either in the public 
enterprises or in the civil service".
The government wage-leadership for the unskilled workers was further con­
firmed by other studies. For example, evidence made available to the 
1974 Committee of Enquiry into the minimum wages in the private sector 
disclosed that the lowest levels prevailing at that time ranged from
£s6 to 15 per month with the majority of private firms paying less than 
(3 1)£s10 per month, a finding consistent with those of the Workers'
Trade Unions' Federation survey undertaken in the same year showing an 
average minumum wage of £s9 per month in March-April 1974 (prior to the
(32)
introduction of minimum wage legislation in July). Comparing this
figure with the public sector's minimum pay at that time which was £s13.9 
per month, would produce a differential of more than 50 per cent. Thus, 
though the evidence is sketchy it would appear that highly qualified 
private sector employees enjoyed relatively higher salaries; it is
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unequivocally the case in respect of unskilled workers that government 
pay was the higher.
A number of recent studies, however, comparing the behaviour of 
private and civil service wage rates provided a different picture. It 
is particualrly interesting to examine the results of the Ministry of 
Labour Survey on Employment, Wages and Hours of Work 1983 - 8 4 . ^ ^
This survey covered 581 establishments in the public sector with 278,661 
employees and 918 establishments in the private sector with 44,000 workers. 
A summary of the findings with regard to the average earnings is provided 
in Table 7.6. The average weekly earnings for wage-earners (unclassified) 
in the public sector were £s14.82 against £s20.56 in the private sector.
For salaried employees (classified) they were £s37.00 and £s63.20 respec­
tively. Although these figures also, need to be viewed with caution (for 
definitional and methodological reasons)^ Comparing them with the 1973 
survey figures (referred to above), nonetheless, supports the hypothesis 
of changing patterns of inter-sectoral differentials in the Sudan. Evi­
dence from the ILO 1984 survey, reproduced in Table 7.7 shows that the 
mean wage for an unskilled worker in the private sector exceeded that 
of a public sector counterpart by approximately 57 per cent. The differ­
entials were still larger for professionals in the sample as the private 
sector employee earned nearly three times the salary achieved by a public 
sector professional. In a study based upon the findings of this survey, 
El-Bagir et al (1984) reported that:
"It is generally accepted that urban wages in Sudan vary 
with the type of employer. However, while it was generally 
thought that the public sector paid higher wages than the 
private sector and that wages in the organised sector varied 
positively with the size of industrial establishment, this 
survey shows that for all categories of workers -professional, 
white collar, skilled and unskilled - private employment in 
general seems to offer better remuneration".(^4)
The most recent evidence available, not only supports our contention of
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a changing pattern from public to private sector 'leadership' but also
shows that the gap between the public and the private sector is widening.
Peter Fallon (1987) argued that:
"Although in 1975 and to a lesser extent 1980, the civil 
service unskilled wage rate was similar to those in the 
private sector, it had fallen behind by 1982. As from 
July 1986, the wage range for an unskilled worker in the 
civil service including allowance will be 60 to 75 Sudan­
ese Pounds per month. Two firms visited in the Khartoum 
area in early March 1986 quoted £s100 a month and between 
£s100 and £s160 in allowances respectively, as the earn­
ings of an unskilled worker. Taking £s100 to £s120 as
representative figures would give us an unskilled earning
differential of around 70 per cent between the civil ser­
vice and private sector at the present time".''-^'
On the evidence just considered, the conspicuous change occurred 
in the pattern of differentials, particularly among unskilled workers, 
appears to be associated with the introduction of the statutory min­
imum wage in 1974. Before that Sudan was not a country in which the 
government exercised a great deal of direct influence over private sec­
tor labour markets. An indirect influence, however, existed and the
public sector minimum was supposed to act as a 'guideline' for the pri­
vate sector. Since its introduction, the statutory national minimum 
wage has been effectively equal to the minimum public sector wage. In 
practice, nevertheless, it has served as a floor; private companies 
evidently gave their lowest-paid workers substantially more than the 
statutory minimum. This is, in fact, unusual for a developing country 
with an abundant pool of unskilled labour, where one expects to find 
the private sector, at best, paying the least-skilled workers the legal 
minimum wage. Although our understanding of the actual causes of this 
phenomenon remains rudimentary, it may be due to the unions' strenth 
and/or the labour market tightness. It has been reported that:
"One way in which private companies have apparently been 
affected by the minimum wage legislation is that trade 
unions demand an equal percentage increase in wages when 
the minimum wage is raised, even when their wages are 
already above the new legal minimum".
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Furthermore, in view of the very high inflation rates currently experien­
ced in Sudan, the extent to which increases in wages beyond the legal 
minimum constitute a serious attempt to prop up real wages above market 
clearing levels, is uncertain.
A particularly significant development has occurred in the sphere 
of pay determination in the private sector in recent years. It is mani­
fested in the endorsement by the Ministry of Labour in August 1986 of 
a national collective agreement which not only reaffirmed the level of 
the minimum wage, but also granted a wide range of stipulated increases 
to private sector employees earning more than the minimum wage. For 
example, a worker earning £s90 per month in July 1986 has seen his pay 
increased by 42 per cent to £ s 1 2 8 . ^ ^  It remains to be seen, however, 
whether a precedent has been set for regular and more serious interven­
tions of this kind.
7.5. CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter has revealed, in very broad terms, 
a narrowing of inter-sectoral differentials and a widening of intra­
sectoral differentials in the past two to three decades. But certain 
qualifications must be noted. Firstly, within the public sector, some 
groups (as exemplified by state bank employees) have seen their premia 
over civil servants and public corporation employees substantially in­
creased. Moreover, data limitations mean that this contention is based 
exclusively upon the movements of basic salary rates. It is quite pos­
sible that these intra-sectoral differentials would not have appeared 
to have narrowed so much had the full allowances and fringe benefits 
been taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the weight of the available 
evidence suggests that, in general, market forces - although in some
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cases they have moved in the same direction - offer no direct explana­
tion of the observed rate and pattern of change in differentials. Al­
ternatively an explanation in terms of a number of institutional factors 
could be proffered. Central to these factors is the government inter­
vention in the labour market. This intervention has taken two forms: 
government decisions regarding the size of pay awards to different cate­
gories of its employees and minimum wage legislation. There is evidence 
that the introduction of Minimum Wage Legislation in 1974 is a major 
reason for the observed changing pattern in inte^-sectoral differentials 
from public to private sector 'leadership'. Moreover, by imposing a 
floor to private sector wages, the legislation has probably pushed up 
the levels of unskilled wages beyond a market-clearing level. Trade 
unions, also, do appear to have influenced the behaviour of differentials 
over time. This could be seen in the limited areas where collective bar­
gaining is operating and in the influence of the labour /movement as a whole, 
through political pressure in exerting upward pressure on unskilled wage 
levels. Finally, in the face of high rates of inflation in recent years 
the government has had little alternative but to increase significantly 
the wages at the bottom end of pay structures. In this sense, the obser­
ved narrowing in top-bottom differentials in the civil service should be 
viewed more as a short-term pragmatic response to a situation of crisis 
rather than a conscious attempt to reform fundamentally the existing pay 
structure in pursuit of increased equity. In the face of mounting 
problems the government has increasingly resorted to such crisis manage­





Ratio of Minimum Basic Salary to Minimum of Unskilled Labourer
(Grade 18) July 1968 - July 1986
Grade
July July July December July
1968 1974 1978 1983 1986
1 14.39 14.39 14.58 12.56 11.67
4 13.01 13.13 10.77 9.26 7.89
9 3.87 3.33 2.98 2.60 2.53
14 2.13 1.95 1.80 1.62 1.67
18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

















1 17.48 14.24 12.16 10.58 11.28 10.07
4 13.02 10.51 9.48 8.18 8.23 7.70
9 2.63 2.93 1.95 2.22 2.66 2.84
14 1 .66 1.71 1.36 1.44 1.44 1.54
18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00




Ratio of After-tax Minimum Basic Salary to the Minimum of Grade 18 








4 Deputy Under-Secretary £s2280 £s3034 £s3387
(11.52) (9.03) (7.88)
9 University Graduate £s 644 £s 950 £s1120
( 3.25) (2.83) (2.60)
14 Secondary School Leaver £s 390 £s 595 £s 695
( 1.95) (1.77) (1.62)
18 Unskilled Worker £s 198 £s 336 £s 430
( 1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Source: World Bank Report No. 5496-SU. Sudan: Prosepcts for
Rehabilitation of the Sudanese Economy Vol III, Oct 1985.
Table 7.4
Differential Ratios in Certain Grades Basic Salary Minima between 























Source: Civil Service and Public Corporations' Pay Scales. 
Civil Service Salary Rate = 1
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Table 7.3
Minimum Basic Salary Differential Ratios between Bank Employees and 
Civil Servants 1974 - 1986
Occupational Group 1974 1979 1984
Top Management* 
University Graduate 










Source: Basic Salary Scales of Civil 
as in Case Study 6.
Service and Bank Salary Scales
* Under-Secretary in the Civil Service and Assistant General Manager 
in the Banks.
Civil Service Salary Rate = 1
Table 7.6





Salaried Employees 37.00 63.20
Wage Earners 14.82 20.56




Mean Wage Rates by Type of Employer (£s per year) 1982










White Collar 1193 2470 107.0
Skilled 1448 1848 27.6
Unskilled Production 923 1105 19.7
Unskilled Service 762 1195 56.8
Source: ILO, Urban Labour Market Survey 1982, quoted in El-Bagir 
et al, Labour Markets in the Sudan, ILO 1984.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T
PUBLIC SECTOR PAY DETERMINATION: 
AN OVERVIEW OF SOME PROBLEMS
8.1. INTRODUCTION
In LDCs, as elsewhere, an economically ideal pay structure would 
be one in which:
"Every rate is just high enough to induce each kind of 
labour to present itself in the needed quantities, 
provides just enough incentive for workers to acquire 
skills and accept responsibility, and just enough in­
centive to meet required standards of performance"( 1)
From the equity perspective as well, such a structure 
would have much to commend itself since pay differences would be kept to 
the minimum levels that are economically essential, ie, a minimum supply 
price structure, without extensive 'quasi-rents' and without discontent- 
producing inequities.
Assessed against this standard, existing patterns of pay structures 
in the Sudanese public sector give rise to considerable concern. There 
is little in the analyses of the preceding chapters to indicate that 
current pay levels or the changes that took place in recent years, have 
served equity and/or efficiency considerations. In retrospect, it is 
evident that the picture is one of inconsistencies, distortions and 
apparent anomalies. In the face of accelerating inflation, periodic 
adjustments of pay scales have failed to preserve employees' purchasing
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power. Real wages have declined precipitously, undermining employee 
motivation and commitment and leading to continuing demands for pay 
increases. Eventually, pressures accumulate to the point where they 
may no longer be resisted. Factional 'catch-up' increases have been 
granted and modifications allowed even though not easily accommodated 
by the treasury or idnividual organisation's budget. The result has 
been a disruptive pattern of irregular adjustments producing a pay det­
ermination system which is ineffective, volatile and circumscribed with 
numerous problems. At the risk of over simplification this chapter 
singles out a few targets which should attract policy concern.
8.2. EROSION OF REAL PAY 1970 - 1986
Discussions of salary trends in Chapters 5 and 6 showed that pub­
lic sector pay has fallen dramatically in real terms over the past 16 
years. To recapitulate the extent of this erosion in the civil service, 
real pay indices of grades 4, 9, 14 and 18 from 1970 to 1986, are prov­
ided in Table 8.1. The four grades (which respectively represent a 
deputy under-secretary, a university graduate, a secondary school 
graduate and an unskilled worker) may be regard as indicative of general 
developments in basic salaries. As evident from Table 8.1 even after 
the full implementation of 1986 increases, the real basic salaries for 
grade minima are only 13 to 21 per cent of the 1970 levels, with the 
relative fall being most acute since the late 1970s. Table 8.2 shows 
the annual percentage change in real basic salaries on a June-June basis 
(with the percentage change resulting from the periodic adjustments 
also shown for appropriate months). Until the implementation of the 
1986 package of improvements, real basic salaries had fallen by 20 per 
cent or more each year. Examples of gross salaries provided in Chapters 
3 and 6 revealed that, in some cases, the fall in basic salaries was
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partially offset by the extension and improvement of allowances, and 
has been ameliorated by promotions, regrading and the incremental system. 
However, for the majority the magnitude of erosion has outweighed the 
effects of any compensatory factors, even allowing for the relatively 
low real pay levels received by new entrants in the past. For example, 
real gross salary levels for civil servants fell by 60 - 70 per cent 
between July 1978 and July 1986.^^ Thus, in a rather uncustomary move, 
a recent World Bank Mission to the Sudan suggested that:
"Despite the continuing budgetary problems, it would be 
inadvisable to reduce the salaries of the civil service 
any further"
Only the fact that real pay levels in the Sudan 
are extremely low could have induced the Bank to take such an unconven­
tional approach since wage restraint is one of the main pillars of the 
Bank's structural adjustment programmes in LDCs (operative in the Sudan 
since 1978).
Moreover, real pay is perceived by public sector employees and their 
respresentative unions to have fallen by far more than analysis of the 
official data suggests. They are particularly critical of the compila­
tion of the cost of living index derived from monthly surveys of prices 
in Khartoum area.^^ The results of these surveys which cover several 
dozen goods and services are used to develop two monthly price indices 
for employees with incomes below and above £s500 per year, using a 
January 1970 base with weights taken from the 1967/68 Household Budget 
Survey. SWTUF officials interviewed by the writer contend that official 
figures underestimate significantly the actual cost of living because 
a) the index reflects the official prices while the majority of essential 
consumer goods are now only obtainable from the 'black market'; b) the 
weights are outdated and cannot reflect current spending patters; and 
c) restriction of price surveys to the Khartoum area precludes measure­
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ment of regional price changes which may be higher because of the short­
ages and poor administrative control systems. Whether or not these par­
ticular arguments are accepted, that a dramatic decline of real pay in 
the public sector has occurred is generally agreed by employees' unions, 
policy makers and international observers alike. It is now apparent 
that periodic salary scale adjustments between 1970 and 1986 have not 
been sufficient to halt the continuing downward trend in real pay. Table 
8.3 shows that during this period while prices rose by 2,245 per cent, 
successive revisions (in 1974, 1978, 1983 and 1985-86) produced only 
relatively moderate increases of 169 to 329 per cent for different grades. 
Moreover, increases granted to employees in each one of these adjustments 
were much less in percentage terms than the corresponding changes in the 
cost of living index allowing real pay to decline by up to 89 per cent.
Comparison of the trends in real pay with the growth in GDP per 
capita provides a further measure of the relative decline of the public 
sector pay. Table 8.4 presents a detailed comparison of these trends.
It compares annual growth rates of an unskilled worker's real wage in 
the civil service with GDP per capita for the period 1970 - 1986. Gen­
erally, if real wages grow more slowly than real GDP per capita, then 
other incomes (from profits, self-employment, etc) must have grown faster. 
In the Sudan as a whole, changes in real wages appear to have fallen well 
behind the rate of economic growth in recent years. The gap between real 
wages and GDP per capita growth rates (column 2 and 4) has narrowed sub­
stantially over time. In the civil service, the unskilled worker's real 
wages have gone from approximately three times per capita GDP in 1970 
to below two-thirds in 1986. In fact, this fall is expected to be more 
dramatic for the higher level civil servants because, as seen already,
unskilled workers were relatively better off in terms of real pay move­
ments during the period. Nevertheless, the comparisons (column 5) show
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not only that real wages are lagging (e>cept on few occasions following 
pay adjustments), but the differences have been substantial, suggesting 
that other incomes have been rising much more rapidly than wages.
Given the wide gaps in practically all kinds of basic statistics 
for the Sudan, the virtual non-existence of data relating to income dis­
tribution is unsurprising. However, a recent ILO study (1987b) reported 
that the income share accruing to the poorest half of the population 
declined from 21.9 to 18.4 per cent between 1967/68 and 1978/80, while 
the share of the top 20 per cent rose from 48.1 to 53.3 per centP^Over­
all the Gini coefficient increased from 0.41 to 0.50 indicating an
(8)
exacerbation in income inequality. Although these figures may not
reveal the worsening situation of wage-earners in the economy, they
support evidence from other sources pertaining to the redistribution of
income in favour of emerging 'parasitic' groups. Ali, A (1986) provided
(9)
data which are reproduced in Table 8.5. The results of this table 
may be crude but they may be used to make approximate comparisons. As 
seen, while the income share of the agricultural sector declined from 
79.2 per cent in 1976/77 to 34.3 in 1982/83, that for commerce increased 
from 24.2 to 28.6 per cent. Moreover, figures in Table 8.5 indicate the 
supremacy of commerce over those sectors which had an increase in percent­
age income share. Thus, the increase for traders was 4.4 percent compared 
to 1.5 per cent in the industrial sector, and 0.3 per cent in utilities;
the remainder without exception experienced a fall in their share with 
the agricultural sector actually losing 45 per cent between 1976/77 and 
1982/83. Such results appear to confirm the increasing inequality hypoth­
esis, the supremacy of non-productive over productive activities and high­
light the distributional impact of the Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAP) implemented since 1978. Other Sudanese scholars also contend that 
these programmes and liberalisation policies which followed the active
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involvement of the World Bank and IMF in the management of the Sudanese 
economy have adversely affected the distribution of national wealth.
Diab (1985), for example, argued that as a result of frequent currency 
devaluations between 1978 and 1983, income from profits increased by 5.9 
per cent while that from wages declined by 4.5 per c e n t / ^ e t  further 
evidence is provided by the flourishing black-market 'Dollar' trade and 
'brief-case' shuttles between the Sudan and Gulf states. More graphic­
ally Professor Ali (1986) summarizes the situation by noting:
"To ordinary Sudanese citizens, going about their daily 
lives of earning a living, the proposition that there 
has been an increasing inequality of income distribution 
in the Sudan is an obvious one that does not need empiri­
cal evidence. To them sufficient evidence is provided 
by the almost daily worsening of their lot, and the ob­
served increasing affluence of the 'fat-cats' of liberal­
isation". '
It is to be expected that the absolute and relative decline in 
real pay has affected performance, motivation and the general level of 
public sector activities. Unfortunately, such impact is not easily 
quantified. Since public sector output is often measured in terms of 
public sector wages, value added in services often being equated with 
wage payments, independent evidence at the level of national accounts 
is not readily available. At a micro level, the value of services del­
ivered could presumably be computed, but measures of government produc­
tivity are generally unavailable for even one point in time, let alone 
over several years. Instead, anecdotal and impressionistic evidence, 
however biased, must be offered. Concern over the productivity of civil 
service was raised earlier in the mid-1970s by an ILO mission to the 
Sudan. The Growth, Employment and Equity report was particularly crit­
ical of the inefficiencies within the government bureaucracy citing lack 
of discipline as a cause rather than the shortages of trained personnel 
and strains imposed by a rapidly growing public sector usually professed
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as explanation for poor government performance. More recent evidence 
suggests that performance has further deterioriated. Thus, J Jacobs (1983) 
in a review of staffing in public sector agriculture observed:
"At the time it achieved political independence the reputation
of the Sudan's public service was deservedly high. From my
own albeit brief and intermittent contact with that service 
in the 1940s, 1930s, and 1970s, I can attest from personal 
experience to its calibre and spirit. I have no hesitation 
in concluding that its present morale and productivity are 
at an all time low".^^)
This view was further confirmed by the ILO report (1987):
"Deterioration in morale, supervision and performance has 
reached the point that there are serious doubts about the 
capacity of large areas of government administration to 
implement necessary government policies. Proposals to 
extend the role of government and impose additional duties 
on the civil service cannot be seriously considered until 
the ability and performance of administrative machine is 
much improved".^
Poor morale, inefficiency and low productivity had, therefore, become 
in-built features of the Sudanese public sector performance; even the 
casual visitor is struck by lack of activity and disorderliness in gov­
ernment offices. If the majority of the employees are not absent, they 
appear to be unoccupied; indeed they now seem to be characterised by 
work-indifferent attitudes. Staff in a variety of public sector occupa­
tions and locations interviewed by the writer claimed that they allocated 
their effort according to what they thought was the department's (or the 
corporation's) due:
"I don't work hard here but I give them effort equal to 
their money".
While it may not be the case that salary levels in 1970 - our chosen 
base year - were in any way the 'right' levels, real pay decline experienced 
in the Sudan in the 1970s and 1980s, following the relatively stable levels 
of the 1960s, must be regarded as extreme, and the consequential responses 
on the part of employees hardly surprising. In addition to decreases in 
work effort, reactions and adjustments to the fall in real pay have
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been manifested in other forms of behaviour, in particular increased 
absenteeism, higher labour turnover, more moonlighting and increased 
incidence of malpractices through bribery, corruption and theft of 
government property. With regard to turnover, for example, among the 
classified civil service grades there were 6202vacant posts in central, and 
5,780 in regional government (excluding the Southern Regions) at June 
1986, implying a vacancy to total classified posts ratio of 7.1 per 
cent. Assuming that it takes three months to fill a vacancy, and with 
no growth anywhere in the system, the annual turnover rate would be more 
than 28 per cent. While this figure may be on the high side as expan­
sion did occur amongst school teachers and health workers, it is possible 
that some vacancies were deliberately left unfilled. Nevertheless, this 
calculation suggests that turnover is substantial. There are, unfortun­
ately, no time series data from which to estimate recent increases in 
the quit rate. The only other available estimate indicates that between 
1976/77 and 1977/78, 11.5 per cent of the total central government prof­
essional and administrative staff and 8.1 per cent of total permanent 
staff left without notice. Slightly lower official estimates were 
obtained for the period 1979/80 to 1980/81. From my discussions with 
civil service officials these figures are clearly lower limits of actual 
voluntary turnover; it is probable that the overall rate is of the order 
of 15 - 20 per cent per annum. It is, therefore, at least arguable that 
recent trends in real public sector pay need to be reversed. Moreover, 
as there is widespread overstaffing in the civil service the budgetary 
implications might be minimised by simultaneously allowing employment 
levels to drop through natural wastage. However, the difficulty with 
this approach is that the largest quit rates are in respect of the more 
highly qualified and skilled staff, so that attrition policies would 
leave the civil service with overmanning in the unclassified grades and
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possible shortages in the higher grades for whom there are plentiful 
job opportunities in the neighbouring oil-rich countries.
The policy question that naturally arises is, why salary scales 
have not been adjusted - at least approximately - in line with price 
movements? The importance of such question stems from the fact that 
the extent to which euqity and efficiency goals of pay policy are met 
depends on the pattern of wage adjustments over time. The size and 
frequency of these adjustments obviously have an important influence 
on micro and macro-economic efficiency. At the same time, on equity 
grounds, a high priority is usually given to pay adjustments that are 
at least sufficient to preserve worker purchasing power, especially 
that of the lowest-paid groups (ILO, 1 9 8 7 ) . ^ ^  In the case of the 
Sudan, there is no shortage of goodwill and good intentions on the part 
of the government to maintain the real pay of its employees. A series 
of interviews with key officials have revealed that the government is 
fully aware of the fact that spiralling inflation in recent years has 
almost completely wiped out the motivational effectiveness of pay. It 
is being increasingly accepted that, once performance standards are 
allowed to deteriorate substantially, it is bound to be a long and 
difficult task to raise them again. Thus, some restoration of the 
value of lost real income is being widely viewed as a precondition for 
effective reform as it is vitally necessary to improve morale and 
efficiency in the public service. Despite this recognition, a number 
of inter-related macro-economic factors have made it virtually impos­
sible to link the nominal pay adjustments to price changes. Central 
to this problem is the nature of inflationary pressure in the Sudan 
on which, two view points, not necessarily mutually exclusive, exist. 
The one (Ali 1986, Salih 1986) claims that high domestic inflation is 
due to successive devaluations. In June 1978, for the first time since
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independence in 1956, the official exchange rate was lowered by 13 per 
cent from £s0.35/$ to £s0.40/$. Since then the Sudanese Pound has been 
devalued six times until in December 1987 a unified exchange rate of 
£s4.50/$ was adopted. The main objective is to make exports competitive 
and more profitable against the production of domestically used goods, 
the so-called non-tradeables. However, experience demonstrates that 
devaluations by themselves are ineffective in bringing about changes 
in the underlying imbalances in the real economy. Even temporary relief 
fails to manifest itself: the ILO (1987b) asserts, for example, that:
"It is arguable that in the Sudan in the last six to eight 
years repeated devaluations and the expectation of devalu­
ation have contributed to the problem of inflation rather 
than to its solution".(15)
The most serious drawback of the devaluation has been the creation of 
a parallel black market for foreign currencies. There is always a large 
gap between the official and the free market exchange rate. Expectation 
of continuing inflation prompts speculators to invest in foreign currency, 
reinforcing the negative cycle of inflation and need for further devalua­
tion. Periodically, government attempts to legitimise currency black 
markets as in 1982 and 1983, but is unsuccessful because appropriate 
macro-economic policies are lacking and the demand for foreign exchange 
continues to outpace supply. At present, while the official exchange 
rate is £s4.5/$, the illegal market rate is £s9.0/$. At a time when 
foreign exchange is very scarce, the black market has become the only 
source available for the majority of private importers raising the cost 
of imported goods. It is also estimated that more than 80 per cent
of the remittances of the Sudanese workers overseas are channelled to
(1 6)
the black market (Hussien, 1985).
The World Bank and the IMF, on the other hand, hold a rather dif­
ferent view without altogether discounting the role of devaluations.
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A 1987 World Bank mission to the Sudan reported:
"Certainly, the expectation of future devaluation causes 
the public to increase its demand for goods and will speed 
up the velocity of money circulation, thereby causing in­
flationary p r e s s u r e s " . ( 17)
However, the high domestic inflation in the Sudan, is seen primarily as
the result of excess demand generated by public sector deficits:
"The cycle of devaluations and the related increases in the 
prices of imported commodities are, in fact, a delayed 
reaction to the excess demand in previous years. If the 
exchange rate had not been fixed, these prices would have 
gone up earlier and reduced the effective demand in the 
economy to compensate for the excess demand created in
the public sector. Thus, price increases following dev­
aluations are simply a delayed market reaction to earlier 
government action ie excess demand for goods and services 
financed through money creation''^®)
As far as the process of pay determination in the Sudan is con­
cerned, policy makers are preoccupied with the consequences rather 
than the cuases of endemic inflation. Upward movements in consumer 
prices cannot be covered by the infrequent pay adjustments, a problem
aggravated by the psychological effects of inflation which make people
feel worse off whether or not they are fully compensated for the fall 
in the value of money.
Compounding the difficulties of maintaining real pay levels is the 
inability of government to finance wage increases. Since the mid-1970s 
fiscal performance has been patently inadequate, with a substantial gap 
existing between revenues and expenditures. By 1985/86 the central
government current account deficit was £s2282.1 millions or 10.7 per
(19)
cent of GDP (World Bank, 1987). The same source estimated that the
1985/86 package of improvements would increase the wage bill for central 
government by 111 per cent and for regional governments by 80 per cent, 
although the package restored real basic salaries in July 1986 by little 
more than one-fifth, and real gross salaries to about one-third of their 
1978 levels.
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The situation in the parastatal sector is no better. Despite 
all the special support they enjoyed, the 137 state-owned organisations 
have become a heavy financial burden on the economy. A 1984 survey of 
sixteen enterprises covering over 80 per cent of total government invest­
ment in enterprises found only three reported yearly profits from 1979/80 
to 1983/84, compared to five in 1975/76 (Table 8.6); their profits amounted
to £s47 million, whereas the losses of the group were £s82 million, or 8
per cent of total tax revenue in 1982/83. Five of the sixteen enterprises 
representing 31 per cent of total government investment in enterprises 
had more liabilities than assets. Another survey of 21 industrial public 
enterprises reported accumulated losses of £s50 million on paid-up capi­
tal of £s146 million, while state enterprises' debt with the Bank of 
Sudan was £s1169 million in August 1984. Clearly the majority of state- 
owned enterprises are not in a position to finance pay increases from 
their internal sources, and represent additional demands on an already 
strained public finance.
The World Bank missions to the Sudan in recent years have persist­
ently asked for a massive reduction in the number of public sector em­
ployees as prerequisite to any public sector reform policy. The latest 
of these missions, for example, argued that:
"In order to make a programme of real pay increases financially
feasible, it will be necessary to reduce the number of central 
and local government employees. There is ample opportunity 
to reduce staff in the public sector. At the moment the low 
productivity of the civil service has become one of the most 
urgent problems in economic reform; an identical situation 
exists in many of the parastatal enterprises. More often 
than not, important work is executed slowly and inadequately, 
and many agencies require much less staff than they have on 
their payrolls. The problem is enormous. In some quarters, 
redundant labour is estimated to be about a third of the 
total number of public sector employees"(20)
A similar view has been expressed by the ILO
which asserts that:
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"One prerequisite for an effective reform is to determine 
appropriate staffing levels throughout the public service.
In both the civil service and the parastatals it is necessary 
to have employment levels which are based on the tasks and 
functions to be done. This requires a comprehensive analysis 
of the appropriate manpower requirement of each organisation, 
ministry and department. This should be based on the applica­
tion of 0 & M analysis ... Such an exercise will inevitably 
conclude that the present staffing levels are considerably 
larger than the requirements for staff based on reasonable 
levels of effort and regular attendance" (21)
It is to be expected then that any reduction in staffing levels 
will enhance the government chances of restoring real pay of the retained 
staff. But, this is not, by any means, an easy task or a realistic option. 
It will certainly generate a fierce resistance on the part of public sec­
tor employees as happened in the case of Sudan Airways following the 
government's decision in December 1987 to make the Sudan Airways Corpora­
tion a public company, a change in corporate status which prompted mana­
gement to dismiss large numbers of staff in an effort to reduce the under­
utilised workforce. The Sudan Airways' unions immediately staged an 
indefinite strike, supported eventually by a one-day strike by about 40 
public sector unions, a development which lead government to back down 
and re-employ the sacked staff.
An alternative approach suggested by the ILO (1987b) involves:
(i) moving qualified labour from the surplus to the few under-manned 
services; (ii) introducing effective incentives for early retirement and 
voluntary redundancy in over-manned departments and agencies; and (iii) 
defining new and expanded tasks in high-priority areas for redundant but 
retained staff. This means both occupational and geographical mobility 
are required, but again neither can be easily obtained. Voluntary move­
ment of surplus labour from Khartoum to the regions where job opportunities 
exist or may be created will be particularly difficult. Social factors, 
as well as the poor provisions of amenities and services, make many areas
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unattractive. Restructuring of pay and allowances might provide
mobility incentives and location allowances for particular regions and 
(22)
districts have been proposed by ILO.
It therefore seems apparent that restoration of real pay may only
be achieved as part of a comprehensive policy of public sector reform.
Such a programme should be designed to improve productivity, to increase 
government financial resources, and to specify staffing levels which 
presume better performance levels. At the same time steps need to be 
taken to ensure that these measures are supported by macro-economic 
policies directed unambiguously to the control of inflation. Unless 
such a programme is attempted and gains some degree of success sizeable 
real pay erosion with its implications will remain the de facto incomes 
policy in the Sudan.
While the dramatic fall in real pay is by far the most urgent prob­
lem arising from the pay determination process in the public sector there
are others, in particular, the absence of sound pay policies, inadequa­
cies of control systems and the over-valuation of paper qualifications. 
These will now be discussed in turn.
8.3. ABSENCE OF SOUND PAY POLICIES
Apart from the minimum wage legislation and the recommendations 
of the ad hoc pay commissions, there is little to indicate the existence 
of a coherent and self-enforcing set of pay policies designed to advance 
the objectives of equity and efficiency in the public service. In a 
country where government is the dominant employer sound policies are 
not only essential in the one sector in which the government can deter­
mine the salary structure directly, but for the national remuneration 
system as a whole.
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The experience of the last couple of decades or so clearly demon­
strates that pay determination process itself has become increasingly 
chaotic. The few policy guidelines which emerge periodically are rarely 
implemented systematically, and government frequently resorts to crisis 
management despite the familiarity of the problems. Available evidence 
suggests that pay determination in the public sector in the 1950s, 1960s 
and up to early 1970s was, generally, less problematic than in the sub­
sequent period (A Suliman, 1975). The major contributory fact to the 
then healthier atmosphere was the existence of well-defined policies 
spelled out by the Wakefield and Mills Commissions in 1951 and strictly 
adopted by successive governments. As a result, real pay remained 
fairly stable and the industrial relations climate was relatively peace­
ful (the incidence of strikes is reported to have been low). From 1951 
to 1970 the real pay of a university graduate in the civil service had 
declined by 5 per cent, and by 3 per cent for the secondary school leaver 
while the unskilled worker enjoyed an increase of 20 per cent (Table 8.7). 
The deputy under-secretary, of course, experienced a 32 per cent loss in 
real pay, but this relative decline was the consequence of a deliberate 
policy objective to dismantle the colonial legacy of high top-bottom 
differentials in the public service pay structure.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the 1978 Job Evaluation and Classificion 
Scheme was meant to bring drastic changes in the pay determination system 
in the Sudanese public service; following claims that pay policies and 
structures in operation from 1951 no longer relected the political, econ­
omic and social realities of 1970s. However, we have seen that the out­
come was disastrous to the pay determination system partly because of 
structural deficiencies in the scheme itself and partly because of the 
employees' reluctance to accept the changes involved. Since then the 
government has been unable to provide either a coherent set of policies or
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to implement its fragmentary policies in an effective way. In recent 
years committees have been set up to revise existing structures and to 
recommend new policies but these have been repeatedly rejected by differ­
ent interest groups within the public sector. In one year (April 1983 
to March 1986) six committees were established but all failed to restore 
stability and industrial peace, and the wave of disputes continues.
Of course the deterioration in public sector real pay itself appears 
to be one of the main causes of the persistent failure to adopt policies 
which might collectively rectify imbalances and bring order and stabil­
ity to the pay structure. As was said earlier, no upward revisions in 
pay scales seem to be satisfactory in relation to employees' expectations. 
Thus, quite often in recent years different groups within the sector 
deliberately pursued industrial action to enhance their emoluments, whether 
their demands could be afforded by individual organisations or the treas­
ury, and regardless of the creation of further anomalies. Concessions to 
such factional demands undoubtedly undermined the maintenance of an 
adequate and coherent set of policies.
The heterogeneous nature of the public sector make-up also tends 
to impede the attainment of a uniform pay policy. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s the public sector was relatively small comprising basically 
the civil service. At that time it was not difficult to standardise job 
classifications and occupational nomenclatures or to rationalise pay 
differentials. However, due to the large-scale nationalisations in May 
1970, the public sector expanded to cover a much wider range of agents, 
activities and occupations; by 1985/86 about one third of public sector 
employees were non-civil servants making it increasingly difficult to 
implement policies universally applicable or acceptable throughout the 
expanded public sector.
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8.4. INADEQUACIES OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM
The weak and ineffective control exercised by responsible govern­
ment agencies constitutes a serious problem in the public sector pay 
determination processes. In fact, inadequate government administrative 
and control capacity could be identified as one of the most significant 
factors underlying the apparent distortions, inconsistencies and anomal­
ies in public service pay structures.
Formally, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is the 
actual employer of every public sector employee. The Civil Service 
Department (CSD) is the organ of the Ministry responsible for determining 
grading, manning and pay structures and for monitoring their operation; 
within the CSD there is a section responsible specifically for public 
corporations. In theory at least, the.system appears to be strongly 
centralised and neither individual government departments nor the cor­
porations have theauthority to make separate decisions involving adjust­
ment of remuneration or conditions of employment without referring the 
matter to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This system 
was designed to achieve uniformity and preclude the emergence of a hybrid 
pay structure. But as the analyses in previous chapters have extensively 
revealed, designating one ministry as a sole employer of all public sec­
tor employees, seems not to have achieved a great deal in this respect, 
basically because of the ineffectiveness of government controls.
As noted earlier, there are three basic grading and salary scales 
for the entire public sector (excluding the public companies). The 
civil service generally appears to abide closely by the grading system, 
salary scales and allowances as formally laid down. Historically the
civil service was the part of the public sector in which relatively tight 
control was achieved, partly because of the sheer mass of articles, decrees
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and bureaucratic controls which make departmental modifications extremely 
difficult and partly because civil servants could not form pressure groups 
for sectoral or departmental pay alterations. However, in recent years, 
professional groups within the civil service have been able to obtain 
considerable increases in allowances; the special engineering allowance 
granted to every engineer in the public sector in 1985 for example is 
just one instance of such a development.
Control problems of the public sector are also acute in public 
authorities and corporations. The case studies have highlighted the 
widespread practices whereby individual organisations have, with or with­
out approval of the Ministry of Finance, modified their general scale and 
effectively created 'in-house' grading structures, pay scales and allow­
ances. The incidence of modifications and alterations is so pronounced 
that formal provisions are hardly traceable in many organisations. In 
1984, for example, all budgeted posts in the Gezira Scheme were raised 
by one grade eliminating grade 18 and creating a new grade 2A; the 
Scheme also made advances to employees of 10 per cent of salaries later 
consolidated as a general 10 per cent salary increase.
Various factors have contributed to the apparent difficulty in 
exercising close control over public sector organisations. Although 
formulating strategies and policies may not automatically ensure their 
implementation, the lack of sound policies, observed in the previous 
section, has obviously undermined the responsible agencies' ability to 
apply available control devices. Another problem, however, arises from 
the fact that existing control mechanisms are themselves unco-ordinated
(23)
and weak, and are poorly and perhaps incompetently applied (ILO, 1987c). 
Under the present institutional set-up in which the public corporations 
function, a number of legislations, articles and ministerial circulars 
regulate the relationship between these corporations and the Ministry
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of Finance and Economic Planning. The 1977 Financial and Accounts 
Procedure Act requires that:
"Every Organisation or Corporation shall submit its budget 
to the Minister for passing it before the submission of the 
same to the authorities within the Organisation or Corporation"
(Section 13); in practice, such provisions are not strictly maintained
due to the absence of sanctions and ineffectivness of auditing. As
recently noted:
"The office of the Auditor General has a severe backlog in 
the verification of the state-owned enterprises' accounts, 
with the result that these audits are an unsuitble manage­
ment tool at all levels"(24)
Thus, the actual expenditures on allowances, 
loans and incentives, and the incidence of regrading and promoting of 
employees may not be systematically monitored by the Ministry simply be­
cause budgets are not compared with expenditures.
A further control problem relates to public companies organised 
under the 1925 Companies Act which was originally enacted to apply to 
private companies. As mentioned earlier, the Act authorises the Board 
of Directors to determine unilaterally the terms and conditions of emp­
loyment of their companies' labour force. The Mixed Amendments Law 
(January 1986) was designed to bring public companies within the ambit 
of the Minister of Finance by requiring them to obtain approval before 
making any change relating to expenditure levels. The Law, however, 
does not appear to be enforced and there is some dispute over the exact 
position regarding the autonomy of the Boards and the power of the Min­
ister to over-rule their decisions.
It is widely recognised, of course, that administrative laxity 
has created opportunities for adjustments and modifications of pay 
structures which could not have been exploited without the support of 
managements, who no less than employees, have a vested interest in im­
proving the conditions of employment of 'their' organiastions, and are
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adept in the arts of non-compliance, moreover, such resistance is
undoubtedly facilitated by the inadequacies of the controllers. Thus,
the ILO mission (1987b) asserts:
"A weak demoralised civil service is ill-placed to apply 
strong effective controls over other parts of the public 
service even if there were clear and consistent controls
to apply and a political will to apply them".
The most unfortunate consequence of the government's inability to 
control the pay determination process has been the development of sect­
ional claims. Different groups firmly make claims on comparative 
grounds, and in the prevailing industrial and political climate in the
Sudan when one group obtains a rise in pay or allowances, there will be
pressures for similar treatment for other groups.
In the continuous struggle to improve the alarmingly low real pay levels, 
trade unions pursue sectional interest claims and back-up their claims 
with threats of industrial action notwithstanding the requirements of 
the established procedures involving conciliation, mediation and arbit­
ration. In consequence, an environment has been created in which coercive 
comparability is a powerful method of pay determination, the ILO (1987c) notes:
"Employees and their unions constantly compare improvements 
obtained by other groups with their own terms and condit­
ions but frequently they look at the changes or new bene­
fits obtained rather than at full package of rewards and 
duties"
The banks employees' 1986 claim for the 
nature of work allowance and the recent claim by GPC employees for the 
same allowance pesents an illustration of the strong force of coercive 
comparability in the public sector (case study 3 and 6 ).
The absence of job specifications and lack of adequate criteria 
for determining job content and effort complicates the mechanics of 
comparability. It is difficult if not impossible consequently to apply 
the 'equal pay for equal work' principle, and strong emphasis is, there­
fore, placed on educational qualifications as a basis for comparability
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claims: 'equal pay for the possession of similar qualifications'. The 
importance of this comparative yardstick consequently focuses attention 
on the role of educational qualifications in determining pay in the 
Sudanese public sector, particularly the over valuation of 'paper' 
qualifications.
8.5. OVER-VALUATION OF 'PAPER' QUALIFICATIONS
Existing salary scales and grades - as shown in Chapters 5 and 6 - 
reflect a differential treatment of academic or paper qualifications in 
government employment. This is demonstrated by the fact that the rec­
ruitment process is almost exclusively based on cognitive certification 
performed by the schooling system, this certification is in turn directly 
linked to rather rigid channels of advancement. The higher the level 
of education the better the pay rates and career prospects. No matter 
how favourable a person's position - be he experienced, suitable for 
the job, creative, etc - he would generally be unable to increase basic 
salary above the rate corresponding to his educational attainment. 
Similarly, a person with a poor experience/performance record, if he had 
somehow managed to receive a degree, would be protected by paper qualifi­
cations; educational achievement is thus used as the sole screening device
for entry to public service employment. This is not, however, to suggest
that educational credentials are not generally a reliable indication of 
capacity, but the thrust of the argument is that they ought not to be
taken as the only measure .
Although promotion and regrading might be expected to have the 
effect of removing part of this differential treatment after some years' 
service paper qualifications play a major role in giving access to prom­
otion opportunities as individual examples (Table 5.15, Chapter 5 ) in­
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dicate. Further evidence is provided by Ahmed (1980) who reported 
that only 3 per cent of assistant technicians in the civil service mana­
ged to obtain jobs normally requiring higher qualifications; and even 
those either had 13 to 20 years experience or had acquired additional 
academic credentials by part-time study.
It is not surprising then that many of the manning and pay problems 
currently experienced have more to do with the association syndrome of 
public sector pay levels and formal education qualification rather than 
with incentives related to job performance. It has become a well- 
established norm that employees with similar educational qualifications 
should receive the same salary and allowances regardless of job content, 
effort input or working conditions, while groups seek to differentiate 
their particular qualifications, special training or expertise to just­
ify some form of preferential treatment. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the strong emphasis placed on qualifications is one of the main 
factors behind the upheaval of sectional demands. Moreover, this cust­
omary association between qualifications and recruitment into the pub­
lic service has made the prevailing system inflexible and ill-equipped 
to adapt to changing labour market conditions or job requirements. There 
are, for example, shortages of technicians and suitably qualified employ­
ees below university graduate level; co-existing with conspicuous over- 
supply of arts and social science graduates (Chapter 2). While the 
1985 - 86 adjustments have differentiated to some extent in favour of 
technicians, there still exists a 50-60 per cent gap between the basic 
salary of a university graduate and that of a secondary school leaver, 
a margin widened by other benefits and allowances. To overcome the 
shortage of technicians it may be necessary to reclassify their jobs
into higher salary grades as part of a comprehensive restructuring of 
relative pay to be shaped by the service's skill needs rather than
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customary payment for paper qualifications. Another method of dealing 
with the problem might be to 'filter-down', a process whereby the 
highly qualified are encouraged to train as technicians and accept 
entering at lower occupational levels. However, such a policy may not 
be feasible because of the attitudes of young employees (and their 
parents) who see university education as a passport to government 
employment and a licence to enjoy the fruits of its high pay and social 
status. Such attitudes, of course, generate excessive demand for uni­
versity education while the vocational track remains a distinctively 
second class option (Chapter 2) despite endemic skill shortages.
8 .6 . CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a general perspective on some problems 
currently facing the pay determination process in the Sudanese public 
sector. By far the most serious problem is the dramatic fall in real 
pay levels experienced during the last couple of decades or so. This 
has had an equally significant effect on performance, motivation, and 
commitment; deterioration in employee morale has undoubtedly undermined 
the effectiveness of public sector operations. There is now clearly 
an urgent need to halt the decline in real pay, yet the precarious 
state of government finances and the impact of public sector wage 
claims on the budget means that it is difficult if not impossible to 
reconcile the need to improve employees' purchasing power with prudent 
fiscal policy. Although it is widely asserted that there is overstaff­
ing in many parts of the public service, and that reductions in numbers 
may enhance the government's capability to improve real pay of those 
retained, this course does not appear to present an easily achievable 
manpower policy option.
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Another set of problems arises from the government's lack of 
coherent pay policies and adequate control mechanisms other than the 
fragmentary guidelines provided by the ad hoc pay review bodies. There 
is little to indicate the existence of clear-cut policies regarding the 
determination of pay for different occupational groups or different com­
ponents of the public sector. While the civil service appears to be more 
directly and rigorously controlled, public corporations have developed 
extensive opportunities to modify and effectively increase emoluments 
notwithstanding the formal provisions laid down by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning. Under the present institutional frame­
work, the government has only limited control over public companies' 
terms ofemployment. Consequently, a multitude of pay scales, grading 
systems and allowances has bred wide-ranging anomalies and distortions 
in the pay structures of the public sector as a whole. A strong tend­
ency for coercive comparability has been developed as manifested by 
pressures and claims for special treatment, a process exacerbated by 
reliance on formal educational qualifications as the prime criterion 
for relative pay determination, to the exclusion of other yardsticks.
The distortion of labour market signals inherent in this system has 
meant that manpower imbalances become inevitable and are largely 

















4 100 78 59 19 13
9 100 67 55 18 14
14 100 71 60 20 16
18 100 78 71 26 21
Source: Civil Service nominal salaries are deflated by CPI for 





Annual Percentage Change in Real Basic Salaries 1970 - 1986
MonthAear Grade 4 Grade 9 Grade 14 Grade 18
June 1970 
June 1971 + 1.9 + 1.9 + 1.9 +1.9
June 1972 - 3.6 - 3.6 - 3.6 - 3.6
June 1973 -18.6 -18.6 -18.6 -18.6
June 1974^ >. 
July 1974
-19.1 -19.1 -19.1 -19.1
- 2.0(+21.2) -16.3(+ 3.6) -11.0(+10.1)- 3.0(+20.0)
June 1975 + 2.0 -12.8 -7.4 +1.1
June 1976 - 3.0 - 3.0 - 2.8 - 3.1
June 1977 -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 -11.0
June 1978/^ v 
July 1978
-19.0 -19.0 -19.0 -18.8
+ 3.5(+27.8) +12.6(+38.8) +15.5(+42.5)+26.3(+55.6)
June 1979 + 8.7 +18.3 +21.2 +32.4
June 1980 -21.7 -21.7 -21.7 -21.7
June 1981 -23.4 -23.4 -23.4 -23.4
June 1982 -18.3 -18.3 -18.3 -18.3
June 1983-,\ 
Dec 1983
-22.9 -22.9 -22.9 -22.9
(+ 5.6) (+ 7.9) (+10.6) (+23.0)
June 1984 -19.4 -19.4 -19.4 -19.4
June 1985 -32.1 -25.0 -21.7 -16.7
June 1986/,v 
July 1986
- 0.3 + 2.5 + 3.0 -1.3
+ 8.1(+ 7.7) +10.7(+13.5) +11.7(+15.9)+ 7.1(+ 5.7)
(1) Figures in parenthesis are for June 1973 - July 1974
(2) M " " " " June 1977 - July 1978
(3) " " " " " Nov 1982 - Dec 1983
(4) " " " " " June 1985 - July 1986





Percentage Changes in Nominal Basic Salaries and the Cost of Living 
Index 1970 - 1986
Grade 1970-74 1974-78 1978-83 1983-86 1970-86
4 23 39 10 43 169
9 14 32 12 63 189
14 11 57 15 73 243
18 18 70 29 67 329
CPI 72 86 246 112 2245
Source: Civil Service Pay Scales and CPI for Higher Salaried.
Table 8.4
Annual Growth Rates of Unskilled Worker’ 
ita 1970 - 1986















(2) - (4) 
(5)
1970 148.2 _ 54.7 — —
1971 150.9 + 1.8 58.9 + 7.7 - 5.9
1972 145.5 - 3.6 61.3 + 4.1 - 7.7
1973 118.4 -18.6 55.0 -10.3 - 8.3
1974 95.7 -19.2 49.1 -10.7 - 8.5
1975 65.3 -31.7 47.7 - 3.9 -27.8
1976 63.3 - 3.1 58.1 +21.8 -24.9
1977 56.3 -11.1 62.2 + 7.1 -18.2
1978 45.7 -18.2 55.1 -11.5 - 6.7
1979 60.5 +32.4 52.1 - 5.4 +37.8
1980 47.4 -21.7 48.3 - 7.3 -14.4
1981 36.3 -23.5 50.7 + 5.0 -28.5
1982 29.6 -18.5 55.0 + 8.5 -27.0
1983 22.3 -24.7 53.2 - 3.3 -24.4
1984 34.9 +56.5 52.9 - 0.6 +57.1
1985 18.5 -47.0 42.8 -19.1 -27.4
1986 28.9 +56.2 45.9 + 7.2 +49.0
Source: Real wage data refer to an unskilled worker's wage in the Civil Service de­
flated by CPI figures for June every year except for 1986 in which April CPI 
used. GDP per capita figures (at current prices) are also deflated by CPI 





















Agriculture 74 68.5 79.2 215 65.8 34.3
Service 108 15.5 13.0 267 19.5 1 2 . 6
Industry 184 4.5 6.4 602 3.5 7.9
Utilities 237 0.9 1.7 757 1 . 1 2 . 0
Construction 255 1.8 4.9 967 2 . 1 4.9
Transport 404 3.4 10.6 1033 3.8 9.5
Commerce 640 4.9 24.2 2813 4.2 28.6
Total 1 0 0 . 0 100.0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
Source: Derived 
ment and





Note: The economic sector is regarded as the income class and
employment is used as population weight. As GDP figures 
are in current prices, this table reflects the distribu­
tion of nominal income.
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Table 8.6
Profit and Loss of 16 Parastatals between 1975/76 and 1983/84 
(£s = 000)
1975/76 1982/83 1983/84
Gezira Board (4438) (2608) NA
Mechanised Farming Corp (239) (2188) NA
Rahad Agricultural Corp - (NA)* (NA)*
Blue Nile Agricultural Corp (339) (NA)* (NA)*
White Nile Agricultural Corp - (12508) (13716)
New Haifa Agricultural Corp (202) (2095) (3768)
Friendship Textiles - (819) (959)
Hag Abdalla Textiles 33 (1024) (4556)
Guneid Sugar Company (491) (8584) (9415)
Maspio Cement Company 645 2925 315
Cotton Public Corp 355 2393 6997
National Electricity Corp NA (24356) NA
Khartoum Water Corp NA (6239) (5701)
Sudan Railways Corp (1380) (19600) (40480)
Sea Ports Corp 4942 41900 35000
River Transport Corp (188) (1687) NA
Source: World Bank (1987): Sudan, Problems of Economic Adjustment, 
p 67.
* Even though figures are not available, it is known that these 





Nominal and Real Pay Scales (£s per annum)& Indices of Real Pay 
for Selected Grades 1951 - 1970
Grade 1951 1960 1966 1970
1. Nominal Salary
IV 1548 1740 1865 2116
Q 330 468 532 632
J 180 252 306 350
I 70 101 127 168
2. Real Salary
IV 1548 1200 1084 1053
Q 330 323 309 314
J 180 174 178 174
I 70 70 74 84
3. Real Salary Index
IV 100 78 70 68
Q 100 98 94 95
J 100 79 99 97
I 100 100 106 120
4. Cost of Price Index 100 145 172 201
Source: Data for 1951 from Wakefield and M ills Commissions' 
Reports, 1951. figures for 1960 and 1966 from 1968 
Commissions, and figures for 1970 are provided by 
CSD.
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1. E Berg, op cit, p 295.
2. ibid.
3. See Table 7.11 (Chapter 7).
4. See World Bank (1987).
5. Revealed in an interview with SWTUF officials.
6 . ILO (1987a), p 96.
7. See ILO (1987b).
8 . Gini Coefficient ranges from sero to one; zero implying perfect 
equality and unity indicating extreme inequality. In general the 
Gini Coefficient is below 0.40 in the industrialised world, varies 
around 0.50 in most Affrican countries, and approximates to 0.60
in some latin American countries. See ILO (1987b), op cit, pp 36-37.
9. See A Ali (1986).
10. See M Diab (1985).
11. A Ali (1985).




16. See M Hussien (1985).
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22. There is always the danger that such allowance will spread through­
out the country and thus become ineffective as an allocative tool.
23. ILO (1987c), pp 31-39.
24. World Bank (1987).
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C H A P T E R  N I N E  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1. SUMMARY
The prime object of this thesis, as stated in the introduction, 
is to examine in depth the nature of public sector pay determination 
in the Sudan and, thus, to identify the factors affecting the process 
and influencing the pay rates available to government employees in 
both relative and absolute terms. Therefore, this study followed an 
inductive/empirical approach.
Chapter One provided the theoretical background by reviewing the 
relevant theories and accordingly a broad conceptual framework was es­
tablished. The chapter started by identifying some distinctive features 
of pay determination problems and pay structures in LDCs. It emerged 
that dualism, wide pay differentials, extensive government intervention 
and the supremacy of non-economic factors in pay determination are basic 
characteristics of LDCs' labour markets that have few parallels in more 
developed economies. This was followed by an examination of wage theo­
ries advanced within the domain of development economics, to discover 
whether there can be one all-embracing theory of wages that explains the 
reality of the situation in LDCs. One of the most prominent development
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theories has been the labour surplus (or Lewis) model which postulates 
that competitive pressure from surplus labour in the 'traditional' sec­
tor is expected to keep wages for the unskilled labour in the 'capitalist' 
sector at levels determined by subsistence requironents in the former, due 
allowance being made for differences in the cost of living and other 
characteristics of the two sectors. The model further assumes that as 
development proceeds, employment will expand in the high productivity 
capitalist sector until such time as the labour surplus is fully absorbed 
and eventually real wages will begin to rise. The Harris-Todaro model 
of internal migration contends that the exogenously fixed urban wage 
rate is much higher than the 'subsistence plus margin' wage proposed 
by Lewis, and despite rising unemployment levels in urban centres, this 
wage remains rigid. This model was apparently unclear about what exactly 
determines the wage rate in the urban sector. J Stiglitz (1974, 1976) 
attempted to answer the question while retaining the assumption of dual­
ism. He argued that the apparent gap between rural and urban wages is 
the outcome of rational wage setting by employers and the relatively high 
wage in the urban sector is required to reduce the cost of labour turn­
over and/or improve efficiency.
These models have been criticised on the grounds that the behaviour 
of wages in many LDCs in recent years was out of line with their predic­
tions. Serious doubts have been cast on the usefulness of these models 
as analytical constructs for treating problems of wage determination in 
developing economies. Thus, attention has turned to the consideration 
of alternative theories and several attempts have been made in the recent 
past to apply some of the emerging labour market models to the problems 
of LDCs. Among those models considered in Chapter One were the 'Internal 
Labour Market', 'Segmented Labour Market' and 'Rent-Seeking' theories.
The ILM and SLM emerge from the so-called literature of 'dual labour
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markets' which postulates a distinction between a primary and a sec­
ondary labour market. While supply and demand forces are important in 
secondary labour markets, administrative regulations, custom and habit 
determine the wage rate for the job rather than for the worker in inter­
nal labour markets of the primary sector. Within an LDC context segmen­
tation is reflected in rural/urban, formal/informal, and public/private 
sectors' dichotomies. The basic idea is that the higher wages paid in 
some sectors result from 'protection' whether stemming from particular 
government, union or company policies. The Rent-Seeking theory, on the 
other hand, maintains that the wage rate is exogenously determined and 
contends that where wages are rigid, and there is unemployment, part of 
the earnings of the employed constitutes a 'rent'. Whatever the ventures 
and limitations of these theories it was concluded in Chapter One that 
although different labour market models may explain some aspects of pay 
determination processes in LDCs, none can stand as a single all-embracing 
theory of wage determination in such economies. Nonetheless, the assump­
tions of these models indicate that a synthesis of two basic approaches, 
market and institutional, is essential to the formulation of any theore­
tical structure which may approximate reality and have any general pred­
ictive value. Such a synthesis was regarded as a broad conceptual frame­
work for analysis of public sector pay determination in the Sudan.
To examine the relative impact of market versus institutional forces 
it was deemed necessary to draw a picture of the characteristics and 
functioning of the labour markets in the Sudan and Chapter Two provided 
the required analysis. The realisation that general economic environment 
greatly influences the demand for labour, the supply of labour, the ability 
of government to pay, and thus the wage levels, meant that it was essential 
to review the major developments in the Sudanese economy over the last 15 
years or so. It was revealed that the Sudan is currently facing a deep­
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ening economic crisis created by a multitude of internal and external 
forces. Thus, it has not been possible either to halt the rapid deterior­
ation in output or to control the sky-rocketing inflation. As a result, 
the absorptive capacity of the economy has been severely curtailed leading 
to mounting labour demand problems which, coupled with the structural 
supply-side problems, have created major imbalances in the labour market.
A severe shortage of experienced skilled manpower exists concurrently 
with apparent surpluses of university and secondary school graduates as 
well as surpluses of unskilled labour. Shortages are directly associated 
with the massive exodus of Sudanese skills to oil rich Arab countries 
while part of the surpluses could be attributed to the influx of refugees 
from neighbouring African countries. Chapter Two also showed that the 
labour markets are stratified into rural/urban and the formal/informal 
segments. The formal sector labour market is dominated by the public 
sector.
Chapter Three detailed the size, the growth and the leverage im­
plications of public sector employment. It was found that more than 
80 per cent of workers in the formal sector work for the government in 
either the civil service or in the parastatals. Past government policies 
such as 'guaranteed employment' led to substantial increases in the vol­
ume of employment, wage expenditure with considerable over-manning in 
government departments. A major problem is that the extent of this over­
manning cannot be determined with any precision owing to the lack of in­
formation regarding prevailing staff levels and the absence of yardsticks 
for measuring public sector labour requirements. Nonetheless, we have 
argued that such overstaffing must affect government's ability to main­
tain 'adequate' pay levels.
The analyses of public sector pay started in Chapter Four, which 
examined the historical development of pay structures and pay determination
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processes since the establishment under colonial rule of formal admini­
strative structures in the Sudan up to 1969. Our belief that the hist­
orical legacy is an influential factor in the pay determination process 
was confirmed. The use of an ad hoc commission as the chief method of 
pay determination was first introduced by the British half a century ago 
and is still perceived by policy-makers as indispensable. Adherence 
to principles such as the subsistence requirments for determining the 
minimum wage proposed by the Wakefield Commission in 1931 also persists, 
while the preservation of a top-down pay structure allows for wide pay 
and benefits differentials in favour of elitist senior civil servants.
Chapter Five was concerned with the analysis of current pay levels, 
elements of remuneration, salary trends and the major developments since 
the early 1970s. Partly reflecting the influence of historical legacy 
and partly because of technical shortcomings and the government's arbit­
rary decisions, the first attempt to introduce a job evaluation scheme 
in 1978 was disastrous. The scheme created far more anomalies than it 
rectified, and coupled with inflationary pressures led to a deteriorating 
industrial relations climate. With unions and professional associations 
increasingly resorting to industrial action in support of pay claims, 
whether for removal of anomalies or fresh rewards, government concessions 
to sectional demands have increased the propensity for 'coercive compara­
bility' among different groups generating never-ending waves of demands 
and/or strikes. These demands were prompted, of course, by the drastic 
fall in real basic pay scales and were partially met by improved allow­
ances which have become as important as basic salary, undermining the 
coherence of pay structures and creating further anomalies and distor­
tions. Through the exertion of industrial and political pressures unions 
succeeded in increasing effective pay, most of the time through special
allowances. Chapter Five, also, showed that internal labour market
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provisions influence the basic salary rate and the amount of allowances 
paid to the employee. They, nonetheless, reduce the scope for the work­
ing of market forces within the civil service labour market.
Chapter Six examined the pay in the parastatal sector. In principle 
there are formal grading classifications and pay scales at least for the 
public corporations and public authorities. In practice, however, these 
organisations have been quite successful modifying their pay scales and 
allowances extensively. These modifications have been possible partly 
because the system itself is weak and can be easily manipulated and par­
tly because pressures from some of these organisations are too strong to 
be resisted. Consequently wide-ranging variations and disparities exist 
among the gross pay of broadly comparable groups in different parts of 
the public sector which could hardly be taken to reflect differences in 
economic circumstances.
This issue of intra-sectoral pay differentials was further examined,
along with other kinds of differntials in Chapter Seven. Generally, a
compression in occupational differentials over time (at least with regard 
to basic salary) could be observed. But it was not possible to establish 
whether the compression applies to all components of total remuneration.
Moreover, little evidence was found to indicate that the pattern of
occupational differentials between different groups reflected changes 
in the underlying supply and demand conditions. Our contention was 
further confirmed by the apparently wide but not economically justifiable 
pay differentials among employees in various public sector organisations.
It was also found that a turning point in the relationship between the 
pay of public sector and private sector employees (particularly at the 
bottom of pay structures) coincided with the introduction of the minimum 
wage legislation in 1974. Evidently, by imposing a floor to private sec­
tor wage, which was effectively equated to the public sector minimum, the
- 306 -
legislation has pushed up the unskilled wage rate above the levels pre­
vailing in the public sector and/or required to clear the market* In 
all, analysis in Chapter Seven pointed to the conclusion that institutional 
factors play the chief role in determining the relative and absolute pay 
levels for public sector employees.
Chapter Eight highlighted some of the problems involved in the 
establishment of 'adequate' pay levels in the public sector. As this 
study indicated, the problems facing the pay determination process are 
numerous and inter-related. It was by no means possible to deal exhaust­
ively with all these problems and thus a few targets which were thought to 
require immediate policy concern were singled out. By far the most serious 
problems originate from persisting inflationary pressures. Real pay in 
1986 was as low as 13 per cent of the 1970 levels with notable negative 
impact on morale, motivation and performance. While a number of pay 
increases took place in recent years it appears that such advances were 
insufficient to halt deterioration in real pay. In the circumstances of 
uncontrollable national economic problems government's ability to curb 
inflation and/or to provide full compensation for the increasingly rising 
costs of living has been severely undermined. The cycle of sectional 
demands in recent years could, therefore, be seen primarily as attempts 
to improve real pay although they also reflected the weakness of the 
system and the absence of adequate policies. Apart from the general 
guidelines set by the pay review bodies there is little to indicate that 
the government is pursuing any coherent and self-enforcing set of policies 
for the remuneration of employees. The use of an ad hoc committee system 
itself is an indication of the crisis management - responses designed 
simply to diffuse current industrial pressures. The absence of clear-cut 
policies coupled with a weakened and demoralised adminsitrative machinery 
has significantly impaired the government control system. The apparent
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failure of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to impose its 
standard provisions on individual public sector organisations is just 
one example of the ineffectiveness of the formal control system. Prob­
lems of control have been exacerbated by the exclusive reliance on formal 
educational qualifications for the determination of relative pay scales. 
Employees typically ask for 'equal pay for the possession of similar 
qualification' regardless of the relative job content or effort input. 
Obviously, such a tendency to emphasise qualifications as the basis of 
comparison makes it difficult to reward performance and differentiate 
between employees' abilities and skills other than those believed to be 
provided by edcuational attainment. Thus, inherent in such a system is 
the displacement of economic and efficiency considerations.
9.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
The findings of this study appear to have provided sufficient 
material for working out a sketch of a theoretical framework approxima­
ting the practice of pay determination in the Sudanese public sector.
It can be a viable analytical construct for future study of similar 
experiences in other LDCs.
(i) There is a lower limit fixed by the cost of fulfilling 'sub­
sistence' requirements below which wages are not allowed to fall. This 
is effected, however, not through the long-term adjustments in labour 
supply as envisaged by orthodox theories (for example the Lewis' model) 
but through the actions of the government and trade unions. The govern­
ment may have political interest and the unions may have social interest 
in raising the level of minimum wage above what is needed to meet physio­
logical requirements. Whatever the case, once the living standard of 
workers measured in terms of 'needs - satisfaction' establishes the basis
- 308 -
for the determination of wages, it follows that the content of this 
wage has to be safeguarded against a fall in the purchasing power of 
money wages. Failing to do this means that the principle of needs-based 
wages is undermined. The payment of a cost of living allowance in the 
past subsequently replaced by a range of other allowances is thus theo­
retically justifiable. Nonetheless, real pay in the public sector fell 
well behind levels achieved a decade or two ago indicating the signifi­
cance of other factors in the pay determination process.
(ii) The upper limit to the rise of wages is determined by the 
government's 'ability to pay'. It is this ability which ultimately det­
ermines the government decision whether to provide full compensation for 
real pay erosion or not. Such a decision in turn depends on economic 
conditions, domestic rate of inflation and external pressures.
(iii) Assuming that both these limits are determinate, the actual 
salary rates will fall somewhere between these two limits and will be 
determined by a number of variables which include:
a) The influence of unions: the hypothesis of the union-wage 
relationship is traditionally sought to be verified by correl­
ating the degree of unionisation with relative pay levels over 
time and space. It is also established that unions exercise 
their influence at the negotiating table. Neither of these 
conditions are relevant in the public sector in the Sudan.
Yet as stated more than once in this study, individual unions 
and the labour movement in general play a significant role in 
determining relative and absolute levels of pay through the 
exertion of 'political' pressure.
b) Historical legacy: this is one of the factors which is, 
understandably, not included in existing theoretical approaches. 
Nonetheless, it could take various forms, adherence to the
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principles established by colonial governments some decades ago; 
the persistence of pay structures which as originally initiated 
were intended to benefit the foreign ruling-class, and continued 
largely because of the disproportionate influence of bureaucratic 
elite (conventionally senior civil servants or decision-makers); 
the adoption of the same pay determination machinery and the 
prevalence of attitudes which typically make any kind of change 
a difficult task.
c) Government Policy or Decision: as in many LDCs, the government 
in the Sudan has been obliged by circumstances to play the role
of 'pace-setter', 'model-employer',and 'employer of last resort'. 
In effect, policies such as 'guaranteed employment' have been 
pursued with a direct impact on the levels of public sector pay, 
and few parallels, to the best of my understanding, in the exist­
ing body of the relevant theory. Moreover, enough evidence has 
been brought about in this study to suggest that government's 
decision is by far the most influencial determinant of absolute 
and relative pay levels. Apposite to say that such decisions need 
not be economically justifiable.
d) Internal Labour Market Provisions: The basic assumptions of
the Internal Labour Market theory are evidently materialised in
the employment practices of the public sector in the Sudan. For
example, in the civil service, entry to the service is restricted 
to three 'ports', unskilled workers enter at grade 18, secondary 
school leavers at grade 14, and university graduates at grade 9. 
Other posts are filled through upgrading and promotion. However, 
one major difference is that wage rates are not established on the 
basis of a job evaluation scheme as postulated by the theory. In
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consequence, other assumptions advanced by the ILM theory cannot 
be verified, for example, that promotion is based solely on 'merit'.
e) Educational Qualification; the recruitment to the public sector 
and the channels of advancement are exclusively determined by 
educational attainment. To this extent the practice in the Sudan 
exhibits the features of 'credentialism' model which refers to a 
situation in which there are several levels of jobs with rigid 
wages and several levels of education, and in which preference for 
hiring in a particular job is always given to the applicant with 
higher educational qualification. Sudan's experience also verifies 
the 'rent-seeking' hypothesis and in the current circumstances of 
rigid pay scales and notable graduates unemployment, many of the 
public sector posts could be considered, in line with the assump­
tions of this theory, as 'rent-bearing' jobs. However, on the 
evidence of this study it is not possible to verify the hypotheses 
of the 'bumping' model which asserts that even though there is a 
rent seeking, there is no unemployment because as education expands 
better educated workers will 'bump' their less educated cohorts
off each level of the job ladder. In the process, the model assumes, 
the average wage rate will fall. There is little to indicate that 
unemployed educated Sudanese are accepting jobs at lower levels, 
a failure which may be related to social factors.
f) The Form of Organisation: this study revealed that the public 
sector is not a homogeneous body. The exact form of organisation, 
civil service unit, public corporation, or public company is very 
significant in terms of effective pay available to public sector 
employees. Given the relative importance of the parastatals as 
employers vis-a-vis the civil service, it is within the public
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sector that much of the comparison and subsequent dissatisfaction 
over pay differences occurs. Thus, there is a notable labour 
market segmentation within the public sector where workers with 
identical human capital characteristics are rewarded differently 
depending on the segment of the public sector (labour market) in 
which they happen to be located. This implies that segmentation 
within the public sector can be more significant than in the trad­
itional 'sectoral straight-jackets' .
This attempt at providing a schematic explanation of the determina­
tion of pay in the public sector in the Sudan, sheds some light on the 
relevance of existing theories of wage determination in developing econo­
mies. The analysis reveals that while most of the existing models indivi­
dually provide an explanation for one or more elements constituting this 
complex process, none is comprehensive enough to encompass all the variables 
identified in the foregoing postulated framework. It is acknowledged, of 
course, that a major problem with such a framework is that identification 
of relevant variables calls for their quantification and measurement, and 
it is apparent from this study that many of these variables are not easily 
quantifiable, certainly in terms of the economist's measuring techniques 
or analytical tools. It is suggested that future empirical investigation 
of public sector labour market operations in LDCs should be multidisciplin­
ary in approach if a fuller understanding of pay determination in such 
countries is to be reached.
9.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The clear messsage that arises from the findings of this study is 
that there is a pressing need for reform. But the big question is how?
To be successful any reform programme needs to encompass three basic
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elements: a) definition of problems and needs; b) development of 
strategies for reform; and c) development of instruments of action for 
implementation.
The problems currently facing the public sector are complex, 
enormous and interconnected. Immediate policy decisions need to be 
taken simultaneously in the three main areas of pay, staffing levels and 
productivity. There is a need to improve real pay levels, to reduce the 
volume of employment and more importantly to increase output and efficiency. 
But the improvement in pay and allowances is directly related to the pos­
sibility of saving in manpower and improvement of output. At the same 
time, it will be unrealistic to expect an improvement in performance and 
efficiency without a corresponding improvement in the current levels of 
real pay.
A comprehensive set of recommendations has been put forward by a 
recent ILO mission to the Sudan (for details see ILO 1987b and 1987c).
These recommendations establish the general policy retirements as well 
as the machinery for reform. They include:
a) Determination of appropriate staffing levels throughout the 
public sector on the basis of a comprehensive Organisation and 
Method (0 & M) analysis to determine functions, and the tasks 
to be done with the required level of effort and output for 
members of each grade.
b) Rationalisation of current staffing levels through shifting 
qualified labour from surplus to under-manned services, introduc­
tion of attractive incentives for voluntary retirment, inducement 
of some potentially redundant staff in the public sector to move
to the private sector, and provision of incentives for occupational 
and geographical mobility.
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c) The establishment of appropriate salary scales and allowances. 
Relative salary levels should be based on job evaluation techniques 
which take due account of the importance of job content, while 
more attention should also be paid to labour market conditions;
the importance attached to formal educational qualifications 
should be reduced.
d) The Civil Service Department should be strengthened; addditional 
specialists and expertise in job evaluation techniques, manpower 
planning, labour economics, statistics and accounting should be 
provided to enable the department to analyse and implement effect­
ively the pay policies and staffing issues in all parts of the 
public sector.
e) The establishment of a Staffing, Pay and Productivity Board 
(SPPB) with members from the Civil Service Department, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning, trade union federations, para- 
statal organisations, private industry and the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security. In addition to providing the analysis and 
detailed policy proposals to initiate and implement the reforms 
in the public sector, the Board should also discuss proposed 
changes in salary scales and allowances for all public sector 
employees.
Defining the problems, determining the deficiencies of the system 
and formulating overall strategies have never been difficult tasks.
Since the political independence in 1956 endless committees, international 
organisations’ missions and other investigative bodies have produced 
reports, explored various problems and numerous recommendations. Never­
theless, the dilemma of reform programmes in the public sector in the 
Sudan resides in the mediocrity of their results. Many obstacles arise
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at the implementation stage. The list may include resistence of 
employees to new ideas, lack of adequate support and commitment on the 
part of government, inadequate skills to execute the reform programme 
and insufficient data. These obstacles contribute to the wide gap bet­
ween proposed and executed change.
Over the last couple of years the idea of a social contract has 
emerged. It was first proposed by the National Economic Conference in 
February 1986 and since then it appears to be high on the government 
agenda. In its policy statement to the 1986 Constituent Assembly the 
newly elected government claimed that it would seek agreement with trade 
unions on a social contract to achieve social peace and mobilise the 
nation for the reconstruction of the economy. The same claim was repeated 
recently amongst the seven-points reform plan announced by the Prime 
Minister in an address to the Assembly on 24 March, 1988. Moreover, the 
1986 ILO mission was asked that its report should be written on the assum­
ption that a social contract would be established. Consequently, the 
mission's report (1987c) detailed the obligations and commitments of the 
government, trade unions, employers and management as well as the benefits 
and dangers of a social contract. The report identified five main areas 
in respect of which general policy agreement between government and trade 
unions ought to be obtained: i) efficiency in the public service; ii) im­
provement of real pay levels; iii) periodic review of salaries and allow­
ances; iv) effective price control systems; and v) adherence to agreed 
methods for peaceful resolutions to industrial disputes. In theory, it 
may not be difficult to achieve consensus on such policy matters, or even 
to convince the social partners to accept the sacrifices involved. But 
still the practical problems remain, and the way in which the social 
contract is currently presented by the government adds to the general 
scepticism. Recent statements by government officials give the impression
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that the social contract will provide solutions to all problems, not 
least the drastic fall in real pay which is by far the major concern of 
employees. Inevitably this will lead to the creation of excessive 
expectations, endanger the realisation of policy objectives and make 
the required changes more unattainable.
From what has been said above, one is compelled to ask whether 
anything can be done to improve the prospects of effecting change. If 
the response is to be affirmative, there are policy prerequisites whether 
or not there is a social contract.
Firstly, there must be clear evidence of genuine commitment of the 
government to reform. Immediate actions are needed to bridge the current 
gap of mistrust between the government and employees or trade unions.
For example, measures to control prices or to curb black market activities 
can enhance the opportunities for the success of reform ideas. On the 
other hand, measures such as raising senior civil servants' salaries by 
100 per cent without corresponding increases for other groups (as occurred 
in April 1988) obviously serve to make policies unacceptable to the major­
ity.
Secondly, a more realistic approach to reform may be achieved 
through employee involvement. The prevalent elitist rigid approach does 
not offer employees the opportunity to participate in, or influence 
change. So exclusivist have most policies and practices been that employ­
ees are never told the reasons for change or the rationale for decisions.
Thirdly, the personnel responsible for defining reform policy and 
implementing it are often ill-equipped in terms of required training.
Lack of understanding and expertise by those in command of reform processes 
weakens their potential impact. Extensive training programmes to famil­
iarise employees with the new order and conditions, and to develop neces­
sary skills are crucial for acceptance and implementation of reform.
- 316 -
Fourthly, reform must be comprehensive and rest on a system 
perspective rather than on a piecemeal approach.
Finally, diagnostic data ought to be collected and discussed openly 
to inform or allow those affected to become involved in the process of 
change. Such involvement through information and feedback mechanisms 
results in a) more constructive attitudes by employees, and b) improve­
ments in the quality of all aspects of reform because of the greater 
validity and completeness of information and analysis.
Thus, we believe that the public sector pay determination system 
in the Sudan needs to be subjected to some kind of almost 'revolutionary' 
upheaval that will shatter its status quo and reorientate it effectively 
towards the twin goals of equity and efficiency.
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A P P E N D I X  A
CASE STUDIES
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C A S E  S T U D Y  (1)
SUDAN RAILWAYS CORPORATION 
(SRC)
INTRODUCTION
Railways play a significant role in the Sudanese economy. In a 
country where other modes of transport are not highly developed like the 
Sudan, the railways remain the most dominant, mode of transport and it is 
almost monopolising the transporation system conveying over 90 per cent 
of exports and imports. In the field of passenger traffic, the Sudan 
Railways is also the biggest carrier with three million passengers moving 
annually by railways during the last decade.
EMPLOYMENT
Outside the civil service, Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC) is the 
largest employer in the country. In 1986, the total number of employees 
amounted to 34,043 (Table A.1.1). However, comparing this figure with 
the size of the workforce in 1983 shows a reduction of 2.9 per cent 
during the period. This reduction reflected the compound effect of two 
factors: a) high turnover; and b) low recruitment levels. As evident 
from Table A.1.2 a relatively large number of railways staff left the 
Corporation during the period 1980 - 1985, and as the management acknow­
ledges the drift continues. Those who left the service, for a variety 
of reasons, represented 16.7 per cent of the workforce in 1983. Although
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the exact number cannot be given, those who left the SRC voluntarily 
constitute the majority of leavers. Also, although the reasons for 
quitting are not recorded, it is the Personnel Manager's view that 
most leavers, particularly engineers and technicians, emigrated.
As part of its Structural Adjustment Programmes in the Sudan, the 
World Bank has recently stressed the need to rationalise the size of 
employment in Sudan Railways. The Bank's missions to the Sudan believe 
that the Corporation is overstaffed, and any particular course of reform 
should begin by cutting the number of employees drastically. In a recent 
report the Bank suggested that 50 per cent of the existing workforce 
would be sufficient to run an efficient and profitable business. In 
consequence, the Bank has consistently attempted to have SRC management 
committed to this policy objective and made it a condition for any main­
tenance loan, technical assistance or rehabilitation programme.
However, the SRC management holds a different view. A number of 
top management members interviewed by the researcher think that the Bank 
is grossly mistaken. In their opinion there is overstaffing but the 
problem arises from the fact that the SRC is currently running on only 
30 per cent of its capacity due to the lack of spare parts which have to 
be imported and for which hard currency is not made available. If an 
adequate supply of spare parts could be obtained and the working capa­
city raised to 60-70 per cent, there would be enought work sufficient 
to justify current manning levels. Nonetheless, the prevalence of over- 
staffing in certain departments of SRC has not been challenged by mana­
gement. For example, the Personnel Manager pointed to the apparent 
overstaffing in the carpentry section. In the past, coaches were manu­
factured locally in SRC workshops but since 1980 the Corporation has
imported ready-made coaches from Europe; no employees were made redundant 
bee ause it was thought that some of these employees could be transferred
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to areas of shortages, an expectation difficult to realise. Sections 
and places needing labour are usually in remote areas where living con­
ditions are comparatively hard; many preferred to leave SRC rather than 
move to rural areas. Employees asked about this preference to work in 
the city, said that urban work gave the chance to find another job to 
supplement their railway wages which have become insufficient to acquire 
basic necessities.
GRADING SYSTEM
According to the general classification of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning in respect of terms of service in the public sector, 
SRC is a public authority. In effect, it has the same grading structure 
as the civil service which comprises 19 grades. Grades 1 -14 are largely 
for the classified staff and grades 13 - 18 cover the unclassified workers. 
However, as Table A.1.3 shows, a significant proportion of unclassified 
category are in grades 10 - 13, reached through promotion and after ser­
vice of almost 20 - 25 years.
The recruitment grades in SRC correspond to those for the civil 
service and other public authorities. Grade 9 is for university gradu­
ates, grade 14 for secondary school leavers, and grade 18 for the unskilled 
workers. This leaves the remaining grades to be filled by promotion.
Except in very few cases where there is a pressing need to recruit some
highly qualified personnel, for example, as advisers, it is not custom­
'll
ary to recruit grades above specified entry levels.
The relatively small numbers of staff in the recruitment grades 
(9, 14 and 18), shown also in TableA.1.3, confirms our earlier observa­




Although SRC uses the grading structure that is formally provided 
for public authorities, it has adopted the salary scales for public 
corporations, (Table A.1.4, column 2). Column 3 in the same table pro­
vides a comparison between pay scales in SRC and the civil service. 
Differentials vary from 4.9 per cent to 22.2 per cent with regard to 
the basic salary minima. However, at the scales maxima these differ­
entials have been slightly reduced, ranging from 1.5 per cent (grade 14) 
to 15.3 per cent (grade 7).
Comparison of the salary scales in SRC with similar public authori­
ties' scales, reveals that while the SRC pays higher salaries in grades 
1 - 12, it offers relatively lower rates to those in grades 13 - 18 
(Table A.1.4, column 6). For example, anSRC employee in grade 6 receives 
a 13.9 per cent premium in comparison with an employee in the same grade 
in another public authority. On the other hand, another SRC employee in 
grade 18 may get a rate which is 3.1 per cent lower than the basic salary 
rate payable in another public authority. The adoption of public corp­
orations' pay scales may thus mean two different things to SRC employees: 
for some, and not unexpectedly the classified, it means higher salary, 
and for the majority the unclassified lower income.
ALLOWANCES
A number of allowances are payable to SRC employees. Basically, 
they entail standard and non-standard allowances. The standard allow­
ances are either payable to all SRC employees or all members of certain 
grades. The housing, nature of work and travel allowances are payable 
to everyone with the rates shown in Table A.1.5. Entertainment allow­
ance is received by the staff in grades 1 - 4  and the responsibility
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allowance by those in grades 1 - 3 .  Some allowances are payable to those 
possessing certain qualifications or meeting specific conditions, such 
as the engineer's special allowance, mileage allowance, out of station 
allowance, crew trip allowance, the urban allowance, and climate allow­
ance .
Allowances considerably raise the employees' gross salaries.
Table A.1.6 shows the index of gross salaries relative to basic salaries 
for all SRC grades. As evident, the standard allowances increase the 
basic salaries by amounts ranging from 58.8 per cent to 111.5 per cent.
The numbers and quantum of allowance become more significant the higher 
the grade. In effect the ratio of gross salary to basic salary is rela­
tively higher in the top four grades.
Basic salaries are further raised by non-standard allowances. Table 
A.1.7 provides examples of the gross salaries of employees in grades 4,
9, 10A, 14 and 18, drawn from the monthly pay-sheets record as for July 
1986. The gross salary of a train crew, for example, indicates that the 
non-standard allowances (out-of-station, trip-money, and the urban allow­
ances) represented the equivalent of almost 65 per cent of his basic sal­
ary for the month; far more significant than what he received in standard 
allowances which amounted to about 49 per cent. These pay data in Table 
A.1.7 demonstrate clearly any analysis of relative pay in the public sec­
tor which excludes allowances would be seriously misleading.
These examples also show that overtime is an important pay component 
in the earnings of some SRC employees, particularly the unclassified staff. 
For instance, the labourer in grade 18 received more than 150 per cent 
of his basic wage for overtime work in the previous month. While there 
may be special working requirements which make high overtime working un­
avoidable in SRC, the Personnel Manager claimed that the widely open 
opportunities for overtime work have serious implications for work prac­
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tices and labour costs: many workers deliberately delayed work from Ao<»v\ct\- 
hours to justify the more generously paid overtime hours.
LABOUR COST
Table A.1.8 shows the budgeted expenditure for the financial year 
1986/87 which amounted to about £s90 million. This table was compiled 
from the SRC Annual Financial Report, 1983/86. However, information 
obtained from the Personnel Manager of SRC indicated that labour costs 
could be in the order of £s120 - 140 million for 1986/87. Moreover, a 
simple mathematical multiplication of the numbers of staff in each grade 
with their minimum basic salary would put the cost of basic salaries 
alone well above £s90. Such divergence in the actual cost and reported 
cost clearly reflects the ineffectiveness of the public finance control 
system.
Nonetheless, even these rather unrealsistic estimates suggest that 
total personnel cost accounts for some 78 per cent of total annual estim­
ated operating costs of £s115 millions and to some 70 per cent of the 
gross budgeted revenue of £s128 million for 1986/87 (figures quoted from 
SRC, Annual Financial Report, 1983/86). In the light of these labour 
cost figures, the case for reduction in SRC payroll costs is easy to 
make. Any policy to control the payroll costs must consider the numbers 
employed as well as the elements of costs. It is evident from Table A.1.8 
that overtime payments amount to the equivalent of 15 per cent of the 
provisions for basic salary, a cost which appears inconsistent with the 
assertions SRC is over-manned. However, this largely reflects the dev­
elopment of mal-practices regarding overtime work and the lack of mana­
gement control over such practices.
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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
There are two unions in SRC: the Sudan Railways' Workers Union 
(SRWU) representing the unclassified; and the Sudan Railways' Officials 
Union (SROU) for the classified staff, with virtually 100 per cent mem­
bership for both unions.
SRWU is not only the largest union but it is also the first union 
to be established in the Sudan. In July 1947 the railway workers gained 
recognition of their union after a 12-day strike, and three years later 
were able to form the Sudan Workers' Trade Unions Federation along with 
other unions which were established following SRWU formation. Since 
then the role and influence of SRWU in the industrial relations as well 
as the political scene has been of major significance.
For SRC, as for other public authorities, terms of service are 
determined by the Civil Service Department. In effect, the unions' 
role as pay negotiating partner is non-existent. Nevertheless, my dis­
cussions about pay determination with union officials in SRC revealed 
that unions still influence the package of total pay by other means such 
as:
a) their influence through SWTUF on pay review bodies;
b) asking for special allowances;
c) altering standard allowances, for example, the housing allow­
ance is substantially higher in SRC than in other public authori­
ties or the civil service;
d) regrading and better promotion prospects. In April 1986,
the SRC management conceded to unions' demands for the upgrading 
of 83 posts. This resulted, for example, in the regrading of one 
post from grade 4 to 3, 10 from grade 6 to 5, and 23 posts from 
grade 10 to 8 .
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Finally, unions play an active role in providing services to 
railway workers. The SRC Social Services Department is jointly run 
by representatives of management and union, providing educational facil­
ities, medical care, retail co-operatives and emergency loans.
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Table A .1.1 
SRC
Employees by Departments in 1983 and 1986
Classified Unclassified Total
L / L p c lx, L l l lb l  1 L
1983 1986 1983 1986 1983 1986
Mechanical Engineering 2194 2163 9203 9188 11397 11351
Civil and Electrical Eng 1000 1082 10071 10000 11071 11082
Traffic 2273 2120 4843 4549 7116 6669
Stores 340 323 659 701 999 1024
Personnel & Accounting 970 833 102 76 1072 931
Police and Firemen 62 53 2587 2287 2649 2340
G M Office 330 257 423 389 753 646
TOTAL 7169 6853 27888 27190 35057 34043




Turnover among Employees during 1980-1983
Department Classified Unclass. Total
Mechanical Engineering 498 1645 2143
Civil Engineering 243 1638 1881
Traffic 435 859 1294
Stores 11 203 214
Personnel & Accounting 177 21 198
Police & Firemen 8 146 154
TOTAL 1372 4512 5884




Employees according to the Grade Structure 1986
Grade Classified Unclassified Total
1 1 - 1
2 - - -
3 13 - 13
4 31 - 31
5 131 - 131
6 201 - 201
7 233 - 235
8 309 - 309
9 29 - 29
10 962 19 981
10A 1232 57 1289
11 1108 712 1820
12 875 2077 2952







16 - 5361 5361
17 - 4247 4247
18 - 3664 3664
TOTAL 6800 24903 31703*
* Police and firemen are not included as they 
have separate grades and pay scales.





Pay Scales relative to Civil Service & Public Authority Scales 
(£s annually)
Grade SRC BS CS BS PA 85 Index SRC/CS IndexSRC/PA
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6)
1 8900 - 8400 - 8800 - 106.0 - 101.1 -
2 8100 - 7600 - 8000 106.6 - 101.3 -
3 6864 - 7464 6204 - 6804 6504 - 7104 110.6 - 109.7 105.5 - 104.5
4 6540 - 7140 5682 - 6282 5982 - 6582 115.1 - 113.7 109.3 - 108.5
5 5808 - 6288 4980 - 5460 5220 - 5700 116.6 - 115.2 111.2 - 110.3
6 5208 - 5688 4332 - 4932 4573 - 5172 120.2 - 115.3 113.9 - 110.0
7 3972 - 4692 3708 - 4428 3948 - 4668 107.1 - 106.0 100.6 - 100.5
8 3288 - 3936 2838 - 3594 3054 - 3810 115.6 - 109.5 107.6 - 103.3
9 2130 - 3922 1824 - 3616 1968 - 2760 116.8 - 111.7 108.2 - 105.9
10 2916 - 3420 2664 - 3252 2835 - 3420 109.5 - 105.2 102.7 - 100.0
10A 2753 - 3279 2418 - 2943 2568 - 3093 113.9 - 111.4 107.2 - 106.0
11 2310 - 2835 2052 - 2577 2202 - 2727 112.6 - 110.0 104.9 - 104.0
12 2031 - 2556 1740 - 2265 1890 - 2415 116.7 - 113.3 107.5 - 105.8
13 1404 - 1845 1338 - 1779 1464 - 1905 104.9 - 103.7 95.5 - 96.9
14 1278 - 1656 1200 - 1632 1308 - 1740 106.5 - 101.5 97.7 - 95.2
15 1008 - 1365 924 - 1281 1026 - 1383 109.0 - 106.6 98.2 - 98.7
16 858 - 1110 801 - 1053 873 - 1125 107.1 - 105.4 98.3 - 98.7
17 786 - 996 750 - 960 810 - 1020 104.8 - 103.8 97.0 - 97.6
18 756 _ 936 720 _ 900 780 _ 960 105.0 — 104.0 96.9 _ 97.5




Standard Allowances by Grades (£s annually) 1986
Grade HA NW TA ENT REP Total
1 3300 1800 1920 890 2400 10310
2 2760 1800 1740 810 1800 8910
3 2340 1800 1620 686 1200 7646
4 1980 1680 1500 654 900 6714
3 1440 1560 1080 480 4560
6 1200 1440 960 3600
7 900 1320 840 3060
8 720 1080 720 2520
9 720 900 720 2340
10 720 600 600 1920
10A 720 420 480 1620
11 600 360 480 1440
12 600 300 420 1320
13 480 240 420 1320
14 360 240 420 1020
13 360 180 420 960
16 300 120 360 780
17 240 120 240 600
18 240 120 240 600
HA = Housing Allowance
NW = Nature of Work
TA = Travel Allowance
ENT = Entertainment (10?o of the BS)






















1 1 8900 - 10310 19210 - 215.8 -
2 - 8100 - 8910 17010 - 210.0 -
3 13 6864 - 7464 7646 14510 - 15110 211.4 - 202.4
4 31 6540 - 7140 6714 13254 - 13854 202.7 - 194.0
5 131 5808 - 6288 4560 10368 - 10848 178.5 - 172.5
6 201 5208 - 5688 3600 8808 - 9288 169.1 - 178.3
7 235 3972 - 4692 3060 7032 - 7752 177.0 - 165.2
8 309 3288 - 3936 2520 5808 - 6456 176.6 - 164.0
9 29 2130 - 2922 2340 4470 - 5262 209.9 - 180.0
10 981 2916 - 3420 1920 4836 - 5340 165.8 - 156.1
10A 1289 2754 - 3279 1620 4374 - 4899 158.8 - 149.4
11 1820 2310 - 2835 1440 3750 - 4275 162.3 - 150.8
12 2952 2031 - 2556 1320 3351 - 3876 165.0 - 151.6
13 4194 1404 - 1845 1320 2724 - 3165 194.0 - 171.5
14 571 1278 - 1656 1020 2298 - 2676 179.8 - 161.6
15 5674 1008 - 1365 960 1965 - 2325 194.9 - 170.3
16 5361 858 - 1110 780 1638 - 1890 190.9 - 170.3
17 4247 786 - 996 600 1386 - 1596 176.3 - 160.2
18 3664 756 - 936 600 1356 - 1536 179.4 - 164.1
Source: Data provided by Personnel Department. Details of allowances 
in table 1.5.
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Table A .1.7 
SRC
Effect of Allowances on Monthly Basic Salaries 
Examples from the Pay Sheets, July 1986
Example 1. Grade 4 (Engineer) Example 2. Grade 4 (Administrator
£s
COCO £s ?oBS
Basic Salary 583 100.0 Basic Salary 595 100.0
Standard Alices 623 106.9 Standard Alices 565 95.0
HA 163 28.3 HA 165 27.7
NW 200 34.4 NW 140 23.5
TA 125 21.4 TA 125 21.0
ENT 58 10.0 ENT 60 10.0
REP 75 12.9 REP 75 12.6
Non-standard Alices 370 63.5 Non-standard Alices 220 37.0
Urban 75 12.9 Urban 75 12.6
Mileage 145 24.9 Mileage 145 24.4
Qualif. 30 5.1
Profess.120 20.6
Gross Salary 1567 270.3 Gross Salary 1380 231.9
Example 3. Grade 9 (Engineer) Example 4. Grade 10A (Train Crew)
£s ?oBS £s ?oBS
Basic Salary 195.5 100.0 Basic Salary 278 100.0
Standard Alices 280 143.2 Standard Alices 135 48.7
HA 60 30.8 HA 60 21.6
NW 160 81.2 NW 35 12.9
TA 60 30.8 TA 40 14.4
Non-standard Alices 63.9 Non-standard Alices 180 64.8
Urban 35 17.9 Urban 30 10.8
Profess. 65 33.2 Out of St 55 19.8
Meal 25 125 12.8 Trip 95 39.2
0T 120 43.2
Gross Salary 600.5 307.2 Gross Salary 713 256.5
Example 5. Grade 14 (Clerical) Example 6 . Grade 18 (Labourer)
£s
COCDas £s ?oBS
Basic Salary 120 100.0 Basic Salary 78 100.0
Standard Alices 85 70.8 Standard Alices 50 64.1
HA 30 HA 20 25.6
NW 20 NW 10 12.8
TA 35 TA 20 25.6
Non-standard Alices Non-standard Alices 35 44.9
Urban 20 16.7 Urban 15 19.2
Out of St 20 25.6
0T 129 165.4
Gross Salary 225 187.5 Gross Salary 292 374.4











Basic Salary 18203 35318 53521
Personal Allowances 10924 12436 23360
Over-time 2130 5867 7997
Others* 1827 3712 5539
TOTAL 33084 57333 90417
Source: Accounting Department SRC 
* such as pensions
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C A S E  S T U D Y  (2)
NATIONAL ELECTRICITY CORPORATION 
(NEC)
EMPLOYMENT
In 1986, the total number of employees in NEC was 12,313 of which 
25.5 per cent were classified. Figures in Table A.2.1 show a substan­
tial increase in the volume of employment by nearly a third between 
1983/84 and 1986/87. The increase was more striking in the classified 
category, and amounted to nearly 67 per cent. Asked about an explanation 
for such a large increase, an official in NEC Personnel Department asserted 
that because of new work arrangements, a relatively large number of engin­
eers and technicians were recruited. The number of engineers and other 
technical staff had doubled from 450 to 904 during the period.
LABOUR COST
Budget provisions for the financial year 1986/87 indicate that the 
cost of basic salaries was approximately £s21 million, (Table A.2.1). 
However, in view of the substantial increase in the basic salary rates 
which took place in 1985/86, it is unlikely that the average basic sal­
ary per employee had fallen as Table A.2.1 suggests; the actual cost of 
basic salaries must therefore have exceeded the estimated figures.
The comparison between the number of staff in each category (classi-
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fied and unclassified) with the budget provisions, reveals that although 
the classified staff represent only 25 per cent of the total workforce, 
they absorb more than 45 per cent of the salary budget.
Table A.2.2 details the budget provisions for total labour costs 
in NEC. As is evident from these figures provisions for allowances alone 
exceed those for basic salaries by nearly 35 per cent. When overtime 
and pension costs are added, the budget provisions for gross salaries 
are more than twice those for basic salaries.
PAY SCALES
The NEC uses the 19 grades of the civil service and public authori­
ties pay structure. Nevertheless, it does not follow the PA salary scales 
but has adapted the salary scales of public corporations by adding a 
premium to each scale except for grades 1 and 9 (the latter being equiva­
lent to grade 12 in the PC grading classification system). Consequently, 
NEC's are higher than PC's scales. Table A.2.3 reveals the effects of 
the special premia which increase NEC salary scales by amounts ranging 
from just under one per cent to almost 37 per cent, widening further the 
gap between NEC and civil service scales. Although formal provisions 
allow for differentials of 2 to 17 per cent between public corporations 
and the civil service scales, for NEC these differentials are of the 
order of 6 - 49 per cent.
ALLOWANCES
As Table A.2.2 showed there is a multiplicity of allowances pay­
able to NEC employees. Some of these are standard supplements payable 
to all grades and all members of a grade (housing, travel, nature of 
work), others received by all members of certain grades (representation).
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On the other hand, a number of allowances are paid to certain occupational 
groups (on-call or special allowances for engineers, for example) or some 
individuals who are possessing special qualifications or fulfilling cer­
tain duties or conditions (mileage allowance for using private cars for 
official duties, meter reader's allowance, construction site allowance, 
post-graduate qualification allowance, efficiency allowances for typing, 
computer and shorthand skills, field-work allowance, etc).
The standard allowances (housing, nature of work, transport and 
representation) considerably increase gross salaries: that for the maj­
ority of the grades these allowances almost double the basic salary, and 
in the case of grade 9 staff they amount to 250 per cent of basic salary 
(table A.2.4).
From Table A.2.5 it can be seen that salaries are increased again 
by the non-standard allowances which represent 82.4 per cent, 50 per 
cent and 95.2 per cent of basic salary for individuals in grades 4, 8 , 
and 9 respectively. The combination of standard and non-standard allow­
ances has practically trebled the basic salary of these three NEC employ­
ees. For grade 14, the lowest classified grade in the structure, the 
amount of non-standard allowances is relatively small reflecting the 
concentration of allowance payments in the top grades; a concentration 
re-inforced by the exclusion of unclassified workers from receipt of non­
standard allowances (Table A.2.5).
OVERTIME
Overtime is paid to some white collar employees and to all manual 
workers in NEC. But it seems that none of the classified staff quoted 
as examples in Table A.2.5 had done any overtime work during that part­
icular month.
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The examples of the four labourers' gross salary shown in the lower 
half of Table A.2.3 suggest that overtime may nearly double the basic 
salary for grade 15 employees and for the other three it is substantially 
greater than the basic salary. The budgeted provisions for overtime in 
1986/87 amounted to the equivalent of 50 per cent of basic salary bill.
The special circumstances related to NEC operations may partially justify 
such an excessive overtime work. Immediate maintenance and repair is 
usually required for frequent power cuts outside the normal working hours. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a yardstick by which labour requirements 
could be determined, it is difficult to discover the extent to which such 
overtime work arises from a genuine need.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
There are five trade unions in NEC which affiliate to their res­
pective national unions. Four of these (Electricity Engineer Unions 
for university graduates, Electricity Engineers Union for non-university 
graduates, Union of Adminstrators for university graduates and Union of 
Electricity Officials) organise classified staff and the fifth (Electri­
city Workers' Union) covers unclassified workers.
It was understood that in disputes which involve all NEC staff 
joint action may be taken by all unions. But individual unions may be 
involved in separate disputes affecting their own members only.
During 1983/84 - 1985/86, for example, five disputes arose, three 
concerned with pay claims, one with dismissal procedures following the 
sacking of 25 engineers and one, in March-April 1985, with national 
political issues. There is no formal collective bargaining machinery in
NEC. When a dispute arises, however, management will talk to union rep­
resentatives and if problems are not solved they must be referred to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning whose agreements relating to pay 




Number of Employees and Cost of Basic Salaries (in £s) 
1983/84 - 1986/87
1983 - 1984 1984 - 1985 1986 - 1987*
No.of classified staff 1 ,884 2,486 3,143
No.of unclassified staff 7,424 8,004 9,172
Total 9,310 10,490 12,315
BS classified NA NA 9,554,303
BS unclassified NA NA 11,582,374
Total 3,782,455 19,728,069 21,136,677
Av. BS per classified employee NA NA 3,039
Av. BS per unclassified employee NA NA 1,263
Av.BS per employee 1,695 1,881 1,716









Basic Salary 21 ,136,677 100
Allowances
Housing 3,265,060 24.9




Engineer's Special 1,612,800 7.6
On Call 749,258 3.5
Fuel (meter readers) 473,472 2.2
Qualification 21,960 0.1




Typing Proficiency 8,182 0.04
Computer Operator Proficiency 10,260 0.05
Shorthand Proficiency 550 -
Commercial 13,709 0.07
Cashier's Responsibility 3,000 -
Health (sanitation) 19,440 0.1
Hardship (rural areas) 78,840 0.4
Bicycle 500 -
Duty per diem/food 10,000 0.05
All Allowances 17,431,899 82.5
Shift Work 405,923 1.9
Overtime 10,657,662 50.4
Total Allowances + premia 28,495,484 134.8
Gross Salaries 49,632,161 234.8
Pensions 2,014,910
Total Labour Cost 51,647,071 244.3





















NEC ?^ PC 
Min Max
(7)
1 8900 8400 105.9 1 8900 100.0
2 8151 7600 107.3 2 8100 100.6
3 7116-7716 6204-6804 114.7-113.4 3 6864-7464 103.7-103.4
4 6792-7392 5682-6282 119.5-117.7 4 6540-7140 103.9-103.5
3 6510-6990 4980-5460 130.7-128.0 7 5208-5688 125.0-123.0
6 6108-6588 4332-4937 141.0-133.4 8 4452-5172 137.2-127.4
7 4902-5592 3708-4428 132.2-126.3 9 3972-4692 123.4-119.2
8 4230-4878 2838-3594 149.0-135.7 11 3288-3936 128.8-123.9
9 2130-2922 1824-2616 116.8-111.7 12 2130-2922 100.0-100.0
10 3081-3585 2664-3252 115.7-110.2 13 2916-3420 105.7-104.8
10A 2754-3423 2418-2943 113.9-116.3 14 2754-3279 100.0-104.4
11 2310-2940 2052-2577 112.6-114.1 15 2310-2836 100.0-103.7
12 2046-2640 1740-2265 117.6-116.6 16B 2031-2556 100.7-103.3
13 1470-1995 1338-1779 109.9-112.1 17B 1404-1845 104.7-108.3
14 1347-1779 1200-1632 112.3-109.0 17B 1278-1656 105.4-107.4
15 1044-1476 924-1281 113.0-115.2 18(4) 1008-1365 103.6-108.1
16 915-1212 801-1053 114.2-115.1 18(3) 858-1110 106.6-109.2
17 828-1098 750- 966 110.4-113.7 18(2) 786- 996 105.3-110.2
18 795-1005 720- 900 110.4-111.7 18(1) 750- 936 105.2-107.4
Source: NEC, Personnel Department and details of equivalent CS & PC grades 
and scales provided by the Civil Service Department.






Annual Basic Salary, Allowances and Gross Salary 1986








1 8900 6420 15320 172.1
2 8151 5820 13971 171.4
3 7116-7716 5820 12936-13536 181.8-175.4
4 6792-7392 5340 12132-12732 178.6-172.2
5 6510-6990 „ 4800 11310-11790 173.7-168.7
6 6108-6588 4140 10248-10728 167.8-162.8
7 4902-5592 4020 8922- 9612 182.0-171.9
8 4230-4876 3840 8070- 8718 190.8-178.8
9 2130-2922 3180 5310- 6102 249.3-208.8
10 3081-3585 1860 4941- 5445 160.4-151.9
10A 2754-3423 1560 4314- 4983 156.6-145.6
11 2310-2940 1380 3690- 4320 159.7-146.9
12 2046-2640 1200 3246- 3840 158.7-145.5
13 1470-1995 1080 2550- 3075 173.5-154.1
14 1347-1779 960 2307- 2739 171.3-154.0
15 1044-1476 900 1944- 2376 186.2-161.0
16 915-1212 780 1695- 1992 185.2-164.4
17 828-1098 780 1608- 1878 194.2-171.0
18 795-1005 780 1575- 1785 198.1-177.6






2) For Grade 1 to Grade 9, the Engineering Allowance has been 
included instead of the Nature of Work Allowance, as the 
majority of the staff in these Grades are engineers. The 
allowances amount to £s2400 per year in Grade 1-Grade 8 , 




Examples of Individual Monthly Gross Salaries, July 1986
Classified:
Grade 4
T T F M
Grade 8 Grade 9 Grade 14
X  I L l l
£s ?oBS £s ?oBS £s ?oBS £s %BS
BS 591 100.0 370 100.0 208 100.0 125 100.0
HA 150 25.4 150 40.5 70 33.7 25 20.0
NW 200 33.8 200 54.0 75 36.1 20 16.0
TA - - 35 9.5 35 16.8 35 28.0
REP 75 12.7 - - - - - -
Others 487 82.4 185 50.0 198 95.2 10 8.0
GS 1503 254.3 940 254.1 586 281.7 215 172.0
Labourers:
Grade 15 Grade 16 Grade 17 Grade 18
ITEM
£s %BS £s %BS £s ?oBS £s ?oBS
BS 123 100.0 95.5 100.0 86.5 100.0 66.3 100.0
HA 25 20.3 20.0 20.9 20.0 23.1 20.0 30.2
NW 15 12.2 10.0 10.5 10.0 11.6 10.0 15.1
TA 35 28.5 35.0 36.6 35.0 40.5 35.0 52.8
0T 234 190.2 121.0 126.7 99.0 114.5 91.0 137.3
GS 432 351.2 281.5 294.8 250.5 289.6 222.3 335.3
Source: Data provided by Wage Department, NEC.
* Others include:
-Grade 4: mileage, qualification and on call allowances. 
-Grade 8 : construction allowance.
-Grade 9: on call allowance.
-Grade 14: secretarial allowance.
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C A S E  S T U D Y  (3)
GENERAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
(GPC)
INTRODUCTION
The GPC was established under the GPC Act, 1980 as an independent 
corporation with two main objectives:
a) exploring, producing, refining and distributing 
petroleum; and
b) importing crude oil, and exporting the surplus.
Section 14(1) of the Act gives the GPC management power to deter­
mine the terms and conditions of service of all employees.
EMPLOYMENT IN GPC
GPC currently employs 1,100 people including those engaged on the 
pipeline carrying refined oil from Port-Sudan to Khartoum. The pipeline 
is the largest department employing half of the workforce in GPC. How­
ever, information made available to the researcher does not include this 
department, so that the following analysis relates only to 572 persons 
located in the Khartoum head office and at branches in Port-Sudan, Kosti, 
El-Obeid, Geddaref and Atbra, to cover all GPC employees with the excep­
tion of pipeline workers.
Table A.3.1 shows that 66.8 per cent of GPC employees are classi-
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fied. This may appear to suggest that the classified component of the 
Corporation's employment structure is unusually high but the inclusion 
of pipeline workers would probably have changed the picture as the dep­
artment is expected to exhibit a greater concentration of manual jobs.
The sex division of the workforce in Table A.3.2 reveals that 12 
per cent are female, all doing classified work. This may suggest that 
the employed women in the public sector are largely educated. More than 
48 per cent of GPC female employees are clerical staff, a share which 
reflects national occupational proportions for females. However, the 
38 per cent of university graduates among GPC female employees is obviously 
a large share relative to the national trend but this could be attributed 
to the high concentration of graduates in GPC workforce. Among all class­
ified staff, university graduates (the majority in grade 12 and above in 
Table A.3.1) represent nearly 70 per cent.
THE GRADING SYSTEM
The GPC uses the same grading classification system as other public 
corporations, with 23 grades (1-15, 16A and 16B, 17A and 17B, and 18(4)- 
18(1)). Grade 12 is the entry level for university graduates, grade 17A 
for secondary school leavers and grade 18(1) for unskilled workers. Sec­
ondary school leavers are recruited directly by GPC, while university 
graduates have to be recruited through the Civil Service Recruitment 
Committee.
Employees recruited in grade 12 may expect promotion after two 
years and those who are recruited in grade 17A after three years. Dis­
cussions with GPC Personnel Department staff revealed that the issue of 
promotions is always problematic. One reason for that stems from the 
fact there are no sufficient vacancies in upper grades to which staff
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who satisfy the length of service condition could be promoted. It 
was understood that the turnover rate is relatively low because GPC is 
amongst the few well paying parastatals in the Sudan, and as its work­
force is fairly young the number of retiring personnel is quite small, 
if not non-existent. Currently (1986) more than 35 per cent of employees 
in grade 11, 55 per cent in grade 16B are eligible for promotion having 
spent an average 4-5 years in these grades. To deal with this promotion 
blockage the GPC has resorted to a policy of paying the staff the salary 
and allowances of the higher grade, a practice with serious implications 
both on performance standards and salary policy. Moreover, there is 
considerable evidence of mal-practices and nepotism with employees com­
plaining that their relationship with the top management is the most 
crucial factor in the promotion stakes. They argue that there is urgent 
need for proper job description and analysis to show basic job require­
ments and promotion paths. Employees also should know about vacancies, 
selection methods and what preparation is necessary to fit them for 
higher-rated jobs.
THE PAY IN GPC
Before the 1985/86 salary adjustments in the public sector, the 
GPC used to have unilaterally determined pay scales subject only to 
approval by the Minister for Energy. These salary scales, as Table A.3.3, 
column 6 > shows were relatively higher than those in public corpQibtions 
under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 
The average differential in most grades in favour of GPC staff was approx­
imately 10 per cent, though with considerable dispersion: at the bottom 
end of grade 13, for example, the GPC employee was receiving a 56.6 per 
cent uplift in terms of basic salary alone.
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In 1983 an attempt was made to bring the GPC under the direct 
control of the Ministry of Finance. The particular section in the GPC 
1980 Act was repealed and a provision was made for the extension of the 
PC general schedule to GPC employees. GPC staff immediately claimed that 
this change affected them adversely. It appears that the claim was basic­
ally based on the fact that in 1985/86 adjustments the pay increase for 
GPC employees was relatively less than in other public corporations. In 
order to align GPC pay scales with that of other corporations, this was 
a necessary measure. Thus, while grade 1 basic salary had been increased 
by 50 per cent in the public corporations between 1983 and 1986, the cor­
responding increase for GPC employees was 22 per cent. But, as Table 
A.3.3 shows, all grades got pay increases and no individual's basic sal­
ary was reduced by the adjustments. The unacceptability of this loss of 
the privileged position among public sector employees prompted a two-week 
strike in September 1985 and led the government to re-adjust scales by 
paying a premium on every step of each grade's scale, together with the 
insertion of an additional step plus premium to grades 12, 13, 17A and 
18(4), and two extra steps and premium to grade 18(2). These premia 
raised basic salary scales by amounts ranging from 3 per cent to 30 per 
cent as may be seen from Table A.3.3, column 9.
ALLOWANCES, OVERTIME AND BENEFITS
Earnings in the GPC as in other PCs substantially increased by the 
payment of a number of allowances. Table A.3.4 shows the annual amounts 
of the standard allowances: housing, travel, mileage, family, represent­
ation and petroleum allowances. Moreover, a number of non-standard 
allowances are payable to GPC employees. Engineers receive a special 
allowance ranging from £s150 to 200 a month; they are further entitled
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to a technical allowance received also by geologists and technicians 
and ranges from £s30 to 75 a month. Other allowances include tanker, 
shift work, acting, gualification, typing, telex operating, secretarial, 
public relations, health and Juba allowances which are paid to certain 
groups or individuals working in certain conditions or fulfulling special 
requirments. These allowances range from £s7 to £s40 per month.
The petroleum allowance is paid in lieu of the nature of work allow­
ance and originally amounted to 25 per cent of basic salary. It was 
later re-adjusted to be calculated on the basis of gross salary; a measure 
which has effectively doubled the amount of the payable allowance and 
increased the gross salary by at least 10 per cent.
As Table A.3.4, column 9 shows the addition of standard allowances 
alone inceases the basic salary by amounts ranging from 86 per cent to 
207 per cent. However, it must be noted that not every individual receives 
all the allowances included in the standard allowance package in Table 
A.3.4. For example, the GPC has a relatively young workforce and not 
all may qualify for family allowance. On the other hand, some non­
standard allowances which may be received by relatively large numbers of 
GPC employees are not included. The engineering allowance in an organi­
sation where the number of engineers is considerable, is one example.
Table A.3.5 shows the total value of allowances and broadly indicates 
that non-standard allowances further enhance the gross salary of GPC 
employees. For example, an engineer in grade 4 has his basic salary 
increased by almost a third because of the engineering allowance alone 
and by 50 percentage points as a result of the payment of other non­
standard (qualification and technical) allowances.
Overtime in GPC is paid to grades 16B and 17B - 18(1), and other 
grades receive a daily food allowance (£s2) for two hours' overtime work. 
The lower half of Table A.3.5 shows the importance of overtime payments
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to manual workers. Grades 18(2) and 18(1), for example, received in 
overtime more than their basic salary for the month; others received more 
than 80 per cent. The five examples' gross pay, thus, was raised to 
levels of three to four times basic salary.
Apart from its generous treatment of employees in terms of pay 
and allowances, the GPC provides its staff with other valuable benefits, 
eg, free medical provision and low cost loans, etc. Family medical care 
may cost an employee, particularly at the lower end of the pay structure, 
almost half of his monthly earnings, while the availability of housing 
loans in a country where there are no mortgage facilities, is of consid­
erable benefit.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Three trade unions (GPC Engineers' Union, GPC Officials' Union, 
and GPC Workers' Union) organise GPC staff. There are no formal provi­
sions for collective bargaining. Nevertheless, it was understood that 
unions' pressure in the recent past had been effective in bringing about 
notable improvements in pay and allowances. The special premium paid 
currently was indicated to be an outcome of a one-week strike in October 
1985. GPC's unions' strength stems largely from the political power they 




Number of Employees by Grade and Sex Division, 1986
Classified Unclassified Total
Grade
M F T M F T M F T
1 3 - 3 - - - 3 - 3
2 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 1
3
/,
7 - 7 - - - 7 - 7
5 14 _ 14 _ _ _ 14 _ 14
6 13 - 13 - - - 13 - 13
7 24 - 24 - - - 24 - 24
8 27 2 29 - - - 27 2 29
9
1 n
40 2 42 - - - 40 2 42
I U
II 71 26 97 _ _ _ 71 26 97
12 33 - 33 - - - 33 - 33
13 - - - 1 - 1 1 - 1
14 19 9 28 3 - 3 22 9 31
13 9 2 11 9 - 9 18 2 20
16B 22 16 38 12 - 12 34 16 50
16A - - - 21 - 21 21 - 21
17B - - - - - - - - -
17A 20 22 42 - - - 20 22 42
18(4) - - - 25 - 25 25 - 25
18(3) - - - 59 - 59 59 - 59
18(2) - - - 25 - 25 25 - 25
18(1) - - - 35 - 35 35 — 35
Total 303 79 382 190 0 190 493 79 572
Source: Personnel Department, GPC.







Employees by Occupational and Sex Divisions, 1986
Occupation Male Female Total
Classified:
Engineers 69 7 76
Technician 27 - 27
Geologists 22 - 22
Scientists 21 4 25
Economists 27 9 36
Accountants 30 7 37
Administrators 24 4 28
Statistician 12 6 18
Lawyers 2 1 3
Clerical workers 69 41 110
Unclassified:
Drivers 49 — 49
Skilled workers 14 - 14
Messengers 65 - 65
Guards 28 - 28
Firemen 10 - 10
Unskilled workers 24 - 24
TOTAL 493 79 572
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* Petroleum Allowance = 25?^  of the gross salary excluding 
excluding Petroleum Allowance.
Family Allowance = £s40 per month for every married person 
in Grade 1-12, and £s30 for Grades 12-18(1). GPC pays 
















£s ?£S £s ?<fiS £s £s £s ?£S
BS 602 100.0 442 100.0 260 100.0 289 100.0 213 100.0
HA 200 33.3 120 27.1 70 26.9 70 24.2 40 18.8
TA - - 35 7.9 - - 35 12.1 35 16.4
FAM 60 10.0 60 13.6 - - 50 17.3 30 14.1
MILE 250 41.5 200 45.2 - - - - - -
REP 80 13.2 - - - - - - - -
ENG 200 33.3 - - 165 63.5 - - - -
TECH 75 12.5 - - 30 11.5 - - 15 7.0
QUALIF 30 5.0 30 6.9 - - - - - -
PET 374 62.2 222 50.2 131 50.5 111 38.4 83 39.1
GS 1871 310.8 1109 250.9 656 252.3 555 192.0 416 195.3
Grade 18(4) Grade 18(4) Grade 18(3) Grade 18(2) Grade 18(1)
£s ?£S £s ?£S £s ?<BS £s ?£S £s ?£S
BS 128 100.0 96 100.0 85 100.0 82 100.0 66 100.0
HA 30 23.4 30 31.3 30 35.3 20 24.4 20 30.3
TA 35 27.3 35 36.5 35 41.2 35 42.7 35 53.0
FAM 45 35.2 45 46.9 45 52.4 35 42.7 45 68.2
PET 60 46.8 52 54.2 49 57.6 43 52.4 42 63.6
GS 298 232.8 258 268.8 244 287.0 215 262.2 208 315.2
OT 106 82.8 86 89.6 75 88.0 97 118.3 68 103.0
GP 404 315.6 344 358.3 319 375.3 312 380.5 276 418.2




FAM: Family Allowance 
MILE: Mileage Allowance 
REP: Representation Allowance
ENG: Engineering Allowance 
TECH: Technical Allowance 









C A S E  S T U D Y  (4)
SUDAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION 
(SAC)
GRADING AND PAY SCALES
Sudan Airways Corporation's salary structure comprises 18 salary 
grades with up to 12 incremental points. As shown in Table A.4.1, SAC 
staff grades are similar to those in the civil service (with the excep­
tion of grade 10A) but salary scales are obviously higher. Table A.4.2 
shows that, except for grades 1 - 4, 12 and grade 11 at the scale minima, 
SAC has increased its basic salary scales by percentages varying between
1 and 25. Differentials over civil service scales amount to 6 - 28 per 
cent.
ALLOWANCES
Comparison of columns 13 and 14 with columns 6 and 7 in Table A.4.3 
shows that the allowances' element in staff earnings has increased con­
siderably since 1980, following increases in the rates of existing allow­
ances, introduction of new allowances (housing and nature of work) and 
the extension of allowances to cover extra grades. Thus, in 1986 stan­
dard allowances served to double or nearly triple basic salaries compared 
with an average enhancement of just under 50 per cent in 1980. The gross 
salary trends in comparison with basic salary trends provides a further 
insight to the considerable improvement in allwoances during the period.
- 355 -
Columns 1 and 2 in Table A.4.4 reveal that basic salary had increased 
by 48 - 108 per cent while the corresponding change in gross salary 
(columns 3 and 4) amounted to 107 - 370 per cent.
REAL PAY
In July 1986, real basic salary was about one-third of the 1980 
levels (columns 5 and 6 , Table A.4.4). Real gross salaries ranged from 
45 to 99 per cent of the 1980 levels (columns 7 and 8). This is a clear 
manifestation of the fact that allowances have helped SAC staff consid­
erably to compensate for the notable fall in real pay levels. An indi­
vidual employee would also have received increments and possibly promo­
tion. Table A.4.4, columns 9 and 8 illustrates the effects of increments 
on real basic salary as well as gross salary. Figures suggest that move­
ment along the incremental steps would have raised real basic salary 
scales by 3 - 10 percentage points, and real gross salary by 2 - 20 per­
centage points. Promotions certainly would have moderated the reduction 
in real pay further.
AIR CREW AND GROUND ENGINEERS1 PAY SCALES
Aircrew (pilots, first officers, flight engineers) and ground 
engineers have separate grades and salary scales as shown in Table A.4.5. 
Each occupational group has its own grades and pay scales: six for cap­
tains and first officers, three for flight engineers. Annual basic sal­
aries for these groups ranged from £s1,885 to £s8,150 in 1980 and bet­
ween £s2,992 and £s11,316 in 1986. In addition to the standard allow­
ances (housing, travel, nature of work, mileage, representation allowances, 
etc) the aircrew receive airport worthiness, maintenance and flying allow­
ances. Comparison of gross salary/basic salary ratios in 1980 and 1986
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reveals that the quantum of allowances was considerably increased 
during the period particularly for the aircrew who were receiving in 
1986 gross salaries which exceeded their basic salaries by 4 to almost 
9 times.
Table A.4 .6 shows the movements in the basic as well as gross 
salary of aircrew and ground engineers. The 200-300 per cent increase 
in nominal gross salaries was just enough to maintain about 50 per cent 
of real gross salary in 1986 relative to 1980 levels.
EXAMPLES FROM PAYSHEET RECORDS
Table A.4.7 shows the gross salary/basic salary ratio for 50 
SAC staff with overtime excluded from gross salary. Data were not avail­
able by grade but have been grouped by range of basic salary. Comparison 
with the gross/basic salary ratios in Table A.4.3 suggests that individ­
uals were receiving other allowances in addition to those included in the 
standard allowances. Table A.4 .8 provides examples of individuals' 
monthly gross salaries as recorded on pay sheets and show gross/basic 
salary ratios higher than those in Table A.4.3 due to the payment of 
'other' allowances. These non-standard allowance probably included 
qualification, airport worthiness, typing and a range of other personal 
allowances.
With regard to overtime, the amounts shown for grade 18 workers 
in Table A.4 .8 relate to overtime hours worked in June, but expressed 
in terms of the July 1986 wage levels. Unclassified workers employed 
at the airport receive guaranteed monthly overtime payment of 36 hours 
a month. This is equivalent to an increase of 30 per cent at the scale 
minimum. As the figures show overtime payment can increase basic salary 
by as much as 100 per cent. Classified staff in grades 10-13 receive
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overtime payment but no details of overtime hours were available for 
the examples provided in Table A.4.8 .
REGRADING
As Table A.4.9 indicates the numbers employed in SAC in grades 1-18 
has fallen over the six years since 1980 from 3,101 to 2,307 and the num­
ber of ground engineers from 150 to 138. This reduction has involved 
a relative upgrading of the workforce. In 1980, for example, grades 
15-18 accounted for 37 per cent of the number employed compared with 28 
per cent in 1986 while the proportion in grades 1-8 almost doubled. The 
effect of upgrading is seen in Table A.4.10. Average basic salary in 
1986 was £s2,882. If the 2,307 employees had been distributed according 
to the 1980 structure of employment, average basic salary would have been 
£s2,324. Average basic salary was, therefore, 24 per cent higher. With 
the number of employees falling by a quarter, the restructuring meant that 
total basic salaries fell by approximately 8 per cent. As figures reveal, 
total basic salary bill of 2,307 actually employed in 1980 at 1986 basic 
salary scales was £s6,647,585 and of the 3,103 employed in 1980 at 1986 
basic salary scales was £s7,210,501. Total estimated gross salary bill 
in 1986 was £s13,200,483 for 2,307 posts and the estimated 1986 gross 
salary bill for 3,103 posts distributed in the 1980 grades was £s14,797,619. 
The reduction of posts by about 26 per cent, thus, led to a reduction in 
the estimated total gross salary bill of only 11 per cent.
What has been said above indicates that savings from the reduction 
in the workforce were inevitably diverted to funding the higher average 
pay levels consequent on the restructuring. However, it is not clear 
whether this restructuring was necessary because of changes in work re- 
quirments or it resulted from unions' insistence on upward grading as a
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condition of any reducation in number of staff. Whatever the reason 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Increase
12
1 8900- 8900 -
2 8100- 8100 -
3 6864-7464 6864 7014 7164 7314 7464 150
4 6540-7140 6540 6690 6840 6990 7140 150
5 6168-6648 6168 6288 6408 6528 6648 120
6 5574-6054 5574 5694 5814 5934 6054 120
7 4902-5583 4902 5034 5163 5292 5424 5553 5583 113
8 3288-4206 3288 3396 3504 3612 3720 3828 3936 4026 4116 4206 82
9 2130-2922 2130 2202 2274 2346 2418 2490 2561 2634 2706 2778 2852 2922 72
10 2952-3765 2952 3045 3141 3236 3327 3426 3525 3606 3687 3765 78-93
11 2646-3435 2646 2739 2832 2925 3018 3111 3204 3297 3366 3435 88
12 2181-2811 2181 2256 2331 2406 2481 2556 2631 2706 2760 2811 70
13 1560-2169 1560 1632 1704 1776 1848 1920 1992 2064 2115 2169 68
14 1509-1980 1509 1566 1620 1677 1734 1788 1845 1902 1941 1980 52
15 1104-1575 1104 1161 1218 1272 1332 1383 1440 1497 1536 1575 52
16 894-1251 894 936 975 1017 1059 1098 1140 1182 1215 1251 39-42
17 828-1095 828 858 888 921 951 981 1014 1044 1068 1095 30-33
18 792-1011 792 822 852 882 906 930 954 987 1011 24-30




Basic Salary relative to CS and PC Basic Salaries, 1986
Piiblic Corporations Civil Service Sudan Air
Index BS Index BS
SA/PC SA/CS
Grde BS Grde BS Grde BS
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 8900 1 8400 1 8900 100.0 106.0
2 8100 2 7600 2 8100 100.0 106.6
3 6864-7464 3 6204-6804 3 6864-7464 100.0-100.0 110.6-109.7
4 6540-7140 4 5682-6282 4 6540-7140 100.0-100.0 115.1-113.7
3 6168-6648 - -
6 5808-6288 - -
7 5208-5688 5 4980-5460 5 6168-6648 118.4-116.9 123.9-121.8
8 4452-5172 6 4332-4932 6 5574-6054 125.2-117.1 128.7-122.7
9 3972-4692 7 3708-4428 7 4902-5583 123.4-119.0 132.2-126.1
10 3624-4344 - -
11 3288-3936 8 2838-3594 8 3288-4206 100.0-106.9 115.9-117.0
12 2130-2922 9 1824-2616 9 2130-2922 100.0-100.0 116.8-111.7
13 2916-3420 10 2664-3252 10 2952-3765 101.2-110.0 110.8-115.8
14 2754-3279 10A 2418-2943 -
15 2310-2835 11 2052-2577 11 2624-3435 113.6-121.6 127.9-133.3
16B 2031-2556 12 1740-2265 12 2181-2811 107.4-110.0 125.3-124.1
16A 1806-2481 - -
17B 1404-1845 13 1338-1779 13 1560-2169 111.0-117.6 116.6-121.9
17A 1287-1656 14 1200-1632 14 1509-1980 117.2-119.6 125.8-121.3
18(4) 1008-1365 15 924-1281 15 1104-1575 109.5-115.4 119.5-123.0
18(3) 858-1110 16 801-1053 16 894-1251 104.2-112.7 111.6-118.8
18(2) 786- 996 17 750- 960 17 828-1095 105.3-109.9 110.4-114.1
18(1) 756- 936 18 720- 900 18 792-1011 104.8-108.0 110.0-112.3





Annual Basic Salary, Gross Salary and Allowances, and the ratio of 
GS/BS in 1980 and 1986
G July 1980 July 1986
R
A
D BS GS GS/BS BS GS GS/BS
E Min Max Alice Min Max Min Max Min Max Alice Min Max Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1 5350-5850 1980 7330-7830 137.0-133.8 8900 11580 20480 230.1
2 4830-5230 1560 6390-6790 132.3-129.8 8100 10020 18120 223.7
3 4600-4960 1560 6160-6520 133.9-131.5 6864-7464 8820 15684-16284 228.5-218.2
4 4380-4740 1560 5940-6300 135.6-132.9 6540-7140 7920 14460-15060 221.1-210.9
3 4155-4515 960 5115-5475 123.1-121.3 6168-6648 6360 12528-13008 203.1-195.7
6 3750-4110 960 4710-5070 125.6-123.4 5574-6054 4980 10554-11034 189.3-182.3
7 3240-3690 900 4140-4590 127.8-124.3 4902-5583 4500 9402-10083 191.8-180.6
8 2075-2795 900 2975-3695 143.4-132.2 3288-4206 4200 7488- 8406 227.7-199.9
9 1250-1800 900 2150-2700 172.0-150.0 2130-2922 3900 6030- 6822 283.1-233.5
10 1865-2495 720 2585-3215 138.6-128.9 2952-3765 2880 5832- 6645 197.6-176.5
11 1635-2175 720 2355-2895 144.0-133.1 2646-3435 2280 4926- 5715 186.2-166.4
12 1280-1685 720 2000-2405 156.0-142.7 2181-2811 2280 4461- 5091 204.5-181.1
13 975-1380 120 1095-1500 112.3-108.7 1560-2169 1980 3540- 4149 226.9-191.3
14 875-1190 720 1595-1910 182.3-160.5 1509.1980 1980 3489- 3960 231.2-200.0
15 730-1045 120 850-1165 116.4-111.5 1104-1575 1680 2784- 3255 252.2-206.7
16 560- 830 120 680- 950 121.4-114.5 894-1251 1680 2574- 1931 287.9-234.3
17 470- 650 120 590- 770 125.5-118.5 828-1095 1560 2388- 2655 288.4-242.5
18 380- 550 120 500- 670 131.6-121.8 792-1011 1560 2352- 2571 297.0-254.3
Source: Personnel Dept, Sudan Airways.
Allowances 1980: Travel Allowance £s10 monthly for all grades, Mileage 
Allowance grades 1-12 +14, Management Allowance 
Grades 1-4.
1986: Travel Allowance, Differential (Nature of Work) Allow­
ance, Housing Allowance for all grades, Mileage Allow­




Percentage changes in Nominal and Real Basic and Gross Salaries, 
1980-1986
Per Cent Change Real BS Real GS Real BS Real GS
G 7/1986 7/1986 with
with
R
A BS GS 7/1980=100 7/1980=100 Increment Increment
D Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 7/80=100 7/80=100
E (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1 166.4 152.1 279.4 261.6 35 32 59 55
2 167.7 154.9 283.6 266.9 35 33 60 56
3 149.2 150.5 234.6 249.8 31 32 53 52 34 55
4 149.3 150.6 243.4 239.0 31 29 51 50 34 53
5 148.4 147.2 244.9 237.6 31 31 51 50 34 53
6 148.6 147.3 224.1 217.6 31 28 47 46 34 49
7 151.3 151.3 227.1 219.7 32 32 48 46 36 51
8 158.5 150.5 251.1 227.5 33 32 53 48 40 57
9 170.4 162.3 280.5 252.7 36 34 59 53 43 63
10 158.3 150.9 225.6 206.7 33 32 47 43 40 52
11 161.8 157.9 209.2 197.4 34 33 44 41 41 49
12 170.4 166.8 223.1 211.7 36 35 47 44 43 52
13 160.0 157.2 323.3 276.6 34 33 68 58 43 76
14 172.5 166.4 218.7 207.3 36 35 46 44 44 50
15 151.2 150.7 327.5 279.4 32 32 69 59 41 77
16 159.6 150.7 378.5 308.5 33 32 79 65 43 87
17 176.2 168.5 404.7 344.8 37 35 72 72 45 92
18 208.4 183.8 470.4 383.7 44 39 99 81 54 107
Source: Compiled from Table A.4.3.





Annual Basic Salary, Allowances and Gross Salary of Air Crew and 
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= Boeing 707 Captain 
= Boeing 737 Captain 
= Fokers 27 Captain
B707 FO = Boeing 707 First Officer
B737 FO = Boeing 737 First Officer
F27 FO = Fokers 27 First Officer
= Flight Engineer (I-III) GE = Ground Engineer (I-VIII)
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Table A.4 .6 
SUDAN AIRWAYS
Air Crew and Engineers - Percentage changes in Nominal and Real Basic 
and Gross Salary, 1980-1986
Percent Change 7/80-7/86
Real BS Real GS Real BS Real GS
7/1986 7/1986 with with
GRADE BS GS
7/80=100 7/80=100 increment increment
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 7/80=100 7/80=100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
B707 Cap. 139.8-138.8 223.1-219.3 29 29 47 46 33 48
B737 Cap. 139.4-138.9 227.8-224.1 29 29 48 47 33 49
F27 Cap. 139.7-139.0 235.8-231.9 29 29 49 49 33 51
B707 F0 141.7-139.5 262.4-251.1 30 29 55 53 35 57
B737 F0 140.2-140.3 264.4-251.9 30 29 55 53 40 58
F27 F0 154.4-147.9 279.6-266.3 32 31 59 56 42 61
FE I 141.1-139.4 275.3-265.5 30 29 57 56 36 59
FE II 144.4-141.9 301.6-290.2 30 30 63 61 37 65
FE III 151.3-147.7 304.5-294.2 32 31 64 62 40 66
GE I 139.4-138.9 259.5-250.0 29 29 54 52 33 57
GE II 139.8-138.9 265.6-257.6 29 29 56 54 32 57
GE III 135.0-137.0 234.2-230.2 28 29 49 48 31 51
GE IV 143.2-140.3 264.3-243.6 30 29 55 51 40 61
GE V 146.1-142.1 231.9-215.6 31 30 49 45 42 54
GE VI 154.3-147.1 245.9-227.4 32 31 52 48 46 57
GE VII 158.7-150.2 213.6-200.9 33 32 45 42 48 50
Source: Compiled from Table A.4.3.
Notes
(i) Real BS 7/1986 = BS 1986 x 100 x 100
BS 1980=100 CP 1986 BS 1980
(ii) CPI 1986 = 476.6





Individual GS as Percentage of BS, July 1986
Monthly Number of n GS/BS Average
Basic Salary Individuals ercen age GS/BS
range
100 18 233-314 264
100-149 4 215-242 231
150-199 4 197-215 208
200-249 6 186-222 195
250-299 3 189-218 199
300-349 - - -
350-399 1 174 174
400-449 3 164-192 175
450-499 7 169-205 179
500-549 2 161-187 174
550-599 4 188-268 228
600-649 - - -
650-699 - - -
700-749 1 250 250
Total 50 161-314 234
Source: Personnel Department, Sudan Airways.




Examples of Individual Monthly Gross Salary, July 1986
Grade 4 Grade 4 Grade 8 Grade 9 Grade 9 Grade 9
£s ?oBS £s ?<6S £s ?iBS £s ?SS £s ?<BS £s ?<BS
BS 343 100.0 595 100.0 283 100.0 177.5 100.0 220 100.0 219.5 100.0
HA 200 36.7 200 33.6 75 26.5 75.0 42.3 75 34.1 75.0 34.2
NE 200 36.7 200 33.6 125 44.2 125.0 70.4 125 56.8 125.0 56.9
Other 355 65.1 375 63.0 60 21.2 111.0 62.5 40 18.2 123.0 56.0
GS 1300 238.5 1370 230.0 543 191.9 488.5 275.2 460 209.1 542.5 247.2
Grade 14 Grade 14 Grade 14 
£s ?<BS £s S8S £s ?£S
BS 144 100.0 135 100.0 125.75 100.0
HA 50 34.7 50 37.0 50.00 39.8
NW 75 52.1 75 55.6 75.00 59.6
Other 60 41.7 60 44.4 60.00 47.7
GS 329 228.5 320 237.0 310.75 247.1
Grade 18* Grade 18 Grade 18 Grade 18 Grade 18 Grade 18
£s ?(33S £s ?<BS £s «BS £s ?£S £s ?<fiS £s ?«BS
BS 82 100.0 81.0 100.0 84.0 100.0 84.25 100.0 75.25 100.0 82.25 100.0
HA 40 48.8 40.0 49.4 40.0 47.5 40.0 47.5 40.0 52.5 40.0 48.6
NW 50 61.0 50.0 61.7 50.0 59.2 50.0 59.2 50.0 65.6 50.0 58.0
Other 61 74.4 81.5 100.6 82.0 96.5 81.5 96.7 81.5 106.9 81.5 99.1
GS 233 284.1 252.5 311.7 256.0 304.8 255.75 303.6 247.75 324.9 253.75 308.5
0/T 163 198.8 48.0 59.3 66.0 78.6 65.5 77.8 38.0 50.0 24.7 30.0
GP 396 482.9 300.5 371.0 322.0 383.3 321.25 381.3 285.85 374.8 278.45 338.5
Source: Personnel Department, Sudan Airways.
* Security Guard 
BS = Basic Salary 
HA = Housing Allowance 
NW = Nature of Work Allowance 
Other = all other allowances 
GS = Gross Salary excluding Overtime 




Number and Percentage of Employees by Grades 1980 and 1986
Grade
No. of Employees 
1980 1986








1 1 1 0.0 0.0 1 1 0.0 0.0
2 2 0 0.1 - 3 1 0.1 0.0
3 3 3 0.1 0.1 6 4 0.2 0.2
4 18 20 0.6 0.9 24 24 0.8 1.0
5 31 67 1.6 2.9 75 91 2.4 3.9
6 79 104 2.5 4.5 154 195 5.0 8.5
7 138 196 4.4 8.5 292 391 9.4 16.9
8 183 277 5.9 12.0 475 688 15.3 29.0
9 64 3 2.1 0.1 539 671 17.4 29.1
10 179 176 5.8 7.6 718 847 23.1 36.7
11 271 323 8.7 14.0 989 1170 31.9 50.7
12 431 298 13.9 12.9 1420 1468 45.8 63.6
13 227 171 7.3 7.4 1647 1639 53.1 71.0
14 308 15 9.9 0.7 1955 1654 63.0 71.7
13 225 176 7.3 7.6 2180 1830 70.3 79.3
16 302 204 9.7 8.8 2482 2034 80.0 88.2
17 621) 179 20.0 7.8 3103 2213 100.0 95.9
18 ) 94 4.1 2307 100.0
Total 3103 2307 100.0 100.0
GROUND ENGINEERS 
Range 1980 1986 1980 1986 1980 1986 1980 1986
1 27 66 18.0 47.8 27 66 18.0 47.8
2 28 16 18.7 11.6 55 82 36.7 59.4
3 10 8 6.7 5.8 65 90 43.3 65.2
4 10 7 6.7 5.1 75 97 50.0 70.3
5 15 6 10.0 4.3 90 103 60.0 74.6
6 20 20 13.3 14.5 110 123 73.3 89.1
7 40 15 27.7 10.9 150 138 100.0 100.0
Total 150 138 100.0 100.0






































1 1 1 8900.0 8,900.0 8,900.0 20480.0 20,480.0 20,480.0
2 2 0 8100.0 - 16,200.0 18120.0 - 36,240.0
3 3 3 7164.0 21,492.0 21,492.0 15984.0 47,952.0 47,952.0
4 18 20 6840.0 136,800.0 123,120.0 14760.0 295,200.0 265,680.0
3 51 67 6408.0 429,336.0 326,808.0 12768.0 855,456.0 651,168.0
6 79 104 5814.0 604,656.0 459,306.0 10794.0 1,122,576.0 852,726.0
7 138 196 5242.5 1,027,530.0 723,465.0 9742.5 1,909,530.0 1,344,465.0
8 183 277 3747.0 1,037,919.0 685,701.0 7947.0 2,201,319.0 1,454,301.0
9 64 3 2526,0 7,578.0 161,664.0 6426.0 19,278.0 411,264.0
10 179 176 3358.5 591,096.0 601,171.5 6238.5 1,097,976.0 1,116,691.5
11 271 323 3040.5 982,081.5 823,975.5 5320.5 1,718,521.5 1,441,855.5
12 431 298 2496.0 743,808.0 1,075,776.0 4776.0 1,423,248.0 2,058,456.0
13 227 171 1864.5 318,829.5 423,241.5 3844.5 657,409.5 872,701.5
14 308 15 1744.5 26,167.5 537,306.0 3724.5 55,867.5 1,147,146.0
13 225 176 1339.5 235,752.0 301,387.5 3019.5 531,432.0 679,387.5
16 302 204 1072.5 218,790.0 323,895.0 2752.5 561,510.0 831,255.0
17 621 179 961.5 172,108.5 597,091.5 2521.5 451,348.5 1,565,851.5
18 94 901.5 84,741.0 2461.5 231,381.0
T 3103 2307 6,647,585.0 7,210,500.0 13,200,483.0 14,797,619.0
Av. BS Av. BS Av. GS Av. GS
2881.5 2323.7 5721.9 4768.8
Source: Accounting Department, Sudan Airways.
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C A S E  S T U D Y  (5)
EARTHMOVING AND IRRIGATION CORPORATION 
(EMIC)
Numbers Employed
In 1986, the EMIC had a workforce of 3909 in regular establish­
ment of which 82.4 percent were unclassified. The classified comprised 
203 engineers and technicians, 149 accountants, 196 clerks and 150 of 
miscellaneous occupations (TableA5.1). Since 1984 vacancies in low 
grade posts have remained unfilled and those in higher grades filled 
by internal promotion, in an effort by the management to reduce over­
manning.
On the other hand, it was reported that the EMIC recruits a large 
number of casual labourers annually. Although no details were avail­
able regarding exact numbers, frequency or incidence of their employ­
ment, in 1986 approximately 4000 casual workers were engaged. The 
EMIC is probably untypical as an employer having this unusually high 
proportion of non-permanent workers paid at about £s3 per day with no 
other entitlements. The discussion below, in the absence of any 
systematic information concerning EMIC's casual labour force, is 
related solely to staff in regular establishment.
Basic Salary Scales
The EMIC has adapted the public corporations' scales for the 
unclassified workers by dropping the first two £r three incremental 
steps and adding additional steps, thereby extending the scale.
Grades 18(1)—18(4), 17B and 16B in the public corporations have been 
renumbered Grades 1-7. The EMIC scales, with the exception of Grade 6 
(which retains the starting salary of Grade 16B but has two additional
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steps) are, therefore, higher than corresponding public corporations' 
scales with a positive differential of up to 15 percent (Tables A.5.2 
and A.5.3).
The movements in the EMIC basic salary scales for unclassified 
staff between 1983 and 1986, are illustrated in TableA5.4. As 
evident, the increases ranged from 33.4 to 58.6 percent in the scale 
minima and from 20 to 47.5 percent in the scale maxima.
The CPI in the first four months of 1986 was 250 percent, the 
average for the corresponding four months in 1983. This suggests 
that basic salary scales fell in real terms by 37.5-52.0 percent bet­
ween 1983 and 1986.
It is understood that classified employees follow the same grad­
ing classification system and basic salary scales as the public cor­
porations' provisions without modifications.
Gross Salaries
It is reported that the EMIC pays housing, transport, nature of 
work and other allowances to its classified and unclassified staff 
at civil service rates. However, examination of payroll records and 
the examples shown in TableA5.5 shows that travel allowance paid is 
higher. In addition, there is a performance bonus, introduced in 
1983, varying between £s20-100 according to grade, paid monthly if 
projects progress according to the scheduled programme.
Overtime is paid to unclassified workers at monthly BS/140 for 
work performed on a normal day and BS/120 for holiday.
The weight of allowances and bonus payments is ‘illustrated in 
TablesA5.5 andA5.6 which show examples of gross salaries of 46 EMIC 
classified and unclassified staff. Bonus adds 15-10 percent to basic 
salary which is effectively doubled when allowances are included.
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No information on overtime payments was available.
Industrial Relations
Three unions organise the EMIC staff (Engineers, Officials 
and Manual Workers) with virtually 100 percent membership. Casual 
labourers are excluded from union membership. EMIC unions, of 
course, affiliate to their respective national unions. Both the 
management and union officials reported that they perceive the role 
of unions in pay determination as rather limited. The unilateral 
setting of basic salaries and allowances by the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning leaves no provision for collective bargaining 
at the organisational level. However, unions feel that they can still 
influence the pay package of their members by other means. A senior 
official in the Engineer's union disclosed to the writer that the in­
troduction of the bonus scheme was a product of a two-weeks strike 




Number of Employees by Occupational Classification


















Manual Workers' Basic Salary Scales and PC Scales (per annum) 
1983 and 1986
Grade Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incremental Step 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EMIC 7 1983 1598 1650 1702 1754 1806 1858 1910 1965 2020 2075
1986 2535 2610 2685 2760 2335 2960 2985 3060
PC 15 Para 2310 2385 2460 2535 2610 2685 2760 2835
EMIC 6 1983 1307 1352 1397 1442 1494 1546 1598 1650 1702 1754
1986 2031 2106 2181 2256 2331 2406 2481 2556 2631 2706
PC 16B Para 2031 2106 2181 2256 2331 2406 2481 2556
EMIC 5 1983 1075 1120 1165 1210 1255 1300 1345 1390 1442 1494
1986 1530 1593 1656 1719 1782 1845 1908 1971 2034
PC 17B Para 1404 1467 1530 1593 1656 1719 1782 1845
EMIC 4 1983 870 910 950 990 1030 1070 1110 1150 1190 1230
1986 1161 1212 1263 1214 1365 1416 1467 1518
PC 18(4) Para 1008 1059 1110 1161 1212 1263 1314 T365
EMIC 3 1983 700 735 770 805 840 875 910 945 980 1015
1986 966 1002 1038 1074 1110 1146 1182 1218
PC 18(3) Para 858 894 930 966 1002 1038 1074 1110
EMIC 2 1983 605 630 655 680 705 730 755 780 835
1986 846 876 906 936 966 996 1026 1056 1086
PC 18(2) Para 786 816 846 876 906 936 966 996
EMIC 1 1983 602 625 648 671 694 717
1986 816 846 876 906 936 966
PC 18(1) Para 756 786 816 846 876 906 936













Index EMIC BS 
/PC BS 
Min Max
15 7 2310 2535 2835 3060 109.7 107.9
16B 6 2031 2031 2556 2706 100.0 105.9
17B 5 1404 1530 1845 2034 109.0 110.2
18(4) 4 1008 1161 1365 1518 115.2 111.2
18(3) 3 858 966 1110 1218 112.6 109.7
18(2) 2 786 846 996 1086 107.6 109.0
18(1) 1 756 816 936 996 107.9 106.4
Notes: For Grades ! 
mental step










which has been taken as the EMIC maximum.
Grade 6 has two extra incremental steps and the higher 
has been used.
For Grade 1 the EMIC scale has one incremental step less 
than the PC scale. The maximum index shows the EMIC max­
imum as a percentage of the full PC scale including this 
extra step. The minimum index calculation, however, is 
straight-forward showing the EMIC minimum basic salary 




Percentage change in Nominal BS and Indices of Real Pay 1983-1986
1986 BS % 1983 BS Index 1986 Real BS
Min Max 1986 Max 1983 = 100
equivalent Min Max
7 158.6 147.5 155.7 63.5 60.0
6 155.4 154.3 62.2 61.7
5 142.3 136.1 141.1 56.9 54.5
4 133.4 123.4 132.0 53.4 49.4
3 138.0 120.0 128.9 55.2 48.0
2 139.0 130.1 55.9 52.0
1 158.6 134.7 54.2 53.9
Source : compiled from tables A.5.1 and A .5.2
Notes:
(i) The 1986 maximum equivalent is the 1986 scale maximum as a 
percentage of the equivalent incremental step on the 1983 
scale. Grade 3 was reduced by two incremental steps and so
Grades 4 and 7. Grade 5 was reduced by one.
































Individual Gross Salary, July 1986
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Source: Personnel Dept, EMIC.




Table A.3 .6 
EMIC
Examples of GS excluding Overtime as percentage of BS, July 1986
Classified Staff Unclassified
Grade BS GS GS/BS Grade BS GS GS/B!
1 742 1452 196 7 255 384 151
3 597 1187 199 6 207 321 155
3 597 1037 174 5 154 258 168
3 581 1175 202 4 114 203 178
3 572 1052 184 3 110 189 172
6 494 878 178 3 81 160 198
8 434 803 185 2 86 165 192
9 391 666 170 1 73 152 208
9 381 859 225 1 68 147 216
9 351 610 174
9 331 655 198
11 301 525 174
11 292 571 196
12 189 428 226
13 264 473 179
13 264 493 187
13 242 421 174
15 242 446 184
16 188 327 174
16 163 228 140
16 163 292 179
16 163 302 185
16 151 289 192
16 151 260 172
16 133 227 171
17A 120 234 195
17A 116 230 198
17A 111 225 203
17A 106 220 208
17A 88 202 230
Source: Personnel Dept, EMIC.
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C A S E  S T U D Y  (6 )
BANK OF KHARTOUM
INTRODUCTION
Bank of Khartoum is the largest of the five commercial state-owned 
banks in the country. The others include: El-Nielin, Unity, The Commer­
cial, and the National Bank of Import and Export. Prior to nationalisation
in 1970, the Bank of Khartoum was the Sudan's branch of Barclays Bank. Its
activities have expanded considerably after taking over the People's Co­
operative Bank, another publicly-owned bank which had run into financial 
difficulties, in 1983.
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR COST
In 1985, the Bank of Khartoum was employing 2,290 staff. Table 
A.6.1 provides details of changes in the volume of the workforce, wage 
bill and profits during 1980-86. Due to the take-over of the People's 
Co-operative bank in 1983, the number of employees increased by 77 per
cent between 1982 and 1983. However, employment fell by approximately
13 per cent and 4 per cent in the next two years. This could be attri­
buted to the creation, following the adoption of Islamic Sharia Laws in 
1983, of a chain of Islamic financial institutions. In 1983/84 alone 
five Islamic banks and three Islamic insurance companies were set up 
recruiting the majority of their employees from the state banks by offer­
ing more attractive terms of service. Nevertheless, some employees
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leaving public banks did so in order to migrate to the neighbouring oil- 
rich Arab countries.
The movements in the wage bill show that there has been a contin­
uous upward trend independent from the changes in the size of the work­
force. For example, while the number of staff fell by about 13 per cent 
from 1983 to 1984, the wage bill had increased by more than 100 per cent. 
This increase in the wage bill appeared to have affected profits which 
fell by almost a half during the period. The modest increase in the 
wage bill in 1983 (by 7 per cent) allowed the net profit to increase 
substantially in 1983/86. Having said this, it is not easy to discern 
a direct relationship between employment, wage bill and the profit. For 
example in 1980/81, there was 4 per cent increase in employment, 23 per 
cent increase in the wage bill and as high as 122 per cent increase in 
profits. In the next year, a relatively modest increase in employment 
and the wage bill did not boost profits which declined by almost 5 per 
cent. This suggests that while the wage bill must be directly affected 
by the numbers employed and may influence profit levels, other factors 
may be equally important in determining both the wage and profit levels.
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
Terms and conditions of employment of staff in the Bank are usually 
determined according to periodic collective agreement between the General 
Union of Banks' Employees (GUBE) and the central bank, Bank of Sudan.
The latter agreement was concluded in 1984. There was an agreement in 
force since January 1979, and partial adjustments were carried out in
1983. Substantial improvements in allowances were made in 1979 and a 
new grade (1A) was introduced. Allowances were not changed in 1983 but 
considerable improvements were made in 1984. Notwithstanding that the
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current collective agreement (1986) provided for revision only in January 
1987, as a result of a threat of industrial action, bank employees were 
able to receive a nature of work allwoance in July 1986. The Resolution 
of Council of Ministers (No. 985, dated August 1985) introducing the 
package of improvements in public sector pay, contained a clause specif­
ically excluding public companies and bank personnel from the approved 
salary increases. There was no such specific exclusion for allowances.
SALARY SCALES AND ALLOWANCES
Basic salary scales and allowances for classified from January 
1974 to April 1986 are shown in Table A.6 .2. As seen, the Bank of 
Khartoum allocates its classified staff in one of the 12 grades extend­
ing from grade 1 to grade 10A plus grade 1A. Allowances in 1983 were 
the same as in 1979 and the basic salary scales remained unchanged from
1984. The nature of work allowance included in 1986 gross salaries 
is shown in Table A.6 .3 which also gives the 1986 basic salary scales 
for the six unclassified grades. It can be seen that for the majority 
of classified grades and all unclassified grades, the nature of work 
allowance as a percentage of the basic salary exceeds the 25 per cent 
stipulated in the July 1986 agreement.
In addition to the nature of work allowance, the standard allow­
ances assumed for purposes of calculating gross salary in Table A.6 .2 
include:
a) housing allowance ranging from £s240 to £s600 per annum
for grades 6 - 1 in 1974, and from £s720 to £s3,300 for grades
10 - 1 in 1984;
b) travel allowance, £s60 to £s240 for grades 10 - 1 in 1974, and
£s480 to £s1,920 for grades 10A - 1 in 1984;
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c) responsibility allowance of £s600 to £s900 for grades 1 and 2 
in 1984;
d) entertainment allowance of 7 per cent of basic salary for 
grades 1 - 4 in 1979 and 10 - 13 per cent in 1984;
e) family allowance assumed to be £s180 per annum in 1984.
Currently it is £s40 a month for a married person plus £s10 for 
each of the first three children;
f) mileage allowance ranged from £s1,500 to £s1,980 per annum 
for grades 4 - 1 in 1984.
In addition, holiday leave payment was made on the basis of half- 
a-month to one-and-a-half month's basic salary in 1974 and on one to 
two-and-a-half month's basic salary in 1984. Cashier, typist and tele­
phonist allowances are payable to the staff performing relevant duties.
As Table A.6 .4 shows, the ratio of gross salary to basic salary 
had increased substantially over the decade. In 1974 gross salary was 
about a quarter to a third more than basic salary. In 1984 it was 
approximately double, and in some cases nearly two-and-a-half times 
basic salary. In 1986, for all grades without exception, allowances 
raised basic salary by more than 200 per cent and for the bottom of grade 
10 by nearly 300 per cent. The fact that allowances remained unchanged 
in 1974, resulted in reduced GS/BS ratios in 1983 relative to 1979 ratios. 
Equally the unchanged basic salaries during 1984-86, combined with the 
increase in the existing rates of allowance as well as the addition of 
the nature of work allowance, led to higher GS/BS ratios in 1986 than 
in 1984. The continuous increase in the GS/BS ratios over time indicates 
that employees are more likely to increase their pay package by gaining 
improved allowances rather than incresed basic salaries.
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The top-bottom basic salary and gross salary ratios for four 
grades are shown in Table A.6 .5. They reveal a narrowing of differentials 
between 1974 and 1983, followed by a widening from 1984. The Personnel 
Manager in the Bark claimed that the observed widening of differentials 
in recent years wes a deliberate policy measure directed to stemming 
the loss of senior staff to the newly opened foreign and Islamic banks.
Indices of nominal and real gross salary are shown in Table A.6 .6 . 
During 1979- 1984, nominal gross salary had increased by 61 - 85 per 
cent in the scales' minima and by 60 - 80 per cent in scales' maxima. 
Nevertheless, whatever the increases in nominal pay all employees' pay 
was eroded considerably in real terms. By 1986, real gross salary 
scales were about 30 per cent of their 1979 levels, some 55 - 64 per cent 
of 1983 levels and 53 - 59 per cent of 1984 levels.
PROMOTION AND REGRADING
While nominal salary increases had, thus, done little to maintain 
the real salaries, individuals would not have remained on the sane minimum 
scale or perhaps in the same grade for seven years. There is a provision 
for two increments a year and an upward progress to higher salary scales. 
Secondary school leavers are recruited into grade 10A with promotion to 
grade 10 after six months. University graduates enter grade 9 and are 
promoted to grade 7 after two years. Promotion not only increases basic 
salary but also the value of allowances. Table A.6 .7 shows the 'career 
profile' of a university graduate and a secondary school leaver assumed 
to have been recruited in January 1979. The university graduate entering 
in grade 9 and promoted to grade 7 in January 1981 would have increased 
his real gross salary by 30 per cent. It has been assumed that from 
January 1984, this individual progressed to grade 6 but received the
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allowances of grade 7. If he had been promoted he would have received 
higher allowances and so a higher real gross salary from 1984. The sec­
ondary school entrant, on the other hand, would have received an increase 
in real gross salary of as little as 2 per cent; if promoted to grade 9, 
his real gross salary would have risen by 10 per cent above the 1979 level,
and by 13 per cent if promoted to grade 8 .
Entrants in January, 1979 benefited from the increase in basic 
salary in July 1979, and so their starting gross salary was relatively 
low. Table A.6.8 illustrates the career profile earnings of two entrants 
in July 1983. The university graduate would have an increase in real 
gross salary of 10.5 per cent in April and a secondary school entrant 
would have a reduction in real gross salary of 7.6 per cent.
Examples of promotion and regrading for a number of the Bank staff 
are provided in Table A.6 .9. Broadly, the figures in the table show that
the effect of promotion and regrading on individuals' real pay could vary
significantly. For example, one person has had a reduction in real gross 
salary of more than 50 per cent since January 1979 while another has had 
an increase of more than 70 per cent (columns 8 - 10). Real gross salary 
in 1979 may have been relatively low for those who had begun employment 
only a short time before January 1979, but due to adjustment in basic 
salary scales, incremental system and the introduction and improvement 
in allowances promotion and regrading, have led to increases in real 
gross salary for a number of these individuals over the period January 
1979 to April 1986, when the nature of work allowance was introduced 
(column 8 ). Nevertheless, even when the nature of work allowance is 
taken into consideration, few individuals were able to increase their 
real gross pay in 1986 relative to 1984 or 1982 levels. Comparison of 
real gross salary indices in columns 8 - 1 0  clearly indicates the signi-
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ficance of the choice of starting date in assessment of changes 
in real gross salary.
Finally, Bank of Khartoum provides generous benefits to its 
employees in the form of free medical care, low-cost loans and a rela­
tively attractive pension scheme. No information was available to ena­




Employment, Wage Bill and Net Profits, 1980-1985
Year


















1980 1425 - 4463 - 10273 - 3132 - 7209 -
1981 1485 + 4.2 5482 + 22.8 22760 +121.6 3692 + 17.9 15327 +112.6
1982 1537 + 3.5 6095 + 11.2 21663 - 4.9 3966 + 7.4 14095 - 8.0
1983 2724 +77.2 7477 + 22.7 37728 + 74.2 2722 - 31.4 13734 - 2.6
1984 2379 -12.7 15779 +111.0 21313 - 53.5 6633 +143.7 8958 - 34.8
1985 2290 - 3.8 16912 + 7.2 45993 +115.8 7385 + 11.3 20084 +124.2
Source: Personnel Dept, Bank of Khartoum. 






1 January 1974 1 July 1979 1 January 1983 1 January 1984 1 A p ril 1986
BS
Min Max




























1 3600-4140 1272-1310 4872-5450 6180-7416 5058-5182 11238-12598 7292-8750 5058-5182 12350-13932 9042-10851 8256-8528 17298-19379 9042-10851 10056-10328 19098-211791A - - - 6000-7200 5040-5160 11040-12360 7080-8496 5040-5160 12120-13656 8779-10035 8218-8405 16997-18440 8779-10035 10016-10205 18795-202402 3060-3510 1234-1266 4294-4776 5052-6060 4405-4506 9457-10566 5960-7150 4405-4506 10365-11656 7390- 8867 6559-6707 13949-15574 7390- 8867 8239- 8387 15629-172543 2580-2980 961- 989 3541-3969 4300-5160 3850-3936 8150- 9096 5074-6088 3850-3936 8924-10024 6285- 7550 5308-5435 11593-12985 6285- 7550 6868- 6995 13153-145454 2208-2586 934- 959 3142-3545 3698-4440 3430-3500 7128- 7940 4363-5239 3430-3500 7793- 8739 5467- 6496 4740-4850 10147-11346 5407- 6496 6180- 6290 11587-127863 1764-2094 540 2304-2634 3000-3600 2160 5160- 5760 3540-4248 2160 5700- 6408 4248- 5070 3240 7488- 8310 5248- 5070 4560 8808- 96306 1416-1716 540 1956-2256 2550-3060 1920 4470- 4980 3008-3610 1920 4928- 5530 3610- 4333 2880 6470- 7213 3610- 4333 4080 7690- 84137 1128-1398 300 1428-1698 2050-2460 1440 3490- 3900 2419-2902 1440 3859- 4342 2902- 3483 2460 5362- 5943 2902- 3483 3540 6442- 7023
8 900-1140 240 1140-1380 1660-1992 1320 2980- 3312 1958-2350 1320 3278- 3670 2274- 2725 2160 4434- 4885 2274- 2725 3120 5394- 5845
9 720- 930 240 960-1170 1345-1614 1260 2605- 2874 1587-1904 1260 , 2847- 3164 1839- 2209 2160 3999- 4369 183?- 2209 2880 4719- 5089
10 576- 756 240 816- 996 1100-1266 1260 2360- 2526 1298-1493 1260 2558- 2753 1454- 1672 2040 3496- 3712 1454- 1672 2520 3974- 4192
1QA
" " '
1062-1167 1260 2322- 2427 1062- 1167 1380 2442- 2547 1062- 1167 1440 2502- 2607
Source: Personnel Dept, Bank o f Khar toon.
(1) Housing Allowance
(2) Travel Allowance
(3) Mileage Allowance 
(A) Fanily Allowance























Basic Salary and Nature of Work Allowance for Classified and 
Unclassified Staff, 1986
Classified:
Grade BS NW Allowance % BS
Min Max £s pa Min Max
1 9042-10831 1800 19.9-16.6
2 7390-8867 1680 22.7-18.9
3 6285-7550 1560 24.8-20.7
4 5407-6496 1440 26.6-22.2
3 4248-5070 1320 31.1-26.0
6 3610-4333 1200 33.2-27.7
7 2902-3483 1080 37.2-31.0
8 2274-2725 960 42.2-35.0
9 1839-2209 720 39.2-32.6
10 1454-1672 480 33.0-28.7
Unclassified :
8B 3556-4267 1200 33.7-28.1
9B 3089-3552 1080 35.0-30.4
10B 2242-2803 840 37.5-30.0
11 1555-2101 600 38.6-28.6
12 1090-1417 420 38.5-29.6
13 756- 920 240* 31.2-26.1
Source: Personnel Dept, Bank of Khartoum.
* £s15 a month if less than two year's service and £s20 a 
month if more than two year's service.
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BANK OF KHARTOUM
Classified EmpJoyees GS as Index of BS, 1974-1986
1/1974 7/1979 1/1983 1/1984 4/1986
Grade GS/BS GS/BS GS/BS GS/BS GS/BS
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 135.3-131.6 181.8-169.9 169.4-159.2 191.3-178.6 211.2-195.2
1A - 184.0-171.7 171.2-160.7 193.6-183.8 214.1-201.7
2 140.3-136.1 187.0-174.4 173.9-163.0 188.8-175.6 211.5-194.6
3 137.2-133.2 189.5-176.3 175.9-164.7 184.5-172.0 209.5-192.7
4 142.3-137.1 192.8-178.8 178.6-166.8 187.7-174.7 214.3-196.8
5 130.6-125.8 172.0-160.6 161.0-150.8 176.3-163.9 207.3-189.9
6 138.1-131.5 175.3-162.7 163.8-153.2 179.8-166.5 213.0-194.2
7 126.6-121.5 170.2-158.5 159.5-149.6 184.8-170.6 220.0-201.6
8 126.7-121.0 179.5-166.3 167.4-156.2 195.0-179.3 237.2-214.5
9 133.3-125.8 193.7-178.1 179.4-166.2 217.5-197.8 256.6-230.4
10 141.7-131.7 214.5-199.5 197.1-184.4 240.3-222.0 273.3-250.7
10A - - 218.6-208.0 229.9-218.3 235.6-223.4
Source: Compiled from Table A.6 .2.
Table A.6 .5
BANK OF KHARTOUM














1 6.25 5.48 5.62 5.86 5.62 5.86 6.22 6.49 6.22 6.49
4 3.83 3.42 3.36 3.51 3.36 3.51 3.72 3.89 3.72 3.89
7 1.96 1.85 1.86 1.94 1.86 1.94 2.00 2.08 2.00 2.08
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Gross Salary
1 5.97 5.47 4.76 4.99 4.83 3.06 4,96 5.22 4.81 5.05
4 3.85 3.56 3.02 3.14 3.03 3.17 2.90 3.06 2.92 3.05
7 1.75 1.70 1.48 1.54 1.51 1.38 1.33 1.60 1.62 1.68
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00




Indices of Nominal and Real Gross Salaries, 1979-1986
Index GS Minimifn Index Real GSMin. . Index GS Maximun Index Real GS Max 
Grade April 1986 on April 1986 on April 1986 on Apil 1986 on
7/79 1/83 1/84 7/79 1/83 1/84 7/79 1/83 1/84 7/79 1/83 1A
1 169.9 154.6 110.4 30 59 54 168.1 152.0 109.3 29 58 53
2 163.3 150.8 112.0 29 57 55 163.3 148.0 110.8 28 56 54
3 161.4 147.4 113.5 28 56 55 159.9 145.1 112.0 28 55 55
4 162.6 148.7 114.2 28 57 56 161.0 146.3 112.7 28 56 55
5 170.7 154.5 117.6 30 59 57 167.2 150.2 115.9 29 57 56
6 172.0 156.0 118.5 30 59 58 168.9 152.1 116.6 29 58 57
7 184.6 166.9 120.1 32 64 59 180.1 161.7 118.2 31 62 58
8 181.0 164.6 121.7 32 63 59 176.5 159.3 119.7 31 61 58
9 181.2 165.8 118.0 32 63 57 177.1 160.8 116.5 31 61 57
10 168.4 155.4 113.7 29 59 55 166.0 152.3 112.9 29 58 55
Source: Figures in Table A.6.2 deflated by respective CPI figures.
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BANK OF KHARTOUM
Illustrations of 'Career' Gross Salaries: Individuals Assumed 
Recruited January 1979
University Graduate Secondary School Leaver
Date
Grade/ BS TA HA NW GS Grade/ BS TA HA NW GS
Step Step
1/79 9/1 60 5 65 10/1 48 5 53
7/79(1) 9/1 112 35 30 - 177 10/1 92 5 30 _ 157
1/80 9/3 123 35 30 - 188 10/3 101 5 30 _ 166
1/81 7/1 135 40 40 - 215 9/1 112 35 30 _ 177
1/82 7/3 188 40 40 - 268 9/3 123 35 30 _ 188
1/83(2) 7/5 242 40 40 - 322 9/5 159 35 30 _ 224
1/84(1) 6/2 316 70 75 - 461 8/2 199 50 60 - 309
1/83 6/4 346 70 75 - 491 8/4 218 50 60 _ 328
1/86 6/4 376 70 75 - 521 7/1 242 50 60 _ 352
4/86(3) 6/4 376 70 75 90 611 7/1 242 50 60 40 392
Index Real Gross Salary Index of Real Salary
1/79 - 4/86: 130 1/79 - 4/86: 102
(1) General Increase in BS and Allowances
(2) General Increase in BS Scales
(3) From 1/84 paid on Grade 6 , but Allow
ances for Grade 7
Table A. 6.8
BANK OF IKHARTOUM
Illustration of 1Career' Gross Salaries: Individuals Assumed
Recruited July 1983
University IGraduate Secondary School Leaver
Date
Grade/ BS TA HA NW GS Grade/ BS TA HA NW GS
Step Step
7/83 9/1 132 35 30 197 10A/1 88.5 35 30
_ 153.5
1/84(1) 153 60 60 - 273 10/1 121 50 60 - 231
7/84 9/3 169 60 60 - 289
1/85 10/3 133 50 60 - 243
7/85 7/1 242 70 75 - 387
1/86 9/2 161 50 60 - 271(2)
4/86(3) 242 70 75 90 477 161 50 60 40 311
Real GS, 7/83 - 4/86: 110.! Real GSi 1983-86: 92. 4
(1) General Increases in BS and Allowances
(2) Increments to Grade 9 as above Grade 10 but assumed not promoted 
to receive Grade 10 Allowance
(3) NW Allowance effective_____________________________________
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Table A.6 .9 
BANK OF KHARTOUM































2 1963 6(74) 133.98 128.98 209.06 78 107
2 1971 7(74) 129.33 129.42 216.12 88 88
2 1954 4(75) 115.35 126.02 100.95 209.06 81 77 101
3 1967 7(74) 121.15 196.89 107
3 1962 6(74) 108.12 130.59 127.59 208.03 54 74 99
4 1970 7(74) 134.48 158.33 176.06 212.88 91 67 67
4 1966 4(74) 132.61 158.33 152.26 226.97 81 63 97
4 1970 7(74) 137.97 155.00 161.24 224.94 68 63 76
4F 1965 7(74) 132.61 158.18 171.84 209.19 86 72 68
3 1975 7(78) 130.30 147.06 159.08 195.39 133 67 65
5 1971 7(78) 125.76 158.82 168.81 200.10 44 58 60
5 1974 7(80) 124.74 168.24 166.40 210.11 122 69 72
5F 1965 7(74) 139.52 150.00 163.59 197.74 60 52 59
3 1962 7(77) 141.25 150.00 152.08 200.10 62 62 80
6 1978 9(81) 134.63 165.98 158.88 196.88 130 95 85
6 1976 7(80) 118.96 149.31 152.08 176.18 79 60 67
6 1973 7(79) 105.92 157.75 152.67 191.25 125 61 67
6 1974 7(80) 126.58 137.08 161.90 187.14 115 69 64
6 1977 7(83) 108.43 144.62 163.16 203.93 158 114 73
6 1976 7(80) 108.77 151.76 149.88 182.43 173 67 70
8F 1979 10(79) 175.89 192.48 244.66 75 73
8F 1980 10(80) 152.13 168.12 222.40 80 76
8F 1980 10(80) 180.57 196.50 236.80 72 70
8F 1980 10(80) 154.55 171.22 228.19 81 77
8F 1976 10(76) 163.30 208.00 68
8F 1977 160.33 238.72 83
10F 1985 10A(85) 265.06
10F 1983 1QA(83) 190.78 222.01 65
10F 1985 10A(85) 179.10 298.07 111
Unclassified:
88 1953 9(81) 129.55 165.63 165.95 195.62 84 55 63
8B 1952 10(74) 129.55 165.63 165.78 202.65 87 56 65
88 1967 166.09 201.24 59
88 1967 159.18 202.65 62
Notes:
(i) Col (2) shows the date of recruitment, Col (3) shows the grade with the year shown in 
parentheses. Details of the grade between the recruitment date and the date show) in 
Col (3) are not available, but comparison of Col (3) and Col (1) gives seme indication 
indication of regrading and promotion.
(ii) F = Female
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A P P E N D I X  B
PRICE INDICES
SUDAN: PRICt INDICES. 1976-1986 
(INDEX NUMBERS)
ITEM 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S
COST OF LIVING INOEX 
(JANUARY 1970 ’ 100)
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SUDAN: PRICE I ND I CES.  1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 6  
(Rates of Inflation)
ITEM 1976 1977 1978 1979 *1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
COST OF LIVING INDEX 
(JANUARY 1870 - 100)



























AVERAGE FOR YEAR >
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- 0 . 5 1 6 . 8 1 2 . 5 2 9 . 5 4 0 . 7 16.  1 2 2 . 5 3 7 . 7 2 7 . 8 4 4 . 8- 0 . 4 1 8 . 4 1 2 . 7 2 9 . 5 4 2 .  1 1 7 . 7 2 0 . 6 3 7 . 4 2 7 . 4 4 8 . 0- 2 .  1 1 9 . 6 1 1 . 6 3 0 . 2 4 1 . 6 1 9 . 3 2 1 . 8 3 7 . 7 2 4 . 8 5 6 . 7
- 3 . 2 2 2 . 4 1 3 . 0 2 6 . 6 3 8 . 9 2 2 . 9 2 5 . 0 3 0 . 4 2 8 . 7 5 5 .  1
- 3 . 0 2 6 . 0 1 5 . 2 2 8 . 9 3 0 . 7 2 5 . 6 2 6 . 4 3 1 .  1 2 5 . 5 6 0 . 93 .  1 1 2 . 3 2 3 . 3 2 8 . 2 2 7 . 6 3 0 . 7 2 2 . 4 2 9 . 9 2 4 .  1 7 4 .  1
1 . 2 1 8 . 0 2 4 . 7 2 8 .  1 2 0 . 4 3 9 . 3 1 6 . 3 3 4 . 3 2 7 . 7 5 4 . 40 .  7 1 2 . 6 2 5 . 3 3 2 . 4 2 1 . 8 4 2 . 4 1 3 . 9 3 3 . 3 3 1 . 9 4 3 . 20 . 3 1 7 . 5 2 4 . 9 3 7 . 6 1 8 . 9 2 3 . 5 3 0 . 4 3 0 . 7 3 3 . 9 4 0 . 34 . 9 1 8 . 8 2 5 . 2 4 1 . 9 1 7 . 4 1 7 . 3 3 8 . 0 2 9 .  1 3 4 . 2 3 8 . 07 . 3 1 8 . 3 2 4 . 6 4 1 . 8 17.  1 1 6 . 4 3 9 . 5 2 6 . 0 4 0 . 6 3 1 . 0
1 0 . 0 1 3 . 3 2 7 . 2 4 4 .  1 1 5 . 2 1 5 . 4 4 4 . 0 2 7 . 2 3 8 . 5 2 6 . 6
1 . 6 1 7 . 9 2 0 . 0 3 3 . 6 2 6 . 3 2 3 . 9 2 6 . 7 3 1 . 7 3 0 . 7 4 7 . 2
2 7 . 7
3 1 . 7  
2 8 . 9
3 0 . 4
2 9 . 5
3 2 . 5  
2 7 . 3  
2 7 . 7
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